t^f^mmyz-'^^^'^m^ 







Pass 'B F 1 3 ' 

Book__ 






GoipghtN?. 



coEHUGHr DEjraste 



Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2011 with funding from 
The Library of Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/empiricalrationaOOschu 



EMPIKICai^ AiNiJ KATIONAL 



PSYCHOLOGY n^. 

'^030 



J^ 



Embracing Cognitions, Feelings, and Volitions 



BY 



A. SCHUYLER, LL. D. 

President of Baldwin University. Author of Principles 
of Logic, and a Series of Mathematical Works 



"How charming is divine Philosophy/ 
Not harsh and crabbed, as dull fools suppose, 
But musical as is Apollo's lute, 
And a perpetual Feast of nectared sweets, 
Where no crude surfeit reigns.'" 






VA]^ ANTWEEP, BEAGG & CO. 

Cincinnati Kew York 

/ft.... 



i\r 



Eclectic Educational Series. 

Dr. Schuyler's Works. . 

Schuyler'' s Principles of Logic \0 n ^n^ 

Schuyler^ s Psychology. ^ '^ 

Schuyler^ s Complete Algebra. 

Schuyler^ s Elements of Geometry. 

Schuyler'' s Trigonometry and Mensuration (Pay^s Series). 

Schuyler^ s Surveying and Navigation [Pay^s Series). 



Descriptive List and Prices on Application. 



Copyright 

1882.. : . 
Van Antwerp, Bragg & Co. 



(ii) 



PEEFAOE. 



Psychology treats directly of Cognition, Feeling, and 
Volition, and indirectly of Intellect, Sensibility, and Will. 
Greater prominence is thus given to the phenomena of 
the soul, with their conditions and laws, than to the 
faculties implied by these phenomena. 

Though much light has, no doubt, been thrown upon 
Psychology by the investigations of Physiologists, — light 
which the Psychologist should heartily welcome,— yet to 
know any phenomenon, as it is in itself, we must study 
it as revealed in consciousness. This is especially true 
of the higher processes of thought. Thus, to understand 
the nature of the reasoning process, it will not suffice to 
examine the structure and functions of the nerves, the 
ganglia, the brain, and the organs of sense, but we must 
analyze the reasoning process itself as a known fact of 
conscious experience. 

The discussion of the Intuitions is introduced at an 
early stage, since they afford the fundamental principles 
for subsequent investigations. To defer the consideration 
of fundamental principles to the last pages, as is com- 
monly done, would embarass all preceding discussions. 
AVhat would be thought of a writer on Geometry, who 
should put his axioms on the last page of his book? 
The difficulty of discussing fundamental princij^les is no 
justification for such an arrangement, since any mind 
mature enough to undertake the study of Psychology, is 
certainly prepared to understand a clear presentation of 

its first piinciples. 

(ill) 



iv PREFACE. 

The elements involved in the act of Perception have 
been discriminated with much care, and an attempt has 
been made to exhibit clearly and correctly the nature of 
this act. That a correct explanation of perception has 
been given, will, it is believed, be admitted by those who 
will carefully study this process in itself,- as revealed by 
their own consciousness, and as developed in the chap- 
ters pertaining to this subject. 

The interesting phenomena of Eepresentation, embra- 
cing Memory, Imagination, and Phantasy have been con- 
cisely and clearly exhibited. Light has been thrown on 
the Law of Association, especially in regard to the transi- 
tion from one series of representations to another. 

The processes of Elaboration have been fully and care- 
fully treated. These phenomena can be understood only 
by actually exhibiting them, and developing their laws. 
No vague discourse about the logical processes will suffice 
to make known their principles and laws, or to unfold 
their philosophy. 

The Aristotelian Logic will, perhaps, never be super- 
seded; but, as is needful, it will be supplemented by 
Modern Logic, which supplies the defects of the ancient, 
while the ancient affords the necessary basis for the 
modern. Each may, therefore, be regarded as the com- 
plement or indispensable counterpart of the other. 

The brief space of a few pages only has been given to 
the subjects of Mood, Figure, and Eeduction. These sub- 
jects, though not essential to Logic itself, are interesting 
in themselves, and in their historical associations. 

There is a growing demand, by progresssive teachers, 
to have Logic presented in connection with Psychology. 
To meet this demand, the third division of Part I. is 
made a course of Logic. It is even more and better 
than this, since it presents, not only the logical pro- 
cesses themselves, but their philosophy, and the relation 



PREFACE. V 

of elaborated thought to the elementary phenomena of 
the mind. 

To those students who have not studied Logic, this 
division will prove an ample course; and to those who 
have, it will be a thorough review, giving broader views 
of thought, and deeper insight into the abstruse pro- 
cesses of the intellectual powers. 

The phenomena of Feeling and Yolition, with their 
corresponding faculties of Sensibility and Will, have, in 
the second and third parts, been as fully discussed as 
the limits of the book w^otild permit. It is believed that 
these parts, though necessarily concise, will be not only 
interesting, but clear and thorough. 

The value of philosophic studies can scarcely be over- 
estimated, and it has been maintained by philosophers of 
opposing schools. John Stuart Mill, in his Examination 
of Hamilton's Philosophy, Vol. I, page 10, says, ^'That 
a true Psychology is the indispensable scientific basis of 
morals, of politics, of the science and art of education; 
that the difficulties of Metaphysics lie at the root of all 
science; that these difficulties can only be quieted by be- 
ing resolved ; and that until they are resolved, positively 
if possible, but at any rate negatively, we are never as- 
sured that any human knowledge, even physical, stands 
on solid foundations." 

Sir Wm. Hamilton, Metaphysics^ Lecture 11.^ says: ''In 
the compass of our experience, we distinguish two series 
of facts, — the facts of the external or material world, 
and the facts of the internal world, or world of intelli- 
gence. . . . The phenomena of the material world are 
subjected to immutable laws, and are produced and re- 
produced in the same invariable succession, and manifest 
only the blind force of a mechanical necessity. 

'' The phenomena of man are, in part, subjected to the 
laws of the external universe. As dependent upon a 



vi PREFACE. 

bodily organization, as actuated by sensual propensities 
and animal wants, he belongs to matter; and in this re- 
spect, he is the slave of necessity. Eut what man holds 
of matter does not make up his personality. They are his, 
not he; man is not an organism, — he is an intelligence 
served by organs. For, in man, there are tendencies, — 
there is a law, — which continually urge him to prove 
that he is more powerful than the nature by which he 
is surrounded and jDcnetrated. He is conscious to him- 
self of faculties not comprised in the chain of physical 
necessity; his intelligence reveals prescriptive principles 
of action, absolute and universal, in the law of duty, 
and a liberty capable of carrying that law into effect, in 
opposition to the solicitations, the impulses of his mate- 
rial nature 

^'Now, the study of Philosophy operates in three ways 
to establish that assurance of human liberty which is 
necessary for a rational belief in our moral nature in a 
moral world, and in a moral Euler of that world. 

"In the first place, an attentive consideration of the 
phenomena of mind is requisite in order to a luminous 
and distinct apprehension of liberty as a fact or datum 
of the intelligence. For though, without philosophy, a 
natural conviction of free agency lives and works in the 
recesses of every human mind, it requires a process of 
philosophical thought to bring this conviction to clear 
consciousness and scientific certainty 

'' In the second place, a profound philosophy is neces- 
sary to obviate the difilculties which meet us whenever 
we attempt to explain the possibility of this fact, and to 
prove that the datum of liberty is not a mere illu- 
sion 

" In the third place, the study of mind is necessary to 
counterbalance and correct the influence of the study of 
matter; and this utility of Metaj)hysics rises in propor- 



FREFA CE. vii 

tion to the progress of the natural sciences, and to the 
greater attention which they engross." 

Psychology, including Logic, constitutes the essential 
basis of a philosophic course. However valuable a work 
on Metaphysics, as that of Ferrier's or Bowne's may be, 
it requires, as the indispensable condition of its profita- 
ble perusal, a preliminary knowl^edge of the phenomena 
and laws of mind. 

A few words in reference to the time and method of 
study may not be amiss. In case the school year is 
divided into three terms, as is now usually the case, 
Psychology ought to be studied by the senior class of 
the Public Schools, or by the junior or senior class of 
the Colleges, the first and second terms, and the History 
of Philosophy the third term; but if the teacher prefers. 
Psychology can be taken the first term by itself, and, in 
connection with the History of Philosophy, the second 
and third terms. 

For valuable critical suggestions, thanks are due to 
B. A. Hinsdale^ late President of Hiram College, now 
Superintendent of Public Instruction, Cleveland, Ohio, 
who kindly consented to read the manuscript. 

This work is presented to the public with the hope 
that it will be profitable, not only to the student, but 
to the general reader who may desire to understand the 
facts and laws of mind; that it will prove especially in- 
teresting to those who may wish to revive their knowl- 
edge of Philosophy; and that thus the time and labor 
and thought bestowed in its preparation may not be 
wanting in good results. 



CO^'TENTS. 



PAGE 

Introduction 11 



PAKT I,— COGNITION AND THE INTELLECT. 
DIVISION I.— ACQUISITION. 

CHAPTER 

I. — Consciousness 19 

-IL— Eeflection , '.29 

III. — Rational Intuition — General View 39 

IV. — Intuitions Continued — Non-Dynamical Conditions. . 46 

V. — Intuitions Continued — Dynamical Conditions. ... 59 

VI. — Intuitions Continued — The Ego and Personal Identity. 75 

VII. -Sensation 89 

VIII. — Perception — General View 98 

IX — Perception through Smell and Taste 102 

X. — Perception through Touch and Hearing . . . . . 107 

XL — Perception through Sight 113 

XII. — Acquired Perception 129 

XIII. — Development and Product of Perception 139 

XIV. — Errors in Perception ... 145 

XV. — Passivity and Activity and Conditions 152 

XVI. — Theories of Perception — Ancient, Medieval, Cartesian. 156 
XVII. — Theories of Perception Continued — Locke, Berkeley, 

Hume ... 165 

XVIII. — Theories of Perception Continued — Kant, Reid, Ham- 
ilton 174 

XIX. — Theories of Perception Concluded — Mill and Porter . 184 

(viii) 



CONTENTS. ix 



DIVISION II.- REPRESENTATION. 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I. — General View of Kepresentation 195 

II. — Laws of Kepresentadon 202 

III. — Peculiarities of Roif^esentation 210 

IV.— Memory . . ./. 218 

V. — Imagination m 228 

VI.— Phantasy 232 



DIVISION III.— ELABORATION. 

I. — Elaboration — General View 241 

II. — Classification and Conception — Preliminary Discus- 
sion 245 

III. — Classification and Conception — General Discussion . 252 
IV. — Classification and Conception— Names, Classes, Concepts 261 
V. — Classification and Conception — Order of Procedure in 

Classification 268 

VI. — Quantity of Concepts . 275 

VII.— Quality of Concepts ....'. 282 

VIII.— Relation of Concepts .291 

IX. — Judgment — General View 299 

X. — Categorical Judgments — Classification and Relation . 305 
XL — Categorical Judgments — Distribution and Conversion 312 

XII. — Conditional Judgments 318 

XIII. — Deductive Reasoning — Immediate Arguments. . . . 322 

XIV. — Deductive Reasoning — Mediate Arguments .... 325 

XV. — Deductive Reasoning — Categorical Syllogisms . . . . 332 

XVI. — Deductive Reasoning— Conditional Syllogisms . . . 338 

XVII. — Deductive Reasoning — Formal Fallacies 347 

XVIII. — Deductive Reasoning — Material Fallacies 357 

XIX. — Deductive Reasoning — Mood of Syllogisms .... 365 
XX. — Deductive Reasoning — Figure of the Syllogism. . . 369 
XXL — Deductive Reasoning — Reduction to the First Figure . 379 
XX 1 1. — Inductive Reasoning — Mathematical Induction. . . 382 
XXIII. — Inductive Reasoning — Logical Induction — Subsidia- 
ries 388 

XXIV. — Inductive Reasoning — Logical Induction 394 

XXV. — Inductive Reasoning — The Ground of Induction . . 402 
XX VL— Modern Logic . 409 



CONTENTS, 



PAET II.— FEELING AND THE SENSIBILITY. 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I. — Physical Feelings 417 

IL— Vital Feelings 427 

HI. — Psychical Feelings — Emotions 432 

IV. — Psychical Feelings — Affections 441 

V. — Psychical Feelings — Desire and Aversion ..... 455 



PAET III.— VOLITION AND THE WILL. 

I. — General View of Volition 463 

IL— Freedom of the Will 469 

III. — Moral Eesponsibility ............ 477 



PSYCHOLOGY. 



INTRODUCTION. 



Psychology is the science which treats of the phe- 
nomena and the faculties of the human soul. It treats 
directly of phenomena and indirectly of faculties, since 
faculties are known only through phenomena. 

The aim of psychology is to ascertain the phenomena 
of the human soul, to analyze and classify these phe- 
nomena, and to determine their conditions and laws. 

The utility of psychology is evident from the fact that 
it supplies the fundamental principles for all the sciences 
pertaining to man as an intellectual, moral, social, and 
religious being; that it cultivates the mind loj calling its 
faculties into vigorous exercise, thus contributing to our 
perfection and consequently to our happiness; and that 
it checks the evils resulting from too exclusive pursuit 
of physical science, by directing our attention to our 
spiritual nature, moral dignity, and probable destiny. 

The means for psychological study may be divided 
into two classes — principal and collateral. 

The principal means for psychological study are con- 
sciousness, reflection, and rational intuition. 

Consciousness is the immediate knowledge which the 
soul has of its phenomena. It is the primary means of 

(11) 



12 PSYCHOLOGY. 

collecting the facts pertaining to the operations of the 
various faculties of the soul. 

Reflection is the turning back of the thoughts to the 
consideration of psychical phenomena. It is the means 
by which the phenomena of the soul are analyzed, com- 
pared, identified or discriminated, and classified. Thus, 
by reflection, psychical phenomena are found to be redu- 
cible to three classes — cognitions, or acts of knowledge; 
feelings, or sensations, instincts, appe'tites, emotions, af- 
fections, and desires; and volitions, or choices. 

Rational intuition is the immediate apprehension of 
necessary truth. It is the means by which the soul ap- 
prehends the necessity of the conditions and laws of its 
phenomena. Thus, by rational intuition, the phenomena 
of the soul are referred to causes capable of producing 
them; for, these phenomena, beginning in time, are not 
eternal. They can not bring themselves into existence, 
since they can not act before they exist. 

A faculty of the soul is its capability of doing a cer- 
tain act, or its susceptibility of being in a certain state. 

Hence, the faculties of the soul, its powers and sus- 
ceptibilities, are, as inferred from its phenomena, like- 
wise reducible to three classes — the Intellect^ or faculty 
of cognition; the Sensibility, or susceptibility of feeling; 
and the Will, or power of volition. 

It is, therefore, evident that the intimate relation of 
the psychical phenomena, the cognitions, feelings, and 
volitions, implies the intimate relation of the faculties, 
the intellect, the sensibility, and the will, and the unity 
of the soul, their common origin; that these phenomena, 
though fleeting, imply, from their continued succession 
and spiritual character, a permanent spiritual subject, 
variously called the soul, spirit, mind, I, self, or ego, en- 
dowed with the faculties of intellect, sensibility, and will. 

The collateral means for psychological studj^ are the 



INTR OD UCTION, 13 

sciences of Biology, Anthropology, Sociology, Anatomy, 
and Physiology. 

Biology is the science of life. It treats of the phenom- 
ena manifested by the living beings of the two organic 
kingdoms, vegetable and animal. As a science, Biology 
is fundamental and comprehensive. It throws great light 
on all the other sciences pertaining to living beings. 

Anthropology is the science which treats of man ac- 
cording to the methods of Natural History. It consid- 
ers him as a complex being, consisting of body, animal 
life, and soul or spirit. It views man in a general way, 
as to race, sex, age, heredity, and the reciprocal influ- 
ence of body and soul. It studies him as affected by 
climate, education, religion, government, employment, 
and accidental circumstances, leaving the more profound 
and scientific study of the physical and spiritual natures 
of man to distinct and special sciences. 

Sociology is the science of society. It treats of man 
in social organizations — the family, society, the church, 
or the state. Man's capabilities are known by his man- 
ifestations .and achievements. In war, he has exhibited 
ambition and patriotism, courage and cruelty, genius 
and rapacity. In peace, he has cultivated science, liter- 
ature, and art; he has engaged in agriculture, in the 
mechanic arts, and in commerce; he has founded gov- 
ernments, organized religions, and developed the learned 
professions. 

Anatomy and Physiology are related sciences which 
treat of the structure and functions of man's physical 
organism. A knowledge of these sciences is a valuable 
preparation for the study of mind; since the body, es- 
pecially the nervous system, sustains vital relations to 
the phenomena of the soul. In the perception of exter- 
nal objects, the mind uses the organs of the five senses. 
In executing its volitions, it employs the body as its in- 



14 PSYCHOLOGY. 

strument; but in the higher operations of thought, it 
seems to act independently of all material organs, exhib- 
iting phenomena totally unlike the properties of matter. 

In endeavoring to ascertain the relations existing be- 
tween the body and soul, the approved methods of 
science — observation, experiment, induction, and deduc- 
tion — are to be employed; and though nothing is to be 
assumed without evidence, yet it may be allowed, in the 
course of an investigation, to form an hypothesis, with 
the understanding that it is merely provisional, and that 
it must stand or fall according as it is confirmed or re- 
futed by subsequent investigations. 

It is legitimate to endeavor to ascertain what physi- 
cal conditions, if any, are the invariable antecedents or 
consequents, as the case may be, of certain psychical 
states; but it is not legitimate to assume, without proof, 
except provisionally, that every psychical phenomenon 
must have fixed physical antecedents or consequents. 

Though our knowledge of the body has already en- 
larged our knowledge of the conditions of the phenom- 
ena of the soul, and may be expected to do so more 
and more as our investigations are continued, yet it is 
to be remembered that we can understand neither per- 
ception, nor representation, nor elaboration, by examin- 
ing the nerves with the Physiologist, nor by feeling the 
head after the manner of the Phrenologist, but only by 
studying these processes themselves, in the light of con- 
sciousness, by the aid of reflection and rational intuition. 

The Rules for Investigation are the following: 

1. Employ the principal and collateral means of study. 

2. Take, as fundamental facts, the psychical phenomena 
given in consciousness, all the phenomena, and nothing 
but the phenomena. 

3. Carefully observe, analyze, compare, and classify 
the phenomena. 



INTR OD UCTION. 



15 



4. Determine the conditions and laws of the phenomena. 

5. Eefer phenomena essentially alike to the same fac- 
ulty, and those essentially unlike to different faculties. 

6. Make an accurate register of the results. 

In order to present a bird's-eye view of the subject, 
we subjoin a summary classification of the phenomena 
of the human soul, also a classification of the faculties 
implied by these phenomena. These classifications give 
an outline of the subject, and they will be useful for 
reference, as we pursue our investigations. 

It will be observed that certain phenomena and the 
corresponding faculties have the same names, a defect 
unavoidable on account of the imperfection of language. 
The word JReason is used to denote the reasoning power. 
It is sometimes used to denote the logical power in gen- 
eral, also the power of rational intuition. 



Cognition 



CLASSIFICATION OF PSYCHICAL PHENOMENA. 

c^ 1-. ^- I Consciousness. 
Subjective { ^^^^^^^^^^^_ 

Rational — Intuition. 
Obj ective— Perception. 

Memory. 



Feeling 



Volition. 



Acquisition 



Representation 
Elaboration 

Physical feeling 
- Vital feeling 
Psychical feeling 



Imagination. 
Phantasy. 

Conceiving. 

Judging. 

Reasoning. 

Sensation. 

Instinct. 

Appetite. 

Of rest or fatigue. 
Of vigor or languor. 
Of health or sickness. 

Emotions. 
AffectionSo 
Desires. 



Solicitation— the antecedent of volition. 
Volition — the choice or decision. 
Execution — the consequent of volition. 



16 



PSYCHOLOGY, 



CLASSIFICATION OF THE PSYCHICAL FACULTIES. 



Subjective 



( Consciousness. 



Intellect 



Acquisitive faculties 



Representative faculties 



Sensibility 



^ Logical faculties 



Physical sensibility 



Vital sensibility 



Psychical sensibility 



\ Reflection. 
Rational— Intuition. 
Objective— Perception. 

Memory. 

Imagination. 

Phantasy. 

Conception. 

Judgment. 

Reason. 

Sensation. 

Instinct. 

Appetite. 

Of rest or fatigue. 
Of vigor or languor. 
Of health or sickness. 

Susceptibility of emotion. 
Susceptibility of affection. 
Susceptibility of desire. 



Will 



Passive susceptibility— as solicited by motive. 
Elective power— ability to choose or decide. 
Executive energy — as exerted in execution. 



Eeview. — Eeproduceon blackboard, expand 6 and 7, and elucidate. 

1. Definition. 

2. Aim 



Introduction 



3. Utility 




4. Means of study 



1st. Principal 



2d. Collateral 




1st. 
2d. 

5. Rules for investigation -i. ^^^ 

5th. 
6th. 

6. Classification of psychical phenomena. 

7. Classification of psychical faculties. 



PART I. 
COaNITION AND THE INTELLECT. 



Psy.-2. (17) 



DIVISION I. 

ACQUISITION AND THE ACQUISITIVE FACULTIES. 

CHAPTEE I. 

CONSCIOUSNESS. 

1. Consciousness as an act defined and character- 
ized.— Consciousness is tlie immediate knowledge which 
the soul has of its phenomena. It is empirical^ since it 
apprehends its object as contingent, and not as nec- 
essary. It is intuitive^ since it reaches its object di- 
rectly, and not through any medium, as the senses, the 
memory, or the reasoning processes. It is, therefore, 
empirical intuition. 

2. Consciousness implied by all psychical phenom- 
ena. — Cognition implies consciousness ; for if I know, I 
know that I know, since if I do not know that I know, 
I do not know\ In like manner, it can be proved that 
feeling implies consciousness, and that volition implies 
consciousness. Hence the absurdity of the opinion that 
consciousness is impossible, as held by M. Comte, who 
says in reference to the consciousness of intellectual ac- 
tivity, ^'In order to observe, your intellect must pause 
from its activity; yet it is this very activity you want 
to observe. If you can not effect the pause, you can 
not observe ; if you do effect it, there is nothing to ob- 
serve." Comte's Positive Philosophy, by H. Martineau, page 
33. But instead of its being impossible to be conscious 

of knowing, it is impossible to know without being con- 

(19) 



20 PSYCHOLOGY, 

scions of knowing. Consciousness is involved in know- 
ing, as an essential element. 

3. Consciousness an intellectual act. — Though con- 
sciousness is implied by all psychical phenomena, whether 
cognitions, feelings, or volitions, yet it is itself an act 
of the intellect. The etymology of the Avord conscious- 
ness^ from con and sciOj indicates its meaning — that 
along with knowing an object, I know also the know- 
ing. In case the object of consciousness is a phenome- 
non of the sensibility, the consciousness of the feeling is 
scarcely distinguishable from the feeling. Thus, if to be 
conscious of pain is not identical w^ith the feeling of pain, 
it is to be aware of the feeling. The faculties of the soul 
are so intimately related, that they do not act independ- 
ently of one another. Knowledge affords the condition 
of desire and affection; and both knowledge and feeling 
precede and accompany volition. 

4. Consciousness as a faculty defined and considered. 
— Consciousness is the capability of knowing our psychical 
acts or states. If the soul is conscious of its cognitions, 
feelings, and volitions, it has the faculty of being con- 
scious of these phenomena, and this faculty is called 
consciousness. The term consciousness., then, is used to 
denote both an act and the faculty to which the act is 
referred. As an act, it is the immediate cognizance 
which the soul takes of its phenomena, and is implied, 
as a necessary condition, by the phenomena of cognition-, 
feeling, or volition. As a faculty, it is the capability of 
immediately knowing psychical phenomena, and is im- 
plied by the act of consciousness, as a necessary condition. 

5. Objects of consciousness psychical phenomena.— 
The objects of consciousness are psychical phenomena, 
actual and present. The soul is conscious of all its phe- 
nomena — all appearances; for, if there is an appearance, 
tliat appearance is known or realized, otherwise it is not 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 21 

an appearance; but a realization of the appearance is 
consciousness. 

The object of consciousness is nothing else than a psy- 
chical phenomenon. In the first place, we are not con- 
scious of an external object, as a house. If we perceive 
a house, we are conscious of the perception, but not of 
the house. Consciousness is immediate knowledge; but 
the knowledge of an external object is mediate, since it 
is derived from the sensation w^iich the object causes. 
In the second place, we are not conscious of the soul, 
nor of the soul as knowing, feeling, or willing, but of 
the knowing, feeling, and willing, as phenomena. The 
necessity of the soul, as the subject of these phenomena, 
is apprehended by rational intuition, as will be more 
fully shown hereafter. 

6. Processes which are not objects of consciousness. — 
In saying that the soul is conscious of all its phenomena, 
we do not affirm that it is conscious of all its processes. 
Phenomena are processes that appear. The soul is con- 
scious of these processes, otherwise they could not be 
phenomena, that is, could not appear. 

There are, however, other processes that are not phe- 
nomena; and since these do not appear, their existence 
is not an object of consciousness, but a matter of infer- 
ence. This is ultimately true of consciousness itself, 
which, though an act, is not a distinct phenomenon, but 
an element of a phenomenon. For, if the act of conscious- 
ness is a distinct phenomenon, it appears, and is, there- 
fore, an object of consciousness. That is, in being con- 
scious of a phenomenon, we should, on this supposition, 
be conscious of the consciousness, and in like manner, 
we should be conscious of this second consciousness, and 
so on, which involves an infinite series of acts of con- 
sciousness, an impossibility in finite time. Granting that, 
by special efi'ort, an indefinite number of acts of con- 



22 PSYCHOLOGY, 

sciousness might thus take place, yet, in general, the 
phenomenon is the object of attention, but not the con- 
sciousness of it, much less the consciousness of the con- 
sciousness of it, and so on. 

There are other psychical processes, inferred from their 
effects, which are unknown to consciousness. These pro- 
cesses have, by certain philosophers, been inconsistently 
called latent modifications of consciousness, and by others, 
unconscious cerebrations. They are latent processes, whether 
purely psychological, physiological, or mixed. 

7. Idea and ideation. — The j)henomenon which is an 
object of consciousness develops and crystallizes into an 
idea of the phenomenon. The development of the idea 
is called ideation. The idea may afterwards be recalled 
in the memory, but not the original phenomenon. The 
idea when recalled is an object of consciousness. 

8. Consciousness simultaneous with its object. — In 
the first place, the consciousness of a phenomenon can not 
be antecedent to that phenomenon, since we should, in that 
case, be conscious of that which has no existence, *which 
is impossible. In the next place, the consciousness of a 
phenomenon can not be subsequent to that phenomenon, 
since, before the consciousness, the supposed j)lienomenon 
could not appear, and hence would not be a phenome- 
non ; that is, consciousness is essential to the phenome- 
i^on, and is, therefore, not subsequent to it. The formula 
of consciousness, I know that I know, does not imply 
that I first know, then, after that, know that I know; 
for, if I first know, without being conscious that I know, 
then, at the first instant of knowing, before the con- 
sciousness of the knowledge, I know, without knowing 
that I know, which is absurd. 

The view that the consciousness of a psychical phe- 
nomenon is subsequent to that phenomenon, makes con- 
sciousness depend on memory. But if we are not con- 



CONSCIO USNESS. 23 

scions of a phenomenon at the instant of its occurrence, 
we should know nothing of it at that instant, and, there- 
fore, have nothing to remember; hence, memory itself 
would be impossible, and consciousness, thus depending 
on memor}^, would also be impossible; but as both mem- 
ory and consciousness are facts, the theory that con- 
sciousness is subsequent to its object, which annihilates 
both memory and consciousness, can not be true. 

We have now found that consciousness of a phenom- 
enon is neither antecedent to that phenomenon nor sub- 
sequent to it; hence, the consciousness of a phenomenon 
is simultaneous Avith that phenomenon. 

9. Consciousness a logical consequent of its object. — 
Though consciousness of a phenomenon is simultaneous 
with the phenomenon, yet the phenomenon involves the 
consciousness as its logical consequent, otherwise it could 
not be a ^^li^nomenon, that is, could not appear; and 
the consciousness implies the phenomenon as its logical 
antecedent, otherwise there would be nothing of which 
to be conscious. 

That a logical consequent may be chronologically sim- 
ultaneous with its logical antecedent, may be illustrated 

by the equation. 

y=f(x). 

This equation is read, y is equal to a function of x^ 
and signifies that the value of y depends on that of x, 
so that, if X changes, changing the value of /Or), y 
changes, so as always to be equal to f{xy 

Now, let X change, the change in x changing the value 
of /(x). The change in f{x) is simultaneous with the 
change in :r, otherwise f{x) has the same value while x 
has different values, which is impossible. 

As x changes, the change in x is followed by a change 
in y ; but the word foUoiced is used in a logical^ not in 
a chronological sense; for the change in y is simultaneous 



24 PSYCHOLOGY, 

with the change in x, since if y could remain, with- 
out change, a moment after the change in x^ then, for 
that moment, y would not be equal to /(x), which is 
contrary to the sup230sition that y is always equal to 
f(x). Hence, the change in y, though logically conse- 
quent to the change in x, is chronologically simultane- 
ous with that change. 

This will serve to illustrate the possibility of the fact 
that logically consciousness may be the consequent of a 
phenomenon, while chronologically the phenomenon and 
the consciousness of it may be simultaneous. 

10. Kinds of consciousness — natural, ethical, and ab- 
normal. — 1st. Natural consciousness is that ordinary form 
of consciousness which is common to all healthy minds. 
It is simply immediate knowledge of psychical phenom- 
ena, whether cognitions, feelings, or volitions. 

2d. Ethical consciousness is that form of conscious- 
ness which is induced by those who practice self-inspec- 
tion in view of ascertaining their moral condition. It 
indicates the controlling influence of conscience, and a 
sensitiveness with regard to right and wrong. The de- 
velopment of this form of consciousness is mainly due 
to the influence of moral and religious systems. Ethical 
consciousness is, strictly speaking, reflection applied to 
moral states. 

3d. Abnormal consciousness is that form of consciousness 
which is exhibited by bashful persons, who imagine that 
others are noticing their awkwardness. They are said to 
be self-conscious. 

11. Varying intensity of consciousness. — Consciousness 
may vary in intensity from obscurity and indistinctness, 
through all the intermediate degrees, to clearness and dis- 
tinctness. The degree of intensity de]3ends largely upon 
the condition of the body, the character of the mind, age, 
culture, and the concentration of attention. 



CONSCIO USNESS, 25 

12. General conditions of consciousness. — These are 
a living subject, a faculty of consciousness, and psychical 
phenomena. 

1st. A living subject is a condition of consciousness; for 
consciousness implies a being who is conscious. 

2d. A faculty of consciousness is a condition of the act 
of consciousness; for without the faculty, or capability 
of being conscious, the act would be impossible. 

3d. A psychical phenomenon is a condition of conscious- 
ness; for psychical phenomena are the only objects of 
consciousness ; hence, in the absence of these phenomena, 
there can be no consciousness, since there would bo 
nothing of which to be conscious. 

13. Conditions of vivid consciousness.^ These are the 
general conditions, above named, also varying psychical 
phenomena, abstraction, attention, and cultivation. 

1st. The general conditions of consciousness are condi- 
tions of vivid consciousness; for whatever is essential to 
consciousness itself, is essential to any degree of con- 
sciousness, and hence, to vivid consciousness. 

2d. Varying psychical pjhenomena are conditions of vivid 
consciousness; for a continuance in a state the same in 
kind throughout, would be attended by a decreasing de- 
gree of intensity of consciousness, tending to total un- 
consciousness. Thus, the miller is scarcely conscious of 
hearing the noise of the mill, though if it made an un- 
usual noise, he w^ould at once be clearly conscious of the 
chan<xe in his sensations. 

3d. Abstraction and attention are conditions of vivid 
consciousness ; for the vividness of the consciousness of 
a particular phenomenon is increased by abstracting the 
attention from other phenomena, and concentrating it 
upon the given phenomenon. 

4th. The cultivation of the faculty is a condition of 
vivid consciousness; for the powder to induce a vivid de- 

Psv.— 3. 



26 PSYCHOLOGY, 

gree of consciousness, can be increased by its cultivation 
through habitual exercise. 

14. Validity of consciousness. — The validity of con- 
sciousness must be admitted — its testimony must be re- 
ceived; for if we doubt it, we have no means of know- 
ing that we doubt, but by consciousness itself If we 
admit the validity of the testimony of consciousness con- 
cerning the realit}^ of the doubt, we can not refuse its 
testimony to the reality of other psychical phenomena. 
Again, to doubt, leads to an impossibility; lor then we 
must doubt that we doubt, and doubt that we doubt that 
we doubt, and so on, which involves an infinite series of 
doubts, an impossibility in finite time. 

An extension of the testimony of consciousness can bo 
made by a comparison of our own psychical phenomena, 
as certified to by our own consciousness, with those of 
other persons, as obtained by testimony. This tends to 
confirm our own experience, to enlarge our knowledge, 
and to correct unhealthy developments. 

15. Diflaculties in consciousness. — The introspective 
method of consciousness, in case of a single well-defined 
phenomenon of at least average intensity, is to be re- 
garded as reliable and authoritative. In regard to pos- 
itive pain or pleasure, a clear thought, a lively emotion, 
an intense desire, an ardent affection, or a decided choice, 
there can be no doubt. 

The phenomena of consciousness are, however, for the 
most part, exceedingly complex. Thoughts, feelings, and 
volitions, following in quick succession, blending and 
vanishing, to be succeeded by others, present an inces- 
santly shifting scene. Many of the elements of a state 
of consciousness are so brief and obscure, and appear so 
inextricably interwoven with others, that it appears dif- 
ficult to distinguish them. 

Consciousness is liable to certain illusions, which, by 



CONSCIOUSNESS. 27 

being pointed out, may be avoided. These illusions, 
however, should be carefully discriminated from the il- 
lusions of perception, the mistakes of memory, and the 
fallacies of inference. 

The illusions of perception, whether originating from 
sense-impressions, or from preconception, consist in ob- 
jectifying erroneous ideas respecting material objects, and 
mistaking them for the qualities of those objects. 

Mistakes of memor^^ consist in believing that the cre- 
ations of the imagination are faithful representations of 
past realities. 

Fallacies of inference are illogical processes of the 
higher powers of thought. 

Inferences from mental states are often mistaken for 
elements of those states. Thus, a person thrilled with 
a new joy exclaims, '' This is the happiest moment of 
my life," believing that the truth of the inference is an 
object of consciousness. He is conscious of his joy, but 
not that it exceeds every past or future joy. A lover 
in vowing eternal fidelity, fancies that he is conscious of 
undying love, little dreaming that in time his ardent 
love may be transformed into violent hate. 

Since consciousness is the mind's immediate knowledge 
of its own phenomena, an illusion of consciousness is a 
misapprehension of present psychical phenomena. It is 
not strange that illusions should arise. Time is requisite 
in order to bring a phenomenon under its representative 
idea, thus identifying it as belonging to a class. While 
doing this, the phenomenon vanishes, or changes, or 
blends with other phenomena. 

Certain states have a general resemblance to one an- 
other, rendering either liable to be mistaken for the 
other. Thus, in morals, transient desires are often mis- 
taken for settled purposes. 

Preconception, or anticipation, gives rise to illusion. 



28 PSYCHOLOGY. 

Thus, when odc anticipates pleasure from social inter- 
course, he imagines, when in company, that he is happy, 
especially if he sees signs of enjoyment in the faces of his 
companions. 

Opinions agreeable to us, we readify aci^ej^t, easily per- 
suading ourselves that we believe them, when, perhaps, 
a more complete analysis of our state of mind would re- 
veal doubt. 

These considerations indicate the importance of sub- 
jecting the states of consciousness to the processes of 
reflection. These processes will be considered in the 
next chapter. 

N. B. — Let the student write a synopsis of each chapter, and elucidate. 
See model synopsis at the close of the Introduction. 



CHAPTEE II. 



REFLECTION. 



1. Reflection defined as an act and as a faculty. — 

1st. As an act. Eeflection is the turning back of our 
thoughts to the consideration of psychical phenomena. 
In perception, our thoughts are directed outward to the 
facts of matter; but in reflection, they are directed in- 
ward to the facts of mind. The act of reflection is com- 
plex, involving several processes. 

2d. As a faculty. Eeflection is the power to perform 
the act of reflection. The faculty is implied by the act. 
As the act of reflection is complex, so also is the faculty. 

2. Processes involved in reflection. — These are ab- 
straction, attention, analysis, synthesis, comparison, iden- 
tiflcation, discrimination, and classification. 

1st. Abstraction is the withdrawal of the thoughts from 
certain phenomena in order to concentrate them upon 
other phenomena. The phenomena to which the thouglits 
are directed are properly said to be prescinded from the 
others, and the thoughts to be abstracted from the phe- 
nomena which are not considered. In ordinary usage, 
however, the phenomena considered are said to be ab- 
stracted from the others, and are called abstractions. 

The utility of abstraction is evident; for by it we 
avoid the distraction and confusion which would result 
from considering many things at the same time. But it 
is not asserted that the mind can not, at the same time, 
attend properly to more than one thing. 

An illustration of abstraction is found in the philoso- 

(29) 



30 PSYCHOLOGY. 

pher, who, absorbed in thought, walks the crowded 
street, oblivious of what is going on around him. He 
is in a state of abstraction. 

2d. Attention is the concentration of the thoughts upon 
a given phenomenon. 

The kinds of attention are voluntary attention and in- 
voluntary. Voluntary attention, or attention proper, is 
the concentration of the thoughts upon a certain phe- 
nomenon, by an act of the will. Involuntary attention 
is simply spontaneous notice induced by the attractive- 
ness of the object, without a special act of the w^ill. It 
can be secured by making an object more attractive 
than other objects. 

The condition of attention is abstraction ; for, in order 
to concentrate the thoughts upon a certain phenomenon, 
it is necessary to abstract them from other phenomena. 

The consequences of attention are clear and distinct 
cognitions, intensified activity, and, if long continued, 
weariness, followed by relaxation of attention. Cogni- 
tions become clear and distinct in proportion as the at- 
tention is abstracted from the many and disconnected, 
and concentrated upon the few and related. Augmented 
intensity of a certain activity follows from a suspension 
or a reduction of other activities, and a concentration of 
energy upon the given activity. Attention long contin- 
ued results in weariness, followed by relaxation of atten- 
tion and wandering thoughts. This indicates the need 
of rest, and the indication ought, in general, to be heeded. 
Bat even in this condition it is possible for a new object 
of absorbing interest to arrest the attention, arouse the 
mind from its lethargy, and call forth its awakened 
energies to a new activity. 

The degree of effort required to concentrate the atten- 
tion upon a given phenomenon, the condition of the sub- 
ject remaining the same, varies directly as the attrac- 



REFLECTION, 31 

tiveness of the distracting phenomena, and inversely, as 
the attractiveness of the given phenomenon. 

The utility of discipline is evident; for, if the attention 
is too easily distracted, as is most commonly the case, 
the mind becomes the sport of passing occurrences, and 
is unable, without great difficulty, to accomplish its worlc ; 
if the attention is too persistent, as is sometimes the 
case, it is transferred with difficulty from one thing to 
another, rendering the person absent-minded, when he 
ought to attend to the subject before him. A disciplined 
mind, in a normal condition, can fix or transfer its at- 
tention at pleasure. The power properly to control the 
attention is a matter of great importance, and should, as 
soon as possible, be acquired by every student. 

3d. Analysis is the resolution of a phenomenon into 
its elements. A complex phenomenon, comprising more 
than one element, is susceptible of analysis; but a sim- 
ple phenomenon, not comprising a plurality of elements, 
is not susceptible of analysis. The methods of analysis 
are simple inspection and experiment. Many complex 
phenomena can, by simple inspection, be at once resolved 
into their elements. Phenomena may appear simple to 
consciousness, when in reality they are complex. These 
may frequently be resolved by experiment, as in case of 
sound and color, thus calling to our aid the methods of 
physical science. 

4th. Synthesis is the recombination of the elements of 
a phenomenon into the whole of which they are the 
constituent parts. By analysis, we discover the ele- 
ments of a complex whole; by synthesis, we recombine 
the elements so as to reproduce that whole; analysis re- 
veals minute parts; synthesis reproduces comprehensive 
wholes. Thus, by analysis, we have found the processes 
involved in reflection ; by synthesis, we regard reflection 
as a whole involving these processes; by analysis, we 



32 PSYCHOLOGY, 

resolve the powers of the soul into their fundamental 
faculties — the intellect, the sensibility, and the will; by 
synthesis, we regard the soul as a whole whose powers 
are the intellect, the sensibility, and the will. 

5th. Comparison is the simultaneous examination of two 
phenomena in view of detectrng resemblances and differ- 
ences. The phenomena compared may be both original, 
or one may be original and the other a representative 
idea, or both may be representative ideas. A past phe- 
nomenon can be compared with another, past or pres- 
ent, only by means of its representative idea. 

The conditions of comparison are two phenomena, either 
original or representative, both present to a mind hav- 
ing the faculty of reflection; and, in thorough-going 
comparison, the processes of abstraction, attention, anal- 
ysis, and synthesis. 

The purpose sought to be accomplished by comparison 
is the detection of resemblances and differences. That 
it is possible to accomplish this purpose appears from 
the fact that in the act of comparison, the mind is con- 
scious of two simultaneous phenomena with their pecu- 
liarities, and thus detects their resemblances and their 
differences. 

6th. Identification is the recognition of a phenomenon 
on its recurrence, as one before known. Strictly speak- 
ing, a phenomenon does not recur; for the second ap- 
pearance, though like the first, though identified with it 
as essentially the same, is not the first, since it can be 
distinguished from the first by the temporal circumstance, 
if by no other, that it occurred after the first. Simul- 
taneous phenomena, though identified as essentially alike, 
may be distinguished by the spatial relation that they 
appear in difierent places. 

An illustration of the nature of identification is ob- 
tained by looking at an object, and observing its appear- 



REFLECTION. 33 

ance, then closing the eyes, and, after a short interval, 
openingv them, and looking at the object, again observing 
its appearance. The two appearances, though identified 
as essentially the same, are discriminated by their tem- 
poral relations — they occurred at different times, and 
one may be called the first, and the other the second. 
The material object, however, remains the same, though 
the appearances or phenomena w4iich it induces can 
thus be discriminated. Again, look at an object, press- 
ing one eye gently with the hand. Two images of that 
object will appear, which, though identified as essentially 
alike, are discriminated by their spatial relations — they 
appear in different places. Two phenomena, though 
identified as essentially alike, are said to be numerically 
different, since they can be discriminated by their tem- 
poral or spatial relations, one being the first, and the 
other the second in time or place. 

The condition of identification is the comparison of 
phenomena essentially alike. There is, in identification, 
a consciousness of positive sameness, as in case of the 
two sounds produced by striking, in succession, the same 
key of a piano. Though, in this case, the identification 
is not absolute, but relative, since the two sounds are 
discriminated as numerically different, one being the 
first, and the other the second, yet growing out of the 
fact of essential sameness, and the lack of essential differ- 
ence, there is positive detection of essential sameness, and 
the absence of the discrimination of essential differ- 
ence. ^ 

7th. Discrimination is the detection of the differences 
between phenomena. 

The condition of discrimination is the comparison of 
phenomena differing in their characteristics. The phe- 
nomena appearing to consciousness, differing in their 
characteristics, it is evident not only that discrimination 



34 PSYCHOLOGY. 

is possible, but it would seem impossible not to discrim- 
inate. Phenomena are identified, if they have essential 
agreements and no essential differences; but they are 
discriminated if they have es.^ential differences, though 
they may have agreements. 

8th. Classification is the assignment of phenomena es- 
sentially alike to the same class, and phenomena essen- 
tially unlike to different classes. 

The conditions of classification are the comparison 
and identification or discrimination of phenomena. 

The characteristic of a class is that attribute in refer- 
ence to which the class is formed. All objects exhibiting 
the characteristic of a class are identified, or referred to 
that class, though they may exhibit differences. The 
identification is partial, not complete, since the agreement 
respects only the characteristics of the class. All objects 
wanting in the characteristic of a class are excluded from 
that class, though exhibiting other characteristics * com- 
mon to all the objects of the class. 

The order of procedure in classification is either to as- 
cend by generalization from individuals to species, and 
from species to genera, or to descend by division from 
genera to species, and from species to individuals. 

Generalizatimi is that process of classification by which 
resembling individuals are grouped into species and re- 
sembling species into genera. It embraces two varieties 
— synthetic specification^ or the grouping of resembling 
individuals into a species, and generification^ or the group- 
ing of resembling species into a genus. A species in- 
cludes all the individuals exhibiting the characteristic of 
the species, and excludes all other individuals. A genus 
includes all the species exhibiting the characteristic of 
the genus, and excludes all other species. 

The principle of generalization is the combination of 
the common characteristics of all the individuals of the 



REFLECTION. 35 

species, or of all the species of the genus. The identi- 
fication of these common characteristics of a species or 
of a genus, is essential to generalization. 

Division is that process of classification by which a 
genus is resolved into its species, or a si^ecies into its 
subspecies or individuals, or in general, of a class into 
its members. It embraces two varieties — analytic spec- 
ification^ or the resolution of a genus into species subor- 
dinate to the genus but co-ordinate with one another, and 
individualization, or the resolution of a species into in- 
dividuals subordinate to the species. 

The purpose of division is the attainment of extensive 
distinctness and completeness. 

The principle of division is that attribute of the class 
divided in reference to which the division is ma.de. The 
members of the class divided difier with regard to the 
principle of division, otherwise no division could be made. 
Thus, angles may be divided with respect to their mag- 
nitude into right and oblique, and oblique angles, into 
acute and obtuse. 

As to the number of members, a division is either a di- 
chotomy, having two members, or a polytomy, having 
more than two m.embers. A polytomy is a trichotomy, a 
tetrachotomy, etc., according as it has three, four, etc., 
members. Strictly speaking, every logical division gives 
a dichotomy, and this is true, though the class can be 
divided into three, four, or an indefinite number of mem- 
bers. Thus, the class polygons, which can be divided 
into triangles, quadrilaterals, pentagons, etc., can also be 
divided into polygons having three sides, or triangles, 
and polygons having more than three sides; and the latter 
class can be divided into polygons having four sides, or 
quadrilaterals, and polygons having more than four sides, 
and so on. 

The two members of a dichotomy agree in exhibiting 



36 PSYCHOLOGY. 

the characteristics of the class divided, and, taken to- 
gether, include every thing of that class; but they dis- 
agree in respect to the characteristics of the members. 
Every thing of the class divided is referred to one or 
the other of the members, and if included in either, is 
excluded from the other, and if excluded from either, is 
included in the other. Thus, since angles are divided 
into right and oblique, any angle is either right or ob- 
lique ; if it is one, it is not the other, and if it is not 
one, it is the other. 

The name of an object, whether an individual or a 
class, is the word employed in its designation. Lan- 
guage plays an important part in thinking — it is the 
product, the instrument, and the embodiment of thought. 

The definition of an object is such a description of it 
as will distinguish it from all other objects. An object 
is defined by referring it to the class immediately con- 
taining it, and distinguishing it from all other objects 
of that class by means of its characteristic attributes. 
Thus, a triangle is a polygon of three sides. 

A species may be ideated and represented by the im- 
agination as a collection of individuals; and a genus may 
be ideated as a collection of species. 

The laws of genera and species are the following: 

(1) Inclusion in a species is inclusion in the genus 
embracing the species. Thus, since the species acute 
angles is embraced in the genus oblique angles, if an 
angle is acute, it is oblique. Let the following laws be 
illustrated. 

(2) Inclusion in a species is exclusion from any thing 
from which the species is excluded. 

(3) Inclusion in a genus is not necessarily inclusion in 
a given species of that genus. 

(4) Inclusion in a genus is disjunctive inclusion in the 
species of the genus. 



REFLECTION. 37 

(5) Exclusion from a genus is exclusion from all the 
species of that genus. 

(6) Exclusion from a species is not necessarily exclu- 
sion from the genus embracing the species. 

(7) Exclusion from all the species of a genus is ex- 
clusion from the genus. 

(8) Whatever can be universally predicated, affirma- 
tively or negatively, of any class, can, in like manner, 
be predicated of any thing contained in that class. 

3. Rules for the attainment of success in reflection. 
Ist. To avoid distraction, abstract the thoughts com- 
pletely from irrelevant phenomena. 

2d. To secure clearness, let the attention be concen- 
trated and persistent. 

3d. To secure distinctness, make an accurate analysis 
of the phenomenon, or an exhaustive division of the 
class. 

4th. To understand the object as a whole, recombine, 
by a comprehensive synthesis, the elements found by 
analysis, or by a jDcrfect generalization, ascend to the 
class from the subdivisions found by division. 

5th. To understand the relations of an object to ether 
objects, perform carefully the related processes of com- 
parison, identification or discrimination, and classifica- 
tion. 

Gth. To secure a comprehensive knowledge of the facts 
of the soul, go over, according to the above directions, 
all the phenomena revealed in consciousness, making an 
accurate record of the results. 

4. DiflB.culties encountered in reflection. 

1st. The phenomena to be observed, unlike the ob- 
jects of the material world, are fleeting, and vanish as 
we attempt to gaze upon them. 

2d. They must, if past, be reproduced and represented 
as ideas; but the representative idea of a phenomenon 



38 PSYCHOLOGY, 

is but a substitute, more or less imperfect, for the jihe- 
nomenon itself 

3d. Only one observer is possible. The testimony of 
others as to corresponding phenomena in their own con- 
.sciousness, thouo:h serving: as a check on hastv conclu- 
sions, is not to be taken as decisive till verified by in- 
dividual experience. 

4th. The introspective method of consciousness and re- 
flectioUj in its persistent, carefuh and comprehensive 
form, is a difficult operation, and jjerfection in the art 
of reflection is a rare, as well as a valuable attainment. 



CHAPTEE III. 



RATIONAL INTUITION. 



1. Rational intuition, as an act, a product, and a 
faculty. — As an act^ rational intuition is the immediate 
apprehension of necessary truth. It differs from empir- 
ical intuition in the character of its object, and in the 
mode of its knowledge. Empirical intuition is the con- 
sciousness of contingent phenomena. Eational intuition 
is the apprehension of necessary truth. 

It is true that all knowledge begins with the experi- 
ence of phenomena; but phenomena imply conditions — 
a subject, an object, and the synthesis of subject and 
object. B}' the act of rational intuition, the intellect ap- 
prehends, not only that phenomena, but that events in 
general, whether they appear or not, are impossible 
without conditions; that is, that conditions are necessary 
to the occurrence of events. For, without conditions, 
events would be cut off from dependence on any thing 
else; hence, before their occurrence, having no relation 
to any thing antecedent, they would be nothing, and 
their occurrence would imply that nonentity springs into 
entit}^, which is im2:)ossible, since nonentity can not 
spring. Ex nihil, nihil fit. Hence, events withoul con- 
ditions are impossible: but the impossibility of events 
without conditions is the necessity of conditions to the 
occurrence of events. 

The objects apprehended by rational intuition are nec- 
essary truths; these truths are not the conditions of 

events, but they are the necessity of these conditions, — 

(39) 



40 PSYCHOLOGY, 

not their absolute necessity, that is, their necessity in 
themselves, irrespective of all other realities, but their 
conditional necessity, that is, their necessity on the con- 
dition of the occurrence of the events. Necessary con- 
ceptions are also said to be objects of rational intuition ; 
but since necessary conceptions are resolvable into nec- 
essary judgments, or truths, it will suffice to say that 
the objects of rational intuition are necessary truths. 

The knowledge of events is the chronological antecedent 
of the rational intuition apprehending the necessity of 
their conditions. Thus, we know an event before we 
apprehend the necessity of its cause. The conditions 
whose necessity is apprehended by rational intuition are 
the logical antecedents of the events known by experience. 
Thus, space is the logical antecedent, or necessary con- 
dition of body; time is the logical antecedent of succes- 
sion, and cause of events. 

As products^ rational intuitions are the cognitions em- 
bodying necessary truths. These products have received 
various names, as axioms^ first principles^ forms of thought^ 
regulative principles^ etc. 

As a faculty^ rational intuition is the power of appre- 
hending necessary truth. This faculty has received va- 
rious designations, as reason^ common sense, the regulative 
faculty^ etc. 

2. Origin of rational intuitions. — The following theories 
have been proposed to account for the origin of rational 
intuitions as products: 

1st. intuitions are derived from the experience of the in- 
dividual. It is true that all knowledge begins with the 
experience of phenomena; that intuitions, as products, 
are phenomena, and are, therefore, the objects of con- 
sciousness; and that they harmonize with all experience. 
But the necessity implied by the act of intuition, not the 
subjective necessity of apprehension, but the objective 



RATIONAL INTUITION. 41 

necessity apprehended, is not an object of consciousness, 
nor is it derived from experience. Cause, for example, 
transcends experience; but its necessity is apprehended 
by the act of rational intuition, on the condition that 
the mind has knowledge of the reality of an event. 

2d. Intuitions are derived from the experience of the race. 
According to this tiieory, that which has been found by 
experience to be universally true, has been so impressed 
on the race that the tendency to believe it has been 
transmitted in the form of necessary belief called intui- 
tion. This theory concedes the fact that this belief seems 
to the individual to be intuitive, though asserting that it 
was originally derived from experience. There are, how- 
ever, many things know^n by experience, as the succes- 
sive phases of the moon, which, though conformable to 
universal experience, are never considered as knowm 
by rational intuition, since they are destitute of the 
character of necessity. Experience deals with contingent 
phenomena; but rational intuition apprehends the neces- 
sity of their conditions. 

3d. Intuitions are innate. According to this theory, in- 
tuitions are born with us, ready for use as occasion may 
require. It is evident, however, that, though the intui- 
tive faculty is innate, intuitions, as products, are not 
innate. In all knowledge there is a subjective factor 
wdiich is supplied by innate power. Intuitions, as prod- 
ucts, are judgments expressing the necessity of the con- 
ditions of events, and can not, therefore, exist prior to 
the experience of events, and hence can not be innate. 

4th. Intuitions are the products of a rational faculty. 
This is the true theory. On the condition that phe- 
nomena are experienced in consciousness, the rational 
power, by direct insight, apprehends the necessity of 
their conditions. The intuitive power acts whenever the 
conditions of its action are present. Thus, whenever 

Psy.-l. 



42 PSYCHOLOGY, 

there is knowledge of the occurrence of an event, ra- 
tional intuition apprehends the necessity of its cause. 

3. Criteria of rational intuitions. — These are the fol- 
io win fj^: 

1st. Self -evidence. Their truth is apprehended as self- 
evident by the immediate insight of the intuitive power. 

2d. Logical priority. They are not derivable. Since 
they are immediately apprehended, they need no proof 
In fact, there is nothing clearer from which they can be 
derived; hence, they possess the characteristic of logical 
priority. 

3d. Universality. Intuitions are universally accepted, 
if not consciously, as abstract principles, yet unconsciously 
in concrete applications. A person may not be able to 
grasp, in its utmost generality, the full meaning of the 
proposition, Every event must have a cause; yet he seeks 
for the cause of a particular event of which he has ex- 
perience, thus assuming that it has a cause, and, virtu- 
ally, that every event has a cause. Another meaning 
may be assigned to the universality of intuitions — they 
are true at all times and in all places. 

4th. Necessity. Intuitions, as acts, apprehend their ob- 
jects as necessary, and their contradictories as impossi- 
ble. As products, they are necessarily true. The intel- 
lect is also necessitated to affirm them, by the constitu- 
tion of the intuitive power. 

4. Conditions of rational intuitions. — ^ These are the 
following: 

1st. The objective condition — the reality whose neces- 
sity is the object of intuition. The act is impossible 
without the object. The reality of the object is involved 
in its necessity. 

2d. The subjective condition — the inmate power to ap- 
prehend the necessity of the reality. The act is imj)os- 
sible without the power. 



RATIONAL INTUITION. 43 

3d. The empirical condition — the experience of a phe- 
nomenon in consciousness, or in general, the knowledge 
of an event. An event being known, the innate power 
of intuition apprehends, by direct insight, the necessity 
of its condiiions. 

6. Reality and validity of rational intuitions. — The 
reality of intuitions is attested by consciousness, but not 
the validity. We know by consciousness that intuitions 
are actual^ not that they are true. The validity of in- 
tuitions is thus shown : 

1st. The common sense of mankind asserts their validity. 

2d. They never conflict, but alwaj^s harmonize. 

3do They are free from the usual vsources of error, 
since they are not deductions from complicated processes, 
but are immediate apprehensions of the intuitive power. 

4th. If they are not valid, our faculties are decej^tive, 
and knowledge is impossible. 

5th. Demonstration implies the validity of intuitions. 
There is either an ultimate basis or an infinite series of 
dependent propositions. But there can be no demonstra- 
tion by means of an infinite series of dependent propo- 
sitions; for, to prove one proposition b}^ others, and those 
by others, and so on in a regressive series, ad infinitum.^ 
would require infinite time, and is, therefore, impossible. 
Hence, demonstration implies an ultimate basis, ^ow, 
this basis, being ultimate, is not derived through any 
thing else. It must, therefore, be an assumption, without 
evidence, or an intuition. It can not be an assumption, 
for then it would not be known to be true, and might 
be false, and demonstration would be impossible. The 
ultimate basis, must, therefore, be an intuition ; and the 
demonstration is valid only on the condition that the 
intuition is valid. Hence, the validity of demonstration 
implies the validity of intuition. 

The above proof is not absolute ; but it shows that if 



44 PSYCHOLOGY. 

demonstration is possible, intuitions are valid. We are 
not, however, authorized to demand assent to a proposi- 
tion on the ground that it is an intuition, unless it ex- 
hibits the tests of an intuition, as given in the criteria. 

An intuition is not a chimera, but is a valid judgment; 
hence, the falsity of the opinion of Diderot^ that : " In the 
last analysis, every idea is resolved into a representative 
picture addressed to the senses; and since every thing in 
our understanding has come to it through sensation, so 
every thing from the understanding, which can not re- 
attach itself to some sensible archetype, is chimerical and 
void of meaning. Hence, it is an important rule in phi- 
losophy, that every expression for which we can not find 
an external and sensible object must be rejected as hav- 
ing no significance." 

To the maxim, "There is nothing in the intellect which 
was not before in the sense," Leibnitz added, "except 
the intellect itself; " and it may also be added, except in- 
tuitions with their logical consequents. 

6. Summary statemonts. — By the act of the faculty 
of rational intuition, the intellect immediately apprehends 
fundamental necessary truth, and embodies the product in 
the form of a judgment. 

Events are known by experience; but the impossibility 
of events without conditions, or the necessity of conditions 
to the occurrence of events is known bv rational intuition. 

The experience of events is the chronological antece- 
dent of the intuition of the necessity of conditions. But 
the conditions are the logical antecedents of the events. 

Intuitions are not derived from the experience either 
of the individual or of the race, neither are they innate, 
but the}' are the products of a rational faculty." 

The criteria of rational intuitions are self-evidence, log- 
ical priority, universality, and necessity. 

The conditions of rational intuitions ar^ necessary re- 



RATIONAL INTUITION, 45 

ality, the innate power of intuition, and the experience 
of phenomena. 

The reality of intuitions is attested by consciousness; 
but their validity is maintained by common sense, by 
their harmony, by their freedom from the usual sources 
of error, by the veracity of our faculties, by the requisites 
of knowledge, and by the fact of demonstration. 

7. Classifications of conditions. — Conditions are classi- 
fied as non-dynamical — those not involving power, and 
dynamical — those involving power. Non-dynamical con- 
ditions are divided into universal and special ; and dynam- 
ical conditions, into substance and cause. 



CHAPTER lY. , 

INTUITIONS CONTINUED. 

1. Universal conditions. — The imiversal iion-dynam- 
ical conditions are those implied by every phenomenon. 
They are divided into the negative condition and the 
positive conditions. 

1st. The negative condition is the absence of counteract- 
ing influences. The occurrence of any event implies the 
absence of preventing causes. Thus, the fall of a body 
implies the absence of support. 

2d. The positive conditions are time and space. 

(1) Time is that in which things persist or succession 
takes place. The fact of succession, that phenomena ap- 
pear, vanish, und are followed by other phenomena, as 
attested by consciousness, implies time, or that in which 
succession takes place. Intuition apprehends the impos- 
sibility of succession without time, or the necessity of. 
time as a condition of succession. 

Any phenomenon involves the date of its occurrence 
and the duration of its continuance. The date answei^s 
the question, when? — the duration, the question, how long? 
Tlie date determines the time of the occurrence; the du- 
ration measures the period of the continuance. 

Any number of events may have the same date and 
duration ; hence, no event excludes another from the time 
through which it continues. Two events are simultane- 
ous if they have the same date and duration ; they are 
successive, if one precedes and the other follows imme- 
diately or after an interval more or less prolonged. 
(46) 



NON-DYNAMICAL CONDITIONS. 47 

The present is that moment, inappreciably small in du- 
ration, which separates the past, or time that has been, 
from the future, or time that will be. As the moment of 
division between the past and the future, the present per- 
petually vanishes into the last moment of the past, and 
is instantly renewed by the first moment of the future. 
Hence, the present is virtually a moving date; for it has 
coincided, in succession, with every date of past time, and 
it will coincide, in succession, with every date of future 
time. In consequence of the movement of the present, 
the period from any past date to the present is contin- 
ually increasing, and the period from the present to any 
future date is continually decreasing; hence, the past 
receives continual increments, and the future suffers con- 
tinual decrements. The present is the only time that 
is; the past has vanished; the future has not yet come. 

The necessary truths pertaining to time, as apprehended 
by rational intuition, are the follow^ing: 

1) Time is that in which things persist or succession 
takes place. As the condition of persistence and succes- 
sion, subjective and objective, time is not only a form of 
thought, but it is an objective reality. 

2) Time has three divisions — the past, the present, 
and the future. 

3) There is no date in past time not preceded by a 
previous date, and no date in future time not succeeded 
by a subsequent date ; hence, the past has no beginning 
and the future no end; that is, time is not finite, and is, 
therefore, infinite. 

4) The present, as a moving date, has coincided, in 
succession, with every date in past time, and will, in like 
manner, coincide with every date in future time; it is 
perpetually the termination of the past and the beginning 
of the future; and, though an infinitesimal in duration, it 
pervades all space, and hence is omnipresent. 



48 PSYCHOLOGY. 

5) Having no beginning, time was never created, and 
having no end, it will never be destroyed; it is neither a 
cause nor an eifect ; it neither exerts *ior deceives energy. 
The statement, "Time works great changes," is poetic, 
not philosophic. Causes effect changes in time. Were 
every thing in time annihilated, time itself would remain 
an absolute void. 

6) The one infinite time is homogeneous, continuous, 
and infinitel}^ divisible, and contains all the different 
periods of time; and these periods are not simultaneous 
but successive, and their dates are relativelv fixed. 

7) Events occur in time and are simultaneous or suc- 
cessive; and successive events, though otherwise alike, 
may be distinguished by their dates, which are relatively 
fixed. 

8) Time is not directly measurable in itself, but is in- 
directly measurable by motion. 

9) As a condition of succession, time is a condition of 
all mental or physical activity, and is, therefore, a condi- 
tion of every art, science, or product of human thought 
or effort. 

(2) Space is that in which bodies are situated and mo- 
tion takes place. Bodies imply space as their necessary 
condition. But how did we reach the idea of body as an 
extended thing? In endea\oring to account for this, let 
us begin with the experience of a simple sensation, which, 
if it be unextended — that is, if it does not occupy space, 
is nevertheless located, th^-t is, it is situated somewhere in 
space. Like a point, ii. .vS position, if not magnitude. 
The location of a sensation is, however, not always clearly 
apprehended, even after the idea of space has been devel- 
oped, but, prior to this, is not apprehended at all. A suc- 
cession of sensations, though eliciting the idea of time, 
does not evoke that of space. 

The discrimination of similar simultaneous sensations. 



NON-DYNAMICAL CONDITIONS, 41) 

by an act of reflection, is a fact whose reality is attested 
by consciousness. But how is this discrimination possi- 
ble ? The rational mind, guided alone \)j the idea of 
time, could not account for the fact, but would decide 
that the sensations ought to blend together as one indis- 
tinguishable sensation. They are, however, discriminated 
as two sensations. Eational intuition, in its endeavor to 
account for the possibility of the discrimination, appre- 
hends the necessity of their reciprocal externality. The 
impossibility of discriminating such sensation^;, if located 
at the same point, is the necessity of their reciprocal ex- 
ternality, as the condition of their discrimination. 

Sensations, as reciprocallj^ external, reveal an extended 
sensorium ; and the sensorium, as extended, leads to the 
knowledge of the organism, or bod}^, as extended. Ad- 
mitting the existence of our. own bodies as extended, we 
are not warranted in denying the existence of other bod- 
ies, as also extended. But body, as extended, implies 
space, or that in which the body is situated, as its neces- 
sary condition. 

A body, as extended, occupies space, and excludes other 
bodies from the space which it occupies. A body not 
only occupies space, but is surrounded by space on all 
sides, since another body may be external to the first, on 
any side of it, and this other body occupies space. 

Space is the condition of motion as well as of bodj^; 
and since motion is possible in any direction, and, by 
familiar experience, is found ^^ be actual, space extends 
indefinitely in all directions. 

The necessary truths pertaining to space, as appre- 
hended b}^ rational intuition, are the following.: 

1) Space is that in which bodies are situated or mo- 
tion takes place. As a condition of body and motion, 
space is not only a subjective form of thought, but is an 
objective reality. 



Psy.— o. 



50 PSYCHOLOGY, 

2) Space has three dimensions — length, breadth, and 
thickness. 

3) Space has no limit beyond which there is no space; 
hence, space is not finite, and is, therefore, infinite. 

4) Space, though infinite in extent, exists in the in- 
finitesimal present, which is a moving date ; hence, space 
persists throughout infinite time, and is, therefore, eternal. 

5) Having no beginning, space Avas never created, and 
having no end, it will never be destroyed; it is neither 
a cause nor an effect; it neither exerts nor receives en- 
ergy. Were every thing in space annihilated, space itself 
would remain an infinite and absolute void. 

6) The one infinite space is homogeneous, continuous, 
and infinitely divisible, and contains all the different 
portions of space; and these portions are not successive, 
but simultaneous, and their positions are relatively fixed. 

7) Bodies exist in space, and are at rest or in motion, 
and those otherwise alike may be distinguished hj their 
positions, which are not relatively fixed. 

8) Space is directly measurable in itself, and indi- 
rectly measurable by motion. 

9) As a condition of body and motion, space is a 
condition of every thing involving body or motion. 

Let these statements be compared with the 'corres- 
ponding ones concerning time. 

Space is a subjective law of thought in this sense, — that 
we are under the necessity of thinking that bodies are 
contained in space; but it is an objective reality in this 
sense, — if there were no mind, space would still be the 
room in which bodies might exist and move. 

Space, then, is not nothing; it is extension. It may 
be said with Prof Bowne, Metaphysics^ page 182: '^ If 
this distinction between space and nothing is to be 
maintained, space must be able in some way to assert 
itself as a determining factor in the system of things. 



NON-DYNAMICAL CONDITIONS. 51 

No matter how nameless or ineffable a substratum we 
may assume for space, this demand can not be escaped." 
The reply is, that being ^ in the sense of substance involv- 
ing power, is not the highest genus in the universe of 
realities, for reality itself is a higher genus, embracing 
both non-dynamic reality with its subdivisions, space, 
and time, and dynamic reality with its subdivisions, 
matter and spirit. To say all reality is dynamic is to 
beg the question at issue, by assuming that which is 
neither self-evident nor capable of proof, but which con- 
tradicts one of the clearest of our rational intuitions. 

2. Special conditions. — The special non-dynamical 
conditions are the conditions of valid thought and the 
guarantees of truth. They are the fundamental laws of 
thought and the axioms of the various sciences. 

The form of an intuition is a judgment, and the ex- 
pression of a judgment is a proposition. A judgment 
arises from a comparison of two objects of thought, and 
the proposition expresses the decision of the judgment, 
by affirming or denying that a certain relation exists 
between these objects. 

As to yiature^ a proposition is analytic or synthetic. 
An analytic proposition is one which affirms what is in- 
volved in the mere conception of the subject, or denies 
what conflicts with such conception. Thus, a body is 
extended; the whole is the sum of the parts; a square 
is not round, etc. A synthetic proposition is one which 
affirms what is not involved in the mere conception of 
the subject, or denies what is not inconsistent with such 
conception. Thus, an ellipse is a conic section. This 
body is not hard. 

As to relation^ any two propositions are congruent or 
conflictive, and conflictive propositions are contraries or 
contradictories. 

Contrary propositions are conflictive propositions which 



52 PSYCHOLOGY. 

are not universally inclusive — other conflictive proposi- 
tions relating to the same things being possible. Thus, 
the propositions, a is equal to 6, and a is less than 6, 
are contraries, since they are conflictives, and another 
proposition, a is greater than ^, is possible. 

Contradictory propositions are conflictive propositionF 
which are universally inclusive — no other conflictive 
propositions of the kind, relating to the same things, be- 
ing possible. Thus, a and h are equal, and a and b are 
unequal. 

1st. The fundamental laws of thought relate either to 
the harmony of thought or to the sequence of thought. 

The laws relating to the harmony of thought are the 
following : 

(1) The law of identity. This law is variously stated, 
positively and negatively, thus : A thing is itself; a thing 
is not any thing else than itself ^ is ^ ; ^ is not non-A. 
A thing is what it is; a thing is not what it is not. 
The whole is equivalent to the sum of all its parts; the 
whole is not inequivalent to the sum of all its parts. 

The law of identity has a special application to a defi- 
nition, the subject and predicate of which are identical 
in fact, though not in expression, since what is involved 
in the subject is evolved in the predicate. 

Consequence. What is involved in any thing may be 
affirmed of that thing, and any thing conflictive may 
be denied. 

(2) The law of congruents. The congruity of two jnopo- 
sitions is consistent with the truth of hoth^ ivith the falsity 
of bothy or with the truth of either and. the falsity of the 
other. Thus, a and b are unequal, and a is greater than 
/>, are congruents. Both are true, if b is less than a; 
both false, if b is equal to a; one true and the other 
false, if 6 is greater than a. 

Consec[uence. From mere congruence, the truth or 



NON-DYNAMTCAL CONDITIONS. 53 

falsity of either of two propositions can not be inferred 
from either the truth or the falsity of the other. 

(3) The law of conflictives. Two conflictive propositions 
can not both he true. For, whether contraries or contra- 
dictories, they are incompatible ; hence, if both were true, 
the truth of each would involve the falsity of the other, 
and both would be false ; then each is both true and false, 
or a truth is. a falsity, which contradicts the negative 
part of the law of indentity — that a thing is not any 
thing else than itself. Thus, the propositions, this tree 
is an oak, and the same tree is a walnut, are con- 
flictives, and both can not be true. 

Consequences. 1) If one of two conflictives is true, 
the other is false. 2) Two true propositions can not be 
conflictive. 3) All truths exist in harmony. 4) A prop- 
osition is false, if it involves the conflictive of a truth. 

The law of conflictives is commonly called the law of 
contradiction. It follows as a corollary from the nega- 
tive part of the law of identity. As a law of the genus 
conflictives^ it is applicable to both species, contraries 
and contradictories, w^hich also have special laws. 

(4) The law of contraries. Two contrary propositions can 
not both he true, hut may both he false. For since they are 
conflictives, both can not be true; and since they are 
contraries, they are not universally inclusive; hence, 
other cases are possible, and both may be false. Thus, 
the propositions, a is equal to h, and a is greater than 
6, are contraries; both can not be true, but both may 
be false, since a may be less than h. 

Consequences. 1) The truth of either of two contra- 
ries involves the falsity of the other. 2) The falsity of 
either of two contraries does not involve the truth of the 
other. 

(5) The law of contradictories. Two contradictory prop- 
ositions can not both be true, nor both false. For, since 



54 PSYCHOLOGY, 

they are conflictives, both can not be true; and since 
they are contradictories, they are universally inclusive; 
hence, no other cases are possible, and both can not be 
false. Thus, the propositions, a and 6, are equal, and a 
and h are unequal, are contradictories; both can not be 
true, nor both false. 

Consequences. 1) One of two contradictories is true 
and the other false. 2) The truth of either of two 
contradictories involves the falsity of the other. 3) The 
falsity of either of two contradictories involves the truth 
of the other. 

The law of contradictories is commonly called the law 
of excluded middle, since any middle supposition is ex- 
cluded. 

This law has a special application to the two proposi- 
tions, one affirming that an object of a genus belongs to 
one of the two contradictory species of a genus, and the 
other affirming that it belongs to the other species. 
Thus, let A be a genus divided into the two contradic- 
tory species, B and (7, and let D be an object in A. 
Then, the propositions, D is ^, and D is 6\ are contra- 
dictories; hence, D is either B or C; if it is one, it is not 
the other; and if it is not one, it is the other. Thus, 
since the genus propositions may be divided into the 
contradictory species, true propositions and false propo- 
sitions, any proposition is either true or false; if it is 
true, it is not false; and if it is false, it is not true. 
What is involved in a true proposition is also true; but 
what is involved in a false proposition may be either 
trne or false. 

The truth of the laws of harmony has been denied 
by certain philosophers, notably by Heraclitus and Hegel. 
Thus, Ferrier, in his History of Greek Philosophy, says, 
in his article on Heraclitus: ''Opposite determinations 
are not only compatible in the same object, but they are 



J. 



NON-DYNAMICAL CONDITIONS. 55 



even necessary to the constitution of every object. . . . 
How does a thing get out of one state into another? 
Because, says Heraclitus, in being in the state in which 
it is, it is already out of it. Being in it is being out of 

it; and being out of it is being in another The two 

moments, the moment of being in it, and the moment 
of being out of it, are one, and constitute one indivisible 
conception of becoming 

" Suppose the changing states of an object to be rep- 
resented by A^ B, (7, D, etc. The state A appears, and 
in appearing disappears. A's disappearance is the ap- 
pearance of Bj which, in like manner, disappears in the 
very act of appearing; but B's disappearance is the ap- 
pearance of (7, which no sooner appears than it vanishes 
into D, and so on. Kow, here the moments of being 
and not being are inseparable. A's being is A's not- 
being; A's not-being is B's being; B's being is ^'s not- 
being; B's not-being is C's being, and so on. 

"Let us try the other alternative — A's being is not 
A's not-being, because, on this supposition being and 
not-being are held asunder as separate conceptions; and 
neither is A's not-being, or disappearance, B's being, or 
appearance. Our supposition is, that appearance, or be- 
ing, and disappearance, or not-being, are separate con- 
cepts, and, therefore, we must not suppose that the dis- 
appearance of A is the appearance of B What, 

then, happens ? This happens, that there is an interval 
between the appearance or being of A and the appear- 
ance or being of B, in which the thing is in no state at 

all And this is the ridiculous and contradictor v 

conclusion to which we are driven, if we suppose change 
to take place by leaps, and that being and not-being, in- 
stead of being mere elements of one indivisible concep- 
tion, are themselves distinct and completed conceptions." 

This view arises from a misconception of what the 



56 PSYCHOLOGY, 

laws of harmony require. Absolute being and absolute 
not-being are certainly incompatible; so also are the 
being of A^ and, at the same instant, the not-being of 
A; but the not-being of A is not incompatible with the 
being of B^ though not identical with it, since in place 
of the being of B^ there might be the being of (7, or of 
D, or of E^ etc. 

There is truth in the view of Ileraclitus that things 
do not remain for a definite time in a fixed state, and 
then change by a sudden leap. The change is continu- 
ous, though the rate of change may be variable. But 
it is not true that a thing is in a state and not in that 
state precisely at the same instant. The thing, however, 
does not rest in that state, but passes through it. 

It is easy to reduce the Heraclitean view to an ab- 
surdity. Thus, to take a case chosen by Ferrier himself, 
let the temperature of water, at the successive moments, 
as it is raised from the freezing to the boiling point, be 

denoted by A, B, 0, D Then, according to Ferrier, 

"^1'5 being is A's not-being; A's not-being is B's being; 
B's being is B's not-being; B's not-being is C's being, 
and so on." Also, according to this view, the water in 
the state A is already out of it. " The two moments, the 
moment of being in it, and the moment of being out of 
it, are one;" and since "being out of it is , being in an- 
other," the water is in the states A and B at the same 
moment. For like reasons, it is, at the very same mo- 
ment, in the states B and C, and, at precisely the same 
moment, in the states D, BJ, etc., to the boiling jDoint. 
Hence, the water is freezing and boiling at the very 
same moment, and at the same time has all intermediate 
temperatures ! 

This consequence is fairly deduced from the premises; 
whereas the absurdity, that a body is, for a time, in no 
state at all, was deduced by Ferrier on the false assump- 



NON-D YNA MFC A L CON I) I TIONS. 57 

tion that the law of identity requires us to hold that not- 
A is incompatible with B. 

The laws relating- to the sequence of thouglit, called the 
laws of Reason and Consequent^ are the following: 

(1) No judgment is warranted icithont a sufficient reason. 
We know by intuition that a reason is necessary to war- 
rant a judgment, but not what the reason is, unless the 
judgment is intuitive. 

(2) To affirm the reason is to affirm the consequent. Thus, 
to affirm that A has the fever is to affirm that he is sick. 

(3) To deny the consequent is to deny the reason. Thus, 
to deny that A is sick is to deny that he has the fever. 

" (4) To'deny a particular reason is not to deny the conse- 
quent^ but to deny every reason is to deny the consequent. 
Thus, to deny that A has the fever is not to deny that 
he is sick, since he may have some other disease; but to 
deny every disease is to deny that he is sick. 

(5) To affirm the consequent is not- to affirm a specified 
reason, but it is to affirm some reason. Thus, to affirm that 
A is sick is not to affirm that he has the fever, but it is 
to affirm that he has some disease. 

The reason may be simply the reason of knowing — 
ratio cognoscendi, or it m^j also be the reason of being — • 
7^atio essendi ; but the laws of sequence are concerned only 
with the reason, as the reason of knowing, and not with 
the reason, as the reason of being, or the cause, which is 
a dynamical condition. 

2d. The special axioms of the various sciences may be 
illustrated by those of Geometry, the fundamental axiom 
of which is the following : 

Either of two magnitudes identical in any respect is, in 
that respect, a substitute for the other. 

By remembering that similar magnitudes are identical 
in form, that equivalent magnitudes are identical in ex- 
tent, and that equal magnitudes are identical in both 



58 PSYCHOLOGY. 

form and extent, this fundamental axiom can be expli- 
cated into three special axioms. 

(1) The axiom of similarity. Either of two similar magni- 
tudes is, in respect to form, a substitute for the other. 

(2) The axiom of equivalencij. Either of two equivalent 
magnitudes is, in respect to extent, a substitute for the other. 

(3) The axiom of equality. Either of tico equal magni- 
tudes is, in respect to both form and extent, a substitute for 
the other. 

The ordinary so-called axioms of Geometry may be 
deduced from the above as corollaries, [See Schuyler s 
Geometry, Art. 23.] 

The act of substituting one thing for another, renders 
an advance in thought possible; and substitution, ac- 
cording to the axiom, is always legitimate when the two 
magnitudes are identical in respect to the attributes 
under consideration. 

The special axioms may also be illustrated by the 
fundamental axiom of Ethics — Benevolence is the primal 
duty. The necessity of benevolence as the condition of 
the performance of duty is a rational intuition. 



CHAPTER V. 



INTUITIONS CONTINUED. 



1. Substance. — Substance is the substratum or under- 
lying power which manifests conjoined properties or 
qualities. 

Attributes are the conjoined properties or qualities 
which are manifested by a substance. 

Attributes are known by experience. Substance itself 
does not appear — it is not a phenomenon; but on the 
condition of the manifestation of its attributes, its ne- 
cessity is a2:)prehended by rational intuition. Attributes 
imply substance as their ground or source; and sub- 
stance involves attributes as the modes of its existence. 
Attributes are not the manifestations of nothing, but of 
underlying power capable of manifesting them. The 
fact that attributes are conjoined in groups is explained 
by their dependence on a common substance, but is 
otherwise inexplicable. A substance must have attri- 
butes, though not necessarily a specified attribute; for, 
if it exist at all, it must exist in some way, and the modes 
of its existence are its attributes. A substance, through 
the action of other substances, may change its manifes- 
tations ; but the substance of the material universe can 
not be augmented or diminished, except, ab extra, by 
supernatural agency, and the manifestation of attributes, 
without substance, is impossible. 

A tJwig is a substance with its conjoined attributes. 

It is contained in space, and has date and duration in 

(59) 



60 PSYCHOLOOY, 

time. The general attributes of things are quantity, 
quality, relation, and modality. 

A thing has quantity involving unitijj when regarded 
as one whole; plurality ^ when regarded as a substance 
with a multiplicity of attributes; totality ^ when regarded 
as the sum of the substance and conjoined attributes. 

A thing has quality involving existence and identity. 
Existence as opposed to non-existence involves reality as 
opposed to non-reality^ something as opposed to nothimj^ 
or entity the negation of non-entity. It is not possible 
for a thing to be and, at the same time, not to be. 
Identity, or the fact that a thing is itself and nothing 
else, involves peculiarity, or the positive attributes char- 
acteristic of the thing, and particularity, or the negative 
of the positive characteristics peculiar to other things, 
though it may have other attributes in common with 
those things. 

A thing has relation, involving the inherence of its 
attributes in the substance in j^erjoetual time; causality, 
when it is the cause of an effect, or the effect of a cause 
in successive time; reciprocity, when acting or reacting 
in simultaneous time. 

Modality is the view of a thing tiUven by the mind as 
influenced by the evidence relating to its reality. It 
embraces the following couples: Necessity, when the 
thing must be, or contingency, when the thing is actual 
or possible, but not necessary; probability, when the ev- 
idence of its reality overbalances the evidence of its 
unreality, or inqjrob ability, when the evidence of its un- 
reality overbalances the evidence of its reality; possibility, 
when the evidence does not absolutely exclude its real- 
ity, or impossibility, when the evidence absolutely ex- 
cludes its reality; certainty, wlien the evidence excludes 
doubt, or uncertainty, when the evidence does not ex- 
clude doubt. 



DYNAMICAL CONDITIONS, 01 

Substance is divided into matter and spirit. Mailer 
is an extended substance. It occupies space, and is 
contained in space, and continues in time. As occupy- 
ing space, it has magnitude, and form, and ultimate in- 
compressibility. As contained in space, it has location 
and mobility. As continuing through a period of time, 
it has date and duration. Sjnrit is that sul)stance which 
is endowed with intellect, sensibility, or will. If a spirit 
does not occupy space, it is nevertheless contained in 
space, and has locality and mobility. As contained in 
time, a spirit has date and duration. 

It follows, from the fundamental laws of thought, that 
two congruent attributes may both be present in the 
same thing, or both absent, or either may be present 
and the other absent, and that the presence or absence 
of either does not involve either the presence or the 
absence of the other; that two conflictive attributes can 
not both be present in the same thing, and that if 
either is present, the other is absent; that two contrary 
attributes can not both be present, but may both be ab- 
sent, that the presence of either involves the absence of 
the other, but tliat the absence of either does not involve 
the presence of the other; that two contradictory at- 
tributes can not both be present in the same thing, 
nor both absent, that the presence of either involves the 
absence of the other, and that the absence of either in- 
volves the presence of the other. 

2. Cause. — A cause is that which produces an event. 
An event is that which comes to pass or takes place. 
It is a change either in the elements of a thing or in 
its relations to other things. An effect is an event pro- 
duced by a cause. 

1st. Kinds of causes. Aristotle distinguishes four kinds 
of causes — formal, material, etiicient, and final. 

The formal cause of a thing is the essential character- 



62 PSYCHOLOGY, 

istic which distinguishes it from other things. Thus, 
the plan of a house is its formal cause, since it distin- 
guishes it from other objects. 

The material cause is the matter out of whicih a thing 
is made. Thus, iron is the material cause of a stove. 

The efficient cause is the force, energy, or exertion of 
power which produces a thing, or changes its place or 
state. Thus, a blow from a bat is an efficient cause 
which will change the direction of a moving ball. 

The final cause is the end or purpose which the thing 
la designed to subserve. Thus, vision is the final cause 
of the eye. 

A cause is said to be imminent when it exists and 
operates within the thing itself It is identical with the 
formal cause. 

A cause is transcendent^ or transeunt^ when it goes 
beyond that in which it inheres and acts upon other 
things, ab extra. It is identical with the efficient cause. 

The word cause is sometimes used to denote simply 
an immediate and invariable antecedent, exclusive of the 
idea of efficiency. This view improperly identifies cause 
with a non-dynamical condition, and resolves the rela- 
tion of cause and effect into that of antecedence and 
consequence, that is, into a law of sequence. Thus, a 
law of nature is a general fact embracing a multitude 
of particular facts. A law when known enables us to 
predict the particular fact. It is not a cause of the 
facts, but a cause of our knowing them — not a ratio 
essendi, but a ratio cognoscendi. 

The word cause is also used improperly in the sense 
of instrument, as when it is said, a pistol was the cause 
of the man's death. The pistol was the instrument, 
while the one who fired it was the cause. 

The signification of the word cause is sometimes en- 
larged so as to embrace, not only that which is efficient 



DYNAMICAL CONDITIONS, 63 

in producing the event, but also all antecedent condi- 
tions, wliether dynamical or non-dynamical; in short, 
whatever is necessary to the occurrence of the event. 
Thus, Mill says: "The cause, philosophically speaking, is 
the sum total of the conditions, positive and negative, 
taken together; the whole of the contingencies of every 
description, which, being realized, the consequent invari- 
ably follows." 

It is best, however, to restrict the application of the 
word cause to those dynamical conditions which conspire 
to produce an event, and to employ the word conditions 
to signify all necessary antecedents, both negative and 
positive, includiag the cause. 

According to this view, a cause is a condition, that is, 
it is indispensable to the event; but a condition is not 
necessarily a cause. Thus space is a condition but not a 
cause of motion. The relation of cause to condition is 
that of species to its genus. Cause is that dynamical 
condition which produces an event. 

Of the various senses of the word cause, the efficient 
cause is the one which corresponds to the popular notion, 
and this is the sense in wdnch the word is here used. By 
using the w^ord condition to denote any necessary ante- 
cedent, positive or negative, dynamical or non -dynamical, 
and the word cause to denote the sum total of the d}"- 
namical conditions, the philosophical and popular signifi- 
cations of these terms are brought into harmony, which 
is a result greatly to be desired. 

Causes are to be distinguished from reasons, which as 
intellectual, moral, or spiritual influences, are either the 
grounds of inference or the motives for volition. 

As grounds of inference, reasons influence the judg- 
ment, and, according to their strength, warrant the con- 
clusion as probable or certain. 

As motives of volition, reasons, though causes of 



64 PSYCHOLOGY, 

desires, are conditions but not causes of volition. They 
solicit, but do not compel volition. The cause of volition 
is the will itself When several forces, as causes of mo- 
tion, act upon a body, the eifect is the resultant of the 
combination of causes; but when different ]notives solicit 
action in different directions, the will, in deciding to 
act in accordance with the solicitations of one of these 
motives, sets aside the others. Volition is, therefore, not 
the resultant of motives, but is the act of the will in 
view of motives. 

Effects, as events, are known by experience. An event 
being known by experience, the conditional necessity of 
a cause as that which produced the event, is known by 
rational intuition. That there is a cause is known by 
intuition; what the cause is, is known by investigation. 

An event being given, its cause is necessary; but the 
supposed event not being a reality, either the cause or 
some other antecedent is not only not necessary, but 
not actual; for if all the antecedent conditions, including 
the cause, were actual, the event would be necessitated. 
The cause is, therefore, not absolutely, but conditionally 
necessary — it is necessary on the condition that there 
is an event. 

An event, as known by experience, is regarded as 
contingent; but the cause and all other antecedent con- 
ditions being given, the event is necessary; that is, the 
character of the cause and other conditions determines 
the nature of the effect; but since the cause is not abso- 
lutely necessary, the event is not absolutely necessary. 

2d. Laws of causality. These are the following: 

(1) Every event must have a cause. 

(2) The eff'ect is always complex, 

(3) The cause is always complex. 

(4) The complexity of the cause is proportionate to 
the complexity of the effect. 



DYNAMICAL CONDITIONS, C5 

(5) Like causes and conditions are followed by like 

effects. 

The first of these laws is, Every event must have a eause; 
that is, every event is an effect. This law is sometimes 
stated. Every effect must have a cause; but this state- 
ment is tautological; for, by definition, an effect is that 
which is produced by a cause; hence, the statement. 
Every effect has a cause, is equivalent to the statement, 
Every thing which is produced by a cause is produced 
by a cause. But an event is that which comes to pass 
or takes place; and though it is true that every event 
has a cause, yet this is not implied in the word itself. 

The theories concerning the origin of the first law, re- 
garded as a causal judgment, are the following: 

1) This judgment has its origin in the perception of cause. 
The first objection to this theory is that we have no 
such perception. This is now generally admitted. AVe 
perceive an event, but not the energy which produces 
the event. 

The second objection is that, if we had such a percep- 
tion, it could not, as a matter of experience, relating 
only to particular cases, account for the universality and 
necessity found in the judgment of causality — that every 
event must have a cause. 

2) The casual judgment has its origin in a consciousness 
of causal efficiency. It is true, for example, that we are 
conscious of the volition to move the hand ; that we are 
conscious of making an effort to move it; and that we 
are conscious of perceiving the hand move ; but we are 
not conscious of the mode in which the effort produces 
the effect. AYe know not what intermediate ai^encies 
there may be between the effort and the effect. 

In the consciousness of effort, we find that there is 
something more in cause than mere antecedence. Here, 
perhaps, Ave have consciousness, not of cause or iiower 

Psy.-(}. 



eQ PSYCHOLOGY. 

itself, but of the exertion of the power in a partieular 
case, though not of the mode of its producing the effect. 
But this does not account for the universality aud ne- 
cessity found in the judgment of causality. 

3) TTie judgment of causality is attained by induct io7i. 
According to this theory we find that events have causes 
in particular cases, and hence infer that they have 
causes in all cases. But as we do not perceive causes 
in particular cases, as we have before seen, but only 
succession, we have no facts to warrant the induction, 
unless we resolve the relation of cause and effect, as 
Hume has done, into that of antecedent and consequent. 
But should we do so, the fact would be, that, so far as 
observed, every event has an antecedent, or every event 
is a consequent; hence, by induction, it is inferred that 
all events, observed or unobserved, have antecedents. 
But such inductions give us probability only, not neces- 
sity. Hence, the causal judgment is not derived from 
induction, since this judgment affirms, as we shall see, 
the necessity of an efficient cause, not the probability 
of an antecedent. 

4) The principle of causality is derived from association 
or custom. If this theory be true, the conviction is a 
growth, and should have degrees; but the conviction is 
as strong when the law is first apprehended as ever 
afterwards. Association, custom, or habit can not ac- 
count for a necessary principle. 

5) The principle of causality is the product of a special 
faculty. There is no necessity of referring the causal 
judgment to a special faculty whose only office is to 
affirm this judgment ; for rational intuition, which affirms 
the necessity of other a priori truths, is competent to 
affirm this also. 

6) The principle of causality is derived from the expec- 
tation of the uniformity of nature. But this expectation 



DYNAMICAL CONDITIONS. 67 

gives only the probable, not the necessary; and does 
not, therefore, give us the causal judgment. 

7) The principle of causality is derived from the law of 
contradiction. This is impossible; for, though under this 
law, more properly called the law of conflictives, we can 
reason from affirmation to denial, yet we can not reason 
from denial to affirmation. 

8) The principle of causality is derived from the law of 
the conditioned. This is the opinion of Hamilton, who 
derives the principle of causality, not from a potency^ 
but from an impotency of mind. "It is the inability 
we experience of annihilating, in thought, an existence 
in time past, in other words, our utter impotence of 
conceiving its absolute commencement, that constitutes 
and explains the whole phenomenon of causality." Bow- 
en's Hamilton's Metaphysics, page 554. 

It will be observed that Hamilton rejects an absolute 
commencement on account of its inconceivability; but if an 
absolute commencement is rejected, a cause for every event 
must be admitted ; hence, there never was a time when 
there was absolutely nothing, since, on that supposition, 
there must have been an absolute commencement. Eter- 
nal existence is, therefore, a reality ; but eternal exist- 
ence is inconceivable. The mind is impotent to conceive 
the eternal. Now, if we derive a principle from this 
impotence, according to Hamilton's method, and reject 
the fact of eternal existence, because it is inconceivable, 
we must admit its contradictory — that there must have 
been an absolute commencement. If an absolute com- 
mencement can be rejected on the ground of its incon- 
ceivability, and its contradictory affirmed — that every 
event must have a cause, and hence that there must 
have been eternal existence, then, certainly, we are au- 
thorized to reject eternal existence on the ground of its 
inconceivability^ and to affirm its contradictory — an abso- 



08 PSY(JirOL()(JV. 

lute commoricemont; hut this «(3t8 aside the hiw of enn- 
sulity, whieh is, therefore, hy Haniilton's owd method, 
shown not to be rieeessary. This method must, therefore, 
he eharaeterized as "impotent," since it fails to account 
for the necessity of the law of causality, as we are at 
liberty to choose hetween the two inconceivahle alter- 
natives. The universal rejection hy mankind of one of 
these inconceivahle alternatives, and the acceptance of the 
other, |)rov(^s that the ground of the rejection is not its 
inconceiva})ility. 

l)j Tlic inipossihllity of an ahHolutc conimenceynent is 
krurwn hij rational intuition^ and hence the necessity of its 
contradict or ij — t/uit encrfj event must /taoe a, cause. It is 
true that we can not conceive the eternal. The imag- 
ination is not competent to deal with the infinite. In- 
tuition ordy has this j)Ower. Though the imagination 
can not grasp the eternal, it is yet ahle to see that there 
is no past date, however I'cmote, ])efore which there 
mi<i:ht not have been heinic. The ima<j:ination can not, 
thei'cfore, deny the eternal, and there is no other ficuUy 
which can. Ori the other hand, intuition has ])ositive 
power to know that an ahsolute commencement is im- 
possihle. 7^V>r, fjrfore a thing is, it can not act, and can 
not, therefore, bring itself into existence ; if it does act, it 
already is, and hence does not bring itself into existence. 

The propositions. There is an absolute commencement, 
and Every event must have a cause, are virtually contradic- 
tories, as has hefore heen shown ; but the falsity of either 
of two contradictories, is logically identical with the 
truth of the other; hence, the impossibility of an abso- 
lute commc^ncement, that is, that an event can take place 
without a cause, is the necessity that every event must 
have a cause. 

In estahlishing the law of causality, we do not employ 
th(; law of conflictives, or, as it is commonly called, the 



DYNAMICAL CONDITIONS. 69 

law of contradiction ; for, under this law, tlioiii^h wc can 
pasH from tlic affii'rnation of cither of two confiictivcB to 
the denial of the other, yet we can not pass from the 
denial of either, to the affirmation of the other; but 
this we can do under tiie law of contradictories, com- 
monly called the law of excluded middle. Thus, undei* 
the law of conHictives, if we know that a Ijody is si)her- 
ical, we know that it is not cubical; but if we sirjiply 
know that it is not spherical, we do not know that it 
is cubical, since it may be cylindrical or conical, or it 
may have any one of the multitude of possible forms. J^iit 
in the case of contradictories, the Y)ropositions are not 
only confiictive, so that the truth of either involves the 
falsity of the other, but they are universally inclusive, 
no other case being possible, so that the falsity of either 
involves the truth of the other. 

The intuition of the impossibility of an absolute com- 
mencement is, therefore, virtually, the intuition of the 
necessity of its contradictory — that every event must 
have a cause. We do not reach the judgment of cau- 
sality tlirough the imjmtency of the mind to conceive an 
absolute commencement, })ut thi'ough the pofenry of the 
intuitive faculty to ap])rehend that an absolute com- 
mencement is impossible. 

It is to be remarked that the inconcdvabUltij of an 
absolute commencement, as spoken of by Hamilton, is 
to ])e understood in the sense that we can not under- 
stand how it can be, and not in the sense that it can 
not be imagined; for the mind can, by Jin act of the 
imagination, form tlu^ ])icture of an object, springing, 
without cause, from non-entity into being. Though the 
picture of an absolute commencement can l)e formed, 
yet it is true, not ordy that the mind is unable to un- 
derstand how an absolute commencement can be, but 
tliat it has })ositive power to know tluit such commence- 



70 PSYCHOLOGY. 

ment can not be at all, since it clearly apprehends that 
it is absolutely impossible for nonentity to spring into 
being. On the other hand, eternal existence is incon- 
ceivable in the sense that it can not be imagined, and 
not in the sense that it is known to be impossible. 
Thouo'h it were true that eternal existence is inconceiv- 
able by us in the sense that we can not understand how 
it can be, yet its necessity is apprehended by reason as 
the condition of the facts of the universe, otherwise non- 
entity must have sprung, without cause, into entity, 
Avhich is impossible. 

The above demonstration shows the falsity of the the- 
ory of Hume, that the relation of cause and effect is re- 
solvable into that of antecedent and consequent. It is 
true that we perceive succession, noi cause. But a mere 
antecedent of an event is simply that which accidentally 
goes before the event. Hence, the absence of a mere 
antecedent would not be followed by the disappearance 
of the event; for the antecedent, whose disappearance is 
followed by the disappearance of the event, is more than 
a mere antecedent — it is a condition. 

Hume held, it is true, that a cause is an immediate 
and invariable antecedent. Then it is more than a mere 
antecedent, since it is that without which the event 
would not take place; for, if the event could take. place 
without it, then it is not necessarily an invariable ante- 
cedent. But that without which the event could not 
take place is a condition of the event. The conditions 
of an event are, therefore, all those antecedents, whether 
d3mamical or non-dynamical, without which the event 
would not take place. 

A non-dynamical condition, though a necessary ante- 
cedent, is not efficient in bringing about the event, since 
then it is not non-djniamical. Thus, space is a non- 
dynamical condition of motion. The absence of support 



DYNAMICAL CONDiriONS. 71 

is a non-dynamical condition of the fall of a body. In 
general, space, time, and the absence of preventing in- 
fluences are the non-dynamical conditions of the occur- 
rence of an}^ event. This is intuitively certain; for 
without space and time, there could be no event, or, if 
there be preventing influences, the event will, of course, 
be prevented, and consequently will not occur. 

A dynamical condition is that which is efficient in 
producing the event. Thus, force is a dynamical condi- 
tion of the change of the condition of a body with 
respect to rest or motion. The sum of the dynamical 
conditions of an event is the cause of the event. 

If Hume's theory be true, that a cause is nothing 
more than an immediate and invariable antecedent, then, 
though it is a condition, that without which the event 
would not occur, it is merely a non -dynamical condi- 
tion, totally devoid of efficiency. It has no influence in 
producing the event, for then it would not be non-dy- 
namical. Hence, the -event must bring itself into exist- 
ence ; that is, nonentity springs into entity, which is 
absurd. Hence, an event is impossible without dj^namical 
conditions as well as non-dynamical; but the sum of the 
dynamical conditions is the cause. Hence, every event 
must have a cause. 

The remaining laws may be more briefly treated. 

The second law is. The effect is alivays complex. Thus, 
a blow of the hammer drives the nail, agitates the air, 
produces sound, develops heat, etc. 

Sometimes the elements of a complex effect are si- 
multaneous, and sometimes successive. 

The third law is. The cause is always complex. This is 
true of the cause proper, or the sum of the dynamical 
conditions. For a stronger reason is it true of the sum 
of all the conditions, dynamical and non-dynamical. 

Thus, the path of a projectile is due to the intensity 



72 PSYCHOLOGY, 

and direction of tlie projecting force, the action of gravity, 
and the resistance of the air. In addition to these dy- 
namical conditions, we have the non-dynamical condi- 
tions, space, time, and the absence from its path of solid 
obstacles, such as trees, buildings, etc. 

The fourth law * is. The complexity of the cause is pro- 
portionate to the coviplexity of the effect. Let us consider 
any effect and its cause, both of which we have found to 
be complex: IS^ow, any modification of the effect requires 
a modification of the cause, since the modification of the 
effect is an event which must have a cause. A new 
element in the effect, therefore, requires a new element 
in the cause. 

The fifth law is, Like causes and conditions are followed 
by like effects. For whatever exists in the causes and 
conditions to determine the effect in one case, exists to 
determine it in the other case, since, by hypothesis, the 
causes and conditions are essentially the same. 

It is, however, to be observed that two effects, alike 
in one aspect, may follow diverse causes. Thus two 
men may be killed, one by a pistol ball, the other by 
poison. As regards death, the effects are alike; but the 
immediate effects on the body are as diverse as the 
causes themselves. 

3d. Z/aw of events. The law of an event is the mode 
of its occurrence. An event must occur in some manner, 
if it occur at all, and the manner of its occurrence is 
its law; hence, every event must have its law. That 
every event must have its law is affirmed, a priori^ by 
intuition; what that law is can be discovered only a 
posteriori^ by investigation. 

The nature of the cause and other conditions of an 
event determines the character of its law, and a knowl- 



- For the fourth law, the author is indebted to Prof. Tappan of Kenyon 
College. 



DYNAMICAL CONDITIONS. 73 

edge of these may enable us to predict the character of 
the law; but the law should never be regarded as cer- 
tain till verified by experience. A knowledge of law 
enables us to predict wliat events will take place, or 
what phenomena will appear, as the effects of given 
causes under given conditions. Effects become, in turn, 
the conditions and causes of other effects. Thus, phe'- 
nomena, as appearances, affect the conscious subject, and 
are the conditions of other phenomena. A thought may 
awaken desire, and a desire may induce volition. The 
events of the material world are related according to law. 

Effects are known by experience, but a knowledge of 
conditions and laws often enable us to predict conse- 
quences. In this power of prevision lies one of the 
chief advantages of science. 

The absolute is that which is free from the relation of 
dependence- on any power without itself It is the un- 
conditioned It is not the unrelated — that which exists 
out of all relation; but it is the independent — that which 
is free from the one relation of dependence. Though, 
existing out of the relation of dependence upon any 
thing else, the absolute is not incapable of existing in 
other relations to other things. 

isTature appears as an indefinite chain, each link of 
which is both an effect and a cause, or, if not a cause, 
at least an instrument, both conditioned and a condition. 
Whence, then, is nature? Three sujopositions are possi- 
ble — the chain of causes and effects, as to the number 
of links, is infinite, or finite without an absolute head, 
or finite with an absolute head. 

If the chain is infinite, each link, as an effect, is con- 
ditioned, and affords no resting place for thought, nince 
the conditioned implies the condition. Tracing the series 
back from the conditioned to its condition, which is also 

conditioned, we find, under this supposition, nothing 
P y.-7. 



74 PSYCHOLOGY. 

which is not conditioned, or no absohite condition. 
Though every thing seems to be accounted for, by re- 
ferring it to its condition, yet the condition of each 
conditioned link is itself conditioned, and notliing is ab- 
solutely accounted for, since every explanation requires 
further explanation as we go back along the series in- 
definitely. This series has no head, absolute or condi- 
tioned, since by supposition it is infinite. 

If the chain is finite without an absolute head, the 
first link, not being absolute, is dependent, or conditioned, 
and conditioned without a condition, which is imj)ossible. 

Since the first supposition is unsatisfactory and the 
second involves an impossibility, the rational mind will 
adopt the third, or only remaining supposition — that 
the chain is finite, as to the number of links, and has 
an absolute head. 

From the facts of the universe, it may be inferred 
that the Absolute is a Divine Personality, eternal and 
supernatural, endowed with intellect, sensibility, and will, 
involving in himself as Creator, liberty, spontaneity, and 
autonomy, and possessing power, wisdom, and goodness, 
in infinite perfection. 

Final cause, or purpose, follows, as a corollary, from 
the doctrine of the Absolute as the intelligent cause of 
the universe. 



CHAPTBK VI. 



INTUITIONS CONTINUED. 



The Ego is the subject of psychical phenomena — it 
is that which cogitates, and feels, and wills. 

Psychical phenomena are known by consciousness; 
but the conditional necessity of the ego is known by 
rational intuition. These phenomena imply a subject, 
and consciousness of them implies a conscious subject. 
The subject of the phenomena is identical with the sub- 
ject of the consciousness, since it is not possille for a 
subject to be conscious of the phenomena of any other 
subject than itself 

As events beginning in time, psychical phenomena 
must have causes. The cause of the phenomena may 
be the conscious subject, endowed with the faculties of 
intellect, sensibility, and will, or some external object 
acting upon the ego as susceptible of given affections, or 
the ego acting in conjunction with some external object. 
In the first case, the ego is chiefly active ; in the second, 
chiefly passive; in the third, both active and passive. 

A faculty of the ego — its power of acting in a given 
manner, or its susceptibility of being in a given state — 
is implied b}^ every act or state. Phenomena essentially 
alike are i*eferred to the same faculty, but phenomena 
essentially unlike, are referred to different faculties. 

Theories relating to the ego. — They are the follow- 



ing:: 



Hume's theory. ^' For my part, when I enter most in- 
timately into what I call myself, I always stumble on 

(75) 



76 PSYCHOLOGY, 

some particular perception or other, — of heat or cold, 
liglit or shade, love oi- hatred, pain or pleasure. I never 
catch myself^ at any time, without a perception, and 
never can observe any thing but the perception." 

li psychical phenomenon^ which is more general, be sub- 
stituted for perception^ which is too narrow, the above 
statement would be, not only clear, but correct. 

Hume also says, ''If any one, upon serious and un- 
prejudiced reflection, thinks he has a different notion of 
himself, I must confess I can no longer reason with him." 

This is well enough so far as it implies that the im- 
mediate objects of consciousness are psychical phenom- 
ena, but not the soul itself; yet it is incorrect, if it im- 
plies that there is nothing but the phenomena. 

But Hume farther says, '' He may, perhaps, perceive 
something simple and continued, which he calls himself, 
though ] am certain that there is no such principle in 
me." Human Nature^ Part IV., 8ec. 2. 

Hume might have said, correctly enough, I am certain 
that I am not conscious of any such principle in me; 
but he was not warranted in saying, '' I am certain that 
there is no such principle in me." There might have 
been such a principle in him, though he was not con- 
scious of the fa::t; for the ego does not know itself by 
consciousness, but apprehends the conditional necessity 
of itself by rational intuition. Thus, if there is thought, 
there is something which thinks. 

What did Hume mean by ''I" and "me"? With all 
his positiveness, it is hardly to be supposed that Hume 
really identified himself, whom he calls "I," with what 
he calls '' perception." Does the perception stumble on 
the perception? The "I" which stumbles on the per- 
ception, is to be discriminated from the perception on 
which it stumbles. Without the " I " as the subject of 
perception, the perception itself would be impossible. 



THE EGO AND PERSONAL IDENTITY, 77 

ReifTs tlieory. " I am conscious of perception, but not 
of the object I perceive; I am conscious of memory, but 

not of the object I remember Our sensations and 

thoughts do also suggest the notion of a mind and the 
belief of its existence, and of its relation to our 
thoughts." Inquiry^ Chapt. II., Sec. 7. This. is correct, 
as far as it goes, but the word "suggest" is hardly 
strong enough. 

Stewarfs theory. After considering matter, Stewart 
says, " The case is precisely similar with respect to mind. 
We are not immediately conscious of its existence; but 
we are conscious of sensation, thought, and volition — 
operations which imply the existence of something which 
feels, thinks, and wills." Steicarfs Philosophy, page 2. 
This is correct and well expressed. 

Hamilton's theory. " Our knowledge is either of matter 
or of mind. Now, what is matter? What do we know of 
matter? Matter, or body is to us the name, either of 
something known, or of something unknown. In so far 
as matter is a name for something known, it means that 
which appears to us under the forms of extension, solid- 
ity, divisibility, figure, motion, roughness, smoothness, 
color, heat, cold, etc. ; in short, it is a common name for 
a certain series, or aggregate, or complement, of appear- 
ances, or phenomena, manifest in co-existence. But as 
the phenomena appear onl}^ in conjunction, we are com- 
pelled, by the constitution of our nature, to think them 
conjoined in and b}^ something; and as they are phe- 
nomena, we can not think them the phenomena of 
nothing, but must regard them as the properties or 
qualities of something that is extended, solid, figured, etc. 

"Now, that which manifests its qualities — in other 
words, that in which the appearing causes inhere, that 
to which they belong, is called their subject, or substance j 
or substratum. To this subject of the phenomena of 



78 PSYCHOLOGY, 

extension, solidity, etc., the term matter or material sub- 
stance is commonly given; and therefore, as contradis- 
tinguished from these qualities, it is the name of some- 
thing unknown and inconceivable. 

''The same is true in regard to mind. In so far as 
mind is the common name for the states of knowing, 
willing, feeling, desiring, etc., of which I am conscious, 
it is only the name for a certain series of connected 
phenomena or qualities, and consequently expresses only 
what is known. But in so far as it denotes that subject 
or substratum in which the phenomena of knowing, 
willing, etc., inhere, — something behind or under these 
phenomena, — it expresses, what in itself, or in its abso- 
lute existence, is unknown. 

" Thus, mind and matter, as known or knowable, are 
only two different series of phenomena or qualities; 
mind and matter as unknown and unknowable, are the 
two substances in which these two different series of 
phenomena or qualities are supposed to inhere. The 
existence of an unknown substance is only an inference 
we are compelled to make, from the existence of known 
phenomena; and the distinction of two substances is only 
inferred from the seeming incompatibility of the two 
series of phenomena to cohere in one." Boiven's Hamil- 
ton^ page 89. 

This passage is worthy of study. If it contains error, 
it is in holding the substance of both matter and mind 
to be unknown and unknowable. It is true that we 
perceive the phenomena of matter and not its sub- 
stance ; and that we are conscious of the phenomena of 
mind, and not of its substance, or of the soul itself. 
But if we are compelled to infer the existence and the 
distinction of two substances, called matter and mind, 
as Hamilton declares, matter and mind are not altogether 
unknown and unknowable, unless, forsooth, we are com- 



THE EGO AND PERSONAL IDENTITY, 79 

pelled by the constitution of our minds and b}^ the force 
of evidence to make illogical inferences. 

A thing is not to be declared unknown and unknow- 
able, because it is not known in a certain w^ay, as, for 
example, by perception or consciousness ; for inference 
and intuition are also modes of knowledge. By infer- 
ence we are not to understand a mere guess, but a log- 
ical deduction, such as a corollary in Geometry. It must, 
however, be admitted that the substance of neither matter 
nor mind is an object of intuition ; but the necessity of 
substance, w^hether matter or mind, is such an object. 
But if the necessity of mind, as the substance or substra- 
tum of psychical phenomena, is known, the actuality of 
mind, as a substance, is also known, as involved in its 
necessity; hence, the substance of mind is not absolutely 
unknown and unknowable. 

Hamilton further says, '^I, at present, avoid entering 
into the metaphysics of substance and phenomena. I 
shall oidy observe, in general, that philosophers have 
frequently fallen into one or the other of three different 
errors. Some have denied the reality of any unknown 
ground of the known phenomena, and have maintained 
that mind and matter have no substantial existence, but 
are merely the two complements of two series of asso- 
ciated qualities. This doctrine is, how^ever, altogether 
futile. It belies the veracity of our primary beliefs; it 
leaves unsatisfied the strongest necessities of our intel- 
lectual nature ; it admits, as a fact, that the phenomena 
arc connected, but allows no cause explanatory .of the 
fact of their connection. 

'• Others, again, have fallen into an opposite error. 
They have attempted to speculate concerning the nat- 
ure of the unknown grounds of the phenomena of mind 
and matter, apart from the phenomena, and have, ac- 
cordingly, transcended the legitimate sphere of philosophy. 



80 PSYCHOLOGY. 

"A third party have taken some one or more of the 
phenomena themselves, as the basis or substratum of the 
others. Thus, Descartes, at least as understood and fol- 
lowed by Malebranche and others of his disciples, made 
thought or consciousness convertible with the substance 
of mind; and Bishops Brown and Law, with Dr. Watts, 
constituted solidity and extension the substance of bodj^. 
This theory is, however, liable to all the objections which 
may be alleged against the first 

''Mind can be defined only a posteriori^ — that is, only 

from its manifestations What we mean by mind 

is simply that which perceives, feels, wills, desires, etc." 
Pages 100 and 101. This accords with the view of 
Aristotle, who defines the soul to be ''the principle by 
which we live, and move, and perceive, and understand." 
It also agrees with that of St. Augustine, who says, 
" Mens se cognoscit cognoscendp se vivere, se meminisse, 
se intelligere, se velle, cogitare, scire, judicare." 

John Stuart Mill's theory. "My mind is but a series 
of feelings, a thread of consciousness, with the back- 
ground of the possibilities of feelings." Exam, of Ham- 
ilton^ Chapter XII. 

Mill is too much inclined to identify the mind with its 
phenomena. Possibly he had a glimpse of the truth in 
what he called " the background of the possibilities of 
feelings." The "background" is the soul; the "feel- 
ings" and, as should be added, the cognitions and the 
volitions are its phenomena. 

Bain's theory. "The operations and appearances that 
constitute mind are indicated by such terms as feeling, 
thought, memory, reason, conscience, imagination, will, 
j)assions, afiections, taste. But the definition of mind 
asj^ires to comprehend, in few words, by some generali- 
zation, the whole kindred of mental facts, and to exclude 
every thing of a foreign character." Sen, and Int. Ch. II. 



THE EGO AND PERSONAL IDENTITY, 81 

In speaking of " the operations and appearances that 
constitute mind/' Bain identifies mind with its phenom- 
ena. If ''the mind is the sum total of subject experi- 
ences," as Bain elsewhere declares, then we are conscious 
of mind, since w^e are conscious of these phenomena; but 
the recognition of a phenomenon on its recurrence, im- 
plies a spiritual subject enduring through the period from 
the occurrence of the phenomenon to its recurrence, and 
therefore distinct from the fleeting phenomena. The dis- 
crimination of one psychical phenomenon from another, 
can be explained only by referring them to a common 
subject, which, being affected differently by them, dis- 
criminates the one from the other. One phenomenon 
can not discriminate itself from another; for that would 
imply that an act or an appearance is an intelligent 
being, which is not the case. 

Dr. Porter's theory. "^^ Of the ego itself we are directly 
conscious." Porter's Elements, Part I., ChajD. I. 

This statement is not to be admitted on authority, and 
is not verified when consciousness itself is interrogated. 
Consciousness is immediate and, therefore, certain knowl- 
edge. If the ego is conscious of itself, any sound mind, 
to say nothing of such philosophers as Hume, Eeid, 
Stewart, and Hamilton, could be no more mistaken with 
regard to the fact, than it could be w^ith regard to the 
consciousness of cognitions, feelings, and volitions. 

There is a sense, however, in which we may admit 
the truth of Dr. Porter's statement. Taking conscious- 
ness in its literal sense, as knowing something along 
with knowing something else, we grant that the ego is 
conscious of itself; for it know^s itself along with know- 
ing any thing else — -it can not know any thing else 
without knowing itself; neither can it know itself with- 
out knowing something else. But how does the ego 
know itself? In knowing any thing else, it apprehends, 



82 PSYCHOLOGY. 

by rational intuition, tlie conditional necessity, and hence 
the reality of itself as the subject of that knowledge. 
But to be conscious of any thing, in the ordinary ac- 
ceptation of the word conscious^ is immediately to expe- 
rience that thing. ISTo one holds that the mind in a 
quiescent state is an object of consciousness; for con- 
sciousness itself is inconsistent w^ith quiescence. Hence, 
the mind can not be conscious without some other object 
of consciousness than the mind itself, or the conscious- 
ness itself, or the mind as conscious; in other words, 
consciousness is impossible without some other object 
than the quiescent mind itself, or the consciousness itself, 
or the conscious mind itself But wdien the ego is con- 
scious of any act, it knows itself through the rational 
intuition of its conditional necessity, as the subject both 
of the act and of the consciousness of the act. 

How Dr. Porter was led to his view will, perhaps, be 
seen from the following quotation : " A psychical act or 
state is, as we have seen, in its nature complex, consist- 
ing of three elements in intimate relation to each other 
— the ego, the object, the acting or suffering of the 
passing moment. But the act or suffering is inconceiv- 
able, except as belonging to the ego and occasioned by 
the object. Of this double relation, consciousness must 
take notice. It must, therefore, also take notice of the 
terms or elements to vfhich it is related." 

The central thought here is, " The act or suffering is 
inconceivable, except as belonging to an ego and occa- 
sioned by an object." Dropping the last expression, 
^'and occasioned by an object," as not now under con- 
sideration, we have left, "the act or suffering is incon- 
ceivable, except as belonging to an ego." But the in- 
conceivability of "the act or suffering, except as belong- 
ing to an ego," is not a consciousness of the ego, and 
does not establish Dr. Porter's doctrine that the ego is 



THE EGO AND PERSONAL IDENTITY. 83 

conscious of itself. It simply shows that psychical phe- 
nomena are inexplicable without a subject. 

There is, however, more than an inconceivability of the 
act or suffering, except as belonging to an ego — there is 
a positive intuition of the necessity of the ego, on the 
condition that the act or suffering is experienced in 
consciousness, otherwise these phenomena, having no 
subject, would be the phenomena of nothing, w^hich is 
impossible. Consciousness, of course, takes notice of this 
intuition. Should it be said that if consciousness takes 
notice of the intuition of the relation of the act and suf- 
fering to the ego, as their subject, '* it must, therefore, 
also take notice of the terms or elements to which it 
is related," the answer is, not unless these terms are 
present phenomena, as consciousness of memory does 
not take notice of the past reality remembered, since we 
are not conscious of the past. But the intuition itself 
directly apprehends, not the ego, but the necessity of the 
ego. If, therefore, consciousness, in taking notice of this 
intuition, should take notice of the terms of this intuition, 
it would take notice of the necessity of the ego, and not 
of the ego itself. But the truth is, the ego is conscious, 
not even of the necessity of itself, but of the intuition of 
the necessity of itself, and in general, of psychical phenom- 
ena. By rational intuition, the ego apprehends that these 
j)henomena must have a subject, and identifies that sub- 
ject with itself, since it could not be conscious of the 
phenomena of any other subject. The question at issue 
is not whether the eo-o knows the fact of its own exist- 
ence, that is admitted, but how this knowledge is at- 
tained? Dr. Porter says, immediately by consciousness. 
We say by rational intuition — not the intuition of the 
ego itself, but of its necessity. 

Dr. Porter further says, " It is of the very nature and 
essence of a psychical state to be the act or experience 



84 PSYCHOLOGY. 

of an individual ego. We are not first conscious of the 
state or operation^ and then forced to look around for a 
something to which it is to be referred, or to which it 
may belong." This is true, and accords with the fact 
that the conditional necessity of the ego is, at once, ap- 
prehended by rational intuition, and that to the ego, 
as subject, psychical phenomena are directly referred. 
We are conscious, not of phenomerui in the abstract, but 
of determinate phenomena, — not of phenomena without 
a subject, but of the phenomena of the ego, the same 
ego which is conscious of them, since it is impossible 
for an ego to be conscious of the phenomena of any 
other ego than itself. 

Again, Dr. Porter says, ^'A mental state which is not 
produced or felt by an individual self, is as inconceivable 
as a triangle without three angles, or a square without 
four sides." But that does not prove that the soul is 
conscious of itself, but that psychical phenomena are in- 
explicable without a subject; and not only inexplicable, 
but impossible without a subject; but this is knowing 
that the soul is, through the rational intuition of its 
necessity, and not by consciousness. Neither conceiva- 
bility nor inconceivability is a tcvst of truth. We may 
conceive, or picture by the imagination, an event without 
a cause; but intuition declares that an event without a 
cause is an impossibihty. Wo can not conceive, or pict- 
ure by the imagination, infinite space, yet intuition af- 
firms that infinite space is a reality. 

Dr. Porter says again, '■' This relation of the act to the 
self is not inferred, but is directly known. The fact cxf 
memory proves this beyond dispute. In every act of 
memory, we know or believe that the object now recalled 
was formerly before the mind; in other words, I, the 
person remembering, did ])reviously know or experience 
that which I recall. But how could this be possible if 



THE EOO AND PEnSONAL IDENTITY. 85 

the first act or state was not known, when it occurred, 
to belong to the same ego w4iich now recalls it?" It 
was known to belong to the ego, that poijit is not the 
one in dispute; but how was it knowji to belong to the 
ego? The necessity of the ego, as the subject of the 
original phenomena, was known by intuition ; the neces- 
sity of the ego is, in like manner, knoAvn as the subject 
of the memory; but the subject of the memory must be 
the same as the subject of the phenomenon remembered, 
otherwise the memory itself would be impossible. 

The ego itself is not the object of consciousness, nor 
even of rational intuition ; but the conditional necessity 
of the ego is an object of direct intuition. Knowledge 
of the necessity of the ego involves a knowledge of its 
actuality, and of this knowledge there is consciousness; 
but consciousness of this knowledge should not be mis- 
taken, as it often is, for a consciousness of the ego; if 
the ego itself were, in its essence, an object of conscious- 
ness, then indeed might we solve the mysteries of the 
spirit.- The ego is not the object, but the subject of con- 
sciousness, and if the subject, then a reality. The ego 
is not known by consciousness as an act or state; for 
that would identify the ego with a phenomenon. Neither 
is the ego in a definite act or state known as the object 
of consciousness, but it is the act or state itself that 
is the object. This act or state is known by rational 
intuition to be impossible, unless it has the ego for its 
subject; but the intuition that an act or state, without 
the ego as its subject, is impossible, is the intuition of 
the necessity of the ego, on the condition that there is 
consciousness of the act or state. Whenever the ego, by 
consciousness, experiences a psychical phenomenon, it ap- 
prehends, by the act of rational intuition, the necessity 
of itself, as the condition or ground of the phenomenon. 
The subject and the object, though distinguishable, are 



86 PSYCHOLOGY, 

not separable in cognition — one can not be known with- 
out the other; but the object is known empirically, while 
the subject is known rationally. 

Personal Identity is the continued essential sameness 
of the ego. Every sane person has an irresistible con- 
viction of his personal identity, as is clearly shown by 
the universal anticipation of the future consequences of 
past acts. 

The necessity of personal identity is known by rational 
intuition as the condition of the phenomena of memory; 
for, if personal identity be not a fact, memory would be 
impossible, since the person, not being the same, could 
not remember the past experience of another person as 
his own. As it is not strictly the ego itself, which is 
apprehended by rational intuition, but the conditional 
necessity of the ego, as the subject of psychical phenom- 
ena, so it is not strictly personal identity itself, which 
is apprehended by rational intuition, but the conditional 
necessity of personal identity, as the condition of the 
fact of memor}", since intuition at once knows that, un- 
less personal identity be a fact, memory itself would be 
impossible. 

Personal identity does not inhere in the cognitions, 
feelings, and volitions themselves, which are successive 
and continually changing, but in the ego which cogitates 
and feels and wills. The ego maintains its identity, 
wdiile its phenomena change continually. The fact of 
personal identity is absolutely incompatible with the 
doctrine of Mr. Bain and others, that ^'the ego is the 
sum-total of subject experiences;" for, in the ever shift- 
ing phenomena of which we are conscious, the universal 
belief of mankind in personal identity can find no possi- 
ble foundation. 

]S[either does consciousness constitute personal identity, 
as Locke seems to teach. He says, "Since consciousness 



THE EGO AND PERSONAL IDENTITY. 87 

alwa^^s accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes 
every one to be what he calls self^ and thereby distin- 
guishes himself from all other thinking beings, in this 
alone consists personal identity, i, 6., the sameness of a 
rational being; and as far as this consciousness can be 
extended backward to any 2)ast action or thought, so far 
reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self 
now it was then ; and it is by the same self wnth this 
present one that now reflects on it, that that action was 
done." Essay, Book II.. Chapter XXYII., Section 9. 

Locke here confounds the evidence of ^^ersonal identit}^ 
with personal identity itself Consciousness reveals psy- 
chical phenomena, and this revelation .is the condition 
on which rational intuition apprehends the necessity of 
the ego; consciousness likewise reveals the memory of 
past phenomena, and this revelation is the condition on 
which rational intuition apprehends the sameness of the 
ego, that is, personal identity. Locke is incorrect in say- 
ing that "consciousness can be extended backwards to 
any past action or thought," for consciousness is limited 
to present phenomena. We remember past phenomena, 
and are conscious of the memory, but not of the j)be- 
nomena. The mem or v, much less the consciousness, does 
not constitute personal identity, but is the evidence of 
that identity. 

Memory, though essential to my present knowledge of 
my past acts, though proving my connection with those 
acts, is not essential to that connection ; for I might 
have performed those acts, though I do not now re- 
member them. The identity, though essential to the 
memory, does not consist in the memory, since it may 
exist, and yet the memory be wanting. Evidence is es- 
sential to a knowledge of a fact, but not to the fact it- 
self, and should not be confounded with the fact. 

To illustrate the relation of memory to personal iden- 



88 PSYCHOLOGY. 

tity, take a case similar to the one given by Dr. Reid. 
A boy wins a prize at school; in middle life, he is made 
a general and wins a battle; in later life, he is made 
president. The general, we may suppose, remembers 
winning the prize, and the president remembers winning 
the battle but not the prize. Since the general remem- 
bers winning the prize, he is identical with the boy; 
and since the president remembers winning the battle, 
he is identical with the general, and consequently is 
identical with the boy, since the general is identical 
with the boy; but if memory constitutes personal iden- 
tity, as Locke seems to teach, then the president is not 
identical with the boy, since he does not remember 
winning the prize. Hence, the president is both identi- 
cal and not identical with the boy, which is absurd. 
The identity of the president with the boy is of course 
consistent with such changes as physical growth and 
mental development. 

The identity of another person is, by that person, 
known by rational intuition, as my own identity is 
known by myself; but the identity of that person is 
believed by me, on evidence more or less conclusive; 
hence, this belief may vary in degree between the limits 
certainty and impossibility. 

The identity of things in general is known by re- 
semblance, but is consistent with great changes, as in 
the case of a tree, throughout growth and decay, where 
there is organic unity; or, as in case of a w^agon, which 
has been frequently repaired. 



CHAPTER YII. 

SENSATION. 

1. Sensation defined and illustrated. — Sensation is the 
feeling which is occasioned by the excitement of some 
part of the organism. In general, sensation results from 
some external stimulus. 

Take an apple, for examj^le. Through the senses of 
smell, taste, touch, hearing, and sight, and the muscular 
power, we have, res]3ectively, the sensations of odor, 
flavor, roughness or smoothness, sound, color, and re- 
sistance. The sensations are not cognitions of the apj)le, 
but are contingent conditions of cognitions. 

Sensation is a phenomenon of the Sensibility, but from 
its intimate relation to the Intellect, as the condition of 
perception, it is necessary to treat it in this connection. 

Sensations are known by consciousness, are analyzed, 
compared, identified, discriminated, and classitied by 
reflection, and are referred, by rational intuition, to the 
ego as their subject, and to some object as their cause. 

2. Conditions of sensation. — These are the sensorium, 
excitants, action of the excitants upon the sensorium, and 
the sensibility. 

1st. The sensorium is the nervous system and the or- 
gans of the special senses. It is the first condition of 
sensation. 

(1) The nervous system is a mass of excitable substance 

consisting of a central mass called the brain, located in 

the head; the spinal cord, inclosed in the back-bone; 

the nerves, a system of ramifying filaments; and the 
Psy.-8. (39) 



90 PSYCHOLOGY. 

ganglia, or exj)an8iori of the nerves into occasional 
knots, or subordinate nerve centers. The nervous sub- 
stance consists of white matter composed of fibers, and 
gray matter containing fibers and cells intermingled. 
The fibers are exceedingly minute, and constitute the 
media of connection and communication. The cells or 
corpuscles are rounded irregular little bodies, and serve 
as nerve centers, or junctions, where the fibers have 
their origin and termini, and multiply their connections. 
The nerves constitute the medium of communication be- 
tween the various parts of the organism and brain as 
principal center, or the ganglia as subordinate centers. 
One set of nerves, the afferent^ conduct impressions to 
the center, and another set, the efferent, convey stimuli 
from the center. 

(2) The organs of the special senses are the nostrils, 
the tongue and palate, the skin, the ears, and the eyes, 
which are, respectively, the organs of smell, taste, touch, 
hearing, and sight. 

The nervous system and the sense organs, taken col- 
lectively, constitute the sensorium, which is, as before 
stated, the first condition of sensation. 

2d. An excitant is something which is capable of af- 
fecting the sensorium. It is the second condition of 
sensation. Thus, odorous objects excite the sense of 
smell; sapid objects, the sense of taste; tangible, the 
sense of touch; audible, the sense of hearing; and visi- 
ble, the sense of sight. 

Also, special agents, as heat, light, electricity, magnet- 
ism, etc., affect the nerves, and afford conditions of sen^ 
sation. The sensation corresponds to the nerve affected. 
Thus, the excitement of the optic nerve is followed by 
the sensation of light; an excitement of the auditory 
nerve, by the sensation of sound. 

A blow, or sudden shock, or injury, may, by exciting 



SENSATION. 91 

the nerves of any special sense organ, be followed by 
the sensation usually experienced in that organ. Thus, 
a flash of light may accompany a severe blow. 

Sensations at certain localities may even be induced 
by a thought directed to those localities, especially if 
the thought is accompanied with emotion. In this case, 
the thought serves the purpose of an excitant, and thus 
a given nervous state is the resultant of an antecedent 
nervous state and a mental act combined. 

Sensations may also be due to the revivals of the re- 
sidual excitement of the sense organ. 

3d. The action of an excitant upon the sensorium is the 
third condition of sensation. Thus, a luminous object 
reflecting light to the eye is the usual condition of vis- 
ion ; a material object in contact with the hand, or with 
some other portion of the body, is the condition of the 
sensation of touch ; and so on, for the other senses. 

4th. The sensibility is the susceptibility of feeling. It 
is the fourth condition of sensation. The other condi- 
tions are chiefly physical; but this is psychical; and 
sensation is itself not a physiological, but a psychical 
phenomenon. The excitement of the nerves, though an 
antecedent condition of sensation, is not sensation itself. 
Sensation, then, is not the excitement of the sensorium, 
but the sympathy of the soul with this excitement. The 
fact that we feel, as consciousness attests, is proof of the 
fact that we have sensibility. 

3. Sensations localized. — A sensation is localized in 
that part of the sensorium aflPected. That we have the 
power to localize sensations is an unquestioned fact, 
whether that power is original or is acquired by expe- 
rience. Thus, the toothache is located in the tooth af- 
fected, and not in the hand; an injury to the foot is 
not referred to the head ; taste is referred to the tongue 
and palate. But certain sensations are vaguely localized. 



92 - PSYCHOLOGY, 

We know by intuition that the sensation is somewhere, 
and by experience that it is in the sensorium, though 
tlie exact place in the sensorium is not always definitel}^ 
determined. The sensorium, psychologically considered, 
is the locus of sensation. 

4. Object of consciousness in sensation. — The object 
of which we are conscious in sensation is not the ex- 
citant ; it is not the sensorium itself as consisting of the 
nervous system and the sense organs; it is not the sen- 
sorium excited to some form of definite action ; it is not 
the excitement of the sensorium; but it is the sensation 
in the sensorium as the locus of sensation. Thus, when 
I grasp a ball in the hand, I am not conscious of the 
ball, nor of the hand, nor of the nerves of the hand, 
nor of the nerves excited, nor of the excitement of the 
nerves, but of the sensations of touch and resistance 
located in the hand. I am no more conscious that the 
sensation is to be referred to the nerves, than that it 
is to be referred to the muscles or veins. The soul is 
not conscious that the body has nerves; it ascertains 
this fact from anatomical investigation; and from physi- 
ological reseach, it discovers that the nerves are condi- 
tions of sensations, since, when destroyed or paralyzed 
in a particular part, sensation in that part ceases. But 
the excitement of the nerves is attended or followed by 
a sensation, which is the sympathy of the soul with the 
nervous excitement; and this sensation is the immediate 
object of which we are conscious. 

5. Quality of sensations. — The quality of sensation 
involves existence and identity. The existence of a 
sensation is opposed to non-existence; it is reality as 
opposed to non-reality, or sensation as opposed to non- 
sensation. But the existence of a sensation does not 
imply that it must have a previously mentioned, speci- 
fied characteristic; for it may have some other charac- 



SENSATION, 93 

teristic. If only the existence of a sensation be given, 
its character is left wholly indeterminate, and may be, 
so far as we know, of any kind whatever. The identity 
of a sensation is the fact that the sensation is itself, and 
nothing else; but the identity of a sensation involves 
peculiarity^ or the positive attributes characteristic of 
itself, and particularity^ or the negation of the positive 
characteristics of any other thing. 

6. Quantity of sensations. — The quantity of sensation 
involves its degree of intensity, and its temporal and 
spatial relations. 

1st. The degree of intensity may vary between the 
limits zero and a degree so great as to be insuj)portable, 
resulting in unconsciousness, as is illustrated by pain, 
and the sensations of light and heat. 

2d. The temporal relations of a sensation involve the 
date, or time of its occurrence, and the duration, or time 
of its continuance. If sensation continues but for a mo- 
ment, duration vanishes into date. 

3d. The spatial relations of a sensation involve its lo- 
cality in the sensorium, and, when more than a j^oint 
is affected, also its extent, and vaguely, perhaps, its fig- 
ure, or form, as may be illustrated in case of color and 
touch. If but a point is affected, extent and figure 
vanish into locality. 

7. Analysis of sensations. — The analysis of a sensa- 
tion, is the resolution of the sensation into its elements. 
A simple sensation, comprising only one element as to 
peculiarity, is incapable of analysis; but a complex 
sensation, comprising more than one element, is capable 
of analysis. A complex sensation can sometimes be 
analyzed by attentive reflection. Sensations may appear 
simple to consciousness when in reality they are com- 
plex. These ma}^ frequently be analyzed by calling to 
our aid the methods of physical science, as in analyzing 



94 PSYCHOLOGY, 

the HcnsatioiiH of color and Round. Reversing the pro- 
cesses of analysis, we may, by a synthetic process, re- 
combine the elements, so as to reproduce a sensation 
essentially like the oriii;inal sensation. 

8. Relation, identification, and discrimination of sen- 
sations. — Sensations are similar or dissimilar in kind^ 
according as they are acquired through the same sense, 
or through different senses, and as such may be identi- 
£ed or discriminated. 

Sensations are similar or dissimilar in variety, accord- 
ing as they involve similar or dissimilar qualities, as to 
peculiarity, and as such may be identified or discrimin- 
ated. 

Sensations similar in kind may be similar or dissim- 
ilar in variety; but sensations dissimilar in kind are 
also dissimilar in variety. 

Sensations similar in kind and variety may agree or 
differ in degree of intensity, and may accordingly be 
identified or discriminated. 

Sensations similar in kind and variety, and agreeing 
in degree of intensity, may agree or differ in temporal 
relations, and may accordingly be identified or discrim- 
inated. 

Sensations similar in kind and variety, and agreeing 
in intensity and in temporal relations, may agree or 
differ in spatial relations, and may accordingly be iden- 
tified or discriminated. 

9. Classification of sensations. — Sensations are classi- 
fied as to kind when referred to the senses or organs 
through which they are acquired. They may be subdi- 
vided, both as to quality and quantity. Sensations arc 
general or special. 

1st. The general sensations comprise all those con- 
nected with the various portions of the organism, except 
the five senses. They are the following: 



SENSATION, 95 

(1) The aensations connected with the muscular sys- 
tem compriwe all those arisini^ from any posture or 
movement of the })0(ly, involvin^^ the contraction or re- 
laxation of the muscles, as in standing, walking, lifting, 
pulling, pushing, striking, etc. 

(2) The sensations connected witli the nervous system 
comprise those arising from the state of the nervous 
system — its general condition, not from a special ex- 
citement. The nerves, are, however, concerned in all 
sensation. 

(3) The sensations connected with the nutritive and 
circulatory systems are such as result from hunger or 
thirst, or their opposites, and those resulting from an 
unhealthy state of tlie organs of digestion. 

(4) The sensations connected with the resjrlraiory 
system are such as the exhilaration resulting from copi- 
ous respiration in pure air, and the feeling of suffocation 
resulting from bad air or from a lack of air. 

(5) The sensations resulting from the general condition 
of the body are such as result from the vigor or elastic- 
ity of health, from the weakness of disease, from rest, 
from fatigue, from the degree of temperature, etc. 

2d. The special sensations are those which are acquired 
through the special senses — smell, taste, touch, hearing, 
and sight. These senses are the principal means for 
acquiring a knowledge of external objects. 

(1) The sensations of smell are known by conscious- 
ness as located in the nostrils. They may be divided, 
as to quality, into agreeable and disagreeable, each of 
which may be subdivided, both with respect to qualit}^ 
and quantity, into an almost endless number of vari- 
eties. It is, y)erha|)s, true that no two I'oses, even from 
the same bush, have ])recisely the same odor, and that 
no two things smell exactly alike. Since it is impos- 
sible to apply names to all these varieties, so countless 



96 PSYCHOLOGY. 

in numbers, it is customary to designate them, either 
by the effects which they cause in us, or by the objects 
from which they proceed. Thus, we speak of agreeable 
or offensive odors, of the odor of the rose, etc. 

(2) The sensations of taste are known by conscious- 
ness as located in the tongue, the palate, and a portion 
of the pharynx. These sensations, as those of smell, are 
divided with respect to quality into agreeable and disa- 
greeable, and each of these may be subdivided into 
numberless varieties. Perhaps no two dishes of food 
have precisely the same flavor. The wonderful discrim- 
inating power of taste is doubtless the reason why this 
sense, which ministers to a gross appetite, gives name 
to the power of appreciating the beautiful in Nature, 
Literature, and Art. As it is impossible to devise names 
lor all the varieties of flavor, they are designated, like 
those of odor, by their eff'ects or by their causes. 

(3) The sensations of touch may be experienced at 
every point on the surface of the body, but especially 
in the ends of the Angers, the lips, and the tip of the 
toniJ-ue. The nature of these sensations can be learned 
only from experience. The sense of touch is very im- 
portant. In fact, certain philosophers regard touch as 
the fundamental sense, and the other senses as its sj)ecial 
modifications. 

(4) The sensations of hearing are located in the ear. 
Sounds, when classified, both as to quality and quantity, 
exhibit a wonderful variety. They vary from low to 
high, through all the intermediate degrees, and, in like 
manner, from feeble to loud, from soft to harsh, from 
smooth to rough, from light to heavy, and from musical 
to discordant. ]^o two persons speak the same word 
exactly alike, even though speaking on the same key; 
for there will be a difference either in the qualities of 
their voices, or in their manner of speaking. 



SENSATION. 97 

(5) The sensations of sight are acquired througli the 
eye, and are classified botli with respect to quality and 
quantity. Light varies from the faintest glimmer to 
the most dazzling brightness. The primary colors, by 
their possible degrees of intensity, and by their combi- 
nations with one another, afford shades of color wonder- 
ful in beauty, and countless in variety. 

Light is supposed to be due to the vibrations of a 
subtle medium called ether. According to Tyndall, 
" The color of light is determined solely by its wave- 
length. The ether-weaves gradually diminish in length 
from red to violet. The length of a wave of red light 
is about 3 9^0 of an inch ; that of the wave of violet 
light is about 57^00 of an inch. The waves which pro- 
duce the other colors of the spectrum lie between these 
extremes." 

The velocity of light is 192,000 miles per second, 
which, reduced to inches, and multiplied, respectively, by 
39,000 and 57,500, will give 474,439,680,000,000, and 
699,494,400,000,000, the number of vibrations, per sec- 
ond, respectively, of red and violet light. 

White light is produced by a combination of all the 
colors in due proportion. It may also be produced by 
certain combinations of two colors. Any two colors 
which, when mixed, will produce white, are called com- 
plementary. The different white lights thus produced 
cause sensations which are indistinguishable, though the 
lights themselves are physically distinguishable by their 
different reactions. Green is produced by combining 
blue and yellow; and violet, by the blending of red 
and blue. 



Psy.— 9. 



CHAPTER YIII. 



PERCEPTION. 



1. Perception defined as an act and as a faculty. 

1st. As an act^ perception is that process of the intel- 
lect by which it gains a knowledge of external objects. 
It is sometimes called sense-perception^ to distinguish it 
from other processes frequently called perception, as 
when one says, "My perception of this truth is clear.'' 
We shall, however, for the sake of brevity, employ the 
term perception in the technical sense of that of sense- 
perception. 

2d. As a faculty^ perception is the power to perceive 
external objects by means of the senses. Thus, we say, 
" Man is endowed with the power of perception." 

2. Conditions of perception. — The conditions of per- 
ception are an object to be perceived, a subject capable 
of perceiving, and such a relation of object and subject 
as to cause a sensation. 

3. Elements of perception. — The elements involved in 
the act of percei)tion are the sensational, the intuitional, 
the inferential, and the ideational. 

1st. The sensational element is the sensation accompa- 
nying an excitement of the nerves, caused by the ac- 
tion of an excitant upon the organism. This sensation 
is experienced in consciousness, and is analyzed, com- 
pared, identified or discriminated, and classified by re- 
flection. Abstraction and voluntary attention are involved 
in reflection as the first steps. Sensation, though in- 
volved in the complex process of perception, is rather 
(98) 



PERCEPTION,— GENERAL VIEW, 99 

the antecedent or condition of perception than perception 
itself. As the beginning of perception it may be re- 
garded as an element of the process. In fact, sensation, 
original or revived, mingles more or less with the other 
elements of perception. 

2d. The intuitional element is subjective or objective. 
The subjective intuitional element is the apprehension, 
by rational intuition, of the conditional necessity of the 
ego, with the faculties implied, as the subject of the per- 
ception. This element being always present does not 
attract especial attention. The objective intuitional ele- 
ment is the apprehension, by rational intuition, of the 
conditioned necessity of a cause of the sensation of which 
we are conscious. Intuition, though apprehending the 
conditional necessity of the cause of the sensation, does 
not apprehend the cause itself. 

3d. The inferential eleynent is the judgment based on 
experience, or on investigation, or on information in any 
way acquired, by which we infer what the cause of the 
sensation is in reality. It is the conclusion which the 
intellect reaches concerning the object which causes the 
sensation. 

4th. The ideational element is the construction by an 
act of the imagination, of the appearance of the object 
which causes the sensation. Thus, we look upon an 
object, and see it with our eyes open. We then close 
our eyes, and represent the same object. In the first 
case, we construct the appearance under the stimulus of 
sensation; but in the second case, we construct the ap- 
pearance, by the aid of the memory, in the absence of 
sensation. If we can picture the object in the absence 
of sensation, we certainly ought to be able to do it 
under the stimulus of sensation. The appearance is con- 
structed in much the same way in the two cases, though 
the object, w^hen presented to the sense, giving definite 



100 PSYCHOLOGY, 

sensations, followed by definite inferences, compels defi- 
nite constructions. These constructions are more vivid 
and rich in elements than the appearances constructed 
in the absence of sensation. The construction of the 
pictures, by the imagination, in the absence of the sen- 
sation, is mainly an intellectual act. There may be re- 
sidual sensations, as when spots are seen after pressing 
the eye; or revived sensations, as the images which 
Newton could recall, by act of the will, after looking at 
the sun. But, more frequently, the image formed in 
the absence of the object or when the sense is closed, 
is purely the creation of the imagination, without sen- 
sation. This is clear in case an object is represented 
which has not been perceived or thought of for a long 
time. No residuum of the sensation can be supposed to 
remain, but the image formed by the imagination is 
clear and distinct. 

A percept is the knowledge of a quality of an object 
gained through a single sense, as the cause of a sensa- 
tion in that sense. A percept may be ideated^ that is, 
developed into an idea, which may be committed to the 
keeping of the memory, and recalled, as occasion may 
require. 

The combination of all the percepts relating to an ob- 
ject, gained through all the senses, is the appearance of 
the object, as acquired by the combined use of all the 
senses ; but the combination of our ideas of these various 
percepts is our idea of the object. 

The combination of all the qualities of an object which 
are known as the objects of all our percepts relating to 
that object, constitutes the object as known by the act 
of perception. 

The combination of all the qualities of an object which 
are known as the objects of all our percepts relating to 
the object, together with all other qualities and pow- 



PERCEPTION, — GENERAL VIEW. 101 

ers in tliat objectj constitute that object as it is in it- 
self. 

The perceptions through the general sensations are 
more or less vague. It is only those through the spe- 
cial sensations that are clear and distinct, and these we 
shall now proceed to consider. 

4. Order of treatment. — Any one of the three fbUow- 
ing orders might be adopted: We might begin with 
touch, then pass to the consideration of the other senses, 
regarding them as modifications of the general sense of 
touch ; or we might begin with sight, the highest sense, 
then descend through hearing, touch, and taste, to the 
sense of smell; or we might begin with smell, the low- 
est sense, then ascend, through the successive gradations, 
to sight, the highest and most perfect sense. We have 
adopted the latter order as being the most simple and 
satisfactory. 



CHAPTEE IX. 

PERCEPTION THROUGH SMELL AND TASTE. 

1. Perception through smell involves sensation, intui- 
tion, inference, and ideation. 

1st. Sensations of odor, as known by consciousness, are 
located in the nostrils. They are analyzed, compared, 
identified or discriminated, and classified by reflection. 

2d. Rational intuition apprehends the conditional ne- 
cessity of the subject and also of the cause. 

(1) The sensation being given, intuition apprehends 
the conditional necessity of the ego with the faculties 
involved, as the subject of the sensation, and of the cor- 
responding perception. This element is unobtrusive, 
since the attention of the ego is directed, not to itself, 
as being present in every phenomenon, but to the sen- 
sation and its cause, especially to the sensation. 

(2) Intuition also apprehends the conditional necessity 
of the cause of the sensation, but not the cause itself 
It apprehends that the sensation must have a cause, but 
it does not apprehend what the cause is, nor decide 
whether it is within or without the organism. 

3d. The inference is the judgment derived from expe- 
rience, investigation, or other sources, inferring the cause 
of the sensation. This cause is not in the ego; for the ego 
is passive in sensation, since sensations are experienced, 
not only without special volition, but in spite of volition. 
The cause is, therefore, objective to the ego, though it 
is not necessarily objective to the organism. 

From science we learn that the immediate cause of 

(102) 



PERCEPTION TITROUOH SMELL, 103 

the sensation of odor is the excitement of the olfactory 
nerves located in the nose; that the cause of the excite- 
ment is some gaseous effluvium coming in contact with 
the organ of smell; and that this effluvium is exhaled 
from bodies, thence called odorous, since the sensation 
follows the presence of such bodies, and ceases on their 
removal. 

The variety in the sensation of odor, in different cases, 
is accounted for bv the difference in the remote cause, 
though the peculiar nature of the cause is wholly un- 
known. The reason why a certain effluvium should 
excite one sensation rather than another can only be 
conjectured. 

Having learned by experience the nature of the sen- 
sation excited by the exhalations of a given odorous 
body, then, whenever that sensation is experienced, w^e 
infer the presence of that body. There is a possibility 
of mistake in this inference, since different objects may 
excite sensations of odor scarcely distinguishable. Intu- 
ition in affirming that the sensation has a cause, does 
not err; but the judgment which affirms what the cause 
is in itself, may err. 

4th. Ldeation pictures to the mind the remote cause 
of the sensation, after the judgment has inferred what 
that cause is. In constructing the appearance, the body 
from which the odor proceeds is usually represented as 
it appears through the other senses, especially through 
the sense of sight. 

5th. The relative prominence of sensation, intuition, in- 
ference, and ideation, is a matter of interest. In smell, 
the sensation predominates, and mainly absorbs the at- 
tention. The intuition of the conditional necessity of 
the subject and object is unobtrusive, though perhaps 
less so in case of the object than of the subject. The 
inference relates to the object which causes the sen- 



1 04 PSYCHOL OGY, 

sation, and. is more prominent than the intuition, but 
less prominent than the sensation. The idea of the im- 
mediate cause of the excitement of the organ is vague, 
since the nature of this cause is occult; but the idea of 
the remote cause from which the exhalation comes, is 
clear, derived as it is from sight. 

6th. The utility of the sense of smell is threefold: 

(1) It affords pleasure through the sensations of agree- 
able odors, and thus adds to the enjoyment of life. 

(2) It guards us, through the sensations of disagreea- 
ble odors, against danger from deleterious exhalations or 
from unwholesome food. 

(3) It may sometimes be used as a chemical test in 
identifying a substance. 

7th. The sense of smell is in close sympathy with the 
sense of taste, which is in immediate proximity. Savory 
odors excite the appetite, while offensive smells occasion 
disgust and disinclination for food. 

2. Perception through taste involves sensation, intui- 
tion, inference, and ideation. 

1st. Sensations of flavor^ as given by consciousness, are 
located in the tongue and palate, and a portion of the 
pharynx. They are analyzed, compared, identified or 
discriminated, and classified by reflection. 

2d. Intuition apprehends the conditional necessity of 
the subject with the faculties implied, and of the object 
as the cause of the sensation. 

3d. The inference is the judgment inferring the cause 
of the sensation. This cause is not in the ego, which 
is passive in sensation, and is, therefore, objective to the 
ego, but not necessarily objective to the organism. 

By experience, we learn that the cause of the sensa- 
tion of taste is a sapid body brought in contact with 
the organs of taste, producing in these organs an ex- 
citement, which is the immediate cause of the sensation. 



PERCEPTION THROUGH TASTE, 105 

From science, we learn the structure and functions 
of the organs of taste, and that a sapid body, to excite 
the sensation of taste, must be in a liquid state, or un- 
dergo, at least, a partial liquefaction. 

What the nature of the cause of the sensation of taste 
is, in itself, we know not, save that the cause must be 
adequate to the production of the sensation. There is, 
perhaps, chemical action between the sapid body and 
the organ of taste; but why one element should pro- 
duce one sensation, and another element another sensa- 
tion, we know not. What the object is, and that it 
produces the sensation, can be ascertained; but how it 
produces the sensation, or why that sensation rather 
than another, is a mystery. 

Having learned by experience with what bodies cer- 
tain sensations are connected, then whenever we identify 
a sensation which we have learned is caused by an ob- 
ject of a certain class, we infer the object which excites 
the sensation. There is a possibility of mistake in this 
inference, since different objects may excite sensations 
scarcely distinguishable; but the mistake, if it occur, is 
not in the intuition that there must be a cause, but in 
the judgment inferring what that cause is. 

4th,- Ideation pictures, not the occult quality which is 
the real cause of the excitement of the nerves of taste, 
but the object of which this cause is a quality, as it has 
been found by experience to appear through the other 
senses, especially sight and touch, and thus completes 
the process of perception. 

5th. As to the relative i^Tominence of these four elements, 
it is to be observed that sensation, as the chief object of 
attention, predominates, though not in so marked a de- 
gree as in smell. The ego with the faculties involved is 
implicitly assumed, but is not made the object of special 
attention. The intuition of the conditional necessity of 



106 PSYCHOLOGY. 

the cause is more prominent. The inference is more 
conspicuous than the intuition, but less conspicuous than 
the sensation. The image formed by ideation is clear 
and distinct. 

6th. The utility of the sense of taste is threefold : 

(1) It contributes to our enjoyment through the agree- 
able sensations which it affords. 

(2) It guards against danger through the disagreeable 
sensations, which deleterious articles of food excite. 

(3) It may be used as a chemical test in identifying 
a given substance. 

7th. Taste is intimately associated with touch, as the 
organs of taste are also organs of touch. In general, 
we may say, taste gives the sensations of flavor, and 
touch the sensations of roughness or smoothness; yet in 
certain cases, these sensations approach and seem to 
blend. This fact suggests the inquiry whether taste is 
not a special modification of touch — that is, touch trans- 
formed and intensified, and located in proximity to the 
sense of smell with which it acts in sympathy. 



CHAPTEE X. 

PERCEPTION THROUGH TOUCH AND HEARING. 

1. Perception through touch involves sensation, intui- 
tion, inference, and ideation. 

1st. Sensations of touchy as given by consciousness, are 
located at the extremity of the nerves terminating in 
the skin, especially at the tips of the fingers, the lips, 
and the tongue. They are analyzed, compared, identi- 
fied or discriminated, and classified by reflection. 

2d. Intuition apprehends the conditional necessity of 
the subject with the faculties implied, and of the object 
as the cause of the sensation. 

3d. The iyiference is the judgment inferring the cause 
of the sensation. This cause not being in the ego, which 
is passive in sensation, is objective to the ego. When 
the sensation of touch is experienced, we infer that this 
sensation is caused by some external body in contact 
with the organ of touch. As the pressure increases, the 
tactual sensation runs gradually into the muscular sen- 
sation, and the acute perception of touch proper is trans- 
ferred, by insensible degrees, into the perception of a 
resisting body, as the cause of the muscular sensation. 
From Anatomy and Physiology, we learn the structure 
and functions of the organs of touch in their relations 
to the muscular and nervous systems. 

Through the sense of touch, especially in its relation 
to the muscular sensation, we obtain unimpeachable ev- 
idence of the existence of objects external to ourselves — 

not external to our spirits only, but to our bodies. 

(107) 



108 PSYCHOLOGY, 

We have already found that we are conscious of sen- 
sations localized more or less definitely in the sensoriiim, 
which is immediately known as the locus of sensation, 
but not as the nervous system and the sense organs, 
which constitute, as we learn from science, the material 
apparatus of sensation. The sensorium, as the locus of 
sensation, is immediately known to be extended, since 
the sensations, as localized, are known to be reciprocally 
external. Simultaneous sensations, not reciprocally ex- 
ternal, especially if the same in quality, would blend 
into one, and be indistinguishable. But the fact that 
such sensations are distinguishable, is proof that they 
are reciprocally external, and in fact, as such, they are 
discriminated. Space is at once apprehended by rational 
intuition as the necessary logical antecedent of the fact 
that similar simultaneous sensations are discriminated. 

If the tips of the fingers of one hand be moved along 
the other hand, a double sensation is at once excited — 
the sensation in the fingers touching, and the sensation 
in the hand touched. The sensations in the two hands 
are discriminated as situated in loci reciprocally exter- 
nal. As the fingers move along the hand, the motion 
is detected by the changing localities of the sensations 
in the hand touched. The loci of these sensations are 
noticed and constructed into unity, thus giving exten- 
sion. On pressing the fingers the sensation becomes 
muscular, a perception of resistance arises, and the hand 
touched is known, not only as extended, but as resist- 
ing. The belief in the correctness of this perception is 
strengthened and confirmed by grasping one hand with 
the other. The hand grasped is known to be extended 
by the loci of the sensations within itself and within 
the grasping hand; and it has the power of resistance, 
and is therefore a solid, as is known by its opposing the 
effort made to close the other hand. 



PERCEPTION THROUGH TOUCIT, 109 

If now the hand of another person be substituted for 
the hand before grasped, the sensations in the grasping 
hand will be simihxr to those before experienced, and 
their loci will reveal extent, not only in the grasping 
hand, but in the hand grasped, and the resistance will 
reveal solidity. These perceptions will be confirmed by 
those of the other person. 

If another object be grasped by the hand, analogous 
sensations will be experienced in the grasping hand, 
followed, as before, by the perception of extension, form, 
and resistance. The hand applied to a great variety 
of objects will reveal, with respect to each, its size, form, 
and power of resistance, and will enable us to decide 
whether a given object is rough or smooth, hard or soft, 
solid or fluid, sharp or blunt, in motion or at rest. 

Having thus found that there are bodies external to 
our organism, then, when encountering a resistance to 
our locomotive energy, and not being conscious of caus- 
ing the resistance ourselves^ but being conscious of en- 
deavoring to overcome it, we judge that the power 
causing the resistance is e:j^ternal to ourselves, and by 
the application of the hand, learn other qualities of the 
resisting object. 

The sensations of jpain arising when the body is cut 
or pierced by sharp tools, or burned by a hot body, are 
not sensations of touch. Such sensations, by their 
greater intensity, obscure those of touch, and are fol- 
lowed by perceptions peculiar to themselves. 

4th. Ideation pictures to the mind the nature of the 
surface, according to the sensation^ as rough or smooth, 
also the form of the body, and the appearance which it 
would present to the eye. 

5th. As to the relative jprominence of the four elements 
connected with the sense of touch, it is to be observed 
that the sensation, the intuition, the inference, and the 



110 PSYCHOLOGY, 

idea are, in average cases, in equilibrium. The tactual 
sensation is sensibly experienced; the intuition of the 
necessity of the subject and object is clear; the inference 
that the sensation is caused by an external object in 
contact with the organ is decided ; and the ideated pict- 
ure distinctly embodies the inferential judgment, and 
thus completes the process of perception. 

In passing from smell, through taste to touch, we find 
that, in average cases, the sensation diminishes, the in- 
tuition remains constant, the inference becomes more 
positive, and the idea more clear and distinct. 

6th. The utility of the sense of touch will be manifest 
when we reflect that it reveals the external world more 
positively and certainly than any other sense. The 
causes of the sensations of smell and taste, though their 
necessity is apprehended by intuition, are in their nat- 
ure occult. The cause of the sensation of hearing can 
not, but by the aid of the other senses, especially of 
touch, be positively known to be external to the ear 
itself We may question whether the object supposed to 
be seen be not an illusion; but when we touch it, and 
handle it, and find it extended, figured, solid, and resist- 
ing, we no longer doubt its external reality. 

7th. The relation of touch to the other senses is inter- 
esting. It is an opinion, ancient as the time of Democ- 
ritus, that all the other senses are only modifications of 
touch. This opinion, though rejected by Aristotle with 
the assertion that its impossibility is manifest, was re- 
vived by Telesius, an Italian philosopher of the sixteenth 
century, and has been adopted by many philosophers of 
modern times. All the senses involve touch, or contact 
of something external with the organs of sense; but 
smell and taste involve, perhaps, chemical action as well 
as mechanical contact. The sensations given by the vari- 
ous senses difi'er so widely, as is evident from a compar- 



PERCEPTION THROUGH HEARING. Ill 

ison of the sensations of odor, taste, touch, sound, and 
color, that there is good reason for the popular classifi- 
cation of the five special senses. 

2. Perception through hearing, as through smell, 
taste, and touch, involves sensation, intuition, inference, 
and ideation. 

1st. Sensations of sounds as given by consciousness, are 
located in the ear. They are analyzed, compared, iden- 
tified or discriminated, and classified by refiection. 

2d. Intuition apprehends the conditional necessity of 
the subject with the faculties implied, and of the object 
as the cause of the sensation. 

3d. The inference is the judgment inferring the cause 
of the sensation. This cause not being in the ego, which 
is passive in sensation, is objective to the ego, but not 
necessarily objective to the organism. 

We learn from experiment that a vibrating body com- 
municates vibrations to the air, which are propagated 
to the ear, causing in this organ an excitement which 
is the immediate cause of the sensation of which we are 
conscious. From the sciences of Anatomy and Physiol- 
ogy, we learn the structure and functions of the organ 
of hearing. 

4th. Ideation pictures the inference, and represents the 
cause as it would appear through other senses, especially 
sight, thus completing the act of perception. 

5th. As to the relative prominence of the four elements 
involved in hearing, it is to be observed that the sensa- 
tion is noticeable, the intuition real, the inference prom- 
inent, and the ideation clear and distinct. Let us notice 
the working of these elements in the process of percep- 
tion through hearing. We are conscious of a sensation 
of sound, the attention is abstracted from other things, 
and directed to the sensation, which is analyzed and 
classified. Intuition apprehends the conditional necessity 



112 PSYCHOLOGY. 

of the subject with the faculties involved. This element 
is unobtrusive, since the ego is implied by every phe- 
nomenon, and does not, therefore, attract special atten- 
tion. Intuition also apprehends the conditional necessity 
of the cause, but not what the cause is. Science informs 
us that the immediate cause of the sensation is the ex- 
citement of the auditory nerves, caused by the vibrations 
of the air, which are, in turn, caused by the vibrations 
of the sonorous body. The inference is the judgment 
affirming the cause. The cause is objectified — that is, 
the sound is judged to be caused by the vibrating body, 
w^hich is more or less remote, the intermediate causes 
being but obscurely recognized. The cause is ideated, 
and we are said to perceive the object. The agitation 
of the nerves, and the immediate and remote causes of 
this agitation are the conditions of the sensation ; they 
are the antecedents of the complex process- of the per- 
ception, rather than elements of that process. 

6th. It is not correct to say that we perceive an ob- 
ject through its representative idea, as if we began with 
the idea as a third thing intervening between the object 
and the mind; for the idea is the last step in the pro- 
cess of perception. It is the joint product of the action 
of the objective cause and of the percipient mind, and 
embodies our inference, or conclusion, concerning the 
cause of the sensation. 

7th. The utility of the sense of hearing is evident. 
Sound not only reveals external objects, but, in certain 
cases, w^arns us of danger, and, as employed in language, 
is expressive of thought, feeling, or volition. To this 
sense we are largely indebted for the pleasures of social 
intercourse, and for the enjoyments derived from the 
arts of music and oratory. 



CHAPTER XL 



PERCEPTION THROUGH SIGHT. 



Perception through sight, as through the otlier senses, 
involves sensation, intuition, inference, and ideation. 

1st. The sensations of color ^ light ^ and shade are located 
in*the eye. These sensations are given by conscious- 
ness, and are analyzed, compared, identified or discrim- 
inated, and classified b}^ reflection. 

2d. Intuition apprehends the conditional necessity of 
the subject with the faculties implied, and of the object 
as the cause of the sensation. 

3d. The inference is the judgment as to the cause of 
the sensation. This cause not being in the ego, which 
is passive in sensation, is objective to the ego. 

By experience we learn that light is an essential con- 
dition of vision; and, guided by touch, we infer that a 
material object, more or less distant, from which light 
comes to the eye, is the remote cause of the sensation, 
and is the object of perception. 

From Optics, as a branch of Physics, we learn the 
nature and laws of light, and from Anatomy" and Phj^si- 
ology, the structure and function of the eye. 

Every point in the surface of an object sends out, in 
all directions, rays of light in straight lines diverging 
from that point From a single point in the visible 
surface of an object, the rays of a diverging pencil in 
the form of a cone whose vertex is at the point and 
whose base fills the pupil of the eye, enter the eye 
through the pupil, and are, by the lenses, brought to a 

Psy.-lO. ( 113^) 



114 PSYCHOLOGY. 

focus at some point on the net-work of nerves, called 
the retina, which lines the dark choroid coat of the 
inner chamber of the eye. The focus of the rays of the 
converging pencil is the vertex of an interior cone of 
rays having a common base with the exterior cone. 

The accommodation of the eye so as to secure distinct 
vision, at different distances, needs attention. It is a 
condition of distinct vision that the rays diverging from 
a point, in a pencil, and entering the pupil of the eye 
be brought, by the lenses, accurately to a focus on the 
retina of the eye. Let us suppose a point at such a 
distance from the eye that the diverging rays from it, 
which enter the eye are brought exactly to a focus on 
the retina. Now, if the point be removed a little farther 
from the ej^e, the rays from this point, which enter the 
eye, would be less diverging, and it would seem that 
they would be brought to a focus before reaching the 
retina, and crossing at this focus, and diverging back of 
it, would be spread on the retina in a circle of diffusion 
having the central ray for its axis. If the point be 
moved nearer the eye than its first position, it would seem 
that the interior pencil would reach the retina before 
the rays are brought to a focus, giving, in this case, also 
a diffusion circle. A circle of diffusion would actually be 
formed whenever the point is at a greater or less dis- 
tance than a certain distance, about eighteen inches in 
normal cases, were it not for the power of accommoda- 
tion which the eye possesses. The accommodation is 
secured by a greater convexity of the anterior surface 
of the lens as the point is brought nearer the eye, or a 
less convexity, as the point is removed farther from the 
eye. This change in convexity is eff'ected by a contrac- 
tion of the ciliary muscle, when the point is brought 
nearer the eye, and by a relaxation of this muscle, 
when the point is removed to a greater distance. 



PER CEPTION THE O UOH SIGHT. 1 1 5 

In directing attention from a distant to a near object, 
or the reverse, we are conscious of a feeling indicating 
a change going on in the eye — in the first case, of ac- 
tive accommodation; in the second, of relaxation. Both 
the fact and the necessity of accommodation can be 
shown by experiment. Fix two pins upright about 3 
feet apart, and look at them with one eye nearly in 
range w4th the pins, and about 2 feet from the nearest 
pin. If attention be directed to either pin, the other 
will appear blurred. Either j)in can, at w^ill, be made 
to appear distinct, but not both at the same time. 

We have seen that from a single point in the visible 
surface of an object, rays of a diverging pencil enter 
the eye, and are brought to a focus on the retina. 
Rays of pencils from adjacent points in the surface of 
the object are brought to foci, on the retina, in adjacent 
points wdiich are symmetrically arranged with respect 
to the corresponding points in the object. In like man- 
ner, rays of pencils from all the visible j^oints of the 
object, are brought to their proper foci in corresponding 
points on the retina, thus forming on the retina an im- 
age w^hich is a miniature picture of the object. The 
cause of the sensation at each point of the image on the 
retina is, by an act of judgment, objectified and located 
in its proper position in the surface of the object. If 
the lenses of the eye bring the rays to foci before reach- 
ing the retina, or if they reach the retina before coming 
to a focus, circles of difiusion will be formed, which by 
overlapping one another and confusing the image, render 
the perception of the object indistinct. 

Near-sighted persons wear concave glasses to counter- 
act the excessive convexity of the lenses of their eyes. 
As persons grow old, they gradually lose the power of 
adjusting their eyes to near objects, especially when 
small, and are obliged to use convex glasses. 



116 PSYCHOLOGY. 

4th. Ideation combines and pictures in their true po- 
sitions the objectified causes of the sensations at all the 
points of the image on the retina, and thus constructs 
the objective appearance so as to embody the conclusions 
of the inferential judgment. The vivid pictures appear- 
ing in vision are our ideas of the objects which cause 
the sensations. These pictures embody our conclusions 
respecting the objects, and as objectified, coincide with 
the objects, though they are not the objects themselves, 
as will clearly appear, while we pursue our investiga- 
tions. 

5th. As to the relative prominence of the four elements 
of vision, it is to be observed that the sensation is un- 
obtrusive, except in case of dazzling light, and brilliant 
or finely-blended colors; the intuition of the conditional 
necessity of the ego is implicitly assumed, while that of 
the cause is explicitly recognized; the inference is clear 
and definite; and the idea is distinct and vivid. 

In passing from smell, through taste, touch, and hear- 
ing to sight, in average cases, sensation decreases from 
its maximum in smell to its minimum in sight; intuition 
remains constant; inference and ideation increase from 
their minimum in smell to their maximum in siii^ht. In 
smell and taste, sensation is greater than intuition, intu- 
ition than inference, and inference than ideation ; in 
touch, sensation, intuition, inference, and ideation are in 
equilibrium; in hearing and sight, sensation is less than 
intuition, intuition than inference, and inference than 
ideation. 

6th. The physiological conditions of sight are the eye, 
with its coats, the sclerotic, choroid, and retina, its cor- 
nea, iris, and crystalline lens, its pupil, chambers, and 
humors, also the optic nerve and higher centers. 

Seeing is not consummated in the eye. The optic 
nerve conveys the impressions made on the retina to a 



PER CEPTION Tim O UGH SIGHT, 117 

cluster of four tubercules, or ganglia, called tlie tubercula 
quadrigemina,, where they are received and transmitted 
to higher centers. These tubercules, by reflex action, 
excite the iris, and thus automatically contract or ex- 
pand the pupil, so as to regulate the amount of light 
received by the retina. In like manner, by reflex action, 
the direction of the optic axes are automatically adjusted 
to an object near or remote. 

The tubercula quadrigemina, perhaps reinforced by the 
optic thalamic co-ordinate visual impressions with mus- 
cular sensations, and thus preside over those muscular 
efforts made in maintaining equilibrium or producing 
motion, in all cases in which sight is essential to perfect 
action. Let the experiment be made of balancing the 
body on one foot with the eyes first open then closed. 

The visual impressions made upon the retina, received 
and co-ordinated by the tubercula quadrigemina and 
optic thalami, are sent up to the angular gyms, a section 
of the parietal lobe, where they are photographed and 
still further elaborated, and forwarded to the frontal 
lobes of the brain, where the judgment as to the cause 
of the sensation is pronounced, the conclusion ideated, 
and the process of vision consummated. 

The following quotation from Dr. Clark's Visions, page 
133, places the entire process of seeing, as viewed from a 
physiological stand-point, in a clear light: 

" When light waves from an uplifted dagger fall on 
the retina, the eye records the facts of color, size, posi- 
tion, motion, etc., and transmits an account of them to 
the tubercula quadrigemina. This center carefully ad- 
justs tlie mechanism of the eye, the iris, lenses, muscular 
apparatus and the like, to the demands of careful obser- 
vation, co-ordinates the general muscular system for any 
movement the emergency may require, and makes its 
visual report to the angular gyrus. The latter center 



118 PSYCHOLOGY, 

receives the report, perceives all the details of the dagger, 
the hand grasping it, the face and action of the owner, 
whatever constitutes an exact picture of the scene, and 
transmits a corresponding pictorial re])ort to the frontal 
lobes. Upon receiving this report — this pictorial repre- 
sentation, — the lobes look at it, ascertain its significance, 
determine whether the uplifted dagger is raised for in- 
spection merely, or for a threatened or real plunge, or 
for other purposes, communicate with the instincts and 
emotions, and decide the will to act." 

7th. The object 2)rimarily revealed in consciousness is 
not the remote object, or cause of the sensation, nor the 
waves of light reflected from the object to the eye, nor 
the image formed on the retina, nor the excitement of the 
nerves of the retina or of the optic nerve, or of the higher 
centers, but the sensation of color or of light and shade, 
obscurely located in the retina, though this sensation is 
unobtrusive, except in case of strong light or brilliant 
colors. The phenomena following sensation — the intui- 
tion, the inference, and the ideation, are also objects of 
consciousness. 

The object known by rational intuition is neither the 
sensation, nor the nature of the exciting cause, but the 
conditional necessity of the ego as the subject of the sen- 
sation, and the conditional necessity of the object as the 
cause of the sensation. 

The objects inferred by the judgment are the visible 
qualities in the external object which excite sensation. 

The idea is the picture, or appearance, embodying our 
conclusions respecting the object. This idea, though 
originally formed under the stimulus of sensation, can 
be retained and recalled in the absence of sensation, in 
which case it is less vivid but more indeterminate. 

8th. To explain how we perceive the true 2)osition, 
magnitude, and form of objects, let it be observed that 



PERCEPTION TIIEOUOII SIOIIT. 119 

the cause of a sensation at a point on the retina at the 
vertex of an interior pencil, is objectified, ideated, and 
located at the vertex of the corresponding exterior pen- 
cil, the point from which the rays came, and the only 
point from which they could come, having the direction 
with which they meet at the focus. The objective poiut 
is ideated, and thus seen in its true position. 

The perception of the point in its true place ma}-, in 
part, though this is not probable, be owing to a native 
insight, analogous to the instinct of a young chick which 
perceives a crumb in its true place, as is proved by the 
fact that it picks it up. In man, however, the power 
to perceive a point in its true place, is, no doubt, chiefly, 
if not entirely, acquired gradually by experience, guided, 
in some degree, by the sense of touch, which is tutor to 
the eye; for, if the point be within reach, its location can 
be verified by stretching out the hand and touching it, or 
if a little farther off, by going to it. The location of 
more distant objects can be only approximately deter- 
mined by sight; but no correct estimate of the distance 
of such remote objects as the stars can be made through 
vision. The determination of these distances requires 
the nicest measurements and accurate computation. 

The causes of the sensations at all the points of the 
image on the retina are objectified, ideated, and per- 
ceived to be located, respectively, at the corresponding 
points of the object, giving the assemblage of all the 
visible points in their true ^^ositions, and thus the object 
is seen in its proper place, form, and magnitude. 

The movement of a visible point in space is detected 
by the movement of the image of that point on the re- 
tina, though of this movement we seemed to be uncon- 
scious, since the attention is chiefly directed to the move- 
ment of the objective point. The perception of a varie- 
gated surface proves that the sensation at each point of 



120 PSYCHOLOGY, 

the image is referred to its special cause in the object. 
The cause of the sensation at each point of the image 
being objectified, located, and pictured at the vertex of 
the corresponding exterior pencil, the point from which 
the rajs came, the assemblage of all these objective, 
pictured points gives a picture of the object, having not 
onl}^ color, but outline and form; but since the points 
of this picture coincide with the corresponding points in 
the surface of the object, it follows that the object itself 
has extent and form, and this is confirmed by the sense 
of touch. 

9th. Why does the object appear at full size when the* 
image on the retina is a miniature picture? The axis, 
or central ray of the pencil, from the objective point 
through the center of the lens to the image of the point 
on the retina, is not refracted, and is, therefore, a straight 
line; that is, the axes of the two corresponding pencils, 
exterior and interior, form one straight line. The ex- 
terior pencil is longer than the interior, and hence the 
divergence of the exterior pencil, as the rays come from 
the point to the eye, is less than the convergence of 
the interior. Now take an object, as a cane, and hold 
it, in a vertical position, a few yards from the eye. 
The axes of the pencils of rays from the extreme points 
of the cane cross at the center of the crystalline lens; 
and since the exterior pencils are longer than the in- 
terior, the points at the extremities of the cane, which 
are seen in their true position, are farther apart than 
the images of these points on the retina; hence, the ob- 
ject appears at full size, while its image on the retina 
is only a miniature picture. Of this image we are un- 
conscious, since the sensation is unobtrusive, and the 
attention is directed to the objective appearance. 

10th. Why is the image immrtedf and how is the ob- 
ject seen erect? Since the axes of the pencils of rays 



PER CEPTION Tim O UGH SIGHT. 121 

from any two points cross each other at the center of 
the lens, and when prolonged in straight lines^ fbrni the 
axes of the corresponding interior pencils, the image of 
the highest point of the object will be lowest on the ret- 
ina, and the image of the low^est point of the object will 
be highest on the retina. The images of the intermediate 
points of the object are correspondingly^ arranged on the 
retina, the image of the higher of two points being lower 
on the retina; hence, the image is inverted. For like 
reasons, the sides of the image are reversed; hence the 
image is symmetrically arranged with respect to the 
object. 

How, then, is the object seen erect, and its sides in 
their true position? Since the cause of the sensation at 
the lowest point of the image is seen in its true posi- 
tion at the vertex of the corresponding exterior pencil, 
and hence at the highest point of the object, where it 
actually is, and since the cause of the sensation at the 
highest point of the image is seen where it is, at the 
lowest point of the object, the object is inverted with 
respect to the image, and since the image is inverted, 
the object appears erect. 

11th. Binocular vision^ or double vision through the 
two eyes, demands attention. Why is it that we see an 
object single, when an image of it is formed in each 
eye? If we suppose two appearances for the same ob- 
ject, one for each eye, giving to thought two appear- 
ances, then, since each appearance is in coincidence with 
the object, the supposed two appearances, coinciding 
with the object, coincide Avith each other, and form but 
one appearance, as we find in reality; but this one ap- 
pearance is the combination of two appearances, as can 
be proved by their separation on pressing one eye. 

The two appearances blend, since for each point of the 

image on the retina of one eye, there is a corresponding 
Psy.— 11. 



122 PSYCHOLOGY, 

point of the other image, similarly situated on the ret- 
ina of the other eye. The sensations at the two corres- 
ponding points are referred to the same objective cause 
in its true position, which is, therefore, seen as one 
point; and as the same is true for every otlier point in 
the visible surface of the object, it is evident that the 
object ought to appear single, as is really the case. 

To render this still clearer, let us consider the appear- 
ance, though not the object itself, as the spontaneous 
creation of the intellect, under the stimulus of the sen- 
sation, objectifying the cause of the sensation, assigning 
to it color, position, extent, and form, not as constitu- 
ting the object, nor as representing all its qualities, since 
it has other qualities as revealed by the other senses, 
but as representing the qualities known in vision. Now, 
the appearance in vision, considered as an external im- 
age, constructed by the imagination under the stimulus 
of sensation, as the product of the eifort of the intellect 
to assign the true cause to the sensation, is in coinci- 
dence with the object, as is verified by touch. 

That the appearance is an objective image, a construc- 
tion or creation of the mind, an idea embod^dng our 
inference as to the objective cause of the sensation, and 
not the object itself, is evident from the fact that if we 
push one eye, moving it gently, we shall see two images 
clearly separate, one at rest and the other in motion. 
If the objective appearance is the object, there arc two 
objects, one at rest and the other in motion; but there 
is only one object under consideration, and that one at 
rest; hence, the moving image is not the object. Neither 
is the image at rest the object; for pushing the other 
eye, this image moves as well as the other; but the ob- 
ject is at rest, relatively, at least, as can be ascertained 
from the testimony of a person touching it with his 
hand; hence, neither image is the object, nor in this 



I 



PER CEPTION TIIU O UGH SIGHT. 1 23 

ca.se in coincidence with the object, since the images are 
moving while the object is at rest. 

The reason why the objective image does not coincide 
with the object, when the eye is pressed, is because the 
internal image is thus moved to another part of the ret- 
ina, where an image would be formed by an object in 
the position of the external image, if the eye were not 
pressed, and hence the objective image appears in that 
position. Moving the eye moves the image on the ret- 
ina the same as if the eye remained at rest, and the 
object moved as the objective image appears to move; 
hence, the appearance is constructed, when the eye is 
pressed, as if the object moved. 

If now the pressure be gradually removed from the two 
eyes, the two objective images will approach and finally 
coincide with each other and with the object, as can be 
verified by the hand. The object is not now seen double, 
though there is an image of it on the retina of each eye; 
for the objective image, the appearance, seen through one 
eye coincides with the object, and the appearance seen 
through the other eye coincides with the object; hence, 
these two appearances, or objective images, coinciding 
with the same object, coincide with each other, or appear 
as one objective image, though they maj^ be regarded as 
two coincident images. 

The creation of the image is, in popular language, 
called "seeing the object," and this language is best for 
common use. The spontaneous inference respecting the 
cause of the sensation, and the ideation of the inference, 
or the construction, by the imagination, under the stim- 
ulus of the sensation, of the appearance embodying the 
inference, is seeing the object. But the appearance seen, 
when the eyes are open, is no more the object than is 
the appearance imagined when the eyes are shut. The 
appearance seen when the eyes are open is held, by the 



124 PSYCHOLOGY. 

sensation, to a correspondence with the reality, while the 
appearance imagined when the eyes are shut, can be 
changed at will. 

Seeing with the two eyes aids in the perception of 
reliefs by which a body appears to stand out from a 
plane, or to have a third dimension, that is, depth, or 
thickness, in addition to length and breadth. Thus, 
when a small object, as a marble, is held near the face, 
the part of the surface seen by either eye, is that hem- 
isphere whose pole is the nearest e!xtremity of the di- 
ameter which, when produced, would pass through the 
pupil of that eye ; hence, with the two eyes, more than 
half of the surface is seen. In seeing, as it were, par- 
tially around the object, on opposite sides, the object ap- 
pears raised, or stands out in space. 

A point is not seen in the same direction with the two 
eyes, though it is seen in the same position. Hold one 
finger near the face, and look at it towards a wall, first 
closing one eye, then opening that eye and closing the 
other. It will be found that the range of the finger on 
the wall has perceptibly changed. Open both eyes, and 
look at the wall in the direction of the finger. Two 
transparent images of the finger appear, through which 
the wall is seen beyond. In looking at the wall, the optic 
axes, or lines of vision, are adjusted for the distance of 
the wall, and not for the distance of the finger, which 
would require a greater convergence of the axes. Two 
objective images of the finger appear, since the internal 
images, with their sensations, have the same positions on 
the retinas of the two eyes, as they would have if caused 
by two objects, one for each eye, in the ranges of the re- 
spective objective images, and the mind constructs the 
images according to the usual interpretation of such sensa- 
tions. The images appear transparent, neither concealing 
the wall in the range with it and the eye with which it 



FEB CEPTION THE O UGH SIGHT. 125 

is seen, since that portion of the wall is seen through the 
other eye. If one eye be closed, one image will vanish 
and the other will become opaque. If that eye be opened 
again, the image which vanished will reappear, and the 
other will again become transparent. The two images 
w^ill approach and finally coincide, as the attention is 
withdraw^n from the w^all and directed to the finger, and 
a spot on the wall in the direction of the finger w411 
appear double. 

12th. The material reality is the remote cause of the 
sensation. The appearance is the spontaneous creation 
of the mind, embodying its inference concerning the 
cause. This ideated inference, however, is not the cause 
itself The real objective, or remote cause is more than 
an image — it is a material reality. But how do w^e 
know that there is such a reality? The image which 
embodies our ideas of the cause of a visual sensation, 
combines the percepts of color, locality, extent, and form. 
This combination of percepts, as a mere creation of the 
mind, located in space, could not, in itself, afPect the 
sense of touch, nor offer any resistance to our muscular 
energy. It is absurd to supj)ose that the construction, 
by the imagination, projected into space, of the combi- 
nations of decisions that the cause of certain ocular 
sensations has a certain color, position, extent, and form, 
could also excite the sensation of odor, or flavor, or 
sound, or touch, or oppose our locomotive energy. These 
new sensations must have causes; and combining our 
conclusions as to their causes, with our visual image, 
we have a more perfect knowledge of the cause. The 
material object which has qualities capable of exciting 
ocular sensations has also qualities capable of exciting 
sensations through the other senses. The combination 
of qualities is the complex manifestation of the forces of 
a common substance. 



126 PSYCHOLOGY, 

In perception, we infer what sort of an object that 
must be which gives us certain sensations, and the 
objective image, or ideated appearance, is the mental 
construction embodying our conclusion. This image cor- 
responds, more or less perfectly, with the object itself 
In a geometric sense, the correspondence between the 
image and its object may be perfect, as it is in normal 
vision. The objective image in its position, magnitude, 
and form, is the space conceived to be occupied by the 
material object, and unless the perception is abnormal, 
the image and the object are in coincidence. The image 
represents correctly the geometric properties of the ob- 
ject; but in other respects, we must take the words, 
corresponds and represents^ with some latitude. Thus, 
when we see a solid, we do not understand that the 
objective image is a solid, in the physical sense, but 
that the object is; that is, that it would offer a resistance 
if we pressed it with the hand. 

In seeing an apple, for instance, we perceive color, 
size, and form, and construct an image which coincides 
with the object. We experience a sensation of color, 
and infer in the apple a power to excite this sensation, 
and this power is localized, and has assigned to it extent 
and form; and if our perception be correct, the locality, 
size, and form of the image, coincide with the locality, 
size, and form of the apple. But the apple is more than 
the image constructed by the imagination, as colored, 
located, extended, and figured; for it can manifest itself 
through all the other senses; but it is more than the 
combination of the percepts acquired through all the 
senses. If the apple is simply a combination of all our 
percepts concerning it — merely a complement of images 
and notions, embodying our spontaneous inferences, then 
it has no existence independent of our perceptions, and 
would not exist if not perceived. Our notion of it is 



I 



1 



PERCEPTION THROUGH SIGHT, 127 

undoubtedly a combination of percepts or of their rep- 
resentative ideas; but the apple itself is the combination 
of all the causes of the sensations which it occasions in 
us, together, perhaps, with other qualities altogether 
unknown. This combination of qualities and causes is 
not dependent on our perception for its existence, but 
our perception of it implies its existence. The apple 
does not exist because it is perceived, but it is perceived 
because it exists and is brought into relation to our 
powers of perception. It might even exist and not be 
perceived. ]^o doubt many apples exist that have never 
been perceived by any human being. 

The appearance may be regarded as the joint product 
of two factors — the underlying forces which are the 
causes of the sensations, and the mind which interprets 
the sensations by inferring and ideating their causes. 
If either factor of the product be removed, the product 
disappears. Take aw^ay the external forces, and the sen- 
sations v/ill cease, and the appearance will vanish ; change 
the forces, and the sensations will change and the ap- 
pearance will also change; remove the mind, and there 
will be neither sensation nor perception. The appear- 
ance is not independent of the mind; but the apple, as 
a substance involving a collection of forces, is independ- 
ent of the mind. Neither is the appearance independ- 
ent of the external forces — a mere creation of the mind ; 
for then there w^ould be no cause of agreement in the 
appearances as constructed by diiferent minds. But the 
appearances to two minds of the same object are essen- 
tially alike, which would not be the case if the appear- 
ances were exclusively subjective representations; hence 
the appearance, as a product, has an objective factor 
independent of the mind, and this factor is common to 
the appearances to the two minds, and is the cause of 
their agreement. 



128 PSYCHOLOGY. 

That the objects whose qualities, as causes, excite sen- 
sations in ns, are independent of the mind, is also 
revealed by the fact that the mind can not create its 
sensations at will, since these sensations are forced upon 
the mind, which is passive in their reception. The laws 
governing the combination and succession of sensations 
are, therefore, the laws of a non-ego. Hence, there are 
causes independent of ourselves, which produce in us 
the sensations of which we are conscious. Strictl}^, sen- 
sations are the joint products of the external causes and 
the reactions of the internal sensibility. In perception, 
we pass judgment on the external causes, and construct 
our images so as to embody our notions of them as ex- 
ternal objects independent of ourselves, which they are 
in reality, unless our minds are false and deceive us in 
their spontaneous, unprejudiced decisions. At the sum- 
mit of thought, the conclusions of the Philosopher har- 
monize with the inspirations of the Poet. 

" Full many a gem of purest ray serene, 
The dark, unfathom'd caves of ocean bear; 

Full many a flower is born to blush unseen, 
And waste its sweetness on the desert air." 

13th. The utility of sight is evident: it opens to us a 
world of marvelous beauty ; it is swift and delicate, and 
far-reaching, taking in, at a glance, a wide spread land- 
scape, locating its objects countless in number, marking 
the wonderful variety of forms, and the nicest shades of 
color; it reveals a multitude of worlds beyond our own, 
giving us the most sublime conceptions of the grandeur 
of Jehovah's empire. Indispensable is the information, 
infinite are the blessings, and exhaustless the pleasures 
which it confers. 



CHAPTEE XII. 



ACQUIRED PERCEPTION. 



1. Original and acquired perception defined and il- 
lustrated. — An original perception is a perception, through 
a single sense, of the quality of an external object, which 
is the appropriate cause of a sensation in the organ of 
that sense. 

An acquired perception is the perception of the quality 
of an external object which would cause a sensation in 
the organ of one sense, through the original perception 
of a quality w^hich does cause a sensation in the organ 
of another sense, from the knowledge gained by experi- 
ence that these qualities are united in the same object. 

The perception of the color of an extended object, 
through the sensation which that object causes in the 
eye, is an original perception ; so also is the perception 
of a single quality of an external object, gained through 
a sensation in the organ of any other sense. 

The visual idea formed of the appearance of a person, 
from hearing his voice, is an example of an acquired 
perception. Thus, I hear a well-known voice in an ad- 
joining room, and say that my friend is in that room; 
and though I do not see him, yet I imagine how he 
would appear if seen. In this case, the image is not 
the person, who, by supposition, is not seen. This fact 
accords with the doctrine of the last chapter, that the 
appearance is an image constructed by the mind; for, if 
the image, in the absence of the corresponding sensation, 

that is, the sensation in the organ of the sense appro- 

(129) 



I 



130 PSYCHOLOGY. 

priate to that image, can be constructed under the 
stimulus of another sensation, much more can it be con- 
structed under the stimulus of the 23roper sensation. 

The image constructed under the stimulus of a sensa- 
tion not corresponding to the image, is less distinct and 
more indeterminate than the image constructed under 
the stimulus of the appropriate sensation. Thus, on 
hearing the sound of the voice in the adjoining room, 
the image constructed may be consistent with the sap- 
position that the person is sitting or standing. Ho may 
be in either posture, or in some other; but on going into 
the room, the ocular sensations caused by the person, will, 
by their definiteness, determine in what posture the im- 
age constructed under the iiifluence of the sensation 
shall appear. If the person change his posture, the sen- 
sations will change, also the perception, thus revealing 
the fact that there is a reality present independent of 
our sensations; and this reality, by determining our 
sensations, determines our perceptions. Our perceptions, 
then, are not altogether voluntary, since, when the sen- 
sations are present, they are spontaneously determined 
by the mind informed by experience, and influenced by 
habit. 

There is a great variety of acquired perceptions. 
Thus, I hear musical sounds, and know that they come 
from a violin, a piano, or a guitar, as the case may be, 
and imagine how the instrument looks. We say a 
glowing coal of fire looks hot, imagining, by its appear- 
ance to the eye, how it would feel to the hand. In like 
manner, on seeing an apple, we imagine how it would 
feel, or taste, or smell. 

In original perception, the causes of the sensations 
are known through the sensations themselves; but in 
acquired perception, the cause of a sensation which 
would be experienced, if the object were brought into 



ACqUIBED FEECEPTION. 131 

relation to a certain sense, is inferred, on occasion of an 
original perception of the cause of another sensation ac- 
tually experienced through another sense. Every act of 
acquired perception, therefore, involves a sensation, an 
original jDerception, an act of memory, and a represen- 
tation by the imagination. The act, so far as the rep- 
resentation is concerned, is regulated by the law of in- 
tegration^ hereafter explained, by which the mind re- 
peating any part of an entire process, tends to restore 
the whole. 

2. Acquired perceptions through smell. — Through 
the sensation of smelly we not only perceive its cause, 
but represent, by the imagination, the object of which 
the cause of the sensation is a quality, as it would ap- 
pear to the sight, touch, or taste. In this process, the 
representation involves memory and is governed by the 
law of association, guided by the light of experience. 

Having learned by experience the peculiar odor ex- 
haled from a given object, then whenever we experience 
that odor, we not only infer its cause as an exhalation 
from the object, but we imagine the object as it would 
appear through the other senses. 

3. Acquired parceptions through taste. — Through the 
sensation of taste, we not only perceive the quality which 
is its cause, but we imagine the object of which that 
quality is a property, as it would appear to the other 
senses. Thus, in tasting an article of food in the dark, 
we know, for example, that it is an apple of a certain 
variety, having a certain color and other properties not 
originally known by taste. 

4. Acquired perceptions through touch. — The orig- 
inal perceptions through touch are accompanied by ac- 
quired perceptions representing the objects as they would 
appear to the other senses. 

5. Acquired perceptions through hearing. — Through 



132 PSYCHOLOGY. 

hearing, we have a variety of acquired perceptions. We 
hear a sound, and instantly know that it is, lor example, 
the sound of a bell, and can, perhaps, tell what belL 
We say that another sound comes from a drum, another 
from a coach. We strike a barrel, and know from the 
sound whether it is full or empty. We know from the 
tones of a person's voice whether he is pleased or angry, 
though we can not distinguish a word. 

We are peculiarly liable to mistake in judging of the 
cause of sound. The rumbling of a wagon over a bridge 
may be mistaken for thunder; the hum of a musquito, 
for the blast of a bugle; the rattling of a spoon in a tea- 
cup, for sleigh-bells; the beating of the heart, for a rap 
at the door. The noise made by a pet squirrel turning 
the cylinder of its cage, was actually mistaken for the 
noise made by burglars drilling into a safe, and the police 
were called out to capture the thieves. 

We judge the cause of any familiar noise, in the main 
correctly; but any unusual noise is apt to mislead us in 
our judgment concerning its cause; for we can learn 
this cause only by experience. 

6. Acquired perceptions through sight. — Through 
sights we have acquired perceptions of objects, represent- 
ing them as they would appear through smell, taste, 
touch, and hearing. Thus, an orange at a short distance, 
as an object of visual sense, is simply a yellow circle; 
but by acquired perceptions it is represented as spher- 
ical, with a rough surface, as capable of exciting certain 
sensations of odor and taste, as naturally divisible into 
spherical ungula, and as probably having seeds. 

But the most important of the acquired perceptions 
through sight are those relating to the magnitude, dis- 
tance, and form of objects. 

1st. The real magnitude of an object can be estimated 
from its distance and apparent magnitude. 



ACqUIEED PERCEPTION, 133 

Let I denote a linear dimension of the real magnitude 
of an object; d the distance; v tlie visual angle subtended 
by Z, at the distance <i, or the linear dimension which, 
at a unit's distance, will just conceal I; then v is the 
apparent magnitude of I, 

Then, l^^vy^d. 

Hence, knowing the visual angle subtended by an 
object, that is, its apparent magnitude, and its distance, 
we can estimate its real magnitude. It is not asserted 
that an accurate estimate is made of the real magnitude 
of an object from its distance and apparent magnitude, 
but that, from the above relation, the mind makes an 
approximate estimate of the real magnitude. 

If we are mistaken in regard to the distance, we shall 
fail to estimate correctly the real magnitude. Thus, I 
remember looking, at one time, through a window, and 
seeing, as I thought, at the distance of about eighty 
rods, a stub which appeared to be about fifty feet in 
height, and four feet in diameter. On approaching the 
window to obtain a better view, the object was found to 
be a mark on the light of glass, about one inch long, 
and one-twelfth of an inch in breadth. The perception 
of magnitude is, therefore a judgment wdiich may be 
true or false, according as the assumed distance is correct 
or incorrect. 

2d. The distance of an object can be estimated from 

its real and apparent magnitude. 

I 
Thus, l^^VYd; ,\ d=^ — 

A mistake in reference to the real magnitude is fol- 
lowed by an error in estimating the distance. If the 
magnitude is overestimated, the distance w^ill likewise 
be overestimated, and the reverse. Thus, if a pigeon- 
house near by be mistaken for a church, it will appear 
half a mile distant. 



134 PSYCHOLOGY. 

We also estimate the distance of an object from the 
change in its apparent size and direction caused by 
changing our own position. The nearer the object, the 
greater is the change in apparent size and direction, as 
we change our position. 

We can judge of the distance between two objects 
nearly in the same direction, by the rate of the appar- 
ent change in this distance, as we advance at right 
angles to that direction. The farther the objects are 
apart, the more rapidly will the apparent distance be- 
tween them increase. 

Intermediate objects have the effect of augmenting 
apparent distance. A meadow with numerous hay-stacks 
scattered here and there, seems larger than when the 
stacks are removed. A harbor appears larger when 
containing a great number of vessels than it does when 
the vessels have nearly or quite all sailed away. A river 
seems narrower when viewed from bank to bank than 
it is in reality. 

Multitude seems to augment magnitude or duration. 
A certain distance expressed in feet seems greater than 
the same distance expressed in miles. A period of time 
seems longer when expressed in hours than when ex- 
pressed in years. 

Distance is also estimated from brightness or dimness 
of color, clearness or obscurity of outline, distinctness or 
indistinctness of parts. Other things being equal, the 
distance is less as the color is brighter, the outline 
sharper, or the parts more distinct; and the distance 
is greater, as the color is dimmer, the outline more ob- 
scure, or the parts more indistinct. The distance being 
estimated in this way, the real magnitude can be deter- 
mined from the apparent magnitude. In an adjoining 
field, the colors of the objects are bright, their outlines 
clear, and their parts distinguishable; but in a distant 



ACqUIBED PEECEFTIOK, 135 

field of similar character, the colors of the objects are dim, 
their outlines obscure, and their parts indistinguishable. 
In a neighboring grove, we can distinguish, not only 
the individual trees, but also their branches and leaves; 
while in the distant forest, we can not distinguish the 
leaves, nor the branches, nor scarcely the individual 
trees. 

A ship seen through a fog appears farther off than it 
is in reality. An English traveler, when first visiting 
Italy, judges the mountains to be much nearer than they 
actually are, on account of the clearness of outline and 
distinctness of parts, as seen through the transparent 
atmosphere of that country. 

On account of the smoke, fog, and mist near the earth, 
the atmosphere, viewed in the direction of the zenith, 
appears clearer than when viewed in the direction of 
the horizon ; hence, the apparent vault of the heavens 
is not a hemisphere, its vertical radius being less than 
its horizontal, making the horizon appear much more 
distant than the zenith, causing the shape of the celestial 
vault to resemble the concave side of the crystal of a 
watch. This appearance is also augmented by interven- 
ing objects seen along the earth in the direction of the 
horizon. On account of this apparent shajDC of the ce- 
lestial vault, the sun and moon appear farther off when 
in the horizon than when in the zenith ; and since the 
visual angles subtended by these objects are nearly the 
same in the two cases, being imperceptibly less in the 
horizon than in the zenith, the linear magnitude, which 
varies directly with the distance when the visual angle 
is constant, is judged to be greater. The farther off" an 
object appears, the visual angle remaining the same, the 
larger that object appears. 

3d. The magnitude of an object can be estimated by 
comparison. Let v, v\ respectively, be the visual angles 



136 PSYCHOLOGY, 

subtended by the respective linear dimensions, l^ l\ of 
two objects whose distances from the observer are, re- 
spectively, dj d\ 

Then, l = v X<^j and r = v' X ^'• 

I V d V d 

Hencte, 1^ = -:^ X ^; .-. 1 = 1 X "^ X ^- 

V 

If the objects are equidistant, d = 6^', and I =^V y^ ---^, • 

It is not asserted that in estimating size by compari- 
son, the mind always makes an accurate computation. 
The above formulas express scientifically the mathemat- 
ical relations which, though admitting of clear appre- 
hension and exact application, are, perhaps, for the most 
part, vaguely apprehended and unconsciously applied. 
If we mistake in regard to the magnitude of l\ we shall 
fail in correctly estimating the magnitude of I. Tiius, 
Dr. Abercrombie on going up Ludgate Hill towards the 
great door of St. Paul's Church, took several persons 
who were standing in the doorway to be children; but 
on coming up, he found them to be men. He had com- 
pared them with the door, which was larger than he 
iiad supposed, and this mistake in regard to the size of 
the door, led to an incorrect estimate of the size of the 
men ; and, judging them to be smaller than they were 
in reality, he mistook them for children. The mis- 
take originated in underestimating the distance of the 
church, which led to the underestimate of the size of 
the door. 

4th. The form of bodies involving the third dimension, 
depth, must be learned originally by touch; yet the eye, 
trained by touch, interprets with surprising rapidity the 
signs which indicate the form of bodies. When looking 
at a sphere, we see only a circular disk; but the transi- 
tions of color, the blending of light and shade are of 



ACQUIRED PERCEPTION. 137 

such a character, that we perceive that the object is a 
sphere and not a circle. We have learned by experi- 
ence to interpret the signs of form, and can thus readily 
distinguish one object from another. The painting rep- 
resenting a sphere is really a circle which reflects light 
as a sphere reflects it; and since the painting of a sphere 
causes the same sensations as the sphere itself, these 
sensations are interpreted in the usual way, and the 
painting is imagined to be a sphere. 

Till the mind learns to interpret the signs of a third 
dimension, a solid appears to the eye as a plane surface. 
This is proved beyond question in case of the blind 
when first restored to sight. A painting of a landscape 
appears to them to be a flat surface, as it is in reality, 
with variegated colors, light, and shade. They have 
not yet learned to interpret, by the sense of sight, the 
signs of distance, magnitude, and form, involving the 
third dimension. But when the mind has learned to 
interpret the signs of the third dimension, and of dis- 
tance, it will, whenever these signs appear, perceive the 
third dimension, and, in the majority of cases, judge 
with wonderful correctness, the true distance of the ob- 
ject. The sign and the interpretation become so asso- 
ciated, that when the sign appears, the interpretation, — 
that is, the inference with the ideation — follows. 

Tiie art of painting, therefore, consists in the skill to 
make on a surface such a representation of an object as 
will reflect color, light, and shade to the eye, as the 
object itself would reflect them. The color, light, and 
shade, as signs of form, coming from the object, are 
correctly interpreted, and the form of the object is per- 
ceived; but these signs coming from the painting, just 
as they come from the object, causing similar sensations, 
are interpreted as if coming from the object, and this 
is done even when we know 'that we are looking at 

Psy.-12. 



138 PSYCHO LOOY. 

the painting of the object and not at the object itself ; 
and thus the constructive imagination sees in the paint- 
ing an object having three divisions. If we did not 
know that we were looking at a painting, we should 
believe that we were looking at the object which the 
painting represents. 

It is undoubtedly true that, if we had, by any means, 
such sensations as those caused by the objects which 
now surround us, we should seem to perceive these ob- 
jects, though they were not present. Such pseudo- 
perceptions sometimes occur in case of the abnormal 
action of the organs of vision; but in normal cases, the 
sensations require external causes as the conditions of 
their existence. The ideated judgments concerning the 
causes of the sensations are the products of the percep- 
tion of the objects. 



CHAPTEE XIII. 

DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCT OF PERCEPTION. 

The development of the powers of perception in 
children is effected by their endeavors to learn the prop- 
erties and relations of external things. They make 
many experiments, and learn by success or by failure. 

The several senses, the instinctive tendencies, and the 
faculties of sensation, intuition, inference, and ideation, 
must be assumed as original. 

At first, the perceptions which follow the sensations 
are obscure and indistinct. A sensation, perhaps of 
pleasure or of pain, more decided than usual, attracts 
tlie attention, which is withdrawn from other sensations, 
and an effort is made to enjo}^ the pleasure or to avoid 
the pain. Two or more senses may be emiDloyed at the 
same time, giving groups of sensations which are found 
to be simultaneous or successive, and these become so 
intimately associated that when one is experienced the 
others are expected. 

Intuition awakes and asserts that the sensations have 
causes. The cause of a sensation is discovered by in- 
vestigation, one sense testing or correcting the decisions 
of another. 

The knowledge of a single quality of an object, gained 
through a single sense, is a percept, which may be idea- 
ted or represented by the imagination. The various 
percepts relating to the object, or the ideas representa- 
tive of the percepts, may be combined, giving a more 

perfect knowledge of the object. 

(139) 



140 PSYCHOLOGY, 

The hand and the eye are the principal organs of 
investigation and media of perception. The soul first 
acquires a l^now ledge of its own body by means of the 
muscular and the tactual sensations. Thus, when the 
hand is pressed upon the body, the muscular sensations 
give the portion of the sensorium which is the locus of 
the sensation, and the tactual sensations give to this 
portion its limit or bounding surface. The surface of 
the body is also revealed by glowing warmth or creep- 
ing chill. 

By comparing the double sensation experienced when 
the hand is placed on a portion of the body w4th the 
single sensation experienced when the hand is applied 
to an external body, as a chair or an apple, the mind 
begins to perceive that these are objects exterior to its 
own body. 

When one hand grasps the other, the sensations within 
the hand grasped reveal magnitude, the relative extent 
of which the grasping hand measures. This measure 
will reveal the relative magnitude of another object 
grasped, as equal to, greater, or less than, the hand 
grasped, according to the degree of opening of the grasp- 
ing hand. 

By moving the hand along the arm, magnitude is 
revealed by the loci of the successive sensations, and the 
relative extent of this magnitude is measured by the 
muscular sensations connected with the movement of 
the hand. By comparing these sensations with the 
muscular sensations experienced when the hand is moved 
along another body, the comparative size of this body 
can be estimated. Such experiments are attended with 
ocular perceptions. The mind is coiiScious, not of the 
image on the retina, but of the sensations, the cause 
of which it objectifies and locates, guided by the sense of 
touch, and thus it comes into possession of the visible 



I 



DE VEL OPMENT OF PER CEPTION, 1 41 

signs of external objects in addition to the tactual and 
the muscular. Objects as seen, are found to resist our 
locomotive energy, and it is thus known that they are 
not phantasms, but real external powers. The forms of 
objects as seen are learned more perfectly by handling 
them, so as to be afterwards detected by sight alone. 

The positions of objects, as near or remote, are learned 
by going to them; and thus by experience, gradually 
acquired, we learn to locate objects by sight alone, in 
their true positions, and to take in, at a glance, the 
salient features of a landscape. 

That the eye needs the tutorship of touch is evident 
from the experience of those once blind, after they have 
been l*estored to sight. They are, at first, unable to 
interpret pictures or drawings, or by sight alone to 
perceive the true form, size, or j^osition of objects. To 
them, the various objects of a landscape, seen through 
a window, seem to be variegated colors in contact with 
the glass. 

The percepts of an object acquired through all the 
various senses are ideated and combined into a complex 
idea of the object. Any one of these percepts or its 
idea being given, the mind imagines the object as it 
would appear through any other sense or through all 
the other senses. 

We have found that a percept is the knowledge of a 
quality of an external object, gained by original percep- 
tion through the sensation in the organ of a single 
sense. A percept is developed into an idea which is 
committed to the keeping of the memory, reproduced in 
the imagination, and recognized as the representative of 
the percept. 

By acquired perception, guided by experience, the 
representative idea of a percept gained through one 
sense, is, by the law of association, reproduced sponta- 



142 PSYCHOLOGY, 

neoiisly in the imagination, on the occasion of the orig- 
inal perception of another quality of the external object, 
through the sensation in the organ of another sense. 
This idea may also be recalled by the name of the ob- 
ject. Each original perception gives us a distinct per- 
cept corresponding to a distinct quality in the object. 
Two or more original perceptions may be simultaneous, 
forming a complex perception, or original and acquired 
perceptions may combine. The ideas of two or more 
percepts may be combined, giving a complex idea which 
more or less truthfully represents the complex knowl- 
edge of the object, as acquired by original perception. 

The combination of all our percepts of an object con- 
stitutes our knowledge of the object as perceived. The 
combination of all our ideas of these percepts constitutes 
our notion of the object as conceived. The object itself 
is the combination of all the qualities known as the ob- 
jects of our percepts, together with all its other quali- 
fy p and powers. The object, as a substance involving 
a combination of forces, is independent of the mind. 

xV material body perceived as extended implies space, 
at least the space which it occupies. Two or more 
bodies reciprocally external, imply not only the space 
occupied by them, but the space between them. A body 
in motion implies the space through which it moves. 
The fact that a body can move indefinitely in any di- 
rection implies space surrounding the body on all sides, 
and extending indefinitely. Space, then, is the logical 
antecedent or necessary condition of body — that with- 
out which body can not be ; hence, since body is, space 
must be. A body is perceived' or represented in its re- 
lation to space, as occupying a portion of space, and as 
contained in space; that is, as surrounded by space on 
all sides, and as either at rest in space, or in motion 
through space. 



IJE VEL OFMENT OF FEB CEFTION. 143 

Successive psychical changes imply time. A material 
body perceived as enduring simultaneously with psychi- 
cal changes in the ego, implies the time through which 
it endures. Two bodies enduring in a certain form, 
through different jDcriods, not consecutive, imply not 
only the periods through which they endure, but the 
period included between these periods. The fact that 
the period through which a body endures, in a certain 
state, may be both preceded and followed by the j^e- 
riods through which other bodies endure, proves that the 
Unite period through which a body endures in a certain 
state, is a portion of a greater period extending indefi- 
nitely before and after the given j)eriod. 

Successive changes in the state of a body also imply 
time. The period of a body in a certain state may be 
considered with reference to its date, or time when, and 
with reference to its duration, or time how long. Time, 
then, is the logical antecedent or necessary condition of 
a body as enduring or as exhibiting successive changes 
— that is, time must be in order that a body may 
endure and exhibit successive changes; hence, since 
a body does endure and exhibit successive changes, time 
must be. A body is perceived or represented in its re- 
lation to time in reference to its date, or location of its 
period in indefinite time, and in reference to its duration, 
or the quantity of indefinite time contained in its period. 

A material object is not to be regarded merely as a 
combination of qualities or attributes; nor is one quality 
to be regarded as the substance of which the other 
qualities are the attributes. The substance is the com- 
mon ground, substratum, or underlying power, involving 
a combination of forces which manifest the qualities or 
attributes of the body. The same object which exhibits 
qualities which are the objects of visual percepts, also 
manifests qualities which are the objects of percepts cor- 



144 PSYCHOLOGY. 

responding to the other senses. These qualities are 
perceived as the causes of sensations in us, and are re- 
ferred to the substance as their common ground, or as 
the power involving the forces which manifest them as 
attributes. 

The percepts relating to these qualities, as attributes 
of a substance, are ideated and combined into a complex 
idea or notion of the object which is represented in its 
relations to space and time. These complex ideas, as 
ideal objects or creations of the mind in ideal space and 
time, are the representatives, more or less truthful and 
complete, of our knowledge of the real objects, as they 
were perceived to exist in real space and time. The 
conditional necessity of substance as the ground or sub- 
stratum of the qualities which are the causes of sensa- 
tions in us, is not an object of perception through any 
sense, but is apprehended by rational intuition. 



CHAPTEE XIV. 



ERRORS IN PERCEPTION. 



Errors in perception are not errors in sensation; for 
we are directly conscious of sensation, leaving no room 
for error. Neither are errors in perception errors of 
intuition, which affirms that sensations have causes. 
But the error is found in the inference which judges 
concerning tlie cause of the sensation. It arises from a 
misinterj3retation of a sense-impression, that is, fi^om an 
erroneous inference respecting the cause of a sensation, 
which inference, when ideated, becomes an illusive ap- 
pearance, not corresponding to the reality. 

These illusions are reducible to three classes, accord- 
ing as the cause of the erroneous inference is objective, 
subjective, or both objective and subjective. 

1st. An objective^ passive^ or a posteriori illusion is one 
due to something in the object which gives a sense-im- 
pression similar to that which would be given by the 
object supposed to be perceived. The object thus sug- 
gested is erroneously inferred and ideated, or represented 
by the imagination. Thus, a person may imagine he 
sees a ghost, because lie happens, in the obscurity of the 
night, to see something which strikingly corresponds to 
those descriptions of apparitions with which he has be- 
come familiar. 

2d. A subjective^ active^ or a priori illusion is one due 

to some preconception, or some pre-existing activity, 

which, by awakening expectation, predisposes the mind 

to certain inferences. The object thus anticipated is, 
Psy - 13. ( 145 ) 



146 PSYCHOLOGY. 

tinder favorable conditions, readily imagined and believed 
to be perceived. Thus, a person visiting at night, a 
house which he knows has the reputation of being 
haunted, will be quite likely to see a ghost, especially 
if he is superstitious and has a lively imagination. 

3d. An illusion both objective and subjective is due both 
to the peculiarity of the sensation caused by the object, 
and to the pre-occupation in the mind of the subject. 
This is the most common case. Illusions purely object- 
ive, or purely subjective, are comparatively rare. Most 
commonly the suggesting circumstance and the anticipa- 
tion co-operate in causing the illusion. Thas, in ghost- 
seeing, there is usually an external suggesting object of 
ghost-like form, seen by a mind preoccupied with fear- 
ful anticipations of beholding an apparition. The sug- 
gesting sensation is quickly misinterj^reted and repre- 
sented by the excited imagination in accordance with 
the dreaded anticipation. 

An object may erroneously be regarded as beautiful, 
either because it has certain elements suggesting the 
beauty which the mind imagines and embodies in the 
object, or because the mind is in a state of expectancy 
in regard to beauty, and thus imagines it in the absence 
of those external qualities usually called beautiful, or 
more commonly because both causes, the suggesting ele- 
mients and the expectancy conspire to elicit the errone- 
ous inference, which is ideated, objectified, and embodied 
in the object. This will account, in part at least, for 
the diflPerences which exist in different minds with regard 
to the beauty of objects, notwithstanding very general 
agreements. 

Similar errors may arise in interpreting the looks or 
words of another, when these words are regarded as 
signs of mental states or of disposition or character. The 
error may arise from the sign, from the anticipation, or 



ERR ORS IN PER CEPTION . 147 

from. both. The error is eliminated, in a high degree 
of probability, when many persons agree in drawing the 
same inference from the same indication; but when two 
persons draw conflicting conclusions from the same look 
or word of a third person, one, at least, is in error, and 
the error is probably one of anticipation. 

If the angular gyrus be affected as it would be affected 
by any external object presented to the eye, whether 
that affection be a spontaneous cell-grouping of itself, or 
whether it be an effect sent up from an excitement of 
the retina or of the tubercula quadrigemina, caused by 
stimulants or by disease, or whether it be an effect of a 
preconception or a misconception sent down from the 
frontal lobes, the angular gyrus will transmit the same 
report to the frontal lobes as if the supposed object were 
actually present, and that object will appear to be seen. 
The phenomenon, in this case, differs from the idea of 
the object as reproduced from memory, by the imagina- 
tion, since in the latter case there is no corresponding 
sensation; whereas, in the supposed case, the sensation is 
as real, and the appearance as vivid, as if the object 
were actually present and normally perceived. 

If the nerves of any organ of sense be definitely ex- 
cited, normally or abnormally, there will be a sensation 
followed by a perception or inferential judgment cor- 
responding to the excitement and to the sense whose 
organ is excited. Thus, an excitement of the optic 
nerve is accompanied with the phenomena of vision ; an 
excitement of the auditory nerve is attended by the 
phenomena of hearing, and so on for the other senses. 
The sensation is real, and the cause is real, but there 
may be error in the inference as to the nature of the 
cause. 

It is possible that causes somewhat diverse may pro- 
duce similar effects. A tree before the eye excites the 



148 PSYCHOL OGY, 

nerves of the eye iu a certain manner, and tbiy excite- 
ment produces a sensation, followed by the perception 
of the tree. Now, if the nerves of the eye could, in 
any other way, be excited in the same manner, this ex- 
citement would produce a similar sensation, followed by 
a similar perception, and there would be an apparent 
perception of the tree, though the tree were not present. 
A straight stick thrust obliquely into the water ap- 
pears bent; but this is owing to the refraction of the 
light at the surface of the water, causing the straight 
stick to make the same image, and thus to produce the 
same sensation as that caused by a bent stick ; and 
hence, the mind interpreting the sensation as it has 
been accustomed to do, sees the stick bent. The error, 
if the stick is believed to be bent, arises from not rec- 
ognizing the fact that dissimilar causes under different 
conditions may produce similar effects. The sensation 
is the same as that produced by a bent stick in the air; 
and so frequent has been the association of the sensation 
produced by a bent stick with the cause of the sensa- 
tion, in ordinary cases, that a .Standard for judgment 
has been formed which is applied in the given case; 
hence, the straight stick in the water, giving the same 
sensation as a bent stick in the air is, 'in accordance 
with the habitual sensation, by a spontaneous inference, 
seen bent. We can not get rid of the appearance of a 
bent stick, even after we have learned that the appear- 
ance is an illusion caused by the refracting power of 
the water. The stick will appear bent even after we 
believe or know it to be straight. The appearance is a 
spontaneous creation by the imagination, embodying the 
judgment spontaneously inferred in accordance with ha- 
bitual association, in case of such sensations. The judg- 
ment is not reflective or scientific; for such a judgment 
would conclude the stick to be straight. Tlie judgment 



I. 



ER R ORS IN PER CEPTION, 149 

is, therefore, spontaneous or constitutional; but the con- 
stitutional power which asserts the judgment, is not 
wholly original, as is the constitution of the sensibility 
which reports the sensation, but is in part, at least, 
acquired by the plastic influence of experience and 
habit. 

If we look at a pencil held near the eyes, and at the 
same time, see a more distant object, in the same range, 
without directing especial attention to it, that object will 
appear double; but if we direct attention to the distant 
object, the pencil will appear double. The reason is, in 
the one case, the optic axes are adjusted to the distance 
of the pencil, and in the other, to the distance of the 
object, causing, in the first case, the distant object, and 
in the second case, the pencil, to produce images on the 
retinas of the two eyes, such as would be caused, when 
the optic axes are normally adjusted, by two objects, one 
causing an image in one eye, the other in the other ej^e. 
The sensations being the same as those caused by the 
two objects, the judgment follows the usual law in in- 
ferring the cause, and the imagination constructs the 
aj)pearance accordingly. 

If a person should suddenly become cross-eyed, he 
would see double, for the reason that the same object 
would cause sensations on dissimilar parts of the retinas 
of the two eyes, such as could be caused, wdien the eyes 
were in their normal condition, only by two objects; 
hence, the one object would appear, under the influence 
of the established association for the normal case, as two 
objects. If the person should remain cross-eyed for a 
considerable length of time, his ocular perceptions being 
corrected by touch, he would gradually acquire the 
power to see single, or one object would appear as one; 
and this would be the case, though he did not become 
blind in one eye, as is the tendency in cross-eyed per- 



150 PSYCHOLOGY. 

sons. If a cross-eyed person, who had acquired the 
power to see single, should have his eyes straightened, 
he would, at first, see double, because one object would 
now make images in the two eyes in such places on the 
retinas as could have been made only by two objects 
before his eyes were straightened. 

Roll a sheet of paper into a tube about one inch in 
diameter. Look through the tube with one eye, and at 
the hand placed close by the side of the tube with the 
other. A hole the size of the tube will appear in the 
hand, through Avhich objects are visible. The reason is, 
that though an object, as a door, may be concealed from 
one eye by the hand, a small circular portion of the ob- 
ject is seen with the other eye through the tube, giving 
the same appearance as if that portion were actually 
seen through a hole in the hand. A spot on the hand 
where the hole appears will disappear, if attention is 
directed to objects seen through the tube; but if atten- 
tion be directed to the hand, the spot will appear in 
the hole, as if seen through the tube. 

A person seen at a distance is judged to be a certain 
individual, and the perception seems quite clear, though 
it be erroneous, as afterv^ards found. On approaching 
nearer, certain signs appear inconsistent with the first 
judgment, and the perception becomes indecisive. Ap- 
proaching still nearer, a new judgment is formed, and . 
he is seen to be another person, very different, joerhaps, 
from the one first supposed, and the perception again 
becomes clear and distinct. The sensations caused by 
the person, when at a distance, were, from their some- 
what indeterminate character, not inconsistent with the 
first supposition, and there were positive elements favor- 
ing this supposition; but as he approached, elements 
appeared rendering this supposition improbable. A still 
nearer approach, rendered the sensations more definite. 



■^ 



ERRORS IN PER CEPTION. 151 

and determined the final judgment, and made clear and 
decisive the perception. 

Tactual sensations may lead to erroneous perceptions. 
If we cross the fingers, and place some small object, as 
a pencil, between their tips, it will be felt as tw^o. The 
reason is, when the fingers are in their natural position, 
one pencil could not give the sensations which it gives 
when the fingers are crossed; but two pencils could give 
these sensations, as we find by trial. The one pencil, 
then, between the fingers crossed, giving similar sensa- 
tions to those given by the two pencils when the fingers 
are not crossed, the sensations being interpreted according 
to established associations for the normal case, when the 
fingers are not crossed, is perceived as two pencils. 

A person who has had a foot amputated, will seem to 
feel pain in that foot, for the reason that the nerves of 
the remaining part of the limb are aftected as they 
would be by an injury done to the foot, were it remain- 
ing, and hence the perception. 

Many other interesting examples of errors in percep- 
tion will occur to the reflective mind, and the explana- 
tion of these errors will illustrate the nature of the 
process of perception itself 



CHAPTER XY. 

PASSIVITY AND ACTIVITY AND CONDITIONS. 

1. The state of the soul in perception, its passivity or 
activity, requires attention. The soul \^ passive in sen- 
sation, in this sense, that, when the conditions of sen- 
sation are complied with — that is, w^hen excitants are 
brought into relation with the sensorium, the sensation 
caused by the action of the excitants and the reaction 
of the sensibility is experienced without an act of the 
will. The conditions of sensation being complied with, 
as when a lump of sugar is placed in the mouth, the 
sensation follows, not only without any voluntary action 
of the soul to induce it, but in spite of any effort to 
prevent it or to change its character. 

The soul may be active in reference to sensation, in 
voluntarily complying with the conditions of sensation, 
as in putting sugar into the mouth in view of causing 
the sensation, or in reflecting on sensation, as in ab- 
stracting the attention from other things and directing 
it to its sensations, that thus by comparing them it may 
note their resemblances and differences and classify them 
accordingly. It will be observed that this activity is 
not in the sensation, but relates to the sensation. 

The soul is passive in perception, in this sense, that 
when the object is presented, the perception is deter- 
mined so as to correspond to the object. Thus, in clear 
perception, the mind can not see a man to be a horse. 
The character of the perception is, in part, determined 

by the nature of the sensation caused by the object. 

(152) 



PASSIVITY, ACTIVITY, AND CONDITIONS, 153 

The passivity of the soul in sensation and perception 
is a clear indication of other objects than ourselves. 
These objects causing our sensations and determining 
our perceptions, without volition, establish the existence 
of an external world, and disprove absolute idealism. 

The soul can be active in perception in several ways: 
It can abstract its attention from many objects, and di- 
rect it to a few, in order to gain clear and distinct j)er- 
ceptions. The mind can, at pleasure, attend to certain 
objects, for the time neglecting others. 

The soul can, by special effort, innervate a single 
sense, thus rendering it susceptible of more vivid sensa- 
tions; and by concentrating its attention on these sen- 
sations, can obtain the most clear and distinct perceptions. 
We sometimes suspend the action of one sense, that we 
may increase that of another, as when we close the eyes 
that we may hear the more intently. 

The activity of the mind in perception is exemplified 
in the process of ideation, by which the percepts are 
developed into ideas, and combined into complex images, 
which, as representative of the object, can be retained 
and recalled at pleasure, though the original objects 
themselves are absent. 

The clear perceptions and completed ideas of objects 
which we have in mature years, are the fruits of many 
experiences and attempts, perhaps now forgotten, to gain 
a knowledge of these objects. We seem to perceive ob- 
jects by a passive impression, when, in reality, the 
perception is the resultant of the mind's activity in com- 
bining the percepts acquired through the present sensa- 
tions with the ideas which the mind has already in pos- 
session, in respect to the given objects, or to objects of 
the same class, or even to objects more remotely related 
to those under consideration. 

The activity of the mind in perception is manifest in 



154 - PSYCHOLOGY, 

the widely different results attained by different persons 
from their inspection of the same object. Each will find 
something entirely overlooked by the others. What each 
sees, depends not only on the object, but also on the 
knowledge, culture, habits, occupation, character, and 
condition of the observer. 

Activity and passivity are, therefore, both present in 1 
sensation and perception. Though both are present, yet 
sometimes one preponderates and sometimes the other; 
and from the preponderance of the one element over the 
other, in a certain modification of mind, we style that 
modification active or passive, as the case may be. It 
may be observed that we are not conscious of pure pas- 
sivity. Consciousness is cognizant of the reaction of the 
soul againt the action of a foreign cause. 

2. The conditions of clear and distinct perception are 
the following: 

1st. The general conditions of perception — an object, 
and a subject, and the relation of the two. 

2d. Abstraction of the attention from other things ex- 
cept the object under consideration, thus avoiding dis- 
traction, 

3d. Concentration and continuance of the attention 
upon the object till the perceptions gained by simple 
inspection through the several senses, become clear and 
distinct. 

4th. An examination of the object from different points 
of view, on different sides, and under different conditions. 

5th. An examination of the parts of the object in detail, 
thus securing greater concentration of attention, and 
proportionally clear and distinct perception. 

6th. A comparison of the object with other objects, 
both similar and dissimilar, thus obtaining resemblances 
and contrasts. 

7th. Classification of the object with its species. 



PASSIVITY, ACTIVITY, AND CONDITIONS, 155 

8th. Eepetition of the examination, if necessary, ob- 
serving the above conditions, till satisfactory results are 
reached. 

The results of clear and distinct perceptions, when 
ideated, become permanent and valuable possessions, and 
are essential conditions to the proper performance of the 
higher oj^erations of representation and elaboration. 

3. The properties of matter are given for reference. 
They are the primary, secundo-primary, and secondary. 

1st. The primary properties relate to space or time. 

(1) As to space ^ a body occupies space and is contained 
in space; — as occupying space, it has magnitude, form, 
divisibility, and ultimate incompressibility ; and as con- 
tained in space, it has mobility and situation. 

(2) As to time, a body has duration or renewal of state 
and date of change. 

2d. The secundo-primary properties result from inertia, 
co-attraction, and repulsion. 

Inertia, or want of power in a body to change its state 
as to rest or motion, is a mechanical fact, not a chemical. 

Co-attraction embraces gravity, cohesion, and affinity, 
also capillary, electrical, and magnetic attraction. 

Repulsion may result from compression, heat, electricity 
or magnetism. 

From co-attraction and repulsion result the following 
pairs of properties : Hard and soft, solid and fluid, viscid 
and friable, tough and brittle, rigid and flexible, fissile 
and infissile, ductile and inductile, elastic and inelastic, 
slippery and adhesive, crystallized and uncrystallized. 

3d. The secondary properties are the causes of such sen- 
sations in us as those of odor, flavor, touch, sound, and 
color. These properties are in their nature occult, and 
in their varieties innumerable. 



CHAPTEE XVI. 



THEORIES OF PERCEPTION. 



1. The Ionic philosophers, following the lead of Thales, 
directed their attention to physical phenomenaj which 
they attempted to generalize by induction. They sought 
for the material principle of things, and the manner of 
their generation and decay; but they gave no further 
explanation of perception than that phenomena result 
from the peculiarities of matter, which, in their opinion, 
is endowed with life. 

2. Pythagoras found the principle of things in number 
and iSgure, but threw no light on preception, 

3. The Eleatie philosophers. Xenophanes, Parmenides, 
and Zeno, were eminently metaphysical and idealistic. 
They regarded the phenomena of sense as illusive^ rea- 
son alone giving true knowledge. 

4. Empedocles thought that bodies send off effluxes 
which enter the pores of the various senses, and occasion 
perception. In the case of vision, effluxes also pass out 
from the eye, and the meeting of the two streams gives 
rise to perception. Empedocles laid it down as an axiom, 
that the object known, and the subject which knows, 
must be of like nature — an assumption, which, as Ham- 
ilton has shown, has exerted a powerful influence on 
philosophy from the very earliest to the very latest 
speculations. 

5. Democritus maintained that all forms of being are 
resolvable into matter composed of atoms differing in 

size and shape. The soul differs from the body only in 

^ ( 156) 



ANCIENT AND MEDTEVAL THEORIES. 157 

the fact that it is composed of finer particles. Percep- 
tion is occasioned by contact; lience, all the other senses 
are only modifications of touch. That which is brought 
into contact with the soul, is not the material object it- 
self, but images of that object. These images are de- 
tached from the object and j)rojected through the pores 
of the organs of the various senses. 

60 Plato held that sensation is the product of the joint 
action of the external object and the sentient agent. As 
the individual factor varies, sensations vary. They are 
not necessarily the same in all persons, nor the same in 
the same person in different circumstances. As variable 
and contingent, they are unreliable; hence, perception 
through sensation, is illusive and untrustworthy. 

7. Aristotle maintained that all knowledge begins with 
the individual, and is grounded on sensuous perception. 
He discriminated between sensation and perception, hold- 
ing that we have certain knowledge of sensation, but 
that we are liable to error in our judgments through 
sensation. He also considered the physical media and 
conditions of perception, but made little advancement in 
the knowledge of the structure and functions of the or- 
gans of the senses. Each sense perceives its own object, 
as the eye color, the ear sound, and so on, for the other 
senses; hence, objects are not themselves perceived, but 
their species or perceptible forms. He held that there 
is a common sensory whose seat is in the heart, where 
the several senses meet. All objects have motion or rest^ 
number, magnitude, and form. 

8. The Medieval philosophers, or Schoolmen^ followed 
the doctrines of Aristotle, modified, to some extent, by 
those of Plato. They held that material objects them- 
selves are not immediately perceived, but only their spe- 
cies or images. In support of this opinion, they gave the 
following reasons : 



158 PSYCHOLOGY, 

1st. The object itself, when apparently perceived, is 
frequently not in contact with the organ of sense. 

2d. The object is material, while the soul is spiritual, 
and the two being totally unlike, can not act upon one 
another. The object can not, therefore, affect the soul, 
and hence the soul can not perceive the object. 

3d. Every thing immediately known must be in the 
mind, but this can not be true of the distant object. 

4th. The object itself does not vary, but the aj)pear- 
ance varies, as when objects are seen at different distances, 
or as images seen in a moving looking-glass. A person 
seems to see himself behind the glass, when, in reality, 
he is before it. Hence, the ajDpearance is only the species, 
or image, and not the real object itself. 

The more intelligent of the schoolmen did not regard 
the species as material. In this respect, their views 
closely approximated to the view which we hold to be 
correct, that the appearance is a spontaneous construc- 
tion by the mind itself, made to account for the sensation 
caused by the object. In making this construction, the 
mind is guided by the light of experience. 

The schoolmen maintained that the image acting on the 
organ of sense incites the mind to perceive the object itself. 
This doctrine prepared the way for the gross doctrine of 
an intermediate material image rej^resenting the object. 
The distant object does indeed reflect light to the eye, 
but light itself is not an image. There is, it is true, an 
image formed on the retina, but of this image the soul 
is not conscious. The appearance, which is a combina- 
tion of percepts, or the embodiment of our judgments 
concerning the cause of our sensations, is a consequent, 
but not the cause of sensation, and hence is not the 
object itself, but is our idea of the object. 

9. Descartes assumed nothing. In fact, he doubted 
every thing which it was possible for him to doubt; 



CARTESIAN THEORIES, 159 

but he found one thing, the fact of thinking, which 
he could not doubt. In the system of Descartes, every 
psychical act is thought. Of thinking, he was directly 
conscious, and doubt w^as excluded; but thinking in- 
volves the existence of a thinker. Descartes stated the 
principle thus: Cogito^ ergo sum. I think, therefore I 
am. This statement has sometimes been criticised, as 
involving the petitio principii; for, it is said, Ego is in- 
volved as the subject of coglto, and need not, therefore, 
be inferred as the subject of sum. But Descartes evi- 
dently meant that the fact of his existence was revealed 
to him through his consciousness of thinking, which is 
fundamental and indubitable. 

The next step was to find a w^arrant for passing from 
the ego to the world without, which would reassure us 
of the trustworthiness of our senses, and the validity 
of perception. This warrant Descartes found in God. 
He says : " When the mind reviews the different ideas 
that are in it, it discovers what is by far the chief 
among them — that of a Being omniscient, all powerful, 
and absolutely perfect; and it observes that in this idea 
there is contained not only possible and contingent ex- 
istence, as in the ideas of all other things which it clearly 
perceives, but existence absolutely necessary and exter- 
nal So from its perceiving necessary and external 

existence to be comprised in the idea which it has of 
an all-perfect Being, it ought manifestly to conclude that 
this all-perfect Being exists." Principles, Part L, 14. 

But how does God, the Infinite and Perfect, warrant 
our belief in the existence of matter external to our- 
selves? Descartes says: ^' God would, without question, 
deserve to be regarded as a deceiver, if He directly and of 
Himself presented to our mind the idea of this extended 
matter, or merely caused it to be presented to us by 
some object which possessed neither extension, figure, 



160 PSYCHOLOGY, 

nor motion. For we clearly conceive this matter as en- 

ft/ 

tirely distinct from God, and from ourselves, or from our 
minds, and appear even clearly to discover that the idea 
of it is formed in us on occasion of objects existing out 
of our minds, to which the idea is in every respect sim- 
ilar. But since Grod can not deceive us, — for this is re- 
pugnant to his nature, as has already been remarked, — 
we must unhesitatingly conclude that there exist certain 
objects, extended in length, breadth, and thickness, and 
possessing all those properties which are clearly appre- 
hended to belong to what is extended, and this extended 
substance we call body or matter." Principles^ Part IT., 1. 

The essential quality of matter, according to Descartes, 
is extension. The other qualities, such as hardness, color, 
etc., are variable, and therefore accidental. 

The following points may be noted in the theory of 
Descartes: 

1st. In basing his theory on the facts of consciousness, 
he not only laid the immovable foundation of the edifice 
of truth, but he introduced the psychological method, 
and thus became the founder of Modern Philosophy. 

2d. He distinguished sharply between matter as that 
which is extended, and mind as that which thinks. 

3d. In his attempted demonstration of the existence 
of Grod, Descartes assumes that whatever we clearly 
conceive to exist, must have an objective existence. 
This may be questioned. The existence of God, the In- 
finite and Perfect, may, however, be legitimately dem- 
onstrated from the principle of causality. Then his 
veracity, as involved in his perfection, may be taken as 
the warrant for the trustworthiness of our faculties. 

4th. In saying that the idea of an object is, in every 
way, similar to the object, Descartes uses the word sim- 
ilar with some latitude. The body may be hard, but 
our idea of it can not, with propriety, be said to be 



m 



CARTESIAN THEORIES, 161 

hard. Our knowledge of an object is embodied in our 
idea of that object. 

5th. Descartes is unquestionably right in concluding 
that because our perceptions are, in part, beyond our 
control, they are, in some way, caused by a non-ego. 

6th. Descartes introduced the doctrine of special Di- 
vine interposition by w^hich an extended substance is 
represented to an inextended mind; for he says, ''we ap- 
pear even clearly to discover that the idea of it is 
formed in us, on occasion of objects existing out of our 
minds." Did Descartes mean that the idea is formed in 
us by our own power, or by the power of God ? He 
meant the latter; for he adds: "But since God can not 
deceive us, for this is repugnant to his nature, we must 
unhesitatingly conclude that there exists a certain object, 
extended in length, breadth, and thickness." 

7th. In consequence of this doctrine of Divine inter- 
position in the perception of matter, it was not necessary 
for Descartes to consider matter endowed with dynam- 
ical properties. He therefore regarded extension as the 
sole essential quality of matter. 

10. Malebranch distinguished four elements in percep- 
tion — the action of external objects on the body; the 
affection of the organ acted on; the sensation of the soul 
consequent on the affection of the organ ; the judgment 
consequent on the sensation. 

He rigorously applied the Cartesian precept, that mind 
and matter are two absolutely distinct and heterogeneous 
entities, and hence that it is impossible that there should 
be any causal relation or natural connection between 
them; therefore our ideas of material objects must be 
produced in us by the powder of God. Spirits exist in 
God, the place of Spirits, and thus perceive the Divine 
ideas of material objects. We hence participate in the 
Divine knowledge, or see all things in God 

Psy.— 14. 



162 PSYCHOLOGY, 

As held by Malebranch and by Cartesians generally, 
the idea is an entity distinct from the object and from 
the activity of the percipient mind. In this view, ideas 
are pictures of things in the mind of God. These ideas, 
as pictures of objects, must be truthful, since they are 
God's representations of objects. In perceiving these 
ideas directly, we have an indirect knowledge of the 
objects which they represent. 

The following points may be noted in Malebranch's 
theory: 

1st. The Cartesian theory of perception was developed 
with more clearness by Malebranch than by Descartes 
himself, as is seen by the clearness with which he dis- 
criminated between the elements of perception; two of 
these elements, however, the action of external objects 
upon the body, and the affection of the organ acted on, 
are rather conditions of sensation, than elements of per- 
ception; the other two, the sensation of the soul con- 
sequent upon the affection of the organ, and the judg- 
meiit consequent upon the sensation, are proper elements 
of perception. Two other elements of perception, the 
intuition of the necessity of the subject and object, and 
the ideation of the inferential judgment, were Emitted 
by him altogether. 

2d. If external objects act on the organization, as 
Malebranch maintains, he can not deny to these objects 
dynamical properties; but this w^as done by the other 
Cartesians. 

3d. The excitement in the organ can not be the cause 
of the sensation, if matter can not act on mind, but it 
is only the occasion on which God causes the sensation, 
and presents the idea to the soul. This phase of the 
doctrine, called Occasionalism.^ was developed by Geulinx, 

4th. The sensations seem to serve no other purpose 
than to call attention to the idea in the mind of God. 



CARTESIAN THEORIES, 163 

5th. The judgment which Malebranch speaks of as 
following sensation, is, according to his theory, but the 
perception of the idea in the mind of God. The trutli 
is, however, that the judgment is the conclusion which 
the mind reaches concerning the objective cause of the 
sensation. The idea, instead of being the picture of the 
object which God forms in his own mind, is, in fact, 
only the embodiment, in the form of a mental image, of 
the judgment formed by our owm minds, concerning the 
qualities of the object which causes the sensation. 

11. Spinoza held that thought and extension are phe- 
nomena of one common substance underlying both, and 
that this substance is God, the Infinite and Perfect. 
Thought and extension are indeed phenomenally distinct, 
so that there can be no causal or direct cognitive rela- 
tion between them; but as both are phenomena of one 
common substance, there is a correspondence between 
them — the thought corresponding to the thing, the idea 
to the object, and in this correspondence is found the 
explanation of the fact of perception. 

12. Arnauld, a Jansenist and a friend of the Cartesian 
tendency, held that what the soul perceives is not the 
idea of the object, but the object itself The idea is the 
perception. The words idea and perception, do not de- 
note two entities, but one modification of the soul in 
two relations. Perception is the modification in the act 
of perceiving, while the idea is this modification as the 
expression of our conclusion in regard to the object. 
Ideas, as distinct from the act of perception, have no 
existence. The soul is active in ])erception, and per- 
ceives material objects directly, otherwise it could not 
know that its ideas correctly represent the objects. It 
can be affirmed, with as good reason, that the soul per- 
ceives material objects directly, as that it is directly 
conscious of its own acts and states. 



164 PSYCHOLOGY, 

I- 

These views are very suggestive, and tend in the right 
direction. Though it is true that the original ideas of 
objects have no existence, as distinct from the act of 
perception, yet ideas in representation have such an ex- 
istence. In the representation of absent objects, there 
is no accompanying perception, though a past perception 
is implied. 

The soul, as an intelligent, sensitive spirit, can not fail 
to be conscious of its own acts or states, which are 
modifications of its own energies or receptivities; but 
how can the soul directly know the modifications of a 
substance entirely distinct from itself? The modifica- 
tions of matter are perceived by the soul only as it is 
in some way affected by them; that is, they are known, 
not directly, but indirectly through sensation. This, of 
course, sets aside the assumption that there can be no 
interaction between matter and mind. The soul per- 
ceives what kind of an object that must be which affects 
it in a certain manner, and the idea is the embodiment 
of the perception. 



CHAPTER XYII. 

THEORIES OF PERCEPTION CONTINUED. 

1. Locke holds that there are two sources of knowl- 
edge— sensa^zon and reflection. He says: "If it shall be 
demanded, then, when a man begins to have any ideas; 
I think the true answer is, When he first has any sen- 

sation In time, the mind comes to reflect on its 

own operations about the ideas got by sensation, and 
thereby stores itself with a new set of ideas, which I 

call ideas of reflection These simple ideas, the 

materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and fur- 
nished to the mind only by those two ways above men- 
tioned, viz, sensation and reflection.''' Essay ^ Book 11. , 
Chap. I., Sec. 23, 24, and Chap. II., Sec. 2. 

Locke maintains that there are two classes of proper- 
ties of matter — the primary and the secondary. He says: 
" Qualities thus considered in bodies are, first, such as 
are utterly inseparable from the body, in what state 
soever it be These I call original or primary qual- 
ities of body, which I think we ma}^ observe to pro- 
duce simple ideas in us; viz, solidity, extension, figure, 
motion or rest, and number. Secondly, such qualities 
which, in truth, are nothing in the objects themselves, but 
powers to produce various sensations in us, ... as colors, 

sounds, tastes, etc., these I call secondary qualities 

Ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of 
them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies 
themselves; but the ideas produced in us by the secon- 
dary qualities have no resemblance of them at all. There 

(1(35) 



166 PSYCHOLOGY. 

is nothing like our ideas existing in the bodies them- 
selves." Essay ^ Book II., Chap. VIII., 'Sec. 9, 10, 15. 

Locke also says: "It is evident that the mind knows 
not things immediately, but only by the intervention of 
the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is 
real, only so far as there is a conformity between our 
ideas and the reality of things." Essay ^ Book IV., Chap. 
lY., Sec. 3. 

In regard to Locke, let it be observed that, 

1st. We are not discussing his system in general, but 
only its bearing on the doctrine of perception. 

2d If the mind knows things only by the intervention 
of ideas, how does it know that its knowledge is valid, 
since it has no means of ascertaining whether there is 
or is not a conformity between our ideas and the reality 
of things? To ascertain this conformity, we must know 
the object without the intervention of the idea; but this 
would contradict the assumption that we know objects 
only by the intervention of ideas. The difficulty arises 
from regarding ideas as objective entities and objects of 
perception ; but the difficulty vanishes, if w^e regard ideas 
as the final products of perception, representing the dis- 
coveries which we have made respecting the objects. 

2d. According to Locke, we have no knowledge of 
secondary qualities of matter at all, for "our knowledge 
is real only so far as there is a conformity between our 
ideas and the reality of things; ... the ideas produced 
in us by the secondary qualities have no resemblances 
of them at all." It is true that the secondary qualities- 
are occult, and our ideas of them are vague, yet we know 
them as causes adequate to produce certain sensations. 

3d. Locke ignored rational intuition, as a source of 
knowledge, and laid down principles in regard to per- 
ception, which prepared the way for the idealism and 
skepticism developed by Berkeley and Hume. 



THEORIES OF LOCKE, BERKELEY, HUME, 167 

4th. Locke's method is metaphysical rather than psy- 
chological. It is true as Bowen says : '^ His question was 
not, What do we think and feel, and what are the laws 
governing the succession of our thoughts and feelings ? 
— but, What do we know? Whence comes our knowl- 
edge? Is it born with us, or comes it from experience? 
What are the boundaries that limit it, and how far is it 
trustworthy?" Bowen's Modern Philosophy, page 13. 

5th. Locke la^^s down the proposition, "All our knowl- 
edge comes through sensation and reflection," and then 
acts the part of an advocate in endeavoring to prove 
his proposition. If he had conducted his Essay, not as 
an advocate, but as an investigator, by examining the 
phenomena of mind revealed in consciousness, ascertain- 
ing their conditions and laws, and referring them to 
the faculties implied, he would, in all probability, have 
succeeded better. He was, however, a man of great in- 
tellect, and did great service to Philosophy, in exploding 
the doctrine of innate ideas. Locke's Essay is worthy 
of consideration and careful study. 

2. Berkeley made important contributions to the doc- 
trine of perception in his New Theory of Vision, pub- 
lished in 1709. Assuming with Descartes, Malebranch, 
and Locke, that ideas are the things immediately known, 
he denied not only that these ideas represented ma- 
terial objects, but the very existence of these objects. 
He says: "But, say 3^ou, though the ideas themselves do 
not exist without the mind, yet there may be things 
like them, whereof they are copies or resemblances, 
which things exist without the mind in an unthinking 
substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but 

an idea Again, I ask whether these supposed 

original or external things, of which our ideas are the 
pictures, or representatives, be themselves perceivable or 
no. If they are, then they are ideas, and we have 



168 PSYCHOLOGY. 

gained our point; but if you say they are not, I ap])eal 
to any one whether it be sense to assert a color is like 
something which is invisible ; hard or soft, like something 
which is intangible, and so on for the rest 

*''I assert as well as you, that since we are affected 
from without, we must allow powers to be without, in 
a being distinct from ourselves. So far we are agreed. 
But then we differ as to the kind of this powerful be- 
ing. I will have it to be spirit, you matter, or I know 
not what (I may add too, you know not what), third 
nature. Thus I prove it to be spirit: From the effects 
I see produced, I conclude there are actions ; and because 
actions, volitions; and because there are volitions, there 
must be a will. Again, the things I perceive must have 
an existence, they or their archetypes, out of my mind; 
but being ideas, neither they nor their archetypes can 
exist otherwise than in an understanding. There is, 
therefore, an understanding. But Will and Understand- 
ing constitute, in the strictest sense, a Mind or Spirit." 

Berkeley assumes that whatever is perceivable is an 
idea. But the idea, though an object of consciousness, 
is not the object of perception ; it is the ideated infer- 
ence which we have made concerning the object which 
causes our sensations. 

The essential error of Berkele^^'s theory consists in 
the assumption that ideas are entities independent of the 
mental activity of the percipient subject, and hence that 
they are objects of perception. It is true that there are 
objective entities independent of the mind; but these are 
the objects which cause our sensations, and the corre- 
sponding ideas embody our knowledge of these objects. 
Our ideas of objects are therefore the constructions of 
the percipient mind representing its discoveries or con- 
clusions, its knowledge or belief, concerning the cause 
of its sensations. 



THEORIES OE LOCKE, BERKELEY, HUME, 1G9 

Berkeley's doctrine is the legitimate conclusion of the 
philosophy of Locke, as applied to the material world, 
and, as a rediictio ad ahsurdum argument, is a refutation 
of that philosophy. 

3. Hume began where Berkeley left off, and taking for 
his point of departure the current assumption of the 
prevailing philosophy, that all our knowledge is derived 
from sensation and reflection, deduced tlie following con- 
sequences : 

1st. We have no warrant for inferring substance, 
whether matter as the substratum of the qualities per- 
ceived through sensation, or mind as the substratum of 
psychical phenomena experienced in consciousness. 

2d. We have no w^arrant for inferring the reality of 
space and time save that they are abstractions from con- 
crete experiences. 

3d. We have no warrant for inferring the relation of 
cause and effect, in the sense that cause is efficient in 
producing the effect; hence, the relation called cause 
and effect is resolvable into that of antecedence and con- 
sequence. 

AYe shall justify these statements by quotations: 

Hume says : " An impression first strikes upon the 
senses, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or 
hunger, pleasure or pain, of some kind or other. Of 
this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, 
which remains after the impression ceases, and this we 
call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, wiien it 
returns upon the soul, produces new impressions of de- 
sire or aversion, hope or fear, which may properly be 
called impressions of reflection, because derivable from 
it. These again are copied by the memory and imag- 
ination, and become ideas." Treatise^ Book I., Part I., 
Sec. 2. 

Again, Hume inquires, ''whether the idea of substance 

Psy.— 15. 



170 PSYCHOLOGY. 

be derived from the impression of sensation or reflection. 
If it be perceived by the eyes, it must be a color; if 
by the ears, a sound; if by tlie j)^late, a taste, and so 
on for the other senses. Eut I believe none will assert 
that substance is either a color, a sound, or a taste. 
The idea of substance must, therefore, be derived from 
an imj^ression of reflection, if it really exist. But the 
impressions of reflection resolve themselves into our 
passions and emotions, none of which can possibly rep- 
resent a substance. We have, therefore, no idea of sub- 
stance distinct from that of a collection of particular 
qualities, nor have wjo any other meaning when we 
either talk or reason concerning it. The idea of sub- 
stance, as well as that of mode, is nothing but a collec- 
tion of simple ideas that are united by the imagination, 
and have a particular name assigned them by which 
we are able to recall, either to ourselves or to others, 
that collection." Treatise^ Book I., Part I., Sec. 6. 

"Upon opening my eyes and turning them to the 
surrounding objects, I perceive many visible bodies; and 
upon shutting them again, and considering the distance 
betwixt these bodies, I acquire the idea of extension. . . . 
My senses convey to me only the impressions of colored 
points disposed in a certain manner. Hence, we may 
conclude with certainty that the idea of extension is 
nothing but a copy of these colored points, and the 
manner of their appearance 

" As it is from the disposition of the visible and tangi- 
ble objects we receive the idea of space, so from the 
succession of ideas and impressions we form the idea of 
time; nor is it possible for time alone ever to make its 
appearance or to be taken notice of by the mind." 
Treatise^ Book I., Part II., Sec. 3. 

"As to those impressions which arise from the senses, 
their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly incxplic- 



THEORIES OF LOCKE, BERKELEY, HUME. 171 

able by human reason, and it will always be impossible 
to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately 
from the object, or are produced by the creative power 
of the mind, or are derived from the Author of our be- 
ing." TreMise, Book I., Part lY., Sec. 2. 

"The first time a man saw the communication of mo- 
tion by impulse, as by the shock of two billiard balls, he 
could not pronounce that the one event was connected, but 
only that it was conjoined, with the other. After he has 
observed several instances of this nature, he then pro- 
nounces them to be connected. What alteration has hap- 
pened to give rise to this new idea of connection? JSToth- 
ing but that he now feels these events to be connected 
in his imagination, and can readily foretell the existence 
of the one from the appearance of the other. When we 
say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, 
we mean only that they have acquired a connection in 
thought, and gave rise to this inference, by which the^^ 
are proofs of each other's existence We may de- 
fine a cause to be an object followed by another, and 
where all the objects similar to the first, are followed 
by objects similar to the second." Inquiry, Sec. 7, p. 2. 
In regard to these statements of Hume, we remark : 
1st. If all our ideas are derived from sensation and 
reflection, Hume ought to have concluded that we have 
no idea of matter as the substratum of external qual- 
ities, nor of mind as the substratum of psychical phe- 
nomena, nor of space and time, except as abstracted 
from sensation, nor of cause, except as a uniform ante- 
cedent. But we have all these ideas, as Hume well 
knew; hence, he drew the safer conclusion that we 
have no right to have them. Does Hume admit that 
we have these ideas? He speaks of substance as a suh- 
straturn. What does he mean? He evidently had the 
idea of a substratum — an idea which he could not have, 



172 PSYCHOLOGY, 

if all our ideas are derived from sensation and reflection ; 
hence, all our ideas are not derived from sensation and 
reflection. 

2d. When Hume says: "As to those impressions which 
arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opin- 
ion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason," what does 
he mean by cause f It is quite clear that by cause^ Hume 
here meant efficiency and not a mere antecedent. Again, 
he says: "An impression strikes upon the senses." An 
impression is the mark made on a receptive thing by 
some other thing, as the imprint made on paper by a 
seal. In the case of sensation, what is that other thing 
which makes the impression but the cause of the sensa- 
tion? In saying that "an impression strikes upon the 
senses," and in speaking of the "ultimate cause" of im- 
pressions, Hume appears to have the idea of cause as 
efficiency ; yet this idea he not only has no right to have, 
but could not have, if all our knowledge is derived from 
sensation and reflection ; hence all our knowledge is not 
thus derived. 

3d. If the cause is a mere antecedent^ in no way aflect- 
ing the consequent, it might as well be absent, since its 
presence or absence would be a matter of indiflerence; 
but when absent, the consequent does not follow; hence, 
the antecedent is not a mere antecedent, but something 
more — it is efficient in producing the consequent when- 
ever the consequent is an event in the world of matter. 
Even in the case of motives and volitions, the motives 
are not mere antecedents; for they act efficiently on the 
intellect and the sensibility in producing cognitions and 
feelings, and are the reasons^ though not the causes, of 
volitions. The will itself is the cause of volitions. It 
decides in view of motives. 

4th. It may be true, as Hamilton believed, that Hume 
was not a dogmatist, but a skeptic; and that while hold- 



THEORIES OF LOCKE, BERKELEY, HUME. 173 

ing his conclusions to be logical deductions from his 
premises, he may have believed neither his premises nor 
his conclusions. However this may be, Hume's conclusion 
is a reductio ad absurdum demonstration of the falsity of 
Locke's philosophy, more conclusive even than that of 
Berkeley. 

5th. We hence see the importance of rational intuition 
in the development of philosophy. By rational intuition, 
the mind apprehends the impossibility of events with- 
out conditions, that is, it apprehends the necessity of 
conditions to the occurrence of events. A system of 
philosophy that fails to recognize fundamental truth is 
necessarily incoherent. 



CHAPTEE XYIII. 

THEORIES OF PERCEPTION CONTINUED. 

1. Kant opens the Critique of the Pure Eeason by 
sa3"iDg: "That all our knowledge begins with experi- 
ence, there can be no doubt But though all our 

knowledge begins with experience, it by no means fol- 
lows that all arises out of experience." In the order of 
time, knowledge a posteriori precedes knowledge a j^riori. 

The criteria which distinguish knowledge a priori from 
knowledge a jwsteriori, Kant lays down thus: "Now, in 
the first place, if we have a proposition which contains 
the idea of necessity in its very conception, it is a judg- 
ment a priori ; if, moreover, it is not derived from anj^ 
other proposition, unless from one equally involving the 
idea of necessity, it is absolutely a ^^r/on. Secondly, an 
empirical judgment never exhibits- strict and absolute, 
but only assumed and comparative universality, by in- 
duction ; therefore, the most we can saj" is, so far as 
we have hitherto observed, there is no exception to this 
or that rule." Critique, page 2, Bohn's Edition. 

The distinction between the empirical and the rational 
elements of thought Kant applies in elucidating percep- 
tion. Sensation is caused by objects affecting our sen- 
sibility. Through this sensation, we have an intuition 
of phenomenal objects. That in the phenomena which 
corresponds to the sensation, and is given to us, a pos- 
teriori, Kant calls the matter; but that which is neces- 
sary in order that the matter of the phenomena can be 

arranged under certain relations, and is given to us a 

(174) 



THEORIES OE KANT, REID, HAMILTON, 175 

priori^ and will remain, if we take away all empirical 
elements, he calls the form — pure as in space and time, 
impure as in substance and cause. 

Kant considered the a jmori elements of cognition to 
be subjective forms of thought, and not objective laws 
of things; and hence, notwithstanding their necessity, he 
held them to be i)henomenal. This was his great mis- 
take. The necessity of space and time is not only sub- 
jective, a necessity in the form of our thinking, but 
objective, a necessity in itself Cause is not necessary, 
simply in the sense that we are compelled by the con- 
stitution of our minds to judge that every event must 
have a cause, but in the sense, that if there were no 
mind, it would still be true that an event could not take 
place without a cause. 

His doctrine of perception, Kant thus sums up: "All 
our intuition is but the representation of phenomena; 
the things which w^e intuit are not in themselves the 
same as our representations of them in intuition, nor 
arc their relations in themselves so constituted as they 
appear to us; and if we take away the subject, or even 
only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, 
then not only the nature and relations of objects in 
space and time, but even space and time themselves 
disappear; and as phenomena, can not exist in them- 
selves, but otdy in us." Critique^ page 35. 

If we take away the subject, space and time would, 
of course, disappear, as to that subject, since then, by 
hypothesis, the subject would not be any thing to which 
they could appear. The ideas of space and time, as 
phenomena, can exist only in a subject; but space and 
time, as iiecessar}" realities in themselves, would continue 
to exist, though the subject were annihilated. It is true, 
that things are not the same as our representations of 
them; an object is one thing, and our representation of 



176 PSYCHOLOGY, 

it is another; but if things in themselves are wholly 
unknown, how did Kant know that their relations in 
themselves are not as they appear to us? It is true, 
we do not know the essential constitution of objects, as 
things in themselves, but the fact that the a priori ele- 
ments are the same, whatever our sensations may be, 
proves that they are not vitiated by our sensations, and 
hence that they are the same to all rational minds. 

2. Reid held that the thing perceived is not the image 
or idea, but the very thing itself. Our perception of 
external things is not, as Locke held, representative, 
but immediate and intuitive, and not, therefore, con- 
jectural, but real. 

We shall let Eeid speak for himself: "If we attend 
to that act of our mind which we call perception of an 
external object of sense, we shall find in it three things: 
First, some conception or notion of the object perceived; 
secondly, a strong and irresistible conviction and belief 
of its present existence; and, thirdly, that this convic- 
tion and belief are immediate^ and not the effect of rea- 
soning." Hamilton'' s Beid, -page 258. 

Again, in reference to the conception of hardness, he 
says : " What shall we say, then, of this concej)tion and 
this belief which are so unaccountable and untractable? 
I see nothing left but to conclude that, by an original 
principle of our constitution, a certain sensation of touch 
both suggests to the mind the conception of hardness 
and creates the belief of it; or, in other words, that this 
sensation is a sign of hardness." Page 121. 

In regard to color, he says: "The common language 
of mankind shows evidentl}^ that we ought to distinguish 
between the color of a body which is conceived to be a 
fixed and permanent quality in the body, and the ap- 
pearance of that color to the eye, wdiich may be varied 
a thousand ways, by a variation of the light, of the 



¥ 



THEORIES OF KANT, IlEID, HAMILTON. 177 

medium, or of the eye itself. The permanent color of 
the body is the cause which, by the mediation of vari- 
ous kinds or degrees of light, and of various transparent 
bodies interposed, produces all this variety of apj^ear- 
ances 

The ideas of sight came to be associated v^ith, and 
readily to suggest, things external and altogether unlike 
them. In particular, that idea which we liave called the 
appearance of color, suggests the conception and belief 
of some unknown quality in the bodj^ which occasions 
the idea; and it is to this quality, and not to the idea, 
that we give the name of color." Page 137. 

If the quality which Reid calls color is unknown, does 
the mind perceive the very thing itself? How does 
Reid loiow that his concejDtions are true; in other words, 
that they correspond to the objects? This, according to 
his own admission, he does not know; for in the case 
of color, he admits that the external quality is unknown. 
Reid appears in this, to go back to the philosophy of 
Locke ; but this is so only in appearance ; for if all our 
ideas are derived through sensation and reflection, as 
held by Locke, we have no warrant for affirming an 
external reality back of the idea, and the skepticism of 
Berkeley and Hume are legitimate deductions. But Reid 
was saved from this result, bj" what he calls "common 
sense," which is only another name for rational intuition. 

Reid ought not to have admitted that the quality 
called color is unknown ; for it is known as the cause 
capable of giving us certain sensations. The quality 
which gives us a certain sensation through one sense, is 
associated with other qualities which are the attributes 
of the same substance, and these qualities give us other 
sensations through other senses. 

In holding that perception is immediate, Reid means 
that the mind passes from the sensation to the concep- 



178 PSYCHOLOGY. 

tioii of the quality, and the belief in its existence, not 
by the intervention of any reasoning process, but by an 
instinctive and irresistible principle of our constitution. 
Now, perception does not take place without sensation, 
and is, therefore, mediate through sensation; for the 
conception is suggested by the sensation ; but from the 
sensation to the conception, it is, according to Reid, im- 
mediate. But even from the sensation to the conception, 
the passage is not immediate; for, between these there 
intervenes a judgment, perhaps several, derived from 
experience or investigation, and the conception is the 
idea embodying the conclusion. 

3. Hamilton is not in perfect accord with Reid. He 
says : '•^ Reid maintains that we are not conscious of 
matter; .... that we are conscious of our perception 
of a rose, but not of the rose perceived; that w^e know 
the ego by one act of knowledge, the non-ego by another. 
This doctrine I hold to be erroneous, and it is this doc- 
trine I now proceed to refute. 

"Reid is wrong, because 1°, the knowledge of oppo- 

sites, is one Thus, we can not know what tall is, 

without knowing what is short, — we know what virtue 
is, only as we know Avhat is vice, — the science of health 
is but another name for the science of disease. The act 
which affirms that this particular phenomenon is a mod- 
ification of Me, virtually affirms that the phenomenon is 
not a modification of any thing different from Me, aad con- 
sequently implies a common cognizance of self and not-self; 
the act which affirms that this other phenomenon is a mod- 
ification of something different from Me, virtually affirms 
that the phenomenon is not a modification of Me, and 
consequently implies a common cognizance of not-self 
and self But unless we are prepared to maintain that 
the faculty cognizant of self and not-self is different 
from the faculty cognizant of not-self and self, we must 



THEORIES OF KANT, REID, HAMILTON. 179 

allow that the ego and non-ego are known and discrim- 
inated in the same indivisible act of knowledge." Bow- 
en's Hamilton, pages 150, 151. 

The act in either case is complex, involving a plural- 
ity of elements. Thus, let there be some modification of 
the ego, as, for example, a feeling of pain. We are con- 
scious of the pain, and refer it to the ego as its subject, 
whose conditional necessity we apprehend by rational 
intuition. We also refer the pain to its cause, whose con- 
ditional necessit}^ is also apprehended by rational intui- 
tion, but whose specific qualities are inferred by an act 
of judgment, guided by the light of experience. The 
attention is, in this case, mainly attracted to the feeling 
of pain, and of this feeling consciousness takes special 
notice; but the mind is also aware, less vividly, of all 
the other acts involved, though not of the ego in its es- 
sence, nor of the cause in itself. In ordinary acts of 
perception, the attention is mainly directed to the ob- 
ject perceived. 

Hamilton then inquires, " What, then, is the faculty 
of which this act is the energy? It can not be Eeid's 
consciousness; for that is cognizant of the ego, or mind. 
It can not be Eeid's perception ; for that is cognizant 
only of the non-ego, or matter. But as the act can not 
be denied, so the faculty must be admitted." Bowen's 
Hamilton, page 151. 

Heid did not hold that consciousness is cognizant of 
the ego, or mind, but only of the phenomena of the mind. 
Even Hamilton himself says: '^ There exists no intuitive 
or immediate knowledge of self as the absolute subject 
of thought, feeling, and desire; but, on the contrar}^ 
there is only possible a deduced, relative, and secondar}^ 
knowledge of self, as the permanent basis of these tran- 
sient modifications of which we are directly conscious." 
Notes on Reid, page 29, 5. 



180 PSYCHOLOGY. 

The fact is, consciousness is cognizant, not of the ego, 
but of the phenomena of the ego. The conditional ne- 
cessity of the ego is apprehended by rational intuition, 
and its actuality is involved in its necessity. Perception 
is not an immediate knowledge of matter, but is medi- 
ate, through sensation. 

Hamilton asks: "By what faculty are the ego and 
the non-ego discriminated?^' Page 151. The mind itself 
knows and discrimates. Its ability to know is a faculty; 
and its ability to know in a iSpecial way is a special 
faculty. The faculty does not know^, but it is the ability 
of the mind to know. The mind has the ability to know 
the non-ego; it has also the ability to know the neces- 
sity, and hence the actuality of the ego. The same mind 
knows both the non-ego and the actuality of the ego. 
It has the ability to know these tw^o acts of knowledge, 
and is actually conscious of these acts, and by reflection 
discriminates betAveen them. But in discriminating be- 
tw^een the acts of knowledge, the mind is able to dis- 
criminate between the two objects of knowledge; for it 
discovers that the difl^erence between the acts is deter- 
mined by the difference between the objects, since the 
subject is the same. It is not necessary that the mind 
should know two objects by the same faculty, in order 
to be able to discriminate between them. The very fact 
that it must know them by different faculties is a means 
of discrimination, as in knowing color and sound. 

Again, Hamilton says: "Because 2°, he thus contra- 
dicts his own doctrine of an immediate knowledge of an 
external world," page 153. Heid's opinions in regard to 
our knowledge of an external worhl were neither clear 
nor consistent. It is evident that there is no immedi- 
ate knowledge of the external world; for did not the 
external w^orld in some way affect us, we would not be 
aware of its existence. We know it as the cause of sen- 



THEORIES OF KAN1\ REII), JfAMfT/ION. ISl 

sation. In general, we may say that whatever does not 
in «onne way affect us, must be to us as zero, unless we 
know it by rational intuition, as the necessary condition, 
or by logical inference, as tlie necessary consequence, of 
some something which does affect us. 

Hamilton further says: "An act of knowledge exist- 
ing and being what it is, only by relation to its object, 
it is manifest that the- act can be known only through 
the object to which it is correlative; and Reid's suppo- 
sition that an operation can be known in consciousness 
to the exclusion of its object, is impossible. For exam- 
ple, I see the inkstand. How can I be conscious tliat 
my present modification exists, — that it is a perception, 
and not another mental state, — that it is a perception 
of sight to the exclusion of every other sense, — and, 
finally, that it is a perception of the inkstand, and of 
the inkstand only, — unless my consciousness compre- 
hends within its sphere the object, which at once deter- 
mines the existence of the act, qualifies its kind, and 
distinguishes its individuality? Annihilate the inkstand, 
you annihilate the perception; annihilate the conscious- 
ness of the object, you annihilate the consciousness of 
the operation." Page 153. 

It is true that if you annihilate the inkstand, you an- 
nihilate the perception ; but it is not true that if you 
annihilate the consciousness of the object, you annihilate 
the consciousness of the operation. Hamilton holds that, 
when we see an inkstand, we are conscious, not only of 
the perception, but of the inkstand. But we shall let 
him refute himself 

"What is the external object perceived? .... Noth- 
ing can be conceived more ridiculous than the ojjinion 
of philosophers in regard to this. For example, it has 
been curiously held Tand Eeid is no exception), that in 
looking at the sun, moon, or any other object of sight. 



182 PSYCHOLOGY, 

we are, on the one doctrine, actually conscious of these 
distant objects; or, on the other, that these distant ob- 
jects are those really represented in the mind. Nothing 
can be more absurd; we perceive through no sense 
aiight external but what is in immediate relation and 
immediate contact with its organ." Page 352. 

Then, we do not even perceive the inkstand on the 
desk, unless it is brought into contact with some organ 
of sense. ,But Hamilton has already said that if we see 
it, we perceive it, and are conscious, not only of the 
perception, but of the inkstand itself We are, then, ac- 
cording to Hamilton, both conscious and not conscious 
of the inkstand at the same time, which is absurd. 

We are not conscious of the object, even when it is 
in contact with the organ. Neither are we conscious 
of the organ affected, nor of the aifection, but of the 
sensation accompanying the aifection. By intuition, we 
know that this sensation has a cause, but not wbat the 
cause is. It is only by an inferential judgment, guided 
by the light of experience, and spontaneous from habit, 
that we determine what the cause is, and this determin- 
ation varies in degree of probability between the limits 
of ignorance and certainty. The judgment is embodied 
in the idea of the object. 

" Why do mankind believe in the existence of an outer 
world? They do not believe in it as in something un- 
known ; but, on the contrary, they believe it to exist, 
only because they believe that they immediately know 
it to exist. The former belief is, only as it is founded 
on the latter. Of all absurdities, therefore, the greatest 
is to assert, — on the one hand, that consciousness de- 
ceives us in the belief that we know any material object 
to exist, and on the other, that the material object ex- 
ists, because, though on false grounds, we believe it to 
exist." Page 189. 



THEORIES OF KANT, REIT), HAMILTON. 183 

What we are immediately eonseious of in perception 
is not the material object itself, but the act of perception, 
and the product, which is the idea or appearance em- 
bodying our know^ledge or judgment concerning the object. 

Now, of this appearance, as a mental product, we are 
conscious, and if we mistake this appearance for the ob- 
ject, or thing itself, as many do, we shall, of course, 
seem to be conscious of the object. But the appearance 
is not the object; for if we had the same sensation, from 
wdiatever cause, as the inkstand gives, we should seem to 
see the inkstand, and to be conscious of the appearance, 
though no inkstand were there, or perhaps any other 
material object. Are we, in this case, conscious of the 
material object? In looking into a mirror, we see an 
image of ourself behind the glass. Is that image our- 
self? Are we behind the glass? We seem to see other 
objects behind the glass, which are, in reality, before it. 
These appearances are mental constructions embodying 
our conclusions respecting the objects. We are conscious 
of these appearances, but not of the objects themselves. 
It is by confounding these appearances with the objects, 
that we are led to believe that we are conscious of the 
objects. In denying, then, that we are conscious of the 
external material objects, we do not deny the testimony 
of consciousness; for consciousness gives no such testi- 
mony, when we discriminate between the appearance 
and the object, which we must do, when looking in a 
mirror, and ought to do in all other cases. Hamilton's 
statement, therefore, that if we are not conscious of ma- 
terial objects,' consciousness gives a false testimon}^, is 
void of force. We have falsified no fact of conscious- 
ness, and may still hold with Hamilton himself the sound 
principle, — "the falsity of one fact of consciousness be- 
ing admitted, the truth of no other fact of consciousness 
can be maintained." Page 191. 



CHAPTEE XIX. 

THEORIES OF PERCEPTION CONCLUDED. 

1. John Stuart Mill assumes certain sensationSj .as 
states of consciousness, with their feniporal relations cf 
co-existence or sequence, and by means of the laws of 
association, attempts to account for our belief in the 
existence of an external world. 

In his theory of space, Mill attempts to account for 
the origin of our idea of space as follows: "Suppose two 
small bodies, A and B, sufficiently near together to 
admit of their being touched simultaneously, one with 
the right hand, the other with the left. Here are two 
tactual sensations which are simultaneous, just as a sen- 
sation of color and one of odor might be; and this makes 
us cognize the two objects of touch as both existing at 
once. The question then is, what have we in our minds 
when we represent to ourselves the relation between 
these two objects already known to be simultaneous, in 
the form of extension, or intervening space — a relation 
which we do not su2)pose to exist between the color and 
the odor ? 

" Xow, those who agree with Brown, say that what- 
ever the notion of extension may be, we acquire it by 
passing our hand, or some other organ of touch, in a 
longitudinal direction from A to B ; that this process, as 
far as we are conscious of it, consists of a series of varied 
muscular sensations, dilfering according to the amount 
of muscular effort; and the ettbrt being given, differir.g 

in length of time. When we say that there is a sj^ace 

(184) 



THEORIES OF MILL AND PORTER, 185 

between A and B^ we mean that some amount of these 
muscular sensations must intervene; and when we say 
that the space is greater or less, we mean that the series 
of sensations (amount of muscular effort being given) is 
longer or shorter. 

''If another object C is farther off in the same line, 
we judge its distance to be greater, because, to reach it, 
the series of muscular sensations must be further pro- 
longed, or else there must be the increase of effort which 
corresponds to augmented velocity. Now, this, w^hich is 
unquestionably the mode in w^hich we become mcare of 
extension, is considered by the psychologists in question, 
to be extension 

"An intervening series of muscular sensations before 
the one object can be reached from the other, is the only 
peculiarity which (according to this theory) distinguishes 
simultaneity in space from the simultaneity which may 
exist between a taste and a color, or a taste and a smell ; 
and we have no reason for believing that space or ex- 
tension in itself, is any thing different from that which 
we recognize it by. It appears to me that this doctrine 
is sound, and that the muscular sensations in question 
are the sources of all the notions of extension which we 
should ever obtain from the tactifal and muscular senses 
without the assistance of the eye." Exam, of Hamilton^ 
Vol. I., page 280. 

In reply, let us begin with the statement, "We have 
no reason for believing that space or extension, in itself, 
is any thing different from that which we recognize it 
by." Now, even granting that Mill is right in his opin- 
ion in regard to the means by which we recognize 
space, it by no means follows that we are to identify 
the object recognized with the means of recognition. 
There is a great gulf here between the premise and the 
conclusion. We might as well identify a person, recog- 

Psy.-16. 



186 PSYCHOLOGY, 

nized by his voice, with his voice by which we recog- 
nized him. 

In the very terms of his illustration, Mill pre-supposes 
the idea of space developed; he assumes "Two small 
bodies, A and B^ suflSciently near together to admit of 
their being touched, one with the right hand, the other 
with the left." Each of these bodies, however small, 
being large enough to excite the sensation of touch, oc- 
cupies space, or is extended. 

Again, these bodies being "sufficiently near together," 
are located, and each has a location distinct from that 
of the other, otherwise they could not be discriminated 
as two; for the two sensations caused by the two bodies, 
being similar in quality and quantity, and simultaneous 
in time, would blend into one, and could not be dis- 
criminated, unless located as reciprocally external. The 
locations of the bodies being distinct, the bodies them- 
selves being reciprocally external, there is not only the 
space occupied by the bodies, but space between them; 
hence, we reach the idea of space without the muscular 
sensation, and before we have the sensation by which, 
according to Mill, " we become aware of extension," and 
which Mill considers even " to be extension." 

The two bodies, "J. and ^," must, according to Mill, 
be regarded as two sensations, since the idea of space is 
supposed to be not yet developed, and must be assumed, 
not as bodies in space, but as sensations in time. 

We must also throw out the idea of the movement of 
the hand from A to B^ for motion implies space. We 
then have left, simpl}^ the sensation A^ followed by cer- 
tain other sensations, then the sensation B. ]^ow, in 
this, we have a succession of sensations in time, but not 
the idea of space. Hence, a succession of muscular sen- 
sations can not be the mode by which we become aware 
of extension, much less is it identical with extension, as 



1 



m 



THEORIES OF MILL AND POUTER, 187 

Mill absurdly teaches. Surely the philosopher Avho con- 
founds space with muscular sensation is not a reliable 
guide. 

The sensations in the two hands, though simultaneous 
and alike in kind and degree, are actually discrimina- 
ted; but rational intuition apprehends, as the condition 
of this discrimination, the necessity of the reciprocal ex- 
ternality of the two sensations; for if not reciprocally 
external, they would blend into one, and hence could 
not be distinguished as two. The mind intuitively ap- 
prehends that space must be, in order that the discrim- 
ination of simultaneous sensations, alike in kind and 
degree, may be ; and since such discrimination is a fact, 
space must be a reality. 

The extent of space between A and 5, the idea of 
space being already developed, may indeed be estimated 
by the muscular effort required in passing the hand from 
A to B^ though the reality of this space is determined 
by the cognition of the sensations as distinct in the 
two hands, which is impossible, save on the condition 
of the reciprocal externality of these sensations. The 
idea of locality, though at first vaguely apprehended, as 
implicitly involved in the idea of the reciprocal external- 
ity of two sensations, becomes clear in proportion as ex- 
perience is enlarged. 

Let us now examine Mill's explanation of the belief 
in the existence of a material world. He maintains 
^'that there are associations naturally and even necessa- 
rily generated by the order of our sensations and of our 
reminiscences of sensation, which, supposing no intuition 
of an external world to have existed in consciousness, 
would inevitably generate the belief, and would cause it 
to be regarded as an intuition. 

"What is it we mean when we say that the object we 
perceive is external to us, and not a part of our thoughts? 



188 PSYCHOLOGY. 

We mean that there is in our perception something which 
exists Avhen we are not thinking of it; w^iich existed 
before we had ever thought of it, and would exist if we 
were annihilated; and further^ that there exist things 
which we never saw, touched, or otherwise perceived, 
and things which have never been perceived by man. . . 

" The conception I form of the world existing at any 
moment, comprises along with the sensation I am feel- 
ing, a countless variety of possibilities of sensation. . . . 
These various possibilities are the important things to 
me in the world. My present sensations are generally 
of little importance, and are moreover fugitive; the pos- 
sibilities, on the contrary, are permanent, wdiich is the 
character that mainly distinguishes our idea of substance 
or matter from our idea of sensation, 

"These possibilities, wdiich are conditional certainties, 
need a special name to distinguish them from mere vague 
possibilities which experience gives no warrant for reck- 
oning upon. ]^ow, as soon as a distinguishing name is 
given, though it be only the same thing regarded in a 
different aspect, one of the most familiar experiences of 
our mental nature teaches us, that the different name 
comes to be considered as the name of a different thing. 

" There is another important peculiarity of these certi- 
fied or guaranteed possibilities of sensation ; namely, that 
they have reference, not to single sensations, but to sen- 
sations joined in groups. When we think of any thing 
as a material substance, or body, we either have had, or 
think that, on some given supposition, we should have, 
not some one sensation, but a great and even an in- 
definite number and variety of sensations, generally be- 
longing to different senses, but so linked together that 
the presence of one announces the possible presence, at 
the very same instant, of any or all of the rest. .... 

"The group, as a whole, presents itself to the mind 



THEORIES OF MILL AND PORTER, 189 

as permanent, in contrast, not solely with the temporari- 
ness of my bodily presence, but also with the temporary 
character of each of the sensations comprising the group ; 
in other words, as a kind of permanent substratum un- 
der a set of passing exj)eriences or manifestations; which 
is another leading character of our idea of substance or 
matter as distinguished from sensation 

"In addition to fixed groups, we also recognize a fixed 
order in our sensations; an order of succession, which, 
when ascertained by observation, gives rise to the ideas 
of cause and eifect, according to what I hold to be the 
true theory of that relation, and is, in any case, the 
source of all our knowledge of what causes produce what 
effects. Now, of what nature is this fixed order among 
our sensations? It is a constancy of antecedence and 
sequence 

" In almost all the constant sequences which occur in 
Nature, the antecedence and consequence do not obtain 
between sensations, but between the groups we have been 
speaking about, of which a very small portion is actual 
sensation, the greater part being permanent possibilities 
of sensation, evidenced to us by a smalt and variable 
number of sensations actually present. Hence, our ideas 
of causation, power, activity, do not become connected 
in thought with our sensations as actual at all, save in 
the few physiological cases when these figure by them- 
selves as the antecedents in some uniform sequence. 
These ideas become connected, not with sensations, but 
with groups of possibilities of sensation. .... 

" We find that the modifications which are taking 
place, more or less regularly, in our possibilities of sen- 
sation, are mostly quite independent of our conscious- 
ness, and of our presence or absence. Whether w^e are 
asleep or awake, the fire goes out, and puts an end to 
one particular possibility of warmth and light. Whether 



190 PSYCHOLOGY, 

we are present or absent, the corn ripens and brings a 
new possibility of food. Hence, we speedily learn to 
think of Nature as made up solely of these groups of 
possibilities, and the active force in Nature as manifested 
in the modification of some of these by others. 

" The sensations, though the original foundation of the 
whole, come to be looked upon as a sort of accident de- 
pending on us, and the possibilities as much more real 
than the actual sensations, nay, as the very realities of 
which these are only the representations, appearances, 
or effects. When this state of mind has been arrived 
at, then, and from that time forward, we are never con- 
scious of a present sensation without instantly referring 
it to some one of the groups of possibilities into which 
a sensation of that particular description enters; and if 
we do not yet know to what group to refer it, we at 
least feel an irresistible conviction that it must belong to 
some group or other; that is, that its presence proves 
the existence, here and now, of a great number and va- 
riety of possibilities of sensation, without which it would 
not have been. 

" The whole set of sensations, as possible, form a per- 
manent back-ground to any one or more of them that 
are, at a given moment, actual; and the possibilities are 
conceived as standing to the actual sensations in the 
relation of a cause to its effects, or of canvas to the 
figures painted on it, or of a root to the trunk, leaves, 
and flowers, or of a substratum to that which is sj^read 
over it, or in transcendental language, of matter to form." 
Examination J Volume I., page 236, et seq. 

Let us not be deceived by the plausible ingenuity of 
Mill's theory, or by his apparent belief in the independ- 
ent existence of matter. This independent existence is, 
after all, according to Mill, only the permanent possibil- 
ity of sensation. This would be well enough, if this 



THEOBIES OF MILL AND PORTER, 191 

permanent possibility Were objective; but according to 
ins view, this permanent possibility is subjective; for he 
holds that the sensations are the original foundations of 
the whole. The associations generated by the groups of 
sensations and the order of their sequence induce in us 
the belief in a material world. What does Mill mean by 
the active force of Mature? Neither a simple sensation 
nor a grouj) of sensations is force. Sensation and force 
are not identical. 

Mill conceives the possibilities of sensations as stand- 
ing to the actual sensations in the relation of causes to 
their effects. If by possibilities of sensations are meant 
the objective realities independent of us, we would yield 
assent; for these might indeed cause- sensations in us; 
but this can not be the meaning, since Mill holds that 
sensation is the original foundation of the whole. Sen- 
sations occurring in groups with a certain order of se- 
quence, are, according to Mill, the only realities, and the 
possibilities of these sensations are the causes of those 
which actually occur. Associated with the color of an 
apple are a number of possible sensations of smell, 
taste, touch, etc. Is the possibility of these sensations 
the cause of color? Not unless by the possibility, we 
mean the independent, objective existence of the sub- 
stance of the apple. The cause of the sensation of color, 
or of any other special sensation experienced by us, is 
not the subjective possibility of other sensations. 

The fact that sensations often come to us unsought, 
and that when the conditions are complied with, they 
are beyond our control, compel us to refer them to 
objective substances. These substances are powers, not 
phenomena, and consequently are not known to con- 
sciousness, yet their conditional necessity is apprehended 
by rational intuition. They are the forces which mani- 
fest the qualities causing sensation. 



192 PSYCHOLOGY. 

2. Dr. Porter says : " Objectively viewed, perception 
always knows a material non-ego. But the objects of 
simple and complex perception are unlike. In simple or 
original perception, the object is a simple percept — i. e., 
an extended non-ego. But the term non-ego is equivocal, 
being capable of three distinct meanings, corresponding 
to the three distinguishable egos with which they are 
contrasted. These are the following: (1) The perceiving 
agent as a pure spirit; (2) the percipient agent as a 
spirit animating an extended sensorium; (3) the indi- 
vidual as spirit, sensorium, and body. 

"The three non-egos contrasted with these are: (1) The 
sensorium in excited action, distinguished by the soul 
from itself as pure spirit; (2) the body perceived as 
other than the sentient soul — i. e.^ the soul as anima- 
ting the sensorium ; and (3) the surrounding universe, 
as distinguished from the soul, sensorium, and body — 
i. 6., from the man as soul and body united. 

'' In original perception, the object directly apprehended 
is the sensorium as excited to some definite action. This 
is distinguished from the soul as percipient, by the soul's 
own act of discrimination. In other words, the ego and 
non-ego contrasted are the first named above. This non- 
ego, is the percept appropriate to each of the sense or- 
gans." Elements, page 188. 

Let us now see how Dr. Porter explains the percep- 
tion of external material things: "A material thing or 
object, as known by sense-perception, is a completed 
wdiole made up of separate percepts." Page 165. But, 
according to the above, "the sensorium as excited to 
some definite action," is "the percept appropriate to each 
of the sense organs," then a material thing, as an apple, 
as known by sense-perception, "is a completed whole 
made up of separate percepts;" that is, an apple is a 
completed whole made uj) of the sensorium excited 



THEORIES OF MILL AND PORTER, 193 

through the eye, the sensorium excited through the ear, 
etc., through all tiie senses! But what excites the sen- 
sorium? 

According to Dr. Porter's theory, we can never reach 
a knowledge of a world external to the sensorium, even 
by acquired ^^^rception. For he says: ^'An acquired per- 
ception is gained by using the knowledge given directly 
by one sense, as the sign or evidence of the knowledge 
which we might gain by another." Page 132. But the 
knowledge which we might gain by another sense, if 
actually gained by that sense, w^ould, according to Dr. 
Porter's view, be only a knowledge of the sensorium 
excited through that other sense organ, but if not ac- 
tually gained, is only the conception of the sensorium 
excited through that other sense organ, so that if the 
original and acquired perceptions united give us material 
things, these material things, as known by sense-per- 
ception, original and acquired, are nothing more than 
the sensorium actually excited through certain sense 
organs, together with the conception of how the senso- 
rium might be excited through other sense organs. 

Dr. Porter thinks that the immediate object of con- 
sciousness is the sensorium excited to some form of 
definite action. He says: ^'But what! it may be asked, 
when I grasp a pebble, or an ivory ball, or a stick, is 
that which I perceive as external to jnyself, simply the 
sensorium excited by the object grasj^ed? Is this the 
non-ego which I perceive, and this only? We reply, 
that this is the only non-ego which we reach by direct 
and original perception." Page 124. 

Dr. Porter holds that the object of immediate percep- 
tion is "the sensorium in some form of excited action," 
page 106; that the sensorium consists of '-the nervous 
organism and the sense organs," page 187; that "the 
soul is not aware that it has nerves at all, or that one or 

P.sy.-17. 



194 PSYCHOLOGY. 

more are called into action." Page 121. How^ then, can 
the object of immediate perception be the sensorium in 
some form of definite action? 

A sensation located in the sensorium is an object of 
consciousness; but the sensorium itself is known imme- 
diately only as the locus of sensation. Without the 
guidance of rational intuition, we are shut up to a knowl- 
edge of subject experiences. 

The processes involved in perception are as follows : 

An object excites an organ of sense; this excitement, 
conveyed by the nerves to the higher centers or brain, 
is followed by a sensation ; rational intuition affirms that 
this sensation has a cause; the judgment, guided by ex- 
perience, infers what this cause is; the imagination em- 
bodies this inference in an idea which represents our 
knowledge of the qualtity in the object which excited 
the organ of sense. Other qualities of the object may 
excite other organs of sense, and, by similar processes, 
we form ideas of these qualities. The combination of 
these ideas is the complex idea which represents our 
knowledge of the object. 

But do w^e know the object as it is in itself? We 
press our hand upon a block of wood, for examj)le, and 
pronounce it hard, by which we mean that the parts are 
held firmly in their relative positions. Is not this true 
of the object in itself? Again, we look at it, and handle 
it, and, pronounce it a cube, and by this we mean that 
the object is bounded by six equal squares, and has 
ei2:ht corners and twelve ed^es. Is this not true of the 
object in itself? But if we attempt to find out the es- 
sence of the body, the secret of its constitution, the 
nature of the underlying forces, we shall find that we 
have undertaken to solve a problem which transcends 
our powers. 



DIVISION II. 

KEPRESENTATION AND THE REPRESENTATIVE 

FACULTIES. 

CHAPTEE I. 

GENERAL VIEW OF REPIIESENTATION. 

1. Representation defined as an act, as a product, 
and as a faculty. 

Ist. The act of representation is the process by which 
the intellect reproduces its acquisitions. It is, therefore^ 
re-presentation. 

2d. The product of representation is the idea or repre- 
sentative object constructed by the act of representation. 
As a psychical object, it is called an idea^ an image, or 
a phantasm. The object represented by the idea is a 
past idea of either a material or a psychical object. 

3d. The faculty of representation is the power of the 
intellect to represent its acquisitions. 

2. Illustrations. — Look, for example, upon a land- 
scape, and perceive it, as a whole, with all its various 
objects in their respective positions. Close the eyes and 
represent the landscape to the mind. 

We also recall the acquisitions made through the other 
senses. Thus, in idea, we recall the odor of a rose, the 
flavor of a peach, the softness of velvet, or the familiar 
voice of a friend. 

3. Comparison of perception and representation. — In 

perception, the intellect determines, from the nature of 

(195) 



196 PSYCHOLOGY. 

the given sensations, the nature of the objective causes 
which excite these sensations, and constructs tlie appear- 
ances so as to embody its conclusions. Hence, if the 
sensations are definite, also the inferences, then the con- 
structions, or ideated inferences, are clear and distinct, 
and correspond to the realities of things. 

In representation, the intellect, in the absence of sen- 
sations excited by external causes, represents its acqui- 
sitions, and varies its constructions at pleasure. 

In perception, the appearance of an object is more 
than the grouj) of sensations which that object causes in 
us through the several senses; it is rather a complex 
idea of the object, and embodies our judgments of those 
qualities of the object which cause certain sensations in 
us. The sensations occur in groups, since the causes of 
these sensations are united as the manifestations of the 
qualities of a common substance. 

In representation, the idea of an object is complex, 
and the elements of the idea are the ideas of the quali- 
ties w^hich are the causes of the several sensations. 

As objects are perceived in their relations to space 
and time and to one another, so they are represented 
with like relations. A relation, as such, apart from the 
objects related, is not an object either of perception or 
of representation. 

Ideas as representative of experiences in conscious- 
ness, or of appearances through percej)tion, are individ- 
ual, and as sach are constructed by the representative 
faculty. In this respect, they differ greatly from the 
generalized concepts of the logical faculty, which are 
not capable of representation. 

4. Classes of representation. — Representation is classi- 
fied as memory, imagination, and phantasy. In memory ^ 
the representations correspond to past realities as form- 
erly known. In imagination^ the images are the ideals of 



GENERAL VIEW OF REPRESENTATION, 197 

the true, the beautiful, and the good, or of their oppo- 
sites. In jpliantasy^ the images are grotesque appear- 
ances corresponding neither to past realities nor to sub- 
jective ideals. 

5. Theories of representation. — As actual, as a fact 
to which consciousness testifies, representation must be 
possible. It is one thing, however, to ascertain a fact, 
but quite another thing to account for that fact. How 
is representation joossible? On what conditions does the 
representation of acquisitions depend, when made long 
ago, and are now, perhaps, forgotten? How is the 
knowledge of an object revived in the absence of that 
object? The conditions of representation being beyond 
the sphere of consciousness, can not be positively deter- 
mined. The solution of the problem is, therefore, hypo- 
thetical. Two hypotheses have been proposed to account 
for the fact of representation. 

1st. Mental latency or unconscious -mental action. If this 
hypothesis be true, the latent modifications, or uncon- 
scious activities, are not phenomena; that is, they do 
not appear, otherwise we should be conscious of them. 
The attention directed to the more prominent activities, 
is withdrawn from those obscure j^rocesses occurring in 
the profound depths of the soul, which are, therefore, 
unknown to consciousness. 

It is doubtless true that, in some instances, there is a 
consciousness of certain obscure activities at the moment 
of their occurrence, yet, on account of their unobstrusive- 
ness, they attract but slight attention, and are instantly 
forgotten. Examples of this kind, such as forgetting 
that we heard the clock strike, or a bell ring, will occur 
to the reflective mind. 

2d. Unconscious cerebration. It has already been seen 
that sensation excited by an external object, is the con- 
dition of the perception of that object. The sensation 



198 PSYCHOLOGY. 

caused by one object may, however, be the occasion of 
the representation of another object. If it be assumed 
that, in the absence of the external object, the sensation 
is revived by some molecular movement in the brain or 
other portion of the nervous system, we have an expla- 
nation of the fact of representation. According to this 
view, perception is occasioned by the stimulus of sen- 
sation excited by an extra-organic object; and represen- 
tation is occasioned by the sensation excited by some 
change in the nervous system, occasioned in some other 
way than by the action of the object represented. 

It is probable that certain mental processes are so 
unobtrusive that they either escape notice altogether, or 
the attention given them is so slight that they are in- 
stantly forgotten. The fact that representations are 
variable, at will, indicates that they are not altogether 
determined by sensations excited either by external 
causes or by molecular changes. This is, of course, in 
favor of the first theory. On the other hand, certain 
representations, as phantoms, are determined and forced 
upon the mind with the same necessity as the apj)ear- 
ances in perception, and hence indicate that they are 
formed under the stimulus of sensations excited by mo- 
lecular changes occasioned, in certain instances, at least, 
by alcoholic or narcotic stimulants. This favors the 
second theory. The probability is, therefore, that the 
one theory is true in certain cases and the other theory 
in other cases. 

6. Nature of the product. — The nature of the product, 
as a representative object, will be more clearly under- 
stood by a consideration of its characteristics. 

1st. The idea is a psychical object. Whether the ob- 
ject represented be material or spiritual, the idea, im- 
age, or phantasm, is a psychical object, created by the 
representative faculty in the act of rejoresentation. 



GENERAL VIEW OF REPBESENTATION. 199 

2d. The idea is an evanescent object. The representa- 
tive object, unlike the object whose appearance is rep- 
resented, is transient, since it continues in existence no 
longer than it is kept in being by the act of the repre- 
sentative faculty. 

3d. The idea is an intelleetual object. Whatever the 
object represented may be, — whether material, as mount- 
ains, lakes, clouds, trees, living beings; or psychical, 
as cognitions, feelings, volitions, — ^the idea is not only 
psychical, but intellectual, since it is created by the in- 
tellect and for the intellect, though feeling, as of pleas- 
ure or of sadness, may accompany the representation. 

4th. The idea is a representative object. An idea can 
not resemble a material object; but one idea may re- 
semble another; and hence, as in memory, it may rej)- 
resent the original appearance constructed by the intel- 
lect in the act of perception under the stimulus of 
sensation. In imagination or phantasy, the images or 
phantoms do not represent appearances of real objects, as 
in memory, but of unreal objects, whether possible or 
impossible. 

5th. The idea is less vivid than the original appearance. 
This can be verified by looking at an object, then clos- 
ing the eyes, and representing that object. The idea is 
usually found to be a faint reproduction of the original 
appearance. The same thing is found true by hearing 
music, and then representing it. 

. 6th. The idea contains fewer elements than the original 
appearance. A comparison of the idea with the original 
appearance reveals the fact that the former is but a 
meager outline of the latter. 

7th. The elements of the idea are recalled in succession. 
In perception, the elements of the original appearance 
flash at once on the mind in rich profusion; but in 
representation, these elements are revived in succession, 



200 PSYCHOLOGY. 

one suggesting another. This distinction is vividly 
brought out by Dr. Porter: 

''It is a precipice up which we gaze. First, it im- 
presses us as a whole diversified by its varied features. 
Foremost are the broad faces of perpendicular or impend- 
ing rock. These are buttressed by slopes strewn with 
accumulated fragments. Here and there are bushy crags 
and scattered bowlders. The whole cuts againts the sky 
with a notched outline fringed here and there with nod- 
ding herbage, or broken by some daring tree that, 
stayed upon its uncertain footing, reaches out and up 

toward heaven The quick eye first surveys the 

whole with a rapid sweep, then runs hither and thither, 
as it is caught and led by some salient feature, the rock 
itself bringing out new material faster than the mind 
can appropriate it, impressing the feelings with new 
emotions of wonder the longer we strive to master its 
wealth. 

''Let us seek to image that rock in the mind, at even- 
ing, when we are just returned from a fresh gaze upon 
its front. In place of the exhaustless confusion of the 
vaguely-seen whole to guide and excite the eye, there 
is slowly revived the scanty frame-work of the few parts 
which can be recalled by the mind. These parts are re- 
covered, one by one, as the mind, resting upon what is al- 
read}^ present, brings back in fragments, and by repeated 
efforts, that which each present object suggests. How- 
ever exciting the effort to recall and reconstruct, and 
however pleasing the picture that is recalled, the im- 
pressiveness and exciting power of the reality are wholly 
wanting." Elements^ page 220. 

7. Utility of representation. — The utility of represen- 
tation will be apparent from the following considerations: 

1st. Representation is a source of jjleasure and relief. 
It affords pleasures, pure and varied, and independent 



GENERAL VIEW OF REPRESENTATION, 201 

of fortune or circumstances. The pleasures may be en- 
joyed by the child at his play, by the laborer at his 
toil, by the artist in his creations, by the sick man on 
his bed, by the philanthropist in his labor of love, or by 
the prisoner in his gloomy dungeon. 

2d. Eepresentation is the condition of the logical pro- 
cesses. In thought, we often j)refer the representation 
to the real object; since, containing fewer elements, it is 
less distracting. The imagination can, at will, so vary 
the image as to include the elements under considera- 
tion and exclude all others. It thus renders great aid 
in classification and induction. The image of an indi- 
vidual is variable, and by dropping the peculiarities of 
the individual, the image becomes a schema which, in 
turn, may, by the addition of other peculiarities, be 
varied so as to be conformable to any individual of the 
class. 

3d. The idea is useful, even in observation^ since it di- 
rects the mind to seek for elements which it might 
otherwise overlook. 

4th. Eepresentation is useful in preparing for action. 
A vivid imagination is effective in adjusting the j^owers 
of the mind or the body for energetic effort. Imaginary 
conflicts prepare for real. Eaw recruits are trained, if 
possible, before they are led to an engagement. 

5th. Eepresentation furnishes ideals for real life. Pure 
ideals elevate our aspirations and lead to noble deeds 
or to high intellectual or moral achievements. They aid 
the soul in triumphing over evil in the spiritual strug- 
gles of a religious life. The imagination may also lend 
itself to evil and create those images which allure the 
soul into paths of sin and death. 



CHAPTEE II. 



LAWS OF REPRESENTATION. 



The laws of repreisentation, called also the laws of 
association, may be divided into two classes — general or 
primary, and special or secondary. 

1. The general or primary laws are those which are 
universal in their application. These law^s, as usually 
stated, are the following: 

1st. The law of co-existence or consecution in time. One 
thing suggests another connected with it as simultaneous 
or immediately antecedent or consequent. 

2d. The law of contiguity in space. Either of two things 
known to be contiguous in space, when perceived or re- 
called, suggests the other. As things contiguous in space 
are usually perceived simultaneously or in immediate 
succession, this law acts in connection with the first, or 
perhaps is resolvable into it. 

3d. The laic of dependence. The condition suggests the 
conditioned, or the conditioned the condition; a cause 
its efPect, or an effect its cause; the means the end, or 
the end the means; the premises the conclusion, or the 
conclusion the premises; the whole a part, or a part the 
whole, etc. 

4th. The law of resemblance or contrast. Either of two 
similar things suggests the other, and, in like manner, 
either of two things in striking contrast. Thus, one 
large man suggests another large man, or a small man 
another small man. Thus, also, summer suggests winter, 

and winter summer; cold heat, and heat cold; darkness 

(202) 



1 






LA WS OF BEPBESENTA TION. 203 

light, and light darkness; the rich the poor, and the 
poor the rich; the young the old, and the old the young; 
the giant the dwarf, and the dwarf the giant; the true 
the false, and the false the true; the beautiful the ugly, 
and the ugly the beautiful; the good the bad, and the 
bad the good; the finite the infinite, and the infinite the 
finite, etc. 

5th. The late of mutual relation. Things known to be 
related to the same thing suggest one another. Thus, 
either of tw^o effects of the same cause suggests the 
other, or either of two possible causes of the same effects, 
or either of two signs of the same thing, etc. 

6th. The lavj of sign and signification. Thus, mathe- 
matical signs suggest certain operations, and the opera- 
tions the signs ; words ideas^ and ideas words ; symptoms 
the disease, and the disease the symptoms, etc. This 
law also accounts for the fact that objects denoted by 
the same sound suggest one another, which is usual 1}^ 
stated as another law. For, one object suggests the 
sound wd:iich is its sign, according to the law of sign 
and signification, and this sound suggests the other ob- 
ject which it denotes, according to the same law. 

Attempts to reduce the number of laws have been made 
as follows: 

1st. Aristotle enumerated the laws, as contiguity in time 
or place^ resemblance^ and contrast. These laws hold good 
as far as they go, but the list is not complete. 

2d. Hume stated the laws, as resemblance^ contiguity^ 
cause and effect. These are true, but not complete. 
Hume omits contrast^ of Aristotle's classification, and 
adds cause and effect. In other respects there is an 
agreement. 

3d. Hamilton reduced the law^s to two — simultaneity 
and affinity. Here we have a higher, and perhaps a 
comprehensive generalization. Simultaneity in time, in 



204 PSYCHOLOGY. 

things known, comprehends contiguity in space, and is 
a valid law. Affinity includes the resembling or analo- 
gous, or partially identical objects, also contrariety, as 
the knowledge of opposites is one, since we can know 
what light is only in contrast with darkness, or health 
only in contrast with sickness, etc. 

4th. Bain also reduced the laws to two — contiguity and 
similarity. These are nearly identical with Hamilton's. 
Contiguity primarily refers to space, but may apply to 
time. Similarity is analogous to affinity, yet does not 
include contrast, but expressly excludes it. Mr. Bain 
states the law of contiguity thus: ^'Actions, sensations, 
and states of feeling, occurring together or in close suc- 
cession, tend to grow together, or cohere, in such a way 
that, when any one of them is afterwards presented to 
the mind, the others are apt to be brought up in idea." 
Senses and Intellect, page 327. That is, ideas cohere, as 
if they attracted one another, or they stick together, as 
if covered with mucilage! 

5th. The laic of correlation. Either of two things, 
known to be correlated, suggests the other. The laws, 
as usually stated, or the more general laws of Aristotle, 
Hume, Hamilton, and Bain, may be reduced to this one, 
which is a higher generalization, and a more concise 
statement. 

6th. St. Augustine reduced the laws to one, called the 
laAv of redintegration, which may be stated thus : Objects 
that have been previously united as parts of a single 
mental state suggest one another. Hamilton himself 
showed that his two laws of simultaneity and affinity 
could be reduced to the one law of redintegration. This 
law is also accepted by Wolfe, M^lebranch, and Maass. 

The law of redintegration affirms the restoration of 
the whole of a mental state or process on the condition 
of the presence of any of the parts. Let us ascertain 



LA WS OF EEPEESENTA TION, 205 

whether this law comprehends the laws as commonly 
stated : 

(1) Things simultaneous or consecutive in time suggest 
one another, when they have been considered together 
in the same process of thought, since the recurrence of 
a part of this process suggests the other part. 

(2) Things contiguous in space recall one another, if 
they have been thought of together, since one part of 
a process of thought recalls the other. 

(3) Dependent or related things also recall one another, 
if the dependence or relation is known, or if they have 
been thought of together. 

(4) Resembling or contrasted things suggest one an- 
other, even if they have never been thought of together. 
The law of redintegration does not literally apply here; 
but if we consider similar things to be essentially the 
same, and the knowledge of opj)osites as one, the law 
of redintegration will include that of resemblance and 
contrast. Thus, suppose we know that A is com- 
posed of / and m, and B of m and n. ^ow, in consid- 
ering A, the mind either finds m directly, or ?, which 
suggests m; and this m in A^ being similar to m in _5, 
may be considered essentially the same and be taken 
for it, or if you please, mistaken for it; but m in B has 
been thought of with n, and hence suggests n; but m 
and n combined give m n, that is B. Sir Philip Sidney 
suggests Queen Elizabeth, or the reverse, since each wore 
a rutf about the neck. Either of these persons suggests 
the ruff; and the ruff*, the other person. 

In case of contrast, let A be Im^ and Z be pg, I and 
q being antithetical. The cognition of I involves that of 
g^, since the knowledge of opposites is one; but q sug- 
gests j9, since they have been thought of together, and 
'p combined with q gives pg, that is Z. 

But the fatal objection to the law of redintegration is 



206 PSYCHOLOGY, 

the fact, as stated by Dr. Porter, that '' Objects or ideas 
have of themselves -no greater force or tendency to re- 
store those which with themselves made up a mental 
state, than they have to attract one another. The force, 
in the final analysis, must come from and reside in the 

mind whose products they are The mind thinks 

or tends to think of a when it perceives or thinks of 6, 
because it has previously acted in a similar activity, in 
whole or in part." Elements^ P^g^ 236.* 

7th. Dr. Forter states the law of representation thus: 
"The mind tends to act again, more readily, in a man- 
ner or form which is similar to any in which it has 
acted before in any defined exertion of its energy." 
Elements^ P^g^ 237. 

This statement of the law is preferable to those before 
made, since, as Dr. Porter says, "the force to attract, 
or suggest, or recall another object, comes not from the 
sameness of the part to the whole objectively viewed, but 
from the similarity of two or more mental percepts, or 
mental images regarded subjectively, or as the product 
of the mind's similar activities." The law as stated by 
Dr. Porter is nearly equivalent to the following: 

8th. The law of integration. The mind tends to com- 
plete any process which it enters upon, if it has per- 
formed that process before. Cause and effect, for exam- 
ple, suggest one another, since, in thought, they are 
elements of the same process. This is satisfactory, so far 
as the completion of a j^rocess is concerned ; but it does 
not clearly account for the transition from one process 
to another. 

9th. The law of transition. If two processes have sim- 
ilar elements, the mind, when representing either of 
these elements, is acting as if it were representing the 
other, and thus the transition from the one process to 
the other becomes possible. The similar elements in the 



LA WS OF REPRESENTATION. 207 

two processes are occasioned by similar or antithetical 
elements in two objects or complex representations. 

The complete law of rej^resentation is, therefore, com- 
plex, and may be named and stated as follows: 

10th. Integration^ then transition, then integration. When 
the mind enters upon either of two processes having a 
common element, it tends to complete that process by 
the law of integration; but when reaching the similar 
element, it may make the transition, and complete the 
second process by the law of integration ; and, in like 
manner, it may pass from process to j)i'ocess through 
a long series. 

2. The special or sacondary laws are those which reg- 
ulate the recurrence of the idea of a j)^i'ticular object 
of a class to an individual mind. 

The laws or conditions which modify the tendency of 
an idea to recur are the following: 

1st. Time of contemplatio7i. Time is a condition of a 
clear apprehension of an- object and its relations, and 
hence has an influence on the probability of the recur- 
rence of the corresponding ideas. 

2d. Vividness of apjirehensioii. What is vividly appre- 
hended is likely to be recalled ; and the more vivid the 
apprehension, the more likel}^ the recurrence. 

3d. Frequeney of repetition. Eepetition adds to the 
.clearness and distinctness of apprehension, thus reveal- 
ing new qualities and relations, and increasing the as- 
sociations, and consequently the 2)robability of the recur- 
rence. 

4th. .Reeentness of the date. The impression fades with 
time, since the mind becomes occupied with new objects 
and thoughts; hence, the probability of recurrence is 
greater as the date is more recent. 

An exception to this law is found in the memory of 
the aged, who remember the scenes and events of their 



208 PSYCHOLOGY, 

youth, but are unable to recall those of a more recent 
date. This exception is explained by the second law — 
the vividness of apprehension. In youth, there is a more 
vivid apprehension, since at that period of life, the 
senses are acute, the imagination active, and the feelings 
ardent; but the reverse is usually true in old age. For 
this reason, the aged lose their interest in the present 
and dwell on the past. The remedy for this is to keep 
up habits of activity, both of body and mind, to extreme 
old age. 

5th. Freedom from entangling relations. If the multi- 
plicity of relations should divide the attention and 
weaken the interest in a particular object, that object 
would be less likely to be recalled. "The song which 
we have never heard but from one person, can scarcely 
be heard again without recalling that person; but there 
is obviously much less chance of this j)ai'ticular sug- 
gestion, if we have heard the same air and w^ords fre- 
quently sung by others." But if we have formed the 
habit of recalling the first singer w^henever we hear that 
song, the probability of recalling that singer will be in- 
creased with the number of repetitions, whoever be the 
singer by whom the song is rendered. A picture seen 
at a private house is more likely to be recalled than 
if it had been seen with a multitude of others at the 
Centennial Exposition, unl'ess something remarkable in 
the picture secured for it more than ordinary attention. 

6th. Strength of the original apprehension. The more 
powerfully the mind acts in a particular manner, the 
more likely it is to act in that way again. 

7th. Interest or feeling excited. The mind seeks to re- 
turn to that which affords it pleasure. 

8th. Favoring condition of health. The vigor of the 
mind and consequent grasp of the object is increased 
by an increase of health. 



LA WS OF REPRESENT A TIOK 209 

9th. Coifonnifjj with prevailing habits. The facility and 
clearness of apprehension is enhanced when the object 
belongs to a class which we are at present studying- 
with interest. If a person has formed the habit of 
classifying his knowledge, he will more readily recall 
what is presented proj^erly classified. 

10th. Aptitude of body or mind. There is an original 
difference in the aptitude of different persons for ^per- 
forming certain actions or for discerning objects and 
relations of a certain class; and there Avill he a corre- 
sponding difference in their powers of recalling those 
objects and relations. 



Psy.— 18. 



CHAPTEE III. 

PECULIARITIES OF REPRESENTATION. 

1. Obscure links. — One idea sometimes follows another, 
between which we can trace no connection. How is this 
fact to be explained? Several theories have been pro- 
posed, as the following: 

1st. Stewart's theory. Between the two ideas, appar- 
entlv disconnected, there intervene other ideas which 
serve as connecting links. Of these links, the mind is 
conscious at the time, but immediately forgets them, 
since they attract no attention. Examples of the fact 
that an event known at the time of its occurrence may 
be almost instantly forgotten, will occur to the reflective 
mind, as hearing the striking of a clock or the ring- 
ing of a bell. It is evident that such ideas, though in- 
stantly forgotten, might serve as links connecting those 
ideas in the train of representations that are remembered. 
In certain cases, at least, this theory is satisfactory. 

2d. Hamilton's theory. Hamilton urges in explanation 
of the fact of the occasional want of connection between 
the ideas of a series of representations, the principle of 
latent or unconscious modification of mind, the honor of 
whose origination he ascribes to Leibnitz. Hamilton 
says : '^ This is the case w^ith the mental modifications in 
question ; they are not in themselves revealed to con- 
sciousness, but as certain facts of consciousness neces- 
sarily suppose them to exist, and to exert an influence 
in the mental processes, we are thus constrained to ad- 
mit, as modifications of mind, what are not in themselves 
(210) 



PECULIARITIES OF BEPRESENTA TIOK 211 

phenomena of consciousness Of consciousness, how- 
ever faint, there must be some memory, however short." 
Metaphysics, pages 242, 246. 

This view Hamilton illustrates by a row of ivory balls 
in contact, the ball at either end being struck by another 
ball rolling in the direction of the row. All the balls 
of the row keep their position except the last ball, which 
rolls off with the velocity of the striking ball. 

This theory of latent modifications of mind is not con- 
sistent with Hamilton's opinions, elsewhere expressed, 
that ''every act of mind is an act of consciousness," and 
that "we must say of every state of mind, whatever it 
may be, that it can be nothing else than it is felt to 
be." That which is felt is not a latent modification. 

Dr. Porter remarks on Hamilton's theory as follows: 

''In the very case supposed, when one idea suddenly 
and strangely follows upon another, if we bethink our- 
selves at once, we can ' recall some intervening links. 
We say, if we bethink ourselves at once; for. if the 
effort is made a. few instants later, the clue will fall 
from our hands. At other times, when it seems to have 
totally escaped and eluded us, it can be recovered by per- 
sistent effort and determination. 'Now, the fact that, in 
some apparently desperate cases, we can succeed, demon- 
strates that the objects might have been — nay, that they 
actually were, present to consciousness, though they 
seemed not to have been. We have a right to infer, 
then, on grounds of analogy, that they are so in all cases. 
The analogy of acknowledged and similar phenomena is 
wholly with the first theory. Moreover, analogy would 
seem to suggest and confirm the principle, that where 
there is a feeble activity of consciousness there is a 
feeble hold upon the memory; and we conclude, con- 
versely, that where there is the slenderest hold upon the 
memory, there must have been the feeblest possible en- 



212 PSYCHOLOGY. 

ergy of consciousness. What is intended by the phrase, 
latent modification of consciousness^ is not altogether- clear. 
If it be explained as only a very low degree of conscious 
activity, the two theories are in princij)le the same." 
Elements^ page 244. 

3d. The theory of unconscious cerebration. John Stuart 
Mill says: ''We know that these lost sensations and 
ideas, — for lost they appear to be — leave traces of hav- 
ing existed; they continue to be operative in introducing 
other ideas, by association. Either, therefore, they have 
been consciously present long enough to call up associa- 
tions, but not long enough to be remembered a few 
moments later, or they^have been, as Sir W. Hamilton 
supposes, unconsciously present, or they have not been 
2:)resent at all, but something instead of them, capable of 
producing the same effects. I am myself inclined to 
agree with Sir W. Hamilton, and to admit his uncon- 
scious mental modifications, in 'the only shape in which 
I can attach any very distinct meaning to them, namely, 
unconscious modifications of the nerves 

''In the case, for instance, of a soldier who receives a 
wound in battle, but in the excitement of the moment 
is not aware of the fact, it is difiicult not to believe that 
if the w^ound had been accompanied by the usual sensa- 
tion, so vivid a feeling would have forced itself to be 
attended to and remembered. The supposition which 
seems most probable is, that the nerves of the particular 
f)art were affected as they would have been by the same 
cause in any other circumstances ; but that, the nervous 
centers being intensely occupied with other impressions, 
the affection of the local nerves did not reach them, and 
no sensation was excited. 

" In like manner, if we admit (what physiology is 
rendering more and more probable) that our mental 
feelings, as well as our sensations, have for their physi- 



PECULIARITIES OF REPRESENTATION, 213 

cal antecedents, particular states of the nerves, it may 
well be believed that the apparently suppressed links 
ill a chain of association, those which Sir W. Hamilton 
considers as latent, really are so ; that they are not, even 
momentarily, felt; the chain of causation being continued 
only physically, by one organic state of the nerves suc- 
ceeding another so rapidly that the state of mental con- 
sciousness appropriate to each is not produced. We 
have only to suppose, either that a nervous modification 
of too short duration does not produce any sensation or 
mental feeling at all, or that the rapid succession of 
different nervous modifications makes the feelings pro- 
duced by them interfere with each other, and become 
confounded in one mass. The former of these supposi- 
tions is extremely probable, while of the truth of the 
latter we have positive proof .... 

" It is known that the seven prismatic colors, combined 
in certain proportions, produce the white light of the 
solar ray. .Now", if the seven colors are painted on 
spaces bearing the same proportion to one another as 
in the solar spectrum, and the colored surface so pro- 
duced is passed rapidly before the eyes, as by the turn- 
ing' of a wheel, the w^hole is seen as white. The physio- 
logical explanation of this phenomenon may be deduced 
from another common experiment. If a lighted torch, 
or a bar heated to luminousness, is waved rapidly be- 
fore the eye, the appearance produced is that of a ribbon 
of light; which is universally understood to prove that 
the visual sensation persists for a certain short time 
after its cause has ceased. Now, if this happens with a 
single color, it will happen with a series of colors; and 
if the wheel on which the prismatic colors have been 
painted, is turned with the same rapidity with which 
the torch was waved, each of the seven sensations of 
color will last long enough to be contemporaneous with 



214 PSYCHOLOGY. 

all the others, and they will naturally produce, by their 
combination, the same color as if they had, from the 
beginning, been excited simultaneously. 

'- If any thing similar to this obtains in our conscious- 
ness generally (and that it obtains in many cases of 
consciousness there can be no doubt), it will follow that 
whenever the or^-anic modifications of our nervous fibers 
succeed one another at an interval shorter than the du- 
ration of the sensations or other feelings corresponding 
to them, those sensations or feelings will, so to speak, 
overlap one another, and becoming simultaneous instead 
of successive, will blend into a state of feeling, probably 
as unlike the elements out of which it is engendered, as 
the color white is unlike the prismatic colors. And this 
may be the source of many of those states of internal 
or mental feeling which we can not distinctly refer to 
a prototype in experience, our exjierience only supply- 
ing the elements from which, by this kind of mental 
chemistry, they are composed. The elementary feelings 
may then be said to be latently present, or to be pres- 
ent, but not in consciousness. The truth, however, is 
that the. feelings themselves are not present, consciously 
or latently, but that the nervous modifications, Avhich are 
their usual antecedents, have been present, while the 
consequents have been frustrated, and another conse- 
quent has been produced instead." Examination^ Yol. 
II., page 21. 

Dr. Carpenter agrees with Mr. Mill and illustrates his 
vie.w in the Xlllth Chapter of his Mental Physiology^ 
by numerous interesting examples, to which the reader 
is referred. 

2. Unceasing tendency to the act of representation. 
— After the mind is developed and furnished, through 
the senses, with the requisite fixcts, it could employ it- 
self in endless representation, though the senses be for- 



PECULIAEITIES OF REPRESENTATION, 215 

ever sealed. But this activity may be interrupted in 
two ways: 

1st. Ohjective interruption. Every new object presented 
to the senses awakens perception and interrupts repre- 
sentation. Perception and representation may indeed 
go on together. Eepresentation is, in fact, involved in 
perception, as its final element, but not that kind of 
representation w^hich takes place in the absence of sen- 
sation. But the two acts, representation and perception, 
may not be equally energetic, though going on simul- 
taneously. The mind may be so engaged with the rep- 
sentation that it no longer attentively observes, or the 
attention may be so absorbed in the observation that 
the representation practically ceases, though the new 
object perceived is the occasion of a new train of rep- 
resentations. 

2d. Subjective interruption. The mind has power, by 
an act of the will, to interrupt one series of representa- 
tions and to introduce another. This can be done, either 
by seeking a new object for observation, or by arresting 
one train of representations and introducing another, ir- 
respective of observation, or by exerting the higher ac- 
tivities of its logical powers. The mind is, therefore, 
not wholly passive in regard to its train of representa- 
tions, since it can change them at will. 

There is also possible an indirect and, at least, a 
partial control over the spontaneous representations, 
since those images tend to recur which the mind dwells 
upon frequently and with pleasure. 

It is, therefore, a matter of great consequence that w^e 
be careful in the selection of the objects upon which 
our minds are to dwell. "Whatsoever things are true, 
Vvhatsoever things are honest, w^hatsoever things are just, 
whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, 
whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any 



216 



PSYCHOLOGY. 



virtue, if there be any praise, think on these things," 
The contemplation of the true, the beautiful, and the 
good, will furnish the mind with noble ideals, and aid 
us in our advance towards perfection. 

3. Habit as affecting representation. — Habit is the 
aptitude acquired by repetition. We may divide habits 
into two classes — bodily habits and mental habits, and 
these may be variously subdivided. 

The laws of habit are the following: Acts tend to re- 
cur. The tendency to recur varies with the number of 
repetitions. The tendency to recur varies with the re- 
centness of the repetitions. 

Habit has great influence upon the train of represen- 
tations. Those images upon which the mind delights to 
dwell, seem to recur spontaneously. 

The laws of habit may be applied with great effect 
in forming or changing our modes of thought, or in 
molding moral character. 

4. Association! as lower and higher. — The lower as- 
sociations relate to objects of sense, consciousness, or 
rejDresentation, and depend chiefly on the relations of 
space and time. 

The higher associations include the relations of cause 
and effect, reason and consequent, genus and species, 
and, in brief, all the logical and philosophical relations. 

The ignorant are chiefly under the influence of the 
lower associations, though, to some extent, they are in- 
fluenced by the higher; yet, in reference to the latter, 
they often make ludicrous mistakes, as when they assign 
to things accidentally connected, the relation of cause 
and efl'ect. On the other hand, philosophers especially 
regard the higher associations, and consider the lower as 
of little consequence. 

5. The judgment influenced by association. — In mor- 
als, vice is often regarded with favor, when indulged 



PECULIARITIES OF REPRESENTATION, 217 

in by the higher classes, and virtue with disfavor, when 
practiced by the lower. 

In society, a new fashion is at first distasteful to the 
multitude; but, as it is associated with the higher classes, 
it becomes attractive, and is adopted by the lower; but, 
when it becomes associated with the vulgar, the higher 
classes reject it and adopt another fashion. 

The influence of association is seen in the effect of 
names. Indignation may often be averted, offense 
avoided, or good will secured, by the choice of smooth 
words ; or the reverse effect may be produced by the use 
of opprobrious epithets. ^-A soft answer turneth away 
wrath, but grievous words stir up anger." 

Parties, sects, and schools of philosophy seek honora- 
ble names for themselves, and sometimes endeavor to 
fasten odious epithets upon their opponents, and success 
or defeat may turn upon the adoption of a name. 



Psy.-19. 



CHAPTER lY. 



MEMORY. 



Memory as an act is the retention, recollection, rep- 
resentation, and recognition of previous cognitions. 

Memory as ^faculty is both the capacity to retain, 
and the power to recall, represent, and recognize our 
previous cognitions. 

It is essential to memory that some of the elements 
of a previous cognition be retained, recalled, represented, 
and recognized, as known in past time, though other 
elements of that cognition may be indistinctly recognized, 
and still others, not at all. 

To remember a thing, it is necessary, not only to re- 
tain and recall a knowledge of that thing, but to rep- 
resent and recognize the idea of that thing in its rela- 
tions to space, time, and dependence. 

In memory, a thing is posited in space ^ by represent- 
ing its relations to other things in space, both as to 
direction and to distance; — to direction, as above or 
below, before or behind, at the right or left, north, south, 
east or w^est, — to distance, as near or remote, given 
definitely or indefinitely. 

By memory, a thing is posited in time in its relations 
to other things in time, as simultaneous, or as antecedent 
or consequent; and in the latter case, as immediately 
successive, or separated by an interval more or less pro- 
longed, given definitely or indefinitely. 

Things are also represented in memory in the relation 

of dependence^ as condition and conditioned, reason and 

(218) 



MEMORY. 219 

consequent, cause and effect, producer and produced, 
means and end, whole and part, container and contained, 
ruler and subject, sign and thing signified. 

The elements involved in memory are retention, recol- 
lection, representation, and recognition. 

1. Retention is the keeping of past acquisitions. It is 
the conservative element of memory. 

The fact of retention is not certified to by conscious- 
ness, but is inferred from the fact that a past cognition 
can be recalled, represented, and recognized. 

By retention we are not to understand that the idea 
of a past cognition is consciously kej)t in memory; for 
that would imply representation, and recognition as well 
as retention, but that the effect of the original cognition 
so remains that the mind has the power to rej^roduce 
and recognize its representative idea. 

In the sense just stated, retention can be clearly 
proved, thus: Let there be a perception of an object 
which we shall call A ; and after an interval, perhaps 
of days or years, let the perception of another object 
called B^ recall the idea of A. 'Then, it is clear, that 
the effect of the perception of A still remained in the 
mind; for, if not, the mind w^ould be in the same state 
as if A had never been perceived, in which case, B 
could not recall A^ since B could not recall A, if A had 
never been perceived; but since B does recall A, the 
mind is not in the same state as if A had never been 
perceived, — that is, the effect of the perception of A 
still remained in the mind. 

In illustration of retention, Plato likens it to a tablet 
on which impressions can be made ; Cicero, to a store- 
house in which goods can be stowed away; Gassendi, to 
a piece of paper or cloth, which, receiving certain folds, 
retains the tendency to receive the same folds after- 
wards. 



220 PSYCHOLOGY. 

The theories offered in explanation of the fact of re- 
tention may be reduced to two — the physiological and 
the psychological. 

The physiological theory maintains that, in original 
perception, impressions, more or less permanent, are 
made on one or more of the organs of sense, and com- 
municated to the brain. Retention is referred to the 
abiding effect of the molecular change which took place 
in making the original acquisition, or to the tendency 
of the cell grouping of the nervous centers to recur. 

The psychological theory maintains that any psychical 
phenomenon, as an act, implies a change or modification 
of the state of mind. Hence, the effect of this change 
must remain in the mind; for any state of the intelli- 
gence is the resultant of all its preceding acts or modi- 
fications; and in this fact is found the explanation of 
retention. 

2. Recollection is that act by which past acquisitions 
are recalled. It is the reproductive element of mem- 
ory. The condition of recollection is retention. 

As to kind^ recollection is either involuntary or vol- 
untary, according as it is spontaneous or is occasioned 
by an act of the will. 

By involuntary recollection, certain past acquisitions 
are recalled, without an effort of the will, through their 
association with ideas already present to the mind. As 
all acquisitions are related by their common dependence 
on the same mind, it would seem that any acquisition 
might, according to the law of association, suggest any 
other; but as these acquisitions are related to each other 
with different degrees of intimacy, some will be more 
likely to be recalled than others, and, by their recall, 
the others will be practically excluded, since the mind 
can not attend to all at the same time. Some acquisi- 
tions that are even recalled may, on account of their 



MEMORY, 221 

obscurity, fail to elicit attention, disappear from con- 
sciousness, and be forgotten. 

By voluntary recollection, j^ast acquisitions are recalled 
through an elfort of the will. At first thought, volun- 
tary recollection aj^pears to be self-contradictor}^; for, in 
seeking to recall a thing, it would seem that we already 
know what we wish to recall. But we may know ge- 
nerically, though not specifically, or specifically though 
not individually, or in jDart yet not in whole, or ob- 
scurely yet not vividly. Thus, we may know that it is 
the name of a certain individual tliat we wish to recall, 
and yet not be able to recall the name itself. We may 
also wish to make our recollections more clear and vivid. 

The law of a good recollection is the following: The 
poiver of recollection is increased by exercise. 

The following conditions are to be observed as supple- 
mentary to the law of exercise : 

(1) Make the acquisitions under proper conditions of 
place, time, and j)bysical and mental states. 

(2) Preserve the health of the body and the vigor of 
the mind. 

(3) Give attention to the original acquisitions. 

(4) Secure clearness of cognition and interest in the 
object. 

(5) Ascertain relations and classify. 

(6) Associate the object with other things. 

(7) Repeat the cognitions and recollections. 

(8) Make frequent and truthful communications. 

An application of the above law and conditions will 
greatly strengthen the power of recollection. 
The degrees of for get fulness are the following: 

(1) When the displacement is momentary. 

(2) When the withdrawal of attention is voluntary. 

(3) When the recollection requires an effort. 

(4) When we can not, at present, recall. 



222 PSYCHOLOGY, 

(5) When repeated efforts to recall have failed. 

(6) When we have abandoned all effort to recall. 

It is not, however, to be inferred that the recollection 
of any past acquisition is impossible; for it may recur 
unexpectedly; but we should remember that we can 
not recall what we never knew. We should therefore 
riiake the original acquisitions clear and complete. 

3. Representation is the act by which past acquisitions, 
conserved by retention, and recalled by recollection, are 
reconstructed in consciousness. It is the constructive 
element of memory. 

The conditions of representation are retention and rec- 
ollection; for, without these, representation itself would 
be impossible. 

The representations, as found in memory, correspond 
to the appearances of past realities with their attending 
circumstances of place and time. These representations 
are, by their fidelity to the appearances in past acqui- 
sitions, distinguished from the ideal creations of the 
imagination, and from the grotesque products of the 
phantasy as experienced in reverie and dreaming. 

4. Recognition is the act by which the ideas of past 
acquisitions, retained, recalled, and represented, are iden- 
tified as former possessions of the mind. It is the iden- 
tifying element of memory. Identification implies the 
comparison of things essentially alike. Recognition is 
the completion of the processes involved in memory, and 
without it, though conscious of representations, we should 
be ignorant of their relations to past acquisitions. 

The conditions of recognition in memory, are retention, 
recollection and representation ; for, without these, recog- 
nition would be impossible. 

The elements involved in recognition are as follows: 
(1) A present image of a past acquisition, retained, 
recalled and represented. 




MEMORY, 223 

(2) The ideiitifieatioD of the present image as truly 
representing a past acquisition of our experience. 

(3) Faith in the trustworthiness of memory. 

(4) Time implied in the discrimination of the date of 
the present representation from that of the past acquisi- 
tion represented. 

(5j Personal identity or the essential sameness of the 
ego at tlie two dates. 

The appearance in perception may be compared with 
its rej)resentative idea in memory, thus: 

(1) In perception, a material object is present, causing 
a sensation. Intuition apprehends the conditional neces- 
sity of the ego as the subject of the sensation, and of 
the object as the cause of the sensation. The judgment 
infers what the cause is. The imagination, under the 
stimulus of sensation and inference, constructs the ap- 
pearance embodying the inference. This ideated appear- 
ance is committed to the retentive capacity of memory, 
and passes from consciousness, the mind retaining only 
the effect of the process, and that unconsciously. 

(2) In memory, the mind is able to retain the effects 
of its previous acts, and hence to recall, represent and 
recognize the ideated appearance, though the external 
object and the sensation caused by it are wanting. 

(3) In perception, the original appearance is constructed 
by the imagination under the stimulus of the sensation 
caused by the object. 

(4) In memory, the revived appearance is constructed 
by the same power, in the absence of the sensation 
caused by the object. 

(5) In perception, the original appearance is vivid and 
rich in elements. 

(6) In memory, the revived appearance is less vivid 
than the original, is more indeterminate, and is composed 
of fewer elements. 



224 PSYCHOLOGY, 

The varieties of memory can, in part, be accounted 
for by the prominence, or deficiency, or relative activity 
of the elements of retention, recollection, representation 
and recognition. 

The prominence of retention is manifested in the relia- 
bility of memory, or the probability that what has been 
committed to it will not be forgotten. The deficiency of 
retention is shown by fbrgetfulness; but forgetfulness 
can, in part, be accounted for by supposing the mind 
occupied, and the attention engaged with something else. 

As recollection is the proof of retention, it would seem 
that we have proof that but a small part of our acqui- 
sitions are retained, since the greater part are, perhaps, 
never recalled : but since, under special conditions, much 
is recalled that had been long forgotten, it may be in- 
ferred that much is retained that is never recalled, and 
it may, indeed, be questioned whether any acquisition 
is ever absolutely forgotten. 

The prominence or deficiency of recollection^ in its 
spontaneous form, is manifested in the presence or ab- 
sence of the ready memory; the prominence or deficiency 
of intentional recollection, by the presence or absence of 
the tenacious memory. 

The character of the memory varies according to the 
law of association employed. The employment of the 
law of contiguity in space or time gives rise to the or- 
dinary memory of fact. The employment of the law of 
correlation gives rise to the philosophic memory. The 
observance of the secondary laws of representation, and 
the law and conditions of recollection, tends to give us 
the complete control of all of our possessions, by devel- 
oping a universal memory. We are apt to remember 
what Ave are interested in ; aiid on this account, some 
minds remember facts, other minds, principles. We 
should take an interest in what we wish to remember. 



MEMORY. 225 

The prominence or deficiency of representation is man- 
ifested in the vivid or indistinct memory. An active 
representative power enables us to see clearly, with the 
mind's eye, the scenes of the past, and to portray them 
in vivid pictures. 

The prominence or deficiency of recognition is mani- 
fested in the completeness or incompleteness of the parts 
of the representation which are recognized. 

A perfect memory requires the perfection of all the 
elements — retention, recollection, representation and rec- 
ognition. A good memory is partly the gift of nature, 
and partly the effect of cultivation; and in the differ- 
ences of constitution and cultivation, we find an expla- 
nation of the varieties of memory. 

The cultivation of memory, in consideration of its 
utility, is a matter of great importance. Memory is 
most effectively cultivated by studying its nature, obey- 
ing its laws, and exercising it under proper conditions. 

Retention is cultivated by committing to it a great 
number and variety of well-defined acquisitions, and by 
making frequent demands upon it to deliver up its stores. 

Recollection is cultivated by exercising it in conform- 
ity with its law and conditions. The power to reproduce 
our mental treasures is developed by the act of their 
reproduction. 

Representation is cultivated by making the original 
acquisitions clear and distinct, and by representing all 
their elements in vivid pictures, and by repeated efforts. 

Recognition is cultivated by habitually identifying all 
the elements of the representative ideas. 

The great principle for the cultivation of memory is 
the law — exercise strengthens. The memory should not, 
however, be overtaxed. Exercise should be interrupted 
by intervals of rest. 

Attention to facts and details gives the ready memory; 



226 PSYCHOLOGY. 

and the study of principles, relations, and laws gives the 
philosophical memory. 

Examples of great memory are abundant, and but few 
need be mentioned. 

It is said that Hippias, on hearing five hundred words, 
could repeat them in their exact order; that Seneca 
could repeat two thousand names in the order given; 
that Cyrus and Hannibal knew the names of all the 
soldiers in their respective armies; and that Themistocles 
knew the name of every citizen of Athens. 

These were men distinguished for great intellectual 
power in other respects; and heuce the opinion is dis- 
proved that great memory is the attendant of a weak 
judgment. This may be true when the memory con- 
cerns itself with trivial occurrences, to the exclusion of 
general facts and philosophical principles; but the stock 
of knowledge of an able man is usually not small, and 
of this stock he has complete command. The rea- 
son for this complete control of his acquisitions, is the 
fact that he refers particular cases to general princi- 
ples. This is philosophical memory. It may sometimes 
appear less ready than ordinary memory, since it requires 
time to recur to principles, but it is more sure. Thus, 
one person may learn the rule for an arithmetical pro- 
cess, and another may be able to think out the reason. 
If the first forget his rule, he has no resource; but if 
the second forget the process, he can think it out again. 
Stewart says: ''They who are possessed of much acute- 
ness and originality, enter with difficulty into the views 
of others, not from any defect of their power of appre- 
hension, but because they can not adopt opinions which 
they have not examined." Philosophy^ page 251. Such 
persons prefer to think for themselves. 

Muretus mentions a Corsican to whom he dictated 
words, — Latin, Greek, barbarous, significant, and non- 



MEMORY. 227 

significant, disjointed and connected, — until he worried, 
not only himself, but the young man who wrote them 
down, and the spectators. The Corsican was the only 
one of the whole comj)any who was alert and fresh, 
and he continually asked Muretus for more words. After 
Muretus ceased to give more words, the Corsican began 
and repeated all the words in the same order without 
the slightest hesitation. Then, commencing at the last, 
he repeated them backwards, till he came to the first. 
Then again, he repeated the first, the third, the fifth, and 
so on; and he repeated them in any order desired, with- 
out the smallest error. 

Paschal, Scaligor, Leibnitz, Euler, and Hamilton are 
examples illustrating the fact that great memory may 
accompany great powers of mind in other resj)ects. The 
memory and the judgment are, in fact, friendly faculties, 
and either is ready to assist the other. 

Hamilton says of Scaliger: "The retentive faculty of 
that man is surely not to be despised, who was able to 
commit to memory Homer in twenty-one days, and the 
whole of the Greek poets in three months; and who, 
taking him all in all, was the most learned man the 

world has ever seen During his life-time, he was 

hailed as the Dictator of the Republic of Letters, and 
posterity has ratified the decision of his contemporaries, 
in crowning him as the prince of philologers and crit- 
ics." Metaphysics^ pages 413, 425. 



CHAPTEE V. 



IMAGINATION. 



Imagination, as an act, is that form of representation 
in which the constructions are subjective ideals. 

The faculty of imagination is the power to perform 
the act of imamnation. 

Images are the products creatQd by the act of the 
faculty of imagination. 

The characteristics of the imagination are its picturing, 
modifying, and creative powers. 

By its picturing power, the imagination constructs 
pictures or mental images. 

By its modif^nng power, the images are varied at 
pleasure, and thus released from correspondence to past 
reality, as in memory. 

By its creative power, it forms, for rational purposes, 
ideals of the true, the beautiful, and the good, or of 
their opposites. 

The images are restricted to space, time, possible form, 
thought relations, and elements of experience. 

The images are subject to the relations of space. 
They are represented as having situation, magnitude, 
and form, and as sustaining to one another the relations 
of direction and distance. 

The images are subject to the relations of time. They 
are represented as having date and duration ; as past, 
present, or future; one as simultaneous with another, or 
as preceding or succeeding it, immediately, or separated 

by an interval more or less prolonged. 

(228) 



IMA GIN A TION. 229 

The images are restricted to possible form. Thus, a 
form involving conflictive elements is impossible, and 
hence can not be imagined, as a round square, or a 
spherical cube. 

The images are restricted to thought relations. They 
are represented under the relations of the condition and 
the conditioned, whole and part, etc. 

The images embrace elements known by experience. 
Images of material things are limited to such qualities 
as are known through the senses ; and psychical repre- 
sentations are limited to such phenomena as are revealed 
in consciousness. 

The phases of this power are exhibited in positing, 
magnifying or diminishing, distorting, decomposing, re- 
composing, compounding, anticipating, creating, annihi- 
lating, and recreating. 

The images may be posited in various relations to one 
another in space as to direction and distance, and in 
time as to date, or duration, or order of succession. 

The images, though maintaining the due proportion 
of their elements, may be indefinitely increased or di- 
minished in magnitude. Thus, as in Gulliver's travels, 
we can imagine Lilliputians or Brobdingnags, and other 
things to corresj)ond. We may imagine a human being 
with the intellect of an idiot or that of an angel; as in 
unison with God and exhibiting the fruits of the Spirit 
in a holy life, or as possessed of Satan and manifesting 
all possible wickedness. 

The proportion of the parts may be varied so as to 
give distorted images. Thus, we can imagine a man 
with a head larger than the rest of his body. 

The whole may be resolved into parts which may be 
separately represented. Thus, we can picture a head or 
a hand detached from the bod3\ 

The parts of wholes may be recombined in a different 



230 PSYCHOLOGY. 

order, so as to form a new whole, and thus transform 
the shape into any possible form. 

Parts of one whole may be combined with parts of 
another whole. Thus, we can imagine a mermaid, a 
centaur, a griffin, a man with the head of a dog, etc. 
We can imagine any attribute joined with any substance. 

Guided by memory and judgment, the imagination 
constructs. images embodying its anticipations or expec- 
tations of future events. 

Images may be constructed according to certain laws 
of form, or from equations. We may thus create forms 
such as we have never seen. Thus, we may construct 
the curve represented by the equation, x^ = (a — ^) y^, 
called the Cissoid of Diodes. 

We may imagine every thing swept from existence, 
leaving space and time infinite voids. In this void space, 
imagine a point to move in one direction, with a given 
velocity for a certain time, thus generating a line whoso 
length is equal to the product of the velocity of the point 
by the time of its motion. Imagine this line to revolve in 
the same plane about its origin as a center, thus gener- 
ating a circle whose radius is the revolving line. Im- 
agine the circle to revolve about any diameter, thus gen- 
erating a sphere whose radius is equal to the radius of 
the circle. In this sphere we may imagine every possi- 
ble form, and every variety of being, and, in fact, a new 
universe. 

The utility of the imagination is manifested in practi- 
cal life, in science, in art, in morals and religion. 

in everj^-day life and in the mechanical arts, the 
imagination is employed in adapting means to ends. 
Inventive genius, by the aid of the imagination, con- 
structs instruments and machines, and calls in the aid 
of natural forces. 

A good mathematical imagination is of great service 



IMAGINATION. 231 

in science, and is even indispensable to a well-developed 
mind. The explanation of many phenomena is first 
rej)resented by the imagination, and afterwards con- 
firmed by observation or experiment, and thus the 
hypothesis becomes a theory. There are other hypothet- 
ical explanations of phenomena, such as the relation of 
ether to light, which genius invents by the aid of a 
creative imagination, which satisfy the mind, though 
perhaps never to be verified. 

There is a wide field for the employment of a creative 
imagination in the fine arts — Landscape and Architect- 
ure, Sculpture and Painting, Music and Poetry. 

The imagination forms the ideal standard of attain- 
ment for moral and S23iritual excellence. It elevates the 
soul by throwing the charm of a poetic ideal around 
the life of duty. We should, however, guard against 
the tendency to clothe the actions of selfish genius with 
the garb of virtue, or to adorn the head of the ambitious 
conqueror with the halo of glory. 

The cultivation of the imagination is promoted by lay- 
ing in a store of exalted images drawn from the works 
of Nature and Art, or from the worthy sacrifices of 
virtue and the noble deeds of moral heroism. The im- 
agination is cultivated by the exertion of its j)owers in 
creating ideals of the true, the beautiful, and the good. 

The study of pure literature is the most efiective 
means for the cultivation of the imagination. Here we 
find, in rich profusion, the beautiful creations of lofty 
genius. 



CHAPTER VI. 



PHANTASY 



Phantasy, as an act^ is that form of representation in 
which the mind is a spectator of a series of images 
severed from the usual relations of cognition. 

The act of representation, which seldom ceases, takes 
the form of phantasy, in case of the suspension of rec- 
ognition involved in memory, and of thought and voli- 
tion involved in imagination. 

Phantasy, as an object^ is the product of the act of 
phantasy. These products are called phantasms, spec- 
ters, apparitions, etc. 

Phantasy, as a faculty^ is the power to perform the 
act of phantasy in the production of phantasms. 

The most general division of phantasy is into the 
phantasy of wakefulness, the phantasy of sleep, and the 
phantasy occurring indifferently either in wakefulness or 
in sleep. 

The phantasy of vmkefulness takes the forms of reverie, 
hallucination, intoxication, and insanity. 

Reverie is the simplest form of wakeful phantasy. It 
occurs when, as in a state of lassitude of mind or bodv, 
the higher acts of thought and volition are suspended, 
and the mind gives free rein to the action of the rep- 
resentative power. The pictured products, or phantasms, 
are thus, by the automatic action of the representative 
power, severed from all relation to other things in space 
and time. The current of images may be determined 

by the sensations received passively through the senses, 

(282) 



PHANTASY. 233 

and modified by the laws of association. lieverie may 
be induced by contemplating, for a short time, a single 
object, and then passively yielding to the train of sug- 
gestions. For interesting examples of reverie, consult 
Dr. Carjpentefs Mental Physiology^ Chapter XIY. 

Hallucination arises from a morbid condition of the 
nervous system, Cciusing certain apj^earances called spec- 
tra, apparitions, or phantoms. Spectra occur spontane- 
ously in certain conditions of the sensorium, occasioned 
by stimulants, sickness, anxiety, or trouble. Tliese phan- 
toms assume definite forms and positions; they appear 
with distorted faces; they stand, or sit, or w^alk. The 
mind can not, for the time, get rid of the appearances, 
though knowing that they are not real objects. 

If the organs of vision could be affected by any other 
means, as they would be affected by a visible external 
object, that object apparently is seen. False vision of 
this kind may be called pseiidopia. Dr. Clark says: 
"Not only is the angular gyrus capable of registering 
impressions, but it can reproduce them under the influ- 
ence of an appropriate and sufficient stimulus. 

Visual impressions, which are to a greater or less ex- 
tent pictorial on the retina, become, in the tubercula 
quadrigemina, optic thalami, and angular g^^ri, cell-groups, 
or modified cell-manifestations. Each specific group or 
manifestation is the cipher or hieroglyphic of a specific 
visual object. Such being the mechanism of sight, it is 
evident that whatever will produce in any of the visual 
centers a cell-grouping or modification, which is the rep- 
resentative of any object, as a rose, a dagger, or a face, 
will also produce the subjective sensation or idea of the 
object. Ordinarily, this occurs only when an object is 
presented externally to the eye, and the rays of light 
falling from it on the retina set the whole visual ap- 
paratus in action. Sometimes, however, causes which 

Psy.— 20. 



234 PSYCHOLOGY, 

are purely intra-cranial will revive old cell-groups or 
modifications, and the subjective result is the seeing of 
objects of which there is no external existence. . . . . 
Association utters a call for the assembling of a cerebral 
cell-group; habit enables it to form with facility; emo- 
tion imparts distinctness to it; expectant attention an- 
ticipates and urges its appearance; automatism gives it 
power to act; and the ideational centers welcome and 
utilize the result." Visions, pages 119, 153. 

Intoxication results from the action of alcoholic or nar- 
cotic stimulants upon the nervous system. The conse- 
quences of habitual intoxication are mania, or temporary 
aberration of the intellect ; /r^n^y, or temporary madness; 
delirium, or surrender to wild and terrifying fancies; 
idiocy, or mental imbecility; degradation, or the loss of 
every thing desirable —property, character, self-respect, 
happiness, hope. 

Insanity is a disordered state of mind contined for an 
indefinite period. It is characterized by unbalanced 
mental action, the possession of the mind by some dom- 
inant idea, or the suspension of the power of the will 
to control its own action. Insanity may be induced by 
abnormal action, physical or mental, or by any thing 
which causes lesion of the nervous system, or occasions 
disordered action of the brain. Mania, frenzy, delirium, 
and idiocy, attending intoxication, are examples of in- 
cipient insanity. 

Phantasy in sleep takes the forms of dreaming, night- 
mare, and somnambulism. 

Dreaming is that action of the phantasy which occurs 
in natural sleep. 

The causes of dreams are the state of the body or 
of the mind, or external agencies, physical or spiritual. 

Dreams may be induced by indigestion, nervous atfec- 
tion, weariness, or ill-health. 



PHANTASY, 235 

The scenes and thoughts of the day often recur as 
the dreams of the night. An eminent English judge 
dreamed that lizards were crawling over him. The 
clock in the room in which he slept had on it figures 
of crawling lizards, which he must have seen before 
retiring, though he did not recollect this in the morn- 
ing. The materials of dreams are, no doubt, often sup- 
plied by the traces of the knowledge of events long ago 
forgotten. 

Sounds heard in sleep occasion or modify dreams, as 
thunder may induce the dream of a battle. A blister 
on Dr. Eeid's head caused him to dream of being scalped 
by the Indians. A hot bottle at the feet of Dr. Gregory 
caused him to dream of walking on Mt. Etna. But why 
Mt. Etna rather than Mt. Vesuvius? Other causes were 
at work besides the hot bottle. 

The characteristics of dreams are peculiar and remark- 
ably interesting. 

The representations in dreams are mistaken for ob- 
jective realities. The dreamer believes that he is in a 
real world, oblivious of the fact that he is in a world 
of shadows. 

The appearances in dreams are often grotesque, and 
the inferences drawn irrational. This is explained by 
the absence of the influence of real objects, as in per- 
ception, and by the quiescence or imperfect action of the 
higher powers of thought. 

Efforts are sometimes put forth in dreams which in- 
dicate activity of the will, at least in a low degree; but 
dreams are usually characterized by the absence of ra- 
tional purpose, and the will is not called into action. 

In certain dreams, the representative power, freed 
from the control of the will, acts automatically, and fol- 
lowing out the suggestive clew, without restraint or 
guidance, often reaches surprising results; hence, in 



236 PSYCHOLOGY, 

dreams, lost things have been found, problems solved, 
and discoveries made, which could not have been done 
in a state of wakefulness. 

One of the most remarkable of the peculiarities of 
dreaming is the rapidity of the mind's action. Events 
whicli, in real life, would require days, or even years, 
are witnessed in dreams in a few seconds, though, to 
the mind of the dreamer, they appear to occupy the 
time naturally required. 

Dreams are sometimes remarkable on account of the 
absence of surprise at the grotesque appearance, or of 
joy or sorrow which would attend our knowledge of 
corresponding real events. In other cases, dreams are 
attended with intense exciten.ent of the sensibility. 
Thus, a dream of danger excites fear, and a dream of 
deliverance, gratitude. 

Does the mind always dream in sieep? This is not a 
settled question. It is no proof that we have not dreamed 
because we have no remembrance of dreaming. We 
forget dreams as we forget other things. It is no proof 
that the mind always dreams in sleep, to assume that 
continued activity is essential to the continued existence 
and identity of the soul. This Avould follow from the 
hypothesis that the soul is activity and nothing else; 
but it does not follow from the hypothesis that the 
soul is a substantial personality; for such a power may 
be active or quiescent. The non-exertion of a power 
does not imply its non-existence. Force is the exertion 
of a power, and hence is always acting; but not so the 
power itself Whether the mind always dreams in sleep 
will, perhaps, remain undecided. 

Nightmare is a distressing form of dreaming resulting 
from imperfect circulation of the blood. The sufferer 
imagines himself in some distressing situation, and yet 
is unable to help himself or to call for assistance. 



PHANTASY, 237 

(Somnambulism is that condition of the nervous system 
in which a person performs, during sleep, actions appro- 
priate to the waking state, such as walking, the act im- 
plied in the name. Somnambulism assumes one of three 
Ibrms — natural somuambulism, morbid, or artificial. 

Natural somnambulism may occur in ordinary sleep. 
Certain powers may be aw^ake while others are asleep. 
As in dreaming, there is the absence of voluntary con- 
trol over the current of thought, and the mind is subject 
to the control of some dominant idea; yet, the somnam- 
bulist, unlike the dreamer, has the use of some of his 
senses, and the control of his muscular organs. He can 
walk ; he may see, though he does not hear or feel, or 
hear and not see. There may be complete abstraction 
from every thing except that which is connected with 
the dominant idea; but in relation to this, there may 
be great activity. Thus, in this state, a mathematician 
solves a difficult problem ; an orator delivers an eloquent 
speech ; a musician produces enchanting harmonies. For 
examples, the reader is referred to Caiyentefs Mental 
Physiology^ Chapter XY. 

Morbid Somnambulism is induced by disease. It differs 
from natural somnambulism, wdiich is both preceded and 
followed by ordinary sleep, in the fact that it ma}^ occur 
suddenly in a state of wakefulness. Extraordinary pow- 
ers are exhibited, as if the mind were under the influ- 
ence of another mind, or guided b}^ supernatural power. 

Artificial somnambulism^ called also hypnotism, is that 
form of somnambulism which is artificially induced. It 
may be induced by '' the maintenance of a fixed gaze, 
for several minutes consecutively, on a bright object 
placed somewhat above and in front of the e^^es, at so 
short a distance that the convergence of their axes upon 
it is accompanied with a sense of effort, even amounting 
to pain." Mental Physiology, P^^gc ^^^^1- The subject is 



238 PSYCHOLOGY, 

credulous, and liis feelings are easil)" excited. He is 
under tlie complete control of the operator through whose 
agency he was put into this state. 

There are certain characteristics common to the three 
varieties, as the following: 

The leading activity is that of the representative 
power, and the creations of this powxr chiefly solicit 
the attention and engage the energies of the mind. 

Some of the senses are awake and highly sensitive, 
and perceptions remarkable for acuteness blend with the 
train of representations. Thus, objects are seen by the 
faintest light, and the subject walks securely in the most 
dangerous situations. 

Does the somnambulist really employ his senses? Ho 
undoubtedly perceives; for, he acts in reference to real 
objects, since lie shuns obstacles, walks securelj^ along 
elevated timbers, and with skill handles a pen, or plays 
on a musical instrument. These objects are known to 
him; they are real objects, and not the creations of his 
phantasy. As we know external objects normally by 
perception through the senses, it is more philosophical 
to suppose that the senses, the ordinary means of per- 
ception, are unusually sensitive, and tliat the mind per- 
ceives through them, than that it perceives through 
unknown avenues. 

Those cases in which great intellectual powers are 
displayed, can be accounted for by the excitement of the 
nervous system, and the concentration of the entire 
power of the mind into the effort of the few faculties 
brou<>:ht into action. 

What occurs in a paroxysm, is often forgotten by the 
mind on recovering its natural state, and remembered 
in a subsequent paroxysm. 

Phantasms occurring in either waJicfulness or sleep, 
take the forms of clairvoyance and visions. 



PHANTASY. 239 

Clairvoyance is the power of diHCOvering objects which 
are supposed not to be perceptible through the senses. 
Tliis state is analogous to liypnotism, or artificial som- 
nambulism, if indeed it is not identical with it. 

Tlie condition!^ of clairvoyance are: an excitable condi- 
tion of the nervous system; certain external influences 
acting upon the sensitive organism; a deficiency, for the 
time being, of will power; a predominence, at least tem- 
porary, of feeling over volition, and of rj^presentation 
over the other cognitive acts. 

As to form^ clairvoyance is involuntary^ when induced 
in the subject without his consent, though not necessa- 
rily against his will; or voluntary^ when the subject 
yields himself up, of his own accord, to external influ- 
ences or to the will of another. 

As to the phenomena., it is claimed that the clairvoy- 
ant can see, for example, the diseased parts in the in- 
terior of his own body, or objects through a bandage or 
a thick wall, or at a distance too remote for vision. 

After allowing for exaggeration, guess-work, deception, 
and the drawing of information from others by questions 
or cautious generalizations, these f)henomena may perhaps 
be explained, in part, at least, b}^ the condition of the 
subject, and his relation to physical influences or to 
other minds, if indeed there would be left any thing to 
be explained. 

The subject is in a highly sensitive condition, and his 
representative power is abnormally active. In case of 
internal disease in his own body, it is plain that the 
sensations would sutciifcst the nature of the disease which 
the activity of the representative power would vividly 
picture. It would be very natural, in such a case, to 
mistake representation for perception ; and this is prob- 
ably done when objects at a great distance are supposed 
to be seen, as cities on the otlier side of the globe. 




240 I'S YCHQL OGY. 

The condition of the subject renders him peculiarly 
susceptible to magnetic or electrical influences. His 
mind is in intimate sympathy with other minds, and in 
some way, through mesmeric or higher spiritual influ- 
ence, seems to participate in their knowledge. 

The phenomena of clairvoyance and those of kindred 
nature have by some been attributed to the influence of 
disembodied spirits, as in modern spiritualism. 

A vision is the appearance of something, as if seen, 
when there is, through the eye, no corresponding per- 
ception of an objective reality. 

The conditions are a highly sensitive nervous system 
and an intense activity of the representative power. 

The forms are natural vision — that induced by natural 
agency, — and supernatural vision — that induced by su- 
pernatural agency. The truth of prophecy can not be 
decided a priori, but must be determined a posteriori^ by 
evidence, the same as that of historical questions. 



i 



DIVISION III. 

ELABORATION AND THE ELABORATIVE FACULTIES. 

CHAPTEE I. 

ELABOKATION. 

Elaboration is the process by which the intellect ar- 
ranges objects into classes, and forms and applies gener- 
alized concepts or notions of these classes. 

The processes of elaboration are classification, concep- 
tion, judgment, and reasoning. 

The prorZw<^^,s of elaboration are classes, concepts, judg- 
ments, and arguments. 

The conditions of elaboration are the acquisitions through 
consciousness, reflection, rational intuition, and percep- 
tion, the acts and products of representation, also the 
faculties implied in elaboration. 

The faculty of elaboration is variously denominated, 
thu^ The elaborative or discursive faculty^ since it is em- 
plo3^ed lU working up, into higher forms, the materials 
supplied by acquisition and reproduction; the logical 
Jucidty, since it is the faculty employed in logical pro- 
cesses; the comparative faculty^ since comparison enters, 
as an essential element, into all its processes ; the faculty 
of relations, since it deals with relations; the thought 
faculty^ since its acts are styled thought; the rationed 
facidty^ understanding^ or intelligence^ since it is the fac- 
ulty which characterizes man as rational, and thus dis- 
tinguishes him from inferior beings. 

Psy.-21. (241) 



242 PSYCHOLOGY, 

Let us now give a brief recapitulation of the acts of 
cognition : 

Consciousness is the experience which the sonl has of 
its phenomena. It is essential to cognition; for without 
it, any supposed process would be to us as zero. Con- 
sciousness involves judgment. To be conscious of a phe- 
nomenon involves the judgment, usually informal and 
unexpressed, of the existence of that phenomenon as 
opposed to its non-existence. But consciousness is the 
experience of a determinate phenomenon; hence, the 
judgment involved in consciousuess is not that of bare 
existence, but of a determinate existence, involving the 
identity or peculiarity and particularity of the phenome- 
non, and thus implying an act of comparison. 

Uejiection is the turning back of our cognition to the 
consideration of psychical phenomena. The processes 
involved in reflection are abstraction, attention, analysis, 
synthesis, comparison, identification or discrimination, 
and classification. Though primarily applied to the 
phenomena of consciousness, these processes are also 
employed in the investigation of the properties and re- 
lations of material things. 

The classes formed by reflection consist of species, or 
collections of individuals having a common attribute, and 
of genera, or collections of species having more general 
attributes than the attributes severally characteristic of 
the species. 

A class, as a collection of individuals or of species, 
can be represented by the imagination, though inade- 
quately, since a greater or less number of individuals 
will, almost inevitably, fail to appear in the representa- 
tion of the class; but a concept, as a generalized product 
of the logical faculty, embracing only elements common 
to all the members, can not, as will be shown more 
fully hereafter, be imagined^ it can only be thought. 



GENERAL VIEW. 243 

Rational intuition is the apprehension of the necessity 
of the conditions of phenomena. Tiius, a phenomenon 
experienced in consciousness is, by rational intuition, 
referred to the conscious subject or the ego^ which, as 
tlie subject of consciousness, is discriminated from the 
non-ego^ that is, from every thing else. By rational in- 
tuition, the intellect apprehends the necessity of space 
and time, as the universal conditions of phenomena; of 
fundamental truth, as the condition of valid thought; of 
substance, as the underlying power which manifests 
conjoined attributes; of cause, or that which is efficient 
in producing events; of laws, or the modes of the oc- 
currence of events; and of consequences, or the effects 
following. These intuitions play an important part in 
the processes of elaboration ; and in all of them compar- 
ison and judgment are involved. 

Perception is the ^^I'ocess by which we gain a knowl- 
edge of the properties of external objects. The elements 
involved in perception are the sensational, the intuitional, 
the inferential, and the ideational. Perception involves 
comparison and judgment, and deals with the concrete. 

Representation is the act by which the mind repro- 
duces its acquisitions. It takes the form of memory, 
imagination, or phantasy, according as it deals with past 
realities, with ideals, or with phantasms. 

Eepresentation involves comparison and judgment, and 
deals with the concrete. 

Elaboration generalizes its materials through the acts 
of comparison and judgment, and thus deals with the 
universal. 

By an examination of the above processes, we dis- 
cover that comparison is the typical act of thought, and 
that the typical product is the judgment. 

It is not to be supposed that any one of the above 
processes takes place by itself, that is, in complete iso- 



244 PSYCHOLOGY. 

lation from the others. In fact, two or more of the 
processes occur simultaneously. 

We have used the word faculty to include both an 
active power and a passive susceptibility, of the mind; but 
some writers use the word faculty to denote a power of 
the mind, and the word capacity to denote a susceptibil- 
ity. Hamilton says : '^ We are surely entitled to say in 
general that the mind has the faculty of exerting such 
and such a class of energies, or has the capacity of being 
modified by such and such an order of affections. We 
here ex-cogitate no new, no occult, principle. We only 
generalize certain effects, and then infer that common 
effects must have a common cause; we only classify 
certain modes, and conclude that similar modes indicate 

the same capacity of being modified ^o accusation 

can, therefore, be more ungrounded than that which has 
been directed against philosophers, — that they have gen- 
erally harbored the opinion that faculties are, like organs 
in the body, distinct constituents of mind." Metaphysics, 
pages 269, 272. 

The faculties, then, are powers, active or passive, with 
which the soul is endowed. Even the passive faculties, 
the susceptibilities, or capacities, are powers in the sense 
that the accompanying phenomena are due to their re- 
sponse to stimuli, or to their reaction against impressions. 



CHAPTEE 11. 

CLASSIFICATION AND CONCEPTION. 

Classification is the process of forming grou^DS of ob- 
jects having common qualities. 

In classification we may proceed by generalization — 
the arrangement of individuals into species, and of these 
species into genera; or by division — the resolution of 
genera into species, and of species into sub-species or 
individuals. 

Conception is that process of elaboration by which 
the intellect forms general notions of classes of objects 
havino; common attributes. 

The product of the act of conception is called a con- 
cept or notion. The term concept denotes the combina- 
tion of common attributes which is produced by the act 
of conception; but the term notion denotes the marks or 
signs, notce^ by which the individuals of a certain class 
may be known. 

Generalization embraces synthetic specification — the 
formation of species from individuals, and generification 
— the formation of genera from species. 

The importance of generalization is obvious; for the 
objects of the universe are countless in number, while 
the mind is finite in its powers of comprehension. Were 
it not for the fact of generalization, the finite powers of 
the mind would be overwhelmed by the infinity of the 
universe. But one aim of science is to reduce multiplic- 
ity to unity; and in the realization of this aim, science 

has been highly successful, and has thus enabled the 

(245) 



246 PSYCHOLOGY. 

human mind to grapple with the innumerable facts of 
the universe. 

In generalization, we begin with an examination of 
individual things, whether psychical phenomena or ma- 
terial objects. By an examination of these things, we 
learn what we can of them through consciousness, re- 
flection, rational intuition, and perception. The qualities 
thus discovered and represented in memory, if the ob- 
jects be absent, can be predicated of these objects, thus 
forming individual judgments; as, this apple is red, etc. 

By comparison^ we find that many objects have simi- 
lar attributes, — so far similar, that they may be regarded 
as alike, and hence as common. The same objects that 
possess similar attributes, may also j)ossess dissimilar 
attributes. Abstracting our attention from the dissimilar 
attributes, and concentrating it upon the similar, we 
regard these objects as alike, since they possess similar 
attributes, and class them together. These common at- 
tributes are the marks or signs by which individual 
objects may be known as belonging to this class; and 
of any individual of this class, we may predicate any 
of the common attributes. Our ideas of the common 
attributes of a class, taken together as a combination, 
constitute our notion or concept of the class. Other 
classes, having other sets of attributes, may be formed in 
a similar manner, and thus the universe of objects may 
be formed into classes. 

Strictl}^ speaking, we abstract our thoughts from those 
attributes not common to the class, yet it is common to 
say that we abstract the common attributes, since we 
consider them apart from the other qualities possessed 
by a part only of the individuals of the class. The ideas 
of the common qualities thus said to be abstracted, are 
called abstracts^ because they are considered apart from 
the attributes not common to all the individuals of the 



CLASSIFICATION AND CONCEPTION, 247 

class. In like maimer, a single attribute of a single 
object, considered apart from the other attributes of that 
object, may be called an abstract. Thus, the form of a 
particular chair, considered apart from the other attri- 
butes of that chair, is an abstract. 

If we should form abstract ideas, were it possible, of 
all the objects of the universe, we should not only be 
overwhelmed by their infinitude, but we should have 
ideas of qualities apart from their objects, in which state 
they do not exist in nature; and, viewing these qualities 
thus separately, we should have no knowledge of their 
mutual relation. Hence, we see the necessity of com- 
parison, so that we may not only abstract but combine 
the common qualities, thus forming concepts or notions, 
by w^hich we recognize all the objects having the qual- 
ities involved in the concept as a plurality of individu- 
als embraced in the unity of a class. 

By generification^ we form genera from species. We 
do not rest at a first generalization by which we form 
species from individuals, and the concepts of these spe- 
cies; but comparing these concepts, disregarding their 
differences, we observe their common elements, which 
w^e abstract and combine into higher concepts of genera 
embracing the subordinate classes as species. 

By comparing the concepts of these genera, disregard- 
ing their difPerences, abstracting and combining their 
common attributes, which become fewer as we ascend, 
we obtain still higher concepts, embracing a greater 
number of subordinate classes and individuals. In like 

4 

manner, continuing the process, we arrive, at length, 
practically, at the summit of our ascent — the concept 
being^ the highest genus, embracing all reality, both 
dynamical and non-dynamical. 

By denomination J we assign names to the classes formed 
by generalization, and tlius these classes, together with 



248 PSYCHOL OGY, 

the ideas, concepts, or notions of them become embodied 
in verbal signs. 

We have called being- the highest genus, and practi- 
cally it is so; but as all thinking is relative, and implies 
discrimination, it follows that every class or concept has 
its negative; hence, in speculation, there is no highest 
genus. Thus, being is discriminated from its negative, 
non-being, and both being and non-being may be re- 
garded as species of a higher genus, and so on. To 
these higher genera, no names have been assigned, as 
they are only objects of speculation. Though, absolutely, 
there is no highest genus, yet, practically, for all reality, 
being may be thus regarded; but, relatively to any 
science, there is some class or concept, lower than being, 
which may, for the special purpose of that science, be 
regarded as the summum genus. 

By division^ the reverse of generalization, we descend 
to the subordinate classes and individuals. If some of 
the objects of a class possess a quality not possessed by 
other objects of that class, this quality is a difference 
which divides the class into two species, — one character- 
ized by the presence of this difference, and the other 
by its absence, though perhaps possessing another differ- 
ence which also would have served as a mark of dis- 
crimination in dividing the class. 

Beginning, then, at heing^ we divide and subdivide by 
introducing at each division the differences w^hich* char- 
acterize the species and enable us to discriminate them 
from one another. We thus assign to each species a 
less extent^ that is, fewer classes and individuals than 
was assigned to the genus, but a greater content^ that 
is, more attributes. The process of divjsion may be 
continued till we reach the limit in the individuals. 
Thus, w^e may divide being into dynamic being and 
non-dynamic; dynamic, into matter and spirit; matter, 



CLASSIFICATION AND CONCEPTION. 249 

into organic being and inorganic; organic, into animal 
and vegetable ; animal, into vertebrates and invertebrates, 
and so on, till we reach dog, spaniel, and the individual 
Wag, Each logical division is bifurcate^ having two 
branches, that is, a dichotomy^ having two members. 

The lowest species^ practically, is that whose division 
will give individuals; yet, strictly, since we can continue 
the division so long as there is any diiference, however 
minute, it would be difficult to find a species which 
could not be subdivided into lower species. We reach 
the lowest species, then, when practically we do not care 
to discriminate more minutely, nor to carry our sub- 
divisions farther, though, strictly, the infima species has 
no existence except in speculation. 

For the purposes of Psychology, every class containing 
sub-classes is regarded as a genus of which the sub- 
classes are the species; hence, the same class may be 
both a genus and a species; it is a genus in regard to 
the classes contained under it, and it is a sj)ecies in 
reference to the class under which it is contained. But, 
for the purposes of Natural Science^ the degree of subor- 
dination in the series is designated by a name. Thus, 
X/innceus introduced five grades of subordination — class, 
order, genus, species, variety. With the progress of 
science, intermediate and additional grades have been 
introduced. The Botanical Congress held at Paris in 
August, 1867, recognized twenty-one grades — kingdom, 
division, subdivision, class, sub-class, cohort, sub-cohort, 
order, sub-order, tribe, sub-tribe, genus, sub-genus, sec- 
tion, sub-section, species, sub-species, variety, sub-variety, 
variation, sub-variation. Even this list is probably not 
complete. The important thing to be observed is the 
order of the subdivision; but the degree of importance 
assigned to any grade varies with the opinion of diflPer- 
ent minds. 



250 PSYCHOLOGY. 

A definition is such a description of a thing as will 
distinguish it from all other things. A thing is defined 
by referring it to the class immediately containing it, 
and distinguishing it from other things of the class by 
means of its characteristics. Thus, a triangle is a poly- 
gon of three sides. 

A property^ of a class is an attribute which belongs to 
every object of the class, though it does not enter into 
the definition^ since it may belong also to other classes. 
Thus, it is a property of a rectangle that its angles are 
equal, but this is also true of any regular polygon. 

A generic property is one which is common to all the 
species of a genus. Thus, the sum of the three angles 
of every plane triangle is equal to two right angles. 

A specific property is a property which is common to 
all the individuals of a species. Thus, two angles are 
equal in every isosceles triangle. 

A peculiar property of a class is a property which is 
not found in any object of any other class. Thus, it is 
a peculiar property of the circle that, for a given peri- 
meter, it contains the maximum area. 

A constant property is a property which is always 
and every-where the same. Thus, inertia is a constant 
property of matter. 

A variable property is a property subject to change 
in degree. Thus, density, elasticity, etc., are variable 
properties of matter. • 

An accident is a quality which may or may not be- 
long to certain objects. Thus, the magnitude of a body 
is an accident. 

Denomination embraces nomenclature and terminology. 

Nomenclature is the collection of the names of the 
classes in a science. The number of natural groups is, 
however, so large that it is impracticable to devise or 
to remember names for all of them. Thus, the number 



CLASSIFICATION AND CONCEPTION 251 

of known species of plants is at least 60,000, to say 
nothing of the sub-species, varieties, and sub-varieties. 
Some artifice is, therefore, requisite to secure a practical 
nomenclature. In Eotany, the higher groups, down to 
genera, have distinct names; but the species take the 
name of the genus modified by that of some attribute, 
as geranium sanguineum. In Chemistry, we have an ex- 
ample of a nomenclature in which the prefixes and 
suffixes used in names are significant of the nature of 
the substance, as perchloric acid. 

Terminology is the collection of the names of the parts 
and properties of individual objects in the province of 
a science. Thus, included in the terminology of Botany, 
are the names calyx ^ corolla^ etc., expressive of parts of 
plants; also the names, pinnatifid, palmatifid, etc., ex- 
pressive of the shape of the leaf. 



CHAPTEE III. 

CLASSIFICATION AND CONCEPTION. 

Classification is the formation of groups of objects 
having common qualities. It embraces both generaliza- 
tion and division. 

Generalization is the formation of classes from objects 
having common attributes. It embraces both synthetic 
specification and generification. 

Synthetic specification is the formation of species from 
resembling individuals. 

Let Aj JBj (7, be individual objects having the common 
attributes, a, 6, e, d, e, f, found by examination and com- 
parison, — A having the additional attributes, g, h, pe- 
culiar to itself; and B and C, respectively, the additional 
attributes, i, j, and J, k. 

Disregarding the attributes not common to A, B. (7, 
and abstracting and combining the common attributes 
giving them special prominence, we attribute to them a 
kind of separate existence, objectively fictitious, though 
subjectively real, and thus form the concept, which we 
shall call C\ of the class, which we shall call Jf, em- 
bracing the individuals, A, B, 0, having the common at- 
tributes, a, b, e, d, e, /. 

In the concept C\ no attribute can enter which is 
not common to all the objects of the class; hence, all 
the attributes peculiar to an individual, or common to 
any number of individuals, less than the whole number, 
must be excluded. 

The concept, in its pure form, can not be represented 

(2e52) ■ 




GENERAL DISCUSSTON, 253 

by the imagination; yet it can be rej)resented, with in- 
dividual attributes, in a concrete form, by calling up 
one or more of the individuals, A.^ B^ C. But in calling 
up an individual, we introduce qualities peculiar to the 
individual, as well as the qualities common to all the 
individuals of the class, though we banish, as completely 
as possible, the qualities peculiar to the individual, and 
give to the common qualities special prominence. 

The image thus obtained is individual ; but It has a 
potential universality in the fact that we may vary it so 
as to represent any individual of the class, by droj)ping 
the j)eculiarities of one individual and incorporating 
those of another. But if we drop the peculiarities of 
one individual without incorporating those of another, 
the image itself would vanish. In attempting, for ex- 
ample, to represent, by the imagination, the concept of 
the class horse, we should call up the image of a horse 
of a particular color, form, size, etc., introducing not 
only the qualities common to all horses, but also those 
peculiar to some of the individuals of the class. We 
thus have an image of an individual, real or imaginary, 
but not the concept of the class. If we should drop all 
attributes not belonging to the concept, the image itself 
would vanish, since we could not construct the image, 
unless we assign to it some particular color, form, size, 
etc. Hence, a concept, in its pure generality, can not 
be reiiresented b}^ the imagination. 

On the other hand, if we should drop from the image 
all that is characteristic of the class horse, retaining, at 
the same time, the other elements, it would no longer 
be recoo-nized as the imas-e of a horse, but it would still 
have the elements common to animal, or, dropping these, 
the elements common to organic being, then the element 
common to being, dropping this, the image would vanish. 
Hence, every image must contain both particular and 



254 PSYCHOLOGY, 

universal elements, and will vanish whenever either 
kind is dropped. The universal and the particular are, 
therefore, not two kinds of ideas, but the two elements 
of every idea. An idea that is exclusively general or 
exclusively particular can not be realized, but can only 
be approached by directing the attention especially to the 
one kind of elements or the other. " The common element 
that enters into every cognition is that of being; but 
with this, there is also always present, the subjective 
intuition of the conditional necessity of the ego, as the 
subject of the cognition. 

Though the general concept can not be represented, 
as a pure universal, by the imagination, yet it is possi- 
ble to represent the class as a collection of individuals. 
Thus, the class denoted by X is the collection of the 
individuals, A^ B^ (7, and as such, it is capable of repre- 
sentation. A class consisting of a vast multitude, as the 
class man, can not be represented in its totality, since 
great multitudes of individuals are unknown. Thus, 
many human beings have died, many are not yet born, 
yet such a number and variety can be represented, as 
will do fair justice to the entire class. 

We have formed the individuals A, 5, (7, having the 
common attributes, a, 6, c, d, e, /, into the class X, of 
which the concept C\ is the combination, abcdef of 
these common attributes. 

IN'ow, let Jj, Mj iV, be individuals having the common 
attributes, b, c, f] I, m, n, — L having the additional attri- 
butes, t, u, peculiar to itself; and M and iV, respectively, 
the additional attributes, v, w\ and iv, x. We thus form 
the concept (7", of the class which we shall call Y, con- 
taining the objects X, Jf, iV, having the common attri- 
butes, 6, c, /, ?, m, n. 

Generification is the formation of higher classes from 
species. These classes are called genera (sing, geyius). 



GENERAL DISCUSSION. 255 

Taking the results obtained under synthetic specifica- 
tion, denoting the sum of the attributes by the proper 
letters, without the sign of addition, and writing the 
attributes of the individuals, and the concepts of the 
classes, as subscripts, we have 

A ahcdef gh 

BahcdefiJ )- ^= X abode f ■= C 

Cabcdefjk 

Lbcflmntu 

Mbcflmnviv V ^=^ Ybcflr)in=^ C" 



Nbcfl 



mnwx 



The expression, Ahcdef gh^ is read the individual A, 
whose attributes are a^h^ c^ d^e^f^g ; and Xabcdef = c' 
is read the class JT, whose concept, ah cd ef^ equals C\ 

l^ow, if we wish, by a higher generalization, to form 
a higher class containing the classes X and Y, we dis- 
regard the attributes a,d,e, peculiar to the concept, C", 
of the class Jl, also the attributes, I, m, n, peculiar to the 
concept, (7'', of the class Y, and, by abstracting and com- 
bining the attributes, 6, c,/, common to (7' and C'\ we 
' form the concept, C^^\ of the genus which we shall call 
Z, embracing the classes, X and Y, as species. 

The process of generification is thus exhibited : 



JLabcdef=C'l ^x. ^ 

1 bcjlmn=^ C" ) 



tn 



In like manner, having formed another genus con- 
taining attributes in common with Z^ we form a still 
higher genus, and so on. 

Division is the resolution of a class into sub-classes or 
individuals. Comparing the objects embraced in Z^ we 
find, not only that they possess the attributes, 6, c,/, in 



256 PSYCHOLOGY, 

common, but that some of them possess the attributes, 
a, d^ e, not possessed by the remaining objects of the 
class, and that the remaining objects possess the attri- 
butes, I. m, n, not possessed by the first. We disregard 
the attributes, b, c, /, common to all the objects of the 
genus Zj and direct attention to the attributes, a, r/, e, 
and I, m, n, respectively common to the two parts of the 
genus ^. Either of the groups of attributes, a, d, e, and 
I, m, /I, is sufficient to divide the genus into two species, 
one containing the group of attributes under considera- 
tion, and the other not containing this group. We may, 
if we choose, take both groups into consideration in the 
division. We then divide the genus Z into the two 
species, designated, respectively, by ^ and Y, which, 
though containing the attributes, Z>, c, /, characteristic of 
the genus, and hence common to JT and Y, are charac- 
terized, respectively, by the attributes, a, d, e, and I, m, n. 

This division of the genus, Z^ into the two species, -Z 
and Y, is called analytic specification, to distinguish it 
from synthetic specification, in which a species is formed 
from similar individuals. 

In discriminating ^ and Y, as species of the genus Z, 
the attributes, a, d, e, and I, m, n, respectively character- 
istic of JT and Y, are made especially prominent, while 
the attributes, 6, c, /, characteristic of the genus Z, and 
hence common to JC and Y, are obscurely recognized. 
In generalization, similarities play the important part, 
but differences in division. Similarities are detected by 
identifivcation, and differences by discrimination. 

The discrimination of differences, unchecked by the 
identification of similarities, would individualize and iso- 
late every tiling, and render science impossible; but the 
identification of similarities leads to generalization, in- 
duction, and the comprehensive truths of science. 

The division of X gives the individuals. A, B, (7, each 



GENERAL DISCUSSION. 257 

of which, though containing the attributes, a^ d, e, char- 
acteristic of JC, also the attributes, 6, <?, /, characteristic 
of Z, and hcDce common to JC and F, is especially char- 
acterized by attributes peculiar to itself In like manner, 
the division of Y gives the individuals, X, M, N, each 
of which, though containing the attributes, /, ???, n^ and 
6, c, /, respectively characteristic of Y and Z^ is also 
characterized by attributes peculiar to itself This pro- 
cess is called individualization. The processes of divis- 
ion, including both analytic specification and individual- 
ization is thus exhibited: 

Aabcdefgh 
X c'^abcdef \ B ab cdefij 



Zc" — bef < 



C abed efj k 

Lbcflmn tu 
Y Qff = b cflm n -^ il^ bcfl m nvw 

Nbcflimnwx 



Each higher class embraces all the subordinate classes 
and individuals, and each lower class or individual con- 
tains all the attributes of the higher class, together with 
those attributes peculiar to itself Hence, the higher the 
class the greater the number of objects, and the less the 
number of attributes; and the lower the class the less 
the number of objects, and the greater the number of 
attributes. 

In generalization, by synthetic specification, we form a 
species from resembling individuals by a comparison of 
the individuals; but in generalization by generification, 
we form a genus from resembling species by a compar- 
ison of the concepts of the sj)ecies. 

In division, we find the subdivisions of a class by a 
comparison of the objects of the class, and not by the 
analysis of its concept. Hence, in division, we divide 

Psy.— 22. 



258 PSYCHOLOGY, 

classes, that is, genera and species, not their concepts; 
for the concept of a class contains fewer attributes than 
the concepts of its subdivisions, and these concepts con- 
tain more attributes as we descend. 

The rules for the process of division are the following: 

1st. Every division should be made in reference to 
one principle and only one. . 

2d. The principle of division should be a determinate 
attribute of one of the members of the class divided. 

3d. The principle of division should be selected in 
view of the objects to be accomplished. 

4th. Each member must be less than the class divided. 

5th. The sum of the members must be equal to the 
class divided. 

6th. The members must be co-ordinate and mutually 
exclusive. 

7th. The divisions must proceed continuously, each 
member being immediately subordinate to the class un- 
der which it is placed. 

Denomination^ as the naming of individuals, species 
and genera, constitutes the nomenclature of a science; 
but as the naming of the parts and properties of indi- 
viduals, it constitutes the terminology. 

The name of a class denotes all the subdivisions of 
that class, whether species or individuals, and connotes 
their common attributes. In connection with the pro- 
cess of classification, names are usually applied to des- 
ignate the classes, individuals, or attributes. 

The names of classes are subject to two contrary 
changes, as influenced b}^ generalization or division. In 
generalization, the name of a species is often generalized, 
or extended to its genus, thus increasing its denotation, 
and diminishing its connotation. Thus, the name coal, 
which originally denoted charred wood, was extended to 
a miDeral substance resembling it. The new coal, at 



GENERAL DISCUSSION, 259 

first designated as pit-coal or sea-coal^ becoming the 
more common, is now iisuall}^ designated simply as coal^ 
while the original coal is called charcoal. In division, 
the name of the genus is often specialized or restricted 
to owe of its species, thus decreasing its denotation and 
increasing its connotation. Thus, the name physician^ 
originally signifying one wdio studies nature, now signi- 
fies one who applies his knowledge of the human system, 
to the practice of medicine. One who studies nature is 
called a p)liysicist ; and one who studies animate nature 
is called a naturalist. 

Though a subordinate act, denomination is yet a matter 
of great importance, since it embodies the products of 
thought in verbal signs, and thus affords the requisite 
facilities for thinking. 

A definition is such a description of a thing, w^hether 
an object or a class, as will distinguish it from all other 
things. A thing is defined by affirming it to belong to 
the class immediately containing it, and distinguishing 
it from other things of that class by means of its es- 
sential characteristics. Thus, let Z be the genus embrac- 
ing the species X and F, — X characterized by a d e, 
and y by I m n. Then X is that sjoecies of the genus 
Z^ which is characterized by a d, e. Hence, a definition 
of a thing gives both its denotation and connotation, 
otherwise called its extension and comprehension, or 
sphere and matter, or breadth and depth, or genus and 
differentia. 

A definition should also exhibit the following qualities: 

(1) The subject and predicate of a definition are co- 
extensive and interchangeable. Thus, ''A rectangle is a 
right parallelogram," and ''A right parallelogram is a 
rectangle." The proposition, "Horses are four-footed 
animals," though true, is not a definition, since the predi- 
cate is greater in extent than the subject. 



260 PSYCHOLOGY. 

(2) A definition should not be circular; that is, the 
predicate should not contain the name of the thing de- 
fined, nor any derivative of that name, nor any term 
whose definition involves that name. Thus, the follow- 
ing definitions are circular: ''Law is a lawful command." 
'• Mathematics is the science of quantity," and " Quantity 
is the object of mathematical investigation." 

(3) A definition should be clear and precise. Thus, 
Dr. Johnson's definition, ''Net-work is any thing decus- 
sated or reticulated, with interstices between the inter- 
sections," is not clear. " Parallel lines are those which 
never meet," wants precision, since it is defective, as 
j)arallel lines also lie in the same plane. '^Parallelograms 
are quadrilaterals whose opposite sides are parallel and 
equal," wants precision, since it is redundant. The 
words "and equal" should be omitted. 

(4) A definition should be affirmative rather than neg- 
ative. Thus, "Industry is not honesty," does not tell 
what industry is, but what it is not. A negative defi- 
nition is, however, allowable when a positive one can 
not be given. 

(5) A definition admits of no exception. For an ex- 
ception would invalidate the definition. 

A genetic definition is one which exhibits the mode 
of producing the thing defined. Thus, a sphere is a 
solid generated by the revolution of a circle about a 
diameter. 



CHAPTEE lY. 

CLASSIFICATION AND CONCEPTION. 

1. Names. — A name is the verbal designation of a 
class or an individual, or of a part or an attribute of 
an individual. 

Species and genera uniformly receive names, also in- 
dividuals in cases of importance, as human beings, cer- 
tain domestic animals, geographical objects, etc. ; but in 
other cases, individuals are not named, otherwise than 
by the common name of the class to which they belong. 
In fact, it would be impossible to name every individual, 
as in case of plants, leaves, birds, fishes, insects, etc. 

The parts and qualities of individuals are named in 
the terminology of the sciences, though the individuals 
themselves are not designated by proper names. But 
the names of parts and qualities of individuals are com- 
mon nouns, and apply to the similar parts of resembling 
individuals. 

Xames, as originally applied, were expressive of some 
quality of the objects named, and the same names were 
afterwards api^lied to other objects possessing similar 
qualities, thus aiding classification. As knowledge ad- 
vances, other qualities are discovered in the objects of a 
class, perhaps more important and fundamental than 
that signified by the name, but the name is not usually 
changed, though its signification varies. Hence, a con- 
cept may be variable, while the name and the class as 
inclusive of all its subordinates, known or unknown, 

actual or possible, may be constant. 

(261) 



262 PSYCHOLOGY, 

The variability of a concept, however, differs greatly 
from the variability of the image of an individual; for 
the variability of the image is a consequence of the va- 
riable character of its peculiar elements, since these may 
so change that the image may represent, in rapid suc- 
cession, many different individuals of the class; but the 
variability of the concept is a consequence of a change 
in our opinion as to what is essential to the class, and 
this change is usually of slow growth. With the excep- 
tion of the change growing out of maturer views, a 
concej)t is practically invariable. 

A name denotes the objects of a class, and connotes 
their attributes. But what attributes are connoted? 
Strictly and scientifically, the name should connote only 
essential attributes, — those conceived as constituting the 
concept of the class ; but the concept is, as we have seen, 
variable for the same mind, and differs for different 
minds, and is always represented in connection with the 
peculiarities of an individual. A name, then, practically 
connotes all the attributes, essential and accidental, which 
it calls up to the individual mind. Hence, the connota- 
tion of a name may be variable, while its denotation 
may be constant. 

The expression, constant denotation^ needs qualification. 
Thus, the words Chinese railway may, in the year 1882, 
denote, in our thought, the one short railway in China; 
but, virtually, it denotes all the railways that shall ever 
be constructed in the Celestial Empire. Likewise, the 
name man denotes not only living human beings, but 
also those of past and future generations. The extent 
which a term denotes to an individual mind, varies with 
its knowledge. 

In consequence of the variability in the connotation 
of common names, technical terms are employed in 
science, which shall not only denote the objects of the 



NAMES, CLASSES, CONCEPTS. 263 

respective classes, but also connote exclusively their es- 
sential attributes. Though a common name or a tech- 
nical term, denotes all the objects of the class designated 
by it, yet the mind, when employing either, does not 
actually represent in memory all the objects of the class; 
for a multitude of these objects are wholly unknown, 
and others, though once known, are now, perhaps, alto- 
gether forgotten. 

2. Nature of classes and concepts. — What is the nat- 
ure of classes, — -the species and genera, and their rela- 
tion to their concepts? What is the object of thought 
when we employ a common noun, as man or horse? 
Three theories have been proposed in answer to these 
questions — Eealism, I^ominalism, and Conceptualism. 

1st. Realism, not as opposed to Idealism in Perception, 
but to Nominalism and Conceptualism in Conception, 
is the doctrine that a species or a genus has a real ob- 
jective existence, independent, both of the individual 
objects of the class, and of the act of conception; that 
it embraces the elements common to all the individuals 
of the class; that it is the object of which the concept is 
the counterpart; and that it is the perfect pattern ac- 
cording to which the individuals of the class are fash- 
ioned, and in comparison with which they must forever 
remain imperfect and inferior. This is the doctrine of 
Plato, as understood by Aristotle. The formula, as after- 
wards given, is universalia ante rem. In this extreme 
form, Eealism has long since been exploded. 

A modified realism, is, however, possible. A universal 
is not a kind of being or kind of idea, but an element 
of both being and idea, the other element being partic- , 
ular; but the universal, apart from the particular, can 
neither exist nor be represented. But if we regard a 
species as a collection of resembling individuals, and a 
genus as a collection of resembling species, then both 



264 PSYCHOLOGY, 

species and genera have an objective existence, independ- 
ent, not of the objects, but in a certain sense, of the 
human mind, which has only discovered the classes ex- 
isting in nature. The formula of modified realism is, 
universalia in re. 

Eoth nature and the human mind perform their part 
in classification. In some cases, nature performs the 
more conspicuous part, leaving to the human mind the 
easy part of recognizing obvious resemblances and diff'er- 
ences. This is especially true of the organic kingdoms. 
In other cases, the classes appear to be the creations of 
the human mind; but the resemblances, though occult 
to the common observer, are still in nature, and, as nat- 
ural distinctions, are recognized by the eye of science. 

Since an individual can be represented by the imag- 
ination, a species, as a collection of individuals, can be 
rej^resented, though imperfectly, since but a portion of 
the individuals will, in general, be represented ; yet a 
sufficient number and variety of specimens may be 
chosen as fairly to represent the class. In like manner 
a genus, as a collection of species, can be represented. 

2d. Nominalism is the doctrine that only individuals 
have a real existence; that all our ideas are particular; 
that universals exist only as names of resembling indi- 
viduals; that the concept, in its pure generality, can not 
be represented by the imagination; that only the indi- 
vidual can be represented ; that the idea of an individual 
has a potential universality by which it can be made to 
represent any individual of the class, by dropping the 
peculiarities of one individual and incorporating those 
of another; and that, as soon as all peculiarities are 
dropped, the idea itself will vanish. The formula for 
Nominalism is, universalia post rem. 

The name man, for example, is applicable to every 
individual of the class, and in this sense is universal. 



NAMES, CLASSES, CONCEPTS. 265 

The class man embraces the various races, — white, black, 
red, yellow, and copper colored, divided into nationali- 
ties, ranks, and individuals, of past, present, and future 
generations, with all their peculiarities. The concept 
man, in its pure generality, embraces those elements, 
and those only, which are common to all the individu- 
als of the class. 

-Now, can the concept man be represented by the im- 
agination? Let us tr^^ to represent it. On trial, we 
find that the image which we form is, in every instance, 
an idea of an individual, actual or imaginary, having a 
certain size, form, color, and other peculiarities, but the 
image is not the concept of the class. This image has, 
however, a potential universality, since it can be varied 
by dropping the peculiarities of one individual and in- 
corporating those of another, and so on, so as to make 
it represent any other individual of the class; but as 
soon as we drop all peculiarities, the image itself van- 
ishes, since we can not have an image which does not 
exhibit some definite size, form, color, etc. 

3d. Conceptualisjn is the theory that a universal has 
an existence in the mind of the thinking subject, as a 
pure concept embracing those elements only w^hich are 
common to all the individuals of the class; that it is 
formed by comparing resembling individuals, disregard- 
ing their peculiarities, anJ abstracting and combining 
their common qualities ; and that, after it has once been 
formed from a comparison of resembling individuals, it 
can be reproduced without reference to these individuals, 
though it may be predicated of any of them. 

If the pure concept can not, as we . have shown in 
discussing ^Nominalism, be represented by the imagina- 
tion, what kind of an existence has it, and how can it 
be distinguished from an image of an individual? To 
illustrate, take the idea of an individual of a class, and 

Psy.— 23. 



266 PSYCHOLOGY, 

vary it by dropping the peculiarities of that individual 
and incor^^orating those of another, and 80 on, till the 
idea has represented, in succession, at least a considera- 
ble number of the objects of the class. Now, in this 
varying idea, we have two classes of elements — varia- 
bles and constants. The variable elements form no part 
of the concept, though some one or more of them are 
necessary to the idea of a specified individual. The con- 
stant elements can be ascertained as those which enter 
the idea formed of every individual of the class, and 
these elements alone^ taken together, constitute the pure 
concept, which is^ therefore, not zero to thought, though 
it is zero to the imagination, since it vanishes whenever 
all variable elements are dropped. 

The idea of an individual embraces the constant com- 
mon elements of the concept, plus the variable peculiar- 
ities of the individual. 

In assigning an individual to its class, the common 
elements of the concept are especially considered; but, 
in identifying an individual, the peculiarities which dis- 
tinguish the individual receive the chief attention. 

The error of Eealism is the assumption that the uni- 
versal has an objective existence, apart from the partic- 
ular. 

The error of ISTominalism is the assumption that an 
idea can be merely particular, and that the only thing 
universal is the name. 

The error of Conceptualism is the assumption that 
an idea can be merely general. 

These errors have their origin in the common assump- 
tion that the universal and the particular, which are 
elements, both of things and of ideas, are either kinds 
of things or kinds of ideas. 

The following Propositions concerning Universals was 
contributed by Mr. B. A. Hinsdale. 



NAMES. CLASSES, CONCEPTS. 267 



1. Metaphysical Universals. — These are arehitypical 
forms ill the Divine mind. They are the patterns ac- 
cording to which God wrought in the creation, and may 
be said to correspond to the ''ideas" of Plato. In this 
sense, universals ave before things: \miversalia ante rem. 

2. Natural Universals. — These are the common nat- 
ures belonging to different species, as rationality be- 
longs to men. In this sense, universals are in things: 
universalia in re, 

3. Logical Universals. — These are general notions or 
concepts framed by the human mind; they are based 
on the common natures possessed by the species. In 
this sense universals are after things: universalia post 
rem. 

4. Universal terms or names. — These stand for log- 
ical universals; they are both after things and after 
concepts. 

See the Krauth- Fleming Vocabulary. 

From these four propositions certain others flow. 
. 1st. There are such things as species. 

2d. These species existed in ideas before things; they 
exist in substance in things; they exist in concepts and 
names after things. 

3d. The extreme Eealist is right in the sense of the 
first proposition; the moderate Eealist in the sense of 
the second; the Conceptualist is right in emphasizing 
the subjective nature of the concept; and the extreme 
Kominalist wrong in holding that names are the only 
universals. 



CHAPTEE V. 

CLASSIFICATION AND CONCEPTION. 

In classification, does the mind first ascend by gen- 
eralization, from individuals to species, and from species 
to genera, then descend, by division, from genera to 
species, and from species to individuals, or does it pro- 
ceed in a reverse order, that is, first descend, and then 
ascend? In the formation of language, in its acquisition 
by children, do proper nouns precede common, or do 
common nouns precede proper? 

Three theories have been proposed by philosophers 
in their attempts to answer these questions ; 

1st. Particulars are before generals^ and proper nouns 
are before common. This view is held by Yives, Locke, 
Eousseau, Condillac, Adam Smith, and others. Hamilton 
translates from Yives thus: "The order of learning is 
from the senses to the imagination, and from this to the 
intellect; — such is the order of life and of nature. We 
thus proceed from the simple to the complex, from the 
singular to the universal. This is to be observed in 
children, who first express the several parts of different 
things, and then conjoin them. Things general they call 
by singular names; for instance, the}^ call all smiths by 
the name of that individual smith whom they have first 
known, and all meats, beef or pork^ as they have hap- 
pened to have heard the one or the other first, when 
they began to speak. Thereafter, the mind collects uni- 
versals from particulars, and then again reverts to par- 
ticulars from universals." Metaphysics^ page 493. 
(268) 



ORDER IN CLASSIFICATION, 269 

Locke expresses the same opinion in nearly the same 
words as those used by Yives. 

Adam Smith says : " The assignation of particular 
names to denote particular objects, — that is, the institu- 
tion of nouns substantive, would probably be one of the 
first steps towards the formation of language. Two 
savages, who had never been taught to speak, but had 
been bred up remote from the societies of men, would 
naturally begin to form that language by which they 
would endeavor to make their mutual wants intelligible 
to each other, by uttering certain sounds whenever they 
meant to denote certain objects. Those objects only 
which were most fiamiliar to them, and which they had 
most frequent occasion to mention, would have particu- 
lar names assigned to them. The particular cave whose 
covering sheltered them from the weather, the particular 
tree whose fruit relieved their hunger, the 23articular 
fountain whose water allayed their thirst, would first be 
denominated by the words cave^ tree, fountain, or by 
whatever appellations they might think proper, in that 
primitive jargon, to mark them. 

"Afterwards, when the more enlarged experience of 
these savages had led them to observe, and their necessary 
occasions obliged them to make mention of other caves and 
other trees and other fountains, they would naturally be- 
stow upon each of these new objects the same name b}^ 
which they had been accustomed to express the similar ob- 
ject they were first acquainted with. The new objects had 
none of them any name of its own, but each of them exactly 
resembled another object which had such an appellation. 
It was impossible that those savages could behold the 
new objects without recollecting the old ones, and the 
names of the old ones to which the new bore so close a 
resemblance. When they had occasion, therefore, to 
mention or to point out to each other any of the new 



270 PSYCHOLOGY. 

objectSj thej would naturally utter the name of the cor- 
respondent old one, of which the idea could not fail, at 
that instant, to present itself to their memory in the 
strongest and liveliest manner. And thus those words 
which were originally the proper names of individuals, 
would each of them insensibly become the common name 
of a multitude. 

^'A child that is just learning to speak, calls every per- 
son who comes to the house its papa or its mam^ma; 
and thus bestows upon the whole species those names 
which it had been taught to apply to two individuals. . . . 

"We say of a hero, that he is an Alexander; of an 
orator, that he is a Cicero ; of a philosopher, that he is a 
Newton. This way of speaking demonstrates how much 
all mankind are naturally disposed to give to one object 
the name of any other which nearly resembles it, and 
thus to denominate a multitude by what originally was 
intended to express an individual. 

"It is this application of the name of an individual to 
a great multitude of objects whose resemblance natu- 
rally recalls the idea of that individual, and the name 
which expresses it, that seems originally to have given 
occasion to the formation of those classes and assort- 
ments which, in the schools, are called genera and spe- 
cies." Theory of Moral Sentiments — Appendix. ^ 

2d. Generals are before particulars and common nouns 
before proper. This view was held by many of the school- 
men, by Leibnitz, Turgot, and others. Leibnitz says: 
"General terms serve not only for the perfection of 
languages, but are even necessary for their essential f 
constitution. For, if by particulars be understood things 
individual, it would be impossible to speak if there were 
only proper names and no appellatives; that is to say, 
if there were only names for things individual, since, 
at every moment, we are met by new ones, when we 



ORDER IN CLASSIFICATION, 271 

treat of persons, of accidents, and especially of actions, 
which are those that we describe the most; but if by 
particulars be meant the lowest species, besides that it 
is frequently very difficult to determine them, it is 
manifest that these are already universals founded on 
similarity. 

'■^ Now, as the only difference of species and genera 
lies in a similarity of greater or less extent, it is nat- 
ural to note every kind of similarity or agreement, and 
consequently to employ general terms of everj^ degree; 
nay, the most general being less complex with regard to 
the essences which they comprehend, although more ex- 
tensive in relation to the things individual to which 
they apply, are frequently the easiest to fcrm, and are 
the most useful. 

^' It is likewise seen that children, and those who know 
but little of the language which they attempt to speak, or 
little of the subject on which they would employ it, make 
use of general terms, as thing ^ plant ^ animal^ instead of 
using proper names of which they are destitute.* .... 

" I would add, in conformity to what I have previously 
observed, that proper names have been originally ap- 
pellative, that is to say, general in their origin, as 
Brutus, Caesar, Augustus, Cicero, Alps, etc 

" Thus, I would make bold to affirm that almost all 
words have been originally general terms, because it 
would happen very rarely that men would invent a 
name, expressly and without reason, to denote this or 
that individual. We may, therefore, assert that the 
names of individual things were names of species, which 
w^ere given par excellence^ or otherwise, to some individ- 
ual 

"It is thus, likewise, that men give the names of genera 
to species, that is to say, that they content themselves with 
a term more general or vague to denote more particu- 



272 PSYCHOL OGY. 

lar classes, when they do not care about differences." 
Nouveaux JEssais, Lib. iii. Ch. i., page 297. 

3d. Either order is followed indifferently. Hamilton 
says: ''Here are two opposite opinions, having nearly 
equal authority in their favor, maintained, on both sides, 
with equal ability and apparent evidence. Either doc- 
trine w^ould be held established w^cre w^e unacquainted 
with the arguments in favor of the other. . . . . 

"But I have now to state to you a third opinion in- 
termediate betw^een these, which conciliates both, and 
seems, moreover, to carry a superior probability in its 
statement. This opinion maintains, that as our knowl- 
edge proceeds from the confused to the distinct, — from 
the vague to the determinate, — so, in the mouths of 
children, language at first expresses neither the precisely 
general, nor the determinately individual, but the vague 
and confused; and that, out of this, the universal is 
elaborated by generification, the particular and singular 
by specification and individualization 

'' Instead of commencing with minima, perception com- 
mences with masses. Though our capacity of attention 
be very limited in regard to the number of objects on 
which a fiaculty can be simultaneously directed, yet these 
objects may be large or small. We may make, for ex- 
ample, a single object of attention, either of a w^hole 
man, or of his face, or of his eye, or of the pupil of his 
eye, or of a speck upon the pupil. To each of these 
objects there can only be a certain amount of attentive 
perception applied, and we can concentrate it all on 
any one. 

*' In proportion as the object is larger and more com- 
plex, our attention can, of course, be less apj)lied to any 
part of it, and consequently, our knowledge of it, in de- 
tail, will be vaguer and more imperfect. But, having 
first acquiix'd a comy)re1ionsive knowledge of it, as a 



ORDER IN CLASSIFICATION. 273 

whole, we can descend to its several parts, consider 
these, both in themselves and in relation to each other, 
and to the whole of which they are constituents, and 
thus attain to a complete and articulate knowledge of 
the objects. We decompose, and then we recompose. . . . 

''I say, then, that the first procedure of mind, in the 
elaboration of its knowledge, is always analytical. It 
descends from the whole to the parts, — from the vague 
to the definite. Definitude, that is, a knowledge of 
minute differences, is not, as the oj)posite theory sup- 
poses, the first, but the last term of our cognitions. 
Between two sheep, an ordinary spectator can probably 
apprehend no difference, and if they were twice pre- 
sented to him, he would be unable to discriminate the 
one from the other. But a shepherd can distinguish 
every individual sheep; and why? Because he has de- 
scended from the vague knowledge which makes every 
sheeji, as it were, only a repetition of the same undiffer- 
enced unit, — to a definite knowledge of qualities by 
which each is contrasted from its neighbor. Now, in this 
example, we apprehend the sheep by marks not less indi- 
vidual than those by which the shepherd discriminates 
them; but the w^hole of each sheep being made an ob- 
ject, the marks by which we know it are the same in 
each and all, and can not, therefore, afford the jmnciple 
by which we can discriminate them from each other. 

''I^ow, this is what appears to me to take place with 
children. They first know, — they first cognize the 
things and persons presented to them, as wholes. But 
wholes of the same kind, if we do not descend to their 
parts, afford us no difference, — no mark by which we 
can discriminate the one from the other. Children, thus 
originally perceiving similar objects, — persons, for exam- 
ple, — only as wholes, do at first hardly distinguish them. 
They apprehend first the more obtrusive marks that 



274 PSYCHOLOGY. 

separate species from sjoecies, and in consequence of the 
notorious contrast of dress, men from women; but they 
do not as yet recognize the finer traits that discriminate 
individual from individual. 

"But though thus apprehending individuals only by 
what we now call their specific or their generic qualities, 
it is not to be supposed that children know them by 
any abstract, general attributes, that is, by attributes 
formed by comparison and attention. On the other 
hand, because their knowledge is not general, it is not 
to be supposed to be particular or individual, if by par- 
ticular be meant a separation of sjoecies from species, 
and by individual, the separation of individual from in- 
dividual; for children are apt to confound individuals 
together, not only in name, but in reality." Page 497. 

It may be remarked, on account of its bearing on 
education, that though the order of procedure is, in gen- 
eral, the collection of facts, the classification of facts, 
and the reasoning on the facts, yet we are not to re- 
frain from classifying till we have collected all possible 
facts relating to all possible subjects, or from reasoning 
till we have made all possible classifications. As soon 
as we have collected the facts pertaining to a special 
subject, we can classify, and as soon as we classify, we 
can reason. 

It is true that in a particular investigation the order 
of thought is first acquisition, then representation, then 
elaboration ; yet it is not true that the perceptive facul- 
ties should first be educated, then the re23resentative, 
then the elaborative. These faculties ought to be edu- 
cated together. Children not only perceive, but imag- 
ine and reason. 



CHAPTBE VI. 



QUANTITY OF CONCEPTS. 



The quantity of a concept is of two kinds — compre- 
hensive^ when referring to tlie number of common qual- 
ities of a class, thus corresponding to the connotation of 
the name, and extensive^ when referring to the number 
of subdivisions of the class, thus corresponding to the 
denotation of the name. Thus, the quantity of a con- 
cept emerges, when the concept is viewed with refer- 
ence to its objects — that is, to its content, or common 
qualities involved, and to its extent, or the subdivisions 
of the class. 

1st. The comprehension of concepts. The comprehension 
of a concept is that kind of quantity which is expressed 
by the number of qualities, attributes, or characteristics, 
as they are variously called, of which the concej)t is the 
sum. It is also called its content, matter, depth, or in- 
ternal or intensive quantity. In reference to its compre- 
hension, a concept is, therefore, regarded as a whole of 
which the constituent parts, or elements, are the com- 
mon qualities of resembling individuals or classes. 

The comprehension of the concept of a class is prima- 
rily known in the act of its formation, that is, in com- 
paring all the objects of a class, or a sufficient number 
of them, and ascertaining and combining their common 
qualities. It is secondarily known by analysis, that is, 
by resolving the concept into its constituent elements. 
Thus, the concept man is found to comprehend the ele- 
ments connoted by the words rational and animal, the 

(275) 



276 PSYCHOLOGY. 

word rational connoting the faculties of rational intni- 
tion, conceiving, judging, and reasoning, and the word 
animal connoting the common qualities possessed by liv- 
ing sensitive beings. The concept man immediately 
comprehending the concepts rational and animal, me- 
diately comprehends all their parts, and the pai'ts of 
these f)Jii^t^? ^i^<i -o ^^i^j ^ill ^^^ reach simple elements. 

Generalization — or the formation of a cla.ss of individ- 
uals or of species, and the formation of the concept of 
the class — implies an analysis of the comprehension of 
the concepts of the individuals or of the sjjecies, a com- 
parison of their elements, noting, abstracting, and com- 
binincr those that are common. 

2d. Jlie extension of concejyts. The extension of a con- 
cept is that kind of quantity which is expressed by the 
number of individuals or classes which have, as common 
qualities, the qualities involved in the concept. It is 
also called its extent, sphere, breadth, or external or 
extensive quantity. The extension of a concept is. there- 
fore, the class, regarded as a whole, of which the parts 
are the subordinate classes or individuals having, as 
common qualities, the qualities involved in the concept. 

The extension of a concept is primarily known in tiie 
act of generalization by which individuals are formed 
into classes, and these classes into higher classes. It is 
secondarilv known bv division, that is. bv resolvinic a 
class into its subdivisions, and these subdivisions into 
others, and so on, down to individuals. But the divis- 
ion of a class implies the analysis of the contents of the 
parts of its extent, noting that one part contains quali- 
ties not found in the other parts, and dividing in view 
of this fact. Thus, by examining triangles, and analyz- 
ing their content, we shall find that some of them have 
a right angle, while others have not; -but those not right 
are oV>lique; hence, triangles are divided into right tri- 



Q UA XTITY OF CONCEPTS. 277 

angles and oblique triangles. This division gives a di- 
chotomy, of which the two parts are- contradictories, 
since they are niiittially repugnant, and together univer- 
sallv inchisive of all trianades. Btit shotild we divide 
triano'les into rio-ht triano'les, acute triano:ies. and obtuse 
triano'les, we should have a trichotomv. whose members 
are contraries, since thev are mtituallv reptici:nant. but 
no two of them universallv inclusive. 

The definition of a sj^ecies refers it to its genus, and 
characterizes it bv its content, and hence determines its 
extent and distingtiishes it from the other species of the 
genus. 

Analysis gives content: division, extent: and definition, 
both content and extent. 

The comprehension of a concept can not be repre- 
sented by the imagination, a2:)art from the extension, 
nor the extension apart from the comprehension : btit 
the class can be represented, as having both comji^rehen- 
sion and extension, as found in the realities of nattire. 

3d. jRelation of t?ie comprehension and the extension of 
concepts. 

(l^ The comprehension of a concept varies inversely 
as its extension, that is. the o-reater the extent the less 
the content, aiul converselv: for the hio-her the o-entis. 
the greater the extension, and the less the comprehen- 
sion : and the lower the species, the less the extension 
and the greater the comprehension. Thtis. the compre- 
hension of the concept animal is less than that of the 
concept horse, since it contains those attributes only 
which are common to all the subordinate sjiecies. whereas 
the concept horse contains all the attribtites common to 
all these species, and to all the species of the gentis con- 
tainino- horse, toa'ether with what is characteristic of it- 
self Btit the extension of the concept animal is greater 
than that of the concept horse, since it contains the class 



278 PSYCHOLOGY, 

horse, as a subdivision, together with a great variety of 
other subdivisions. 

(2) The simple concept being is a minimum as to com- 
prehension and a maximum as to extension. It is a 
minimum as to comprehension, since it contains in it no 
essential attribute which is not an attribute of every 
class, sub-class, and individual contained under it, and 
the only attribute thus common is existence. It is 
a maximum as to extension; for, since being is the high- 
est genus, it contains under it all other classes, sub- 
classes, and individuals. It is, therefore, extensive rather 
than comprehensive. 

(3) The class being is incapable of definition, the com- 
prehension of its concept is incapable of analysis, but 
the extension is capable of division. The class is inca- 
pable of definition, since it is not contained under a 
higher genus, neither has it a difi*erential attribute. The 
comprehension of its concept is incapable of analysis, 
since it contains but one element — existence. The ex- 
tension of its concept is capable of division, since by an 
analysis of the comprehension of the parts of the exten- 
sion, they are found to possess qualities peculiar to each; 
hence, the class being can be resolved into classes, sub- 
classes, and so on, down to individuals. 

(4) An individual concept is a maximum as to com- 
prehension and a minimum as to extension. It is a 
maximum as to comprehension, since it contains all the 
attributes common to all the individuals of its class, to- 
gether with what is peculiar to itself It is a minimum 
as to extension, since it contains no classes or individu- 
als under it. It is, therefore, comprehensive rather than 
extensive. 

(5) An individual is capable of definition, the compre- 
hension of its concept is capable of analysis, but the 
extension is incapable of division. An individual is ca- 



Q UANTITY OF CONCEPTS, 279 

pable of definition, since it is contained under a class, 
and has peculiar qualities. The comprehension of its 
concej^t is capable of analysis, since it involves a plural- 
ity of attributes. The extension of its concept is inca- 
pable of division, since it contains neither classes nor 
individuals undei* it. 

(6) A concept neither simple nor individual is neither 
a maximum nor a minimum, either as to comprehension 
or to extension. Since it is neither the highest genus 
nor an individual, it is neither a maximum nor a mini- 
mum as to comprehension; for, the lower the species, 
the greater the comprehension, down to the individuals, 
and the higher the genus, the less the comprehension, 
up to the highest genus. For like reason, it is neither 
a maximum nor a minimum as to extension; for the 
higher the genus, the greater the extension, up to the 
highest genus, and the lower the species, the less the 
extension, down to the individuals. 

(7) A class, not the highest genus, is capable of defi- 
nition, the comprehension of its concept is capable of 
analysis, and the extension is capable of division. The 
class is capable of definition, since it is contained under 
a higher class, and has characteristic qualities. The 
comprehension of its concept is cajDable of analysis, since 
it involves a plurality of attributes, and the extension 
is capable of division, since the class contains other 
classes or individuals under it. 

It will be observed that a class may be defined unless 
it is the highest genus; that an individual may be de- 
fined; that a concept is identified by naming the class 
of which it is the concept; that the comprehension of a 
concept is analyzed but not divided ; that the extension 
of a concept is divided but not analyzed; that the com- 
prehension of the concept being, does not admit of anal- 
ysis, though its extension admits of division ; that the 



280 PSYCHOLOGY, 

extension of the concept of an individual does not admit 
of division, though its comprehension admits of analysis; 
that the class beino- contains but one universal attribute 
— existence^ though all actual attributes are contained in 
its parts; and that being is divided by analyzing the 
contents of its parts. 

In rising, by generalization, from individuals to spe- 
cies, we abstract our thoughts from the peculiarities of 
the individuals, and overlook their idiosyncrasies. Thus, 
the concejDt of the species is less rich in attributes than 
the idea of the individual. In like manner, in rising 
from species to genera, and from these to still higher 
genera, the ascending hierarchy of concepts become 
more and more meager in content, till we reach that of 
being, which is characterized by no attribute but that 
of existence. Thus, the higher we rise, the greater the 
poverty of our concepts in content, till they terminate 
in the minimum of knowledge, if not in utter nescience. 
There are two remedies for this undesirable result: 
(1) The tendencies of abstraction and generalization 
are counteracted by those of division and discrimination. 
As we may rise higher and higher, and thus drop at- 
tributes continually, so we may descend deeper and 
deeper, and thus multiply attributes indefinitely. Though, 
as we ascend towards the summit, the general concepts 
of the higher classes necessarily contain fewer and fewer 
elements, yet the classes themselves contain, not as uni- 
versally diffused, but somewhere in their subdivisions, 
every actual attribute. As we rise, though we drop the 
elements not common from the contents of the general 
concept, 3^et we retain them as elements of parts of the 
extent. Thus being, though indeed containing but one 
universal attribute, that of existence, contains in its sub- 
divisions all attributes, and thus the division of being, 
not of the concept, but of the class, gives all reality. 



QUANTITY OF CONCEPTS. 281 

(2) The intuition of reason declares the necessity of 
the conditions of whatever exists, thus giving to every 
thing its expUmation and law, and uniting all realities 
by their common dependence on the Absolute First 
Cause. 

4th. Other forms of quantity. In addition to the two 
forms of quantity, the comprehension and extension of 
concepts, called the logical luJtoles, there are other wholes 
of which the following are specimens: 

(1) The dianoetic ivhole — the lohole of thought. Every 
thing has its negation, and the two comprise the uni- 
verse, — thus B and non-^. Then, we can say, A is B 
or non-^. 

(2) The mathematical whole — the whole of necessary 
form. Of this species, there are two varieties: The 
arithmetical ivhole, as a collection of objects, involving 
time in their reckoning. The geometric ichole, as a cubic 
foot of wood, a barrel of water. This is a mass whole, 
and space is involved. 

(3) The essential whole — the whole of being. Of this 
S23ecies there are two varieties : T/ie substantial whole — 
the substance with its attributes. The causal ichole — the 
cause and its effects. The substantial Avhole and the 
causal whole are the complementary parts of the essen- 
tial whole. 

(4) The corporate whole — the formal or aesthetic whole. 
This is the idea revealed in the matter by the form. 

(5) The accidental whole — the whole by accident. Of 
this species there are three varieties — Of degree^ as man- 
kind comprises the rich and the poor. Of position^ as 
the upper and the lower, the right and the left, etc. 
Of affinity^ as the family comprises the parent and the 
children. 



Psy.~24. 



CHAPTEE YTI. 



QUALITY OF CONCEPTS. 



The Quality of a concept has relation to the subject 
mind, and is chiefl}^ found in the pairs of opposites — 
clearness and obscurit}^, distinctness and indistinctness. 

1st. Clearness and obscurity. A concept is clear when 
it is discriminated, as a whole, from other concepts. A 
concept is obscure^ when it is confounded with other 
concepts. Clearness is attained and obscurity avoided 
by definition of the class. 

The degree of clearness or obscurity of a concept is 
variable. Perfect clearness, obviating all confusion, is a 
possible, though a rare attainment. Total obscurity, ob- 
literating all distinction, would, when reached, cause the 
concept itself to vanish. The degree of obscurity, there- 
fore, varies between the limits, perfect clearness and 
total obscurity. A concept is characterized as clear or 
obscure, according to its prevailing quality. 

2d. Distinctness and indistinctness. Distinctness and 
indistinctness have two varieties — comprehensive and 
extensive. A concept has comprehensive or extensive 
distinctness or indistinctness, according as the attributes 
involved in its content, or the subdivisions embraced by 
its extent, are discriminated or confounded. Compre- 
hensive distinctness is attained, and comprehensive in- 
distinctness is avoided, by analysis. Extensive distinct- 
ness is attained, and extensive indistinctness is avoided, 
by division. 

The degree of distinctness, in general, varies between 

( 282 ) 



q UALITY OF CONCEPTS. 283 

the limits perfect distinctness and com2:)lete indistinct- 
ness. A concept is characterized as distinct or indistinct, 
according to its prevailing quality. 

A concept may be clear, that is, be discriminated, as 
a whole, from other concepts, and yet be more or less 
indistinct. Thus, our concept of the genus animal may 
be clear, and still be far from having either comprehen- 
sive or extensive distinctness ; but a concept having both 
comprehensive and extensive distinctness, has also the 
quality of clearness. Distinctness is, therefore, a higher 
virtue than clearness, and its attainment is a higher 
achievement. 

3d. Concepts admitting of distinctness. Since compre- 
hensive distinctness signifies a clear apprehension and 
discrimination of the attributes involved in the content 
• of a concept, and extensive distinctness, a clear apj)re- 
hension and discrimination of the classes and individu- 
als embraced in the extent, and bound together into 
unity by the nexus or content, it follows, 

(1) That the concept being — the highest genus, since 
it is a maximum as to extent, and a minimum as to 
content — is capable of extensive distinctness, but incaj)a- 
ble of comprehensive. 

(2) That an individual concept, being a maximum as 
to content, but a minimum as to extent, is capable of 
comprehensive distinctness, but inca])able of extensive. 

(3) That a concept neither the highest genus nor in- 
dividual, since it is not a minimum either as to content 
or extent, is capable both of comprehensive and exten- 
sive distinctness. 

4th. Rules for distinctness. These are the following: 
(1) To secure comprehensive distiiictness, analyze the 
content of the concept, noting especially the positive, 
intrinsic, and essential elements, rather than the nega- 
tive, extrinsic, and accidental. 



284 PSYCHOLOGY. 

(2) To secure extensive distinctness, divide the extent 
of the concejDt, according to the peculiar, positive char- 
acteristics of the parts. 

5th. Sources of indistinctness. These are of two kinds: 

(1) The nature of the concept itself, which is multi- 
plicity, either as to content or extent, bound by a men- 
tal act, into unity. 

(2) The dependence of the concept on language, as the 
condition of its continuance. The name becomes a sym- 
bol for the concept, and frequently the mind is content 
to employ the word without taking the trouble to call 
up the concept. This may be well when we are able 
to call up, at pleasure, the meaning of the word, in a 
clear and distinct concept, thus relieving the mind of 
an unnecessary burden. But when the mind employs a 
word without the ability to call up the corresponding 
concept, indistinctness and confusion of thought are sure 
to follow. Use no word whose meaning; is not clear. 

6th. Illustrations of clearness and obscurity^ distinctness 
and indistinctness. Hamilton says : '' The expressions, 
clearness and obscurity, distinctness and indistinctness, 
as applied to concepts, originally denoted certain modi- 
fications of vision; from vision, they were analogically 
extended to the other senses, to imagination, and finally 
to thought. It may, therefore, enable us the better to 
comprehend their secondary application to consider their 
primary. 

" To Leibnitz we owe the precise distinction of con- 
cepts into clear and distinct, and from him I borrow the 
following illustration: In darkness — the complete ob- 
scurity of night — we see nothing — there is no percep- 
tion, — no discrimination of objects. As the light dawns, 
the obscurity diminishes, the deep and uniform sensation 
of darkness is modified, — we are conscious of a change, 
— we see something, but are still unable to distinguish 



QUALITIES OF CONCEPTS. 285 

its features, — we know not what it is. As the light in- 
creases, the outlines of wholes begin to appear, but still 
not with a distinctness sufficient to allow us to perceive 
them completely; but when this is rendered j)ossible by 
the rising intensity of the light, we are then said to see 
clearly. We then recognize mountains, plains, houses, 
trees, animals, etc. ; that is, we discriminate these objects 
as wholes, as unities, from one another. But their parts, 
— the manifold, of which these unities are the sum — 
their parts still lose themselves in one another; they 
are still but indistinctly visible. 

^'At length, when daylight has fully sprung, we are 
enabled likewise to discriminate their parts; we now 
see distinctly what lies around us. But still we see as 
yet only the wholes which lie proximately around us, 
and of these only the parts which possess a certain size. 
The more distant wholes, and the smaller parts of the 
nearer wholes, are still seen by us only in their conjoint 
result, only as they concur in making up that whole 
which is for us a visible minimum. Thus it is, that in 
the distant forest, or on the distant hill, we perceive a 
green surface; but we see not the several leaves, which 
in the one, nor the several blades of grass, which in 
the other, each contributes its effect to produce that 
amount of impression which our consciousness requires. 
Thus it is, that all which we do perceive is made up 
of parts which we do not perceive, and consciousness is 
itself a complement of impressions which lie beyond its 
apprehension. 

'' Clearness and distinctness are thus only relative. 
For, between the extreme of obscurity and the extreme 
of distinctness, there is in vision an infinity of inter- 
mediate degrees. Now, the same thing occurs in thought. 
For we may either be conscious only of the concept in 
general, or we may also be conscious of its various con- 



286 ' PSYCHOLOGY, 

stituent parts, or both the concept and its parts may be 
lost in themselves to consciousness, and only recognized 
to exist by effects which indirectly evidence their exist- 
ence." Logic ^ page 112. 

7th. Other qualities of concepts. These are as follows: 

(1) Valid concepts are those which are known to cor- 
respond to their objects. Yalidity depends on evidence. 

(2) Invalid concepts are those which are not known to 
correspond to their objects. Invalidity implies want of 
evidence. 

(3) True concepts are those which correspond to their 
objects. True concepts may be valid or invalid accord- 
ing as there is a presence or absence of evidence. Valid 
concepts are always true, but true concepts are not al- 
ways valid. It is possible to assume the truth without 
evidence. A concept is true or false, since it is an im- 
plicit judgment, which is true or false. 

False concepts are those which do not correspond to 
their objects. False concej)ts are alwaj^s invalid, but 
invalid concepts are not always false. 

A concept, therefore, to be both true and valid must 
correspond to its object, and must be also known to 
correspond to its object. The correspondence must hold 
as far as the concept goes, though the concept may not 
do full justice to the object. 

(5) Congruent concepts are those in which all the ele- 
ments harmonize, that is, run together without conflict. 

(6) Incongruent concepts are those which embrace con- 
flictive elements — contrary or contradictory elements. 
Incongruity is a mark of invalidity, and indicates that 
some element has been assumed without warrant. Ya- 
lidity implies congruity ; but congruity does not imply 
validity, since there may be absence of evidence. 

(7) Complete concepts are those which involve all the 
common elements, and embrace all the divisions and sub- 



QUALITIES OF CONCEPTS, 287 

divisions of the class down to the individuals. Com- 
pleteness is, in general, an ideal perfection. Yery few, 
if any, of our concepts are complete. 

(8) Incomplete concepts are those which embrace only 
a part of the elements or objects of the class. Incom- 
pleteness characterizes- most, if not all, of our concepts. 
Most objects have qualities which have escaped our ob- 
servation ; and most classes have individuals altogether 
unknown to us. Different persons may form different 
concepts of the same class, since one ]3erson may com- 
bine one set of attributes, and another person, another 
set. The same person may, at different times, form 
different concepts of the same class. The concept may 
change with advancing knowledge. 

8th. Symbolic and intuitive knowledge. To illustrate 
this distinction, we quote from Leibnitz and from Taine. 

(1) Leibnitz says, as quoted by Hamilton: ''For the 
most part, however, especially in an analysis of an^^ 
length, we do not view, at once, the whole characters 
or attributes of the thing, but in place of these we 
employ signs, the explication of which into what they 
signify, we are wont, at the moment of actual thought, 
for the sake of brevity, to omit, knowing or believing 
that we have this explication always in our poAver. 
Thus, when I think of a regular chiliagon, I do not al- 
ways consider the various attributes of the sides, of 
their equality, and of the number, a thousand, but I 
use these words, whose meaning is obscurely and im- 
perfectly presented to the mind, in lieu of notions which 
I have of them, because I remember that I possess the 
signification of these words, though their application and 
explication, 1 do not, at present, deem necessary. This 
kind of thinking, I am used to call blind or symbolic. We 
employ it not only in algebra and arithmetic, but in fact 
universally. And certainly, when the notion is very com- 



288 PSYCHOLOGY. 

plex, we can not think, at once, all the ingredient no- 
tions; but when this is possible — at least, inasmuch as 
it is possible — I call the cognition intuitive. 

" Of the primary elements of our notions, there is 
given no other knowledge than the intuitive; as of our 
composite notions, there is, for the most part, possible 
only a symbolic. From these considerations, it is evi- 
dent that of the things which we distinctly know, w^e 
are not conscious of the ideas, except so far as we em- 
ploy an intuitive cognition. Indeed, it happens that we 
often falsely believe that we have in our minds the ideas 
of things, erroneously supposing that certain terms 
which we employ had been applied and explicated ; 
and it is not true, at least it is ambiguously expressed, 
what some assert, — that we can not speak concerning 
any thing, understanding what we say, without having 
an idea of it actually present. For we frequently ap- 
ply any kind of meaning to the several words, or we 
merely recollect that we have formerly understood them; 
but because we are content with this blind thinking, 
and do not follow out the resolution of the notions, it 
happens that contradictions are allowed to lie hid, which 
perchance the composite notion involves." Logic, page 
128. Symbolic and intuitive knowledge thus clearly differ. 

(2) Taine says : " My garden is surrounded b}^ a hedge, 
and my fruit is stolen ; I determine on enclosing it with 
a wall. I get wdiat workmen I can in the village — 
lour, for instance — and at the end of the day, I find 
they have built twelve meters of wall. This is not fast 
enough; I send to the next village for six other work- 
men, and ask myself how many meters a day will be 
added to the wall. To find out this, I no longer picture 
to myself workmen, with their blouses and trowels — 
the wall with its stones and mortar, — but replace my first 
workmen by the figure four, the first amount of work 



QUALITIES OF CONCEPTS, 289 

by the figure twelve, the whole number of workmen by 
the figure ten, the amount of work they will do by the 
symbol x^ and write down the following proportion, 

12 X 10 

4.:l2::\{):x = =3 30. 

4 

^'Henceforth, barring accident or drunkenness, if the 
new men work like the old, and all continue to work 
together, as the first four began, my ten men will build 
thirty meters a da^^. Operations of this kind occur 
daily, and all practical calculations are made in this 
way. 

''For the real objects first imagined, figures are substi- 
tuted which replace them partially; they replace them 
in the only point of view in which we need consider 
them, that is, in point of number. This once effected, 
we forget the objects represented; they recede into the 
background; we only consider the figures; we assemble, 
compare, transpose, and manij^ulate them as more con- 
venient equivalents; and the figure we finally arrive at, 
indicates the object or group of objects at which we 
wish to arrive. 

"Substitution goes further than this, and figures sub- 
stituted for things have in turn letters substituted for 
them. After several similar calculations, I observe that, 
in all such cases, the proportion is written in the same 
way — that the first figure always represents the first 
workmen; the second figure, their work; the third, the 
whole number of workmen; the fourth, the unknown 
work; and I thus pass from arithmetic to algebra. 
Henceforth, I replace the first figure by A^ the second 
by B^ the third by (7, and write down as follows: 

^X G 



A: B : : C :x = 



A 



•'I see tluit, in every such case, if I want to know 

Psy.~2.5. 



290 PSYCHOLOGY. 

the amount of work which will be done by all the work- 
men^ it will be sufficient to multiply their number by 
that representing the work done by the first lot^ and 
then to divide the product by the number of workmen 
first employed. 

"Instead of this simj)le case, let us consider the labor 
of an analyist, who Writes equations by the hour. He 
lays aside the figures, but indirectly he is working on 
them, just as an arithmetician lays aside the facts, but 
works indirectly on the facts. Each of them arranges 
and combines symbols, and these symbols are substitutes. 
The fact is, they are not like proper names, substituted 
for the whole of the object they represent, but merely 
for a portion or an aspect of such object. The letter 
used in Algebra does not fully replace the arithmetical 
figure with its precise quantity, but only as regards its 
function and place in the equation it enters into. The 
arithmetical figure does not fully replace the thing it 
stands fi^r, with all its qualities and characters, but only 
as regards quantity and number. Each replaces a part 
only of the imagined object; that is to say, a fragment 
— an extract; the figure, a more complex extract; the 
letter, a less complex one; that is to say, an extract from 
the first extract. But the substitution, though partial, 
is none the less actual. Two complete and infinitely 
fertile sciences depend on it, and .derive their efficiency 
from it." Taine on Intelligence^ page 4.. 



^ 



CHAPTEE VTII. 



RELATION OF CONCEPTS. 



The reciprocal relation of concepts may be considered 
with respect to their comprehension and to their exten- 
sion, thus giving two independent classifications. 

1. As to comprehension, we may consider identity 
and diversity, congruity and incongruity, the intrinsic 
and the extrinsic, subordination and co-ordination. 

Ist. Identity and diversity. Two concepts, when com- 
pared, are found to comprise eitlier the same elements 
or different elements, giving rise to the distinctions of 
identical concepts and different concepts, or, in general, 
of identity and diversity. 

(1) Identity. Identical concepts are either absolutely 
identical or relatively identical. 

a. Absolute identity. No two concepts are absolutely 
identical; for, if so, they could not be distinguished as 
two, since they would have no difference by which they 
could be discriminated. This class of concepts, therefore, 
has not a real^ but only an ideal existence, and consti- 
tutes an imaginary member in the division of identical 
concepts. Even the concepts relating to the same class, 
formed by different minds, or by the same mind at dif- 
ferent times, which make the nearest approach to abso- 
lute identity, are distinguishable ; for, we can say, that 
the one w^as formed by this mind, and the other by 
that, or that one was formed by a mind at one time, 
and the other by the same mind at another time. These 

concepts, if otherwise identical, are numerically differ- 

( 291 ) 



292 PSYCHOLOGY. 

ent — one can be distinguished as the first, and the other 
as the second. The difference is not intrinsic, but ex- 
trinsic; not essential, but accidental. 

b. Relative identity. Concepts relatively identical are 
of two kinds — reciprocating, or convertible, and similar, 
or cognate. 

«. Concepts relatively identical are reciprocating^ or 
convertible^ when they relate to the same class, but des- 
ignate it, in the one case, by one set of attributes, and, 
in the other case, by another set. Thus, the concept of 
the class denominated equilateral triangles, designates 
the class by the equality of the sides, while the concept 
of the class denominated equiangular triangles, designates 
the class by the equality of the angles. But since, in 
the case of triangles, the equality of the sides involves 
the equality of the angles, and conversely, the class of 
triangles denominated equilateral is identical with the 
class denominated equiangular; hence, the concepts of 
this class corresponding to the expressions, equilateral 
triangles and equiangular triangles, though not abso- 
lutely identical, since in the one case, the equality of 
the sides is made prominent, and, in the other, the equal- 
ity of the angles, jai are relatively identical, or more 
specifically, reciprocating, or convertible, since one in- 
volves the other. 

^. Concepts relatively identical are similar^ or cognate^ 
when they belong to the same family, and having the 
same origin are thus kindred. Certain languages are 
said to be cognate, and the same may be said of certain 
virtues or vices. 

(2) Diversity. Different concepts are either absolutely 
different or relatively different. 

a. Absolute difference. No two concepts are absolutely 
different; for, if not subordinate to an}^ lower genus, 
they are, at least, subordinate to being, the highest 



RELATION OF CONCEPTS. 



293 



genus, and hence agree in possessing existence^ the attri- 
bute of this genus, though they differ in other respects. 
Absolutely different concejits, therefore, constitute an 
ideal or imaginary member of the class different con- 
cepts, and merely give symmetry to the classification. 

h. Relative difference. Concepts relatively different are 
distinguished by the fact that they possess diverse at- 
tributes, though they have other attributes in common. 

The laws of resemblance and difference are as follows : 

(1) The law of homogeneity. However different two 
concepts, they m.ust, in some respect, at least in that of 
existence, be alike; for, every other concept is subordi- 
nate to that of being. Hence, things most dissimilar 
must, in one respect at least, be similar. 

(2) The laiv of heterogeneity. Every concept contains 
other concepts under it. In thought, therefore, the di- 
vision of concej^ts gives concepts, not individuals. Hence, 
things most similar, must, in certain respects, be dissim- 
ilar. Thus, take any two concepts with a small differ- 
ence. Now, this difference can be divided, thus giving 
new concepts distinguished by this partial difference, 
and so on, ad infinitum. But the infinite divisibility of 
concepts, like the infinite divisibility of space, time, or 
matter, exists only in speculations. 

To illustrate, let us classify angles, thus: 



Angles 



liight 



< 



Oblique 



V 



Acute 



Obtuse 



Here we pause, not because it is impossible to pursue 



294 PSYCHOLOGY, 

the divisions further, but because it is not called for. 
But we can conceive these angles to be situated in a 
horizontal, a vertical, or an oblique plane, giving hori- 
zontal, vertical, or oblique angles. These angles may 
have any position in these planes, and the sides may 
take an infinite number of directions for each position 
of the vertex. The acute angle may vary through an 
infinite number of values, between the limits 0^ and 90^, 
and the obtuse angle may vary, in like manner, between 
the limits 90° and 180°. 

2d. Congruity and incongruity. Again, as to compre- 
hension, two concepts are either congruent or conflictive. 

(1) Congruity. Two concepts are congruent, if they 
can be united in thought, so that one can be afiirmed 
of the other, or both can be afiirmed of the same object. 
Thus, triangles are polygons. A single concept is con- 
gruous if all its elements harmonize, as a square field. 

(2) Incongruity. Incongruous concepts are conflictive, 
since they involve inconsistent attributes. They are of 
two kinds — contraries and contradictories. 

a. Contrary concepts are mutually repugnant, though 
not universally inclusive of their genus. Thus, the con- 
cepts of the classes triangles and quadrilaterals are con- 
» trary, since they do not include all the divisions of the 
genus polygon. 

h. Contradictory concepts are mutually repugnant and 
universally inclusive of the genus of which they are 
species. Thus, right triangles and oblique triangles are 
contradictories within the sphere of the genus triangle. 
Any triangle is either right or oblique; if it is one, it 
is not the other; and if it is not one, it is the other. 
But within the sphere of another genus, as polygon, right 
triangles and oblique triangles are not contradictories. 
Hence, contradictories in a restricted sphere are not 
necessarily contradictories when the sphere is enlarged. 



RELATION OF CONCEPTS, 295 

Thus, honest and dishonest are contradictories within 
the sphere of moral beings, but not within the sphere 
of beings. Thus, vertebrate and invertebrate are con- 
tradictories within the spliere of animals; organic and 
inorganic, within the sphere of beings; the ego and the 
non-ego, A and not-^1, being and non-being, are univer- 
sally contradictories, since their sphere is absolutely un- 
limited, the two members together comprehending every 
thing, existent and non-existent, 

A single concept is incongruous, when it involves con- 
flictive elements, as a round square. 

Identity is to be distinguished from congruity, and 
diversity from confliction. All identical concepts are 
congruent, but all congruent concepts are not identical. 
Thus, the concej)ts of the classes, equilateral triangles 
and equiangular triangles are relatively identical and 
congruent; learning and virtue are congruent, but not 
identical. All conflictive concepts are diverse, but all 
diverse concepts are not conflictive. Thus, virtue and 
vice, beauty and ugliness, are conflictive and diverse; 
but virtue and beauty are diverse but not conflictive. 

od. The intrinsic and extrinsic. As to comprehension, 
we may also regard concepts as intrinsic or extrinsic. 

- (1) Intrinsic concepts are those which involve the 
qualities necessary to the existence of the class — they 
contain essential elements. Thus, the concept of a tri- 
angle involving three sides and three angles, is intrinsic. 

(2) Extrinsic concepts are those which consist of ac- 
cidental qualities — those not essential to the existence 
of the class. Thus, the concept of a triangle involving 
the equality of its sides, is extrinsic. 

4th. Subordination and, co-ordination. As to compre- 
hension, we may regard concepts in the relation of sub- 
ordination or co-ordination. 

(1) One concept is subordinate to another, as to com- 



296 PSYCHOLOGY. 

prehension, when the first forms a part of the sum total 
of the elements which together constitute tlie compre- 
hension of the second. The concepts of sides, angles, 
and area of a triangle are involved in the concept of 
the class triangle. 

(2) Two or more concepts are co-ordinate^ as to com- 
prehension, when they are exclusive and both are im- 
mediately comprehended as elements of the same con- 
cept. . Thus, the concepts of the sides, angles, and area of 
a triangle, are co-ordinate with one another, though 
alike subordinate to the concept triangle. 

2. As to extension, we may consider co-extension, 
subordination, exclusion, and intersection. 

1st. Co-extension. One concept is co-extensive with an- 
other, when they relate to the same class, and thus have 
the same sphere. Thus, equilateral triangles and equi- 
angular triangles are co-extensive. In comprehension, 
these concepts are called reciprocating or convertible. 
Of the two elements, the equality of the sides, and the 
equality of the angles, that which is explicitly enounced 
in the one is implicitly involved in the other, and con- 
versely. The subject and j^redicate of a definition are 
co-extensive. Thus, in the definition, a triangle is a 
polygon of three side, the concepts, triangle, and a 
polygon of three sides, are co extensive. 

Co-extension may be symbolized by two 
equal co-incident circles, which appear as 
one, though indicated as two by two letters 
placed within, thus: 

2d. Subordination. One concept is subordinate to 
another, when, as to extension, the former is contained 
under the latter, as an individual under a species, or a 
species under a genus. If one concept is subordinate to 
another, it is subordinate to any higher concept em- 
bracing the other. Thus, since horse is subordinate to 





RELATION OF CONCEPTS, 297 

the genus equus, it is subordinate to quadruped, verte- 
brate, animal, organized being, being. 

Subordination may be symbolized by one 
circle within another, the inner circle de- 
noting the subordinate concept. Thus, A is 
subordinate to JB. 

3d. Exclusion. One concept is excluded from another, 
when they have nothing in common as to extension. 
Thus, the concepts of the classes horse and dog, aiford 
an example of exclusion, as to extension, since they 
have neither species nor individuals in common. 

Exclusive concepts may be either co-ordinate or non- 
co-ordinate, — co-ordinate, when each is subordinate to 
the same concept, as acute angles and obtuse angles, 
which are immediately subordinate to oblique angles, — 
non-co-ordinate., when one, but not the other is immedi- 
ately subordinate to a third concept, as right angles 
and acute angles, right angles being immediately subor- 
dinate to angles, and acute angles to obliqe angles. 

Exclusive concepts are conflictive, as to comprehension, 
and are either contrary or contradictory, — contrary, 
when they are not universally inclusive of their genus, 
— contradictory, when they are universally inclusive of 
their genus. Thus right angles and acute angles are 
contraries, while right angles and oblique angles are 
contradictories. 

The exclusion of contraries may /^ X /^ ^ 
be symbolized by two exclusive cir- I A \ I B j 
cles. Thus, the circles A and B. V.__^ V__^ 

The exclusion of contradictories 
may be symbolized by one circle and the indefinite 
surrounding space in the plane of the circle y^ \ 
— the circle denoting one of the contradicto- (a ]B 
ries, and the indefinite space the other, as V__^ 
A and B in the annexed figure. 



298 



PSYCHOLOGY. 



4th. Intersection. Two concepts intersect, when their 
extensions have a common part, and the extension of 
each a j)art not common with the other. Thus, the 
concepts men and liars intersect. For, some men are 
liars; some liars are men; some men are not liars; and 
some liars are not men. 

Intersection may be symbolized by two 
intersecting circles. The concepts sym- 
bolized by A and B^ intersect. 

This method of representing the rela- 
tion of the concepts of classes, as to extension, is due 
to Euler. The circles do not, of course, resemble the 
concepts, but the relation of the circles does correctly 
represent the relation of the extension of the concepts. 




CHAPTBE IX. 



JUDGMENT. 



1. A judgment is the decision that a certain relation 
exists between two objects of thought. 

It has already been seen that every act of cognition 
involves a judgment. A concept itself is an implicit or 
undeveloped judgment. This is evident from an analy- 
sis of the act of conception, for, in conception certain 
attributes are regarded as belonging to all the objects 
of a class, thus involving the judgment that each object 
of the class has these attributes. 

The judgments involved in a concept are called pri- 
mary or psychological. They have individual objects 
for their subjects, and attributes or concepts for their 
predicates. Judgments in which concepts are predicated 
of concepts are called secondary or logical. 

2. A proposition is the expression of a judgment. For 
the purposes of logic, a proposition is considered as con- 
sisting of three parts — a subject, always a substantive 
or a substitute for a substantive, that of which some- 
thing is affirmed or denied, a predicate, also a substan- 
tive or its substitute, that which is affirmed or denied 
of the subject, and the copula, is or is not, or in the 
plural, are or are not, which affirms or denies the predi- 
cate of the subject. Thus, horses are animals , lying is 
not a virtue. 

Such propositions as, trees grow; birds are beautiful, 
are put into the requisite form by saying, Trees are 

things which grow. Birds are beautiful animals. 

(299) 



300 PSYCHOLOGY. 

A proposition does not necessarily imply the real ex- 
istence of the object denoted by the subject; for this 
object may be imaginary, as in the proposition, A cen- 
taur is half horse and half man. Whether the subject 
denotes a real or an imaginary object is to be deter- 
mined by considerations independent of the proposition. 

3. The terms of a proposition, from termini^ limits or 
boundaries, are the subject and predicate, which limit or 
mark the extremes of a proposition. A term expresses 
an individual or a group of individuals, an attribute or 
a group of attributes. 

Ist. A singular term is expressive of an individual. 
Thus, Plato, George Washington, this boy, etc., are sin- 
gular terms. 

2d. A common term is expressive of each individual of 
a class, as well as the class itself. Thus, man, horse, 
tree, etc., are common terms. 

3d. A collective term is expressive of a group, but not 
of each individual of the group. Thus, the senate, the 
convention, the army, etc., are collective terms, since 
we can say this body of men is the senate, but not that 
Sherman is the senate, etc. 

4th. An attributive term is an adjective or a partici]3le 
expressing an attribute or a group of attributes. Thus, 
white, human, etc. For logical purposes, a noun is un- 
derstood when an attributive is the predicate. Thus, 
Plato is human, is logically equivalent to, Plato is a 
human being. An attributive can not by itself be used 
as the subject, but only in connection with a noun, as 
this human being is Plato. 

5th, An abstract term is a noun expressive of an at- 
tribute or a group of attributes considered apart from 
the object to which it belongs. Thus, humanity, virtue, 
form, color, etc. An abstract term may, b}^ itself, be 
either the subject or the predicate of a proposition. 



GENERAL VIEW. 301 

4. The modality of a proposition is the view of it 
taken by the mind as influenced by the degree of evi- 
dence. It is expressed by an adverb in connection Avith 
the copula. Thus, This is certainly the boy who stole 
the fruit; this is probably the boy w^ho stole the fruit, etc. 
These propositions may be expressed in the usual logi- 
cal form, thus. That this is the boy who stole the fruit 
is a certainty, etc. 

5. The classification of judgments may be with ref- 
erence to logical quantity, origin, validity, truth, or form. 

1st. As to logical quantity^ judgments are comprehen- 
sive or extensive, according as the quantity of the predi- 
cate is comprehensive or extensive. 

(1) A comprehensive judgment is one in which the 
predicate is considered in reference to its content. Thus, 
these houses are white. 

(2) An extensive judgment is one in which the predi- 
cate is considered in reference to its extent. Thus, a 
horse is an animal. 

A comprehensive judgment may be turned into an 
extensive judgment. Thus, these houses are white, is 
equivalent to these houses are white objects. 

In a comprehensive judgment, the subject is the whole 
of comprehension of which the predicate is affirmed or 
denied to be a part. The copula is or is not, signifies 
comprehends or does not comprehend. 

In an extensive judgment, the predicate is the whole 
of extension of which the subject is affirmed or denied 
to be a part. The copula, is or is not, signifies is con- 
tained under or is not contained under. 

A definition is both an extensive and a comprehensive 
judgment; for the predicate as the genus of the subject 
is extensive, while the differential quality is comprehen- 
sive, and thus limits the extent of the subject to that 
part of the predicate characterized by this quality. 



302 PSYCHOLOGY, 

2d. As to origin^ judgments are primitive or derivative, 
according as they are original or derived. 

(1) A primitive judgment is assumptive or intuitive, 
according as the relation of the subject and predicate is 
an assumption or an intuition. Thus, Mars is inhabited, 
is a primitive judgment, since it is not derived from 
other judgments; and is assumptive, since it is not 
known to be true. Either of two equal quantities is a 
substitute for the other, is both a primitive and an intui- 
tive judgment. 

(2) A derivative judgment is demonstrative or proble- 
matical, according as it is capable or incapable of proof 
A judgment which is strictly demonstrative may be re- 
garded as problematical till it is proved true. 

3d. As to validity^ judgments are valid or invalid. 

(1) A judgment is valid ^ when the concepts are valid, 
and the relation is intuitive or demonstrative. It is 
valid, if its truth is known. A valid judgment is true. 

(2) A judgment is invalid^ when the law of validity 
is not complied with. It is invalid, if its truth is not 
known. An invalid judgment is true or false. 

4th. As to truths judgments are true or false. 

(1) A judgment is true^ when the relation expressed 
corresponds to the reality. A true judgment is valid or 
invalid according to evidence. 

(2) A judgment is false ^ when the relation exj)ressed 
does not correspond to the reality. A false judgment is 
invalid. 

Validity depends on evidence, and implies truth, but 
truth on correspondence, with or without evidence. 

5th. As to form^ judgments are either categorical or 
conditional. 

(1) A categorical judgment is one. in which the rela- 
tion expressed is not qualified by a condition. Thus, 
horses are animals; some men are liars; >§ is P. 



GENERAL VIEW. 303 

(2) A conditional judgment is one in which the rela- 
tion expressed is qualilied by a condition. 

There are three varieties of conditional judgments — 
hypothetical, disjunctive, and dilemmatic. 

a. A hypothetical judgment is a conditional judgment 
in which the qualifying condition is an hyj)othesis. Thus, 
if ^ is ^, is D. 

h. A disjunctive judgment is a conditional judgment in 
which the qualifying condition is an alternative. Thus, 
J. is £ or C, which is equivalent to, if A is not (7, A 
is -B, or if A is not B, A is C. 

c. A dilemmatic judgment is a conditional judgment in 
which there are two qualifying conditions — an hypoth- 
esis and an alternative. Thus, if J. is B, C is D or E. 

6. The principles of expression are those warranting 
aflSrmation, negation, hypothecation, or disjunction. 

1st. Affirmation is either immediate or mediate. 

(1) Immediate affirmation is warranted by knowledge 
gained by empirical intuition, as in consciousness, or by 
rational intuition, as the fundamental axioms of thought 
or the special axioms of the various sciences. 

(2) Mediate affirmation is warranted in several ways: 
a. By the law of contradictories. Thus, we can af- 
firm either of two contradictories, if we know the other 
is false. 

h. By valid inference from a single ^proposition. Thus, 
if I know that all S is P, I can affirm that some 8 
is P, or that some P is S. 

c. By logical deduction from valid premises. Thus, if 
I know that all M is P, and that all >S' is M, I am 
warranted in affirming that all S is P. 

2d. Negation is either immediate or mediate. 

(1) Immediate negation is warranted by the principle 
of identity — a thing is not any thing other than itself 

(2) Mediate negation is warranted in several ways: 



304 PSYCHOLOGY, 

a. By the law of conflictives. Thus, knowing the 
truth of either of two conflictives, we are warranted in 
denying the other. 

h. By a valid inference from a single proposition. 
Thus, knowing that no S is P, we can afSrm that some 
S is not P, or that no P is aS'. 

c. By logical deduction from valid premises. Thus, 
knowing that no M is P, and that all S is M^ we are 
warranted in affirming that no S is P. 

3d. Hypothecation is warranted, if the condition is a 
valid reason for the consequent, thus, if A has the fever, 
he is sick. 

4th. Disjunction is warranted by two reasons: 

(1) When the parts of the predicate are contradicto- 
ries. Thus, a triangle is right or oblique. 

(2) When the parts of the predicate are all of the 
contraries. Thus, an angle is right, acute, or obtuse. 



'M\ 



CHAPTER X. 



CATEGORICAL JUDGMENTS. 



1. Categorical judgments are classified as to quantity 
and as to quality. 

Ist. As to quantity^ categorical judgments are univer- 
sal or particular — universal^ when the predication, that 
iSj the affirmation or denial, is made of all the subject, 
as all S is P, no >S is P ; particular, when the predica- 
tion is made of only a part of the subject, as some S is 
P, some S is not P. 

2d. As to quality, categorical judgments are affirmative 
or negative — affirmative, when the predicate is affirmed 
of the subject, as all S is P, some S is P; negative, when 
the predicate is denied of the subject, as no S is P, some 
S is not P. 

An individual proposition, as John is a man, is to be 
regarded as a universal. 

An indefinite proposition, one devoid of any mark of 
quantity, is to be interpreted, either as a universal or 
as a particular, according to the matter, but this inter- 
pretation is extra-logical, since logic deals with the form 
of thought and not with the matter. Thus, planets are 
subject to the law of gravitation, is interpreted as a uni- 
versal — all planets are subject to the law of gravitation. 
Metals are useful is inter j)reted as a particular — some 
metals are useful. 

Dividing w4th respect to quantity, and subdividing 
with respect to quality, denoting the universal affirma- 
tive by (A), the universal negative by (E), the particu- 
Psy.-26. ( 305 ) 



306 



PSYCHOLOGY, 



lar affirmative by (1). and the particular negative by 
(O), we have the following summary classification of 
categorical judgments: 



Universal 



Particular 



Affirmative (A) All 8 is P. 
Negative {E) ]N"o S is P. 

Affirnia'tive (/) Some S is P. 
Negative (0) Some S is not P. 



2. The laws of trutli are the following: 



1st. {A), All S is P, is true, if 
8 is subordinate to P, or if 8 is 
co-extensive with P 











2d. (^), No >S is P, is true, if 
8 is excluded from P. 



3d. (/), Some 8 
is P, is true, if {A) 
is true, as above, 
also if 8 intersects 
P, or if P is sub- 
ordinate to 8. 

4th. (O), Some /S 
is not P, is true, 
if (^) is true, as 
above, also if 8 in- 
tersects P, or if P 
is subordinate to 8. 



3. The relation of the propositions, (J), (^), (/), 
(0), or as it is commonly called, their opposition^ is thus 
shown: 




CATEGOEICAL JUDGMENTS. 



307 




A Contraries E 






I 8ub-oontraries Q 




Ist. In relation to agreement or disagreement in quantity 
or quality. 

(1) (A) and {E) agree in quantity, both being univer- 
sal; they disagree in quality, (A) being affirmative, and 
{E) negative. 

(2) (/) and (0) agree in quantity, both being partic- 
ular; they disagree in quality, (/) being affirmive, and 
(0) negative. 

(3) (J.) and (Z) agree in quality, both being affirma- 
tive; they disagree in quantity, (A) being universal, and 
(7) particular. 

(4) {E) and (0) agree in quality, both being nega- 
tive; they disagree in quantity, (^) being universal, and 
(0) particular. 

(5) (A) and (0) disagree both in quantit}^ and in qual- 
ity, (A) being universal and affirmative, and (0) par- 
ticular and negative. 

(6) (jK) and (7) disagree both in quantity and in qual- 
ity, (7i^) being universal and negative, and (7) particular 
and affirmative. 

2d. As to agreement or disagreement in truth or falsity. 
Let it be observed tliat there are five diiferent rela- 
tions possible between S and P, — S is subordinate to P, 



308 PSYCHOLOGY. 

S is co-extensive with P, 8 is excluded from P, .8 inter- 
sects Pj and P is subordinate to ;S^. 

(1) (^) and (^E) are mutually repugnant, since neither 
relation, 8 is subordinate to P, or 8 is co-extensive with 
P, included in (^), is found in (P), nor is the relation, 8 
is excluded from P, which is expressed by (P), found in 
(J.); hence, having no relation common, they can not both 
be true, and therefore the truth of either implies the 
falsity of the other. If it is true that all 8 is P, it is 
false that no 8 is P, and if it is true that no 8 is P, 
it is false that all 8 is P. 

(2) (J.) and (P) are not universally inclusive of all 
possible relations of 8 and P, since there are other re- 
lations, as 8 intersects P, P ij subordinate to 8, not 
found in either; hence, not including all possible rela- 
tions, they may both be false, and therefore the falsity 
of either does not imply the truth of the other. 

(3) Hence, (^) and (P) are called contraries, since 
they are mutually repugnant, but not universally in- 
clusive. Other relations are possible. 

(4) Since the relations in (4) are found in (7), the 
truth of (^) involves the truth of (7). For this reason, 
{A) and (7) are called subalterns, though, strictly, (7) is 
the subaltern of (A). 

(5) Since (7) contains relations not found in (A), as 
well as those in (J), the falsity of (A) does not imply 
the falsity of (7), nor does the truth of (7) imply the 
truth of (yl), but the falsity of (7) implies the falsity 
of (A), since the relations in (A) are in (7). 

(6) For like reasons, (0) is the subaltern of (P), the 
truth of (P) implies the truth of (0), the falsity of (P) 
does not imply the falsity of (0), nor does the truth of 
(0) imply the truth of (P), but the falsity of (0) im- 
plies the falsity of (P). 

(7) Since (7) and (O) contain the common relations, 



CATEGORICAL JUDGMENTS. 309 

S intersects P, and P is subordinate to S^ both may be 
true; hence, the truth of either does not imply the 
falsity of the other. 

(8) Since (/) and (0) are universally inclusive of all 
possible relations of S and P, both can not be false; 
hence, the falsity of either implies the truth of the other. 

(9) Since (/) contains relations not found in (0), and 
(0) a relation not found in (/), either may be true and 
the other false; hence, the truth of either does not im- 
ply the truth of the other. 

(10) (7) and (0) are subordinate to (^4.) and (^E^^ re- 
spectively, and hence are called sub-contriries. 

(11) (A) and (0) are mutually repugnant, since they 
contain no common relation ; hence, they can not both 
be true, and therefore the truth of either implies the 
falsity of the other; and since they are universally in- 
clusive of all possible relations of S and P, both can 
not be false, and therefore the falsity of either implies 
the truth of the other. Hence, (A) and (0) are called 
contradictories, since they are mutually repugnant and 
universally inclusive. 

(12) For like reasons, (^E) and (7) are contradicto- 
ries; hence, the truth of either implies the falsity of the 
other, and the falsity of either, the truth of the other. 

3d. These relations may likewise be thus expressed: 

(1) The truth of (A.) implies the truth of (7) and the 
falsity of (7^) and (O); but the falsity of (A) implies 
the truth of (0). 

(2) The truth of (E) implies the truth of (O) and 
the falsity of (A) and (7) ; but the falsity of (E) im- 
plies the truth of (7). 

(3) The truth of (7) implies the falsity of (E) ; but 
the falsity of (7) implies the truth of (E) and (0) and 
the falsity of (J). 

(4) The truth of (O) implies the falsity of (A); but 



310 PSYCHOLOGY. 

the falsity of (0) implies the truth of {A) and (J) and 
the falsity of {E). 

Let the student answer the following questions: 

(1) What does the truth of (J.) imply? What the 
falsity of {A) imply? 

(2) What does the truth of (^) imply? What does 
the falsity of {E) imply? 

(3) What does the truth of (/) imply? What does 
the falsity of (/) imply? 

(4) What does the truth of (0) imply? What does 
the falsity of (0) imply? 

(5) What implies the truth of (A) ? the falsity of {A) ? 

(6) What implies the truth of {E)l the falsity of (^)? 

(7) What implies the truth of (/)? the falsity of (/)? 

(8) What implies the truth of (0)? the falsity of (0)? 

(9) Show in three ways that the falsity of (/) im- 
plies the truth of (0). 

(10) Show in three ways that the falsity of (0) im- 
plies the truth of (7). 

4th. These relations may receive a more general ex- 
pression : 

(1) The truth of a universal implies the truth of its 
particular; but the falsity of a universal does hot imply 
the falsity of its particular. 

(2) The falsity of a particular implies the falsity of 
its universal; but the truth of a particular does not im- 
ply the truth of its universal. 

(3) The contraries can not both be true, but may both 
be false; hence, the truth of either implies the falsity of 
the other; but the falsity of either does not imply the 
truth of the other. 

(4). The sub-contraries can not both be false, but may 
both be true ; hence, the falsity of either implies the truth 
of the other ; but the truth of either does not imply the 
falsity of the other. 



CA TEG ORICAL JUl) GMENTS. 31 1 

(5) Two contradictories can not both be true nor both 
false; hence, the truth of either implies the falsity of the 
other, and the falsity of either the truth of the other. 

In the above discussion, we have considered the form 
of the proposition but not the matter. 

5th. The following statements, though extra-logical, 
may be found to be useful. 

(1) In necessary matter, the affirmatives, {A) and (J), 
are both true, and the negatives, {E) and (0), are both 
false. Thus, all triangles have three sides, and some 
triangles have three sides, are both true; but no triangles 
have three sides, and some triangles have not three sides 
are both false. 

(2) In contingent matter, the particulars, (/) and (0), 
are both true, and the universals, {A) and (J5/), both 
false. Thus, some triangles are right, and some triangles 
are not right, are both true; but all triangles are right, 
and no triangles are right, are both false. 

(3) In impossible matter, the negatives, {E) and (0), 
are both true, and the affirmatives, (^) and (7), both 
false. Thus, no triangles have four sides, and some tri- 
angles have not four sides, are both true; but all tri- 
angles have four sides, and some triangles have four 
sides, are both false. 



CHAPTEE XL 



CATEGORICAL JUDGMENTS. 



1. Distribution of terms. — 1st Definition and remarks. 

A term is distributed when it is applied to all the in- 
dividuals denoted by the name. Thus, in the expres- 
sions, all men^ no nien^ the term men is distributed. 

A term is undistributed when it is applied only to some 
of the individuals denoted by the name. Thus, men is 
undistributed in the expression some men. 

It would seem that distribution is applicable only to 
common terms; but as singular^ collective^ and abstract 
terms are, as \\q have seen, regarded as universal, they 
are regarded as distributed. 

When an attribute is used as a predicate, the noun un- 
derstood is to be supplied before the rule for distribu- 
tion is to be applied. Thus, the proposition, the bird is 
beautiful, is changed to, the bird is a beautiful animal. 

When an abstract term or an attributive Jms come to 
be regarded as a common noun, as virtue^ color ^ fig^^'^e, 
the good^ etc., its distribution or non-distribution is reg- 
ulated by the rules for common terms. 

2d. Rules for the distribution and. non-distribution of the 
terms of a proposition. 

(1) The subject of every universal j)roposition is distrib- 
uted. Thus, the subject is distributed in the following 
propositions: Every man is liable to accident; All S is 
P; No selfish action is praiseworthy; No S is P; Any 
coward is contemptible. The distribution of the subject 

is shown by one of the words, every., all^ no, any. 

(312) 



CA TEG ORICAL JUD GMENTS. 313 

(2) The subject of every particular projjosition is undis- 
tributed. Thus, the subject is undistributed in the fol- 
lowing propositions: Some men are liars; Some Sis F; 
Some men are not liars; Some S is not P. The non- 
distribution of the subject is indicated by the word some. 

It will b# observed that the distribution or non-distri- 
bution of the subject depends upon the quantity of the 
proposition — the subject is distributed in universals, and 
undistributed in particulars. 

(3) The predicate of every negative proposition is distrib- 
uted. Thus, the predicate is distributed in the following 
j)ropositions : ISTo horse is a ruminant; Some apples are 
not red; No S is P; Some S is not P; for every indi- 
vidual of the class ruminants is excluded from the class 
horse; every red object, from the class some apples; and 
every P, from S. 

(4) The predicate of an affirmative is undistributed^ unless 
the subject is co-extensive vjith the predicate^ or the p)redicate 
is subordinate to the subject. Thus, the predicate is un- 
distributed in the propositions, All horses are animals; 
Some Americans are poets; All S is P; Some S is P; 
for all animals are not horses; all poets are not Ameri- 
cans; nor is it certain that all P is S. 

It will be observed that the distribution or non-distri- 
bution of the 23redicate depends on the quality of the 
proposition — the predicate is distributed in negatives, 
and is, in general, undistributed in affirmatives. 

It may, indeed, be true, in fact, that the predicate of 
an affirmative is distributed, as in case of co-extension 
in (^) or (7), or when, in (Z), P is subordinate to S ; 
but this is extra-logical, since it is not indicated by the 
form^ with which alone logic has to deal. It is impor- 
tant, however, to note that co-extension is found in case 
of definitions, equations, identical propositions, and when 
S and P designate, by different properties, the same 

Psy.— 27. 



314 PSYCHOLOGY, 

class. ThuSj A decagon is a polygon often sides; J ==: 
B ; A is A; All equilateral triangles are equiangular. P 
is subordinate to S in (7)^ when S is the genus of which 
P is a species, as some animals are horses. 

HencCj the rules for distribution may be thus stated: 

(1) All universals distribute their subject, • 

(2) All negatives distribute their predicate,- 

(3) No particular distributes its subject. 

(4) An affirmative does not, in general, distribute its 
predicate. 

2. Conversion of propositions — definitions, rule, clas- 
sification. — The conversion of a proposition is the trans- 
position of its termSj or the interchange of the places of 
the subject and predicate. Thus, the conversion of the 
proposition, S is P, gives the proposition, P is S, 

The convert end, or exposita, is the original poposition to 
be converted. 

The converse is the proposition obtained by conversion. 

The general rule to be observed in conversion is the 
following: A term must not be distributed in the converse 
which is not distributed in the convertend. 

Conversion is divided into immediate and mediate^ and 
each of these into simple and by limitation, or per acci- 
dens, as it is also called. 

Conversion is immediate when the convertend is con- 
verted, without preliminary change of form; that is, the 
original proposition is itself converted. 

1st. Immediate conversion is simple, when the converse 
has the same quantity and quality as the convertend, and 
is denoted by the same vowel. 

(1) (E) always admits of immediate simple conversion. 



{E) No 8 is P. 
.-. \e) ]Sro P is S. 




CATEGOBICAL JUDGMENTS, 



315 



P. 



(2) (7) always admits of immediate simple conversion. 
(J) Some S is 

...(/) Some FiJ^'^^' ^^ ^^ ' '^'' ^ ' ^' 





8. 



(3) (A) arim?:?^5 of immediate simple conversion in case S 
and P are co-extensive, as in definitions, etc., but not in 
general. 



(A) All S is P. 
.-, (A) All P is S. 



(4) (0) admits of immediate simple converse in case of 
exclusion or intersection, but not in general. 



(0) Some S 
is not P. 

.-, (0) Some P 
is not aS. 



It thus appears that (J5) and (J) universally admit 
of immediate simple conversion; and (A) and (0) in 
special cases — (J.) in case of co-extension, and (0) in 
case of exclusion or intersection. To convert (JL) by im- 
mediate simple conversion, in case 8 is subordinate to 
P, is to distribute P in the converse when it is not dis- 
tributed in the convertend, and thus to violate the gen- 
eral rule, that a term is not to be distributed in the 
converse which is not distributed in the convertend. In 
like manner, to convert (0) by immediate simple con- 
version, in case P is subordinate to 8, is to distribute 
8 in the converse, when it is not distributed in the con- 
vertend, and thus to violate the rule. 

2d. Immediate conversion is by limitation, when the 




316 



PSYCHOLOGY, 



quantity is reduced, the convertend being universal^ and 
the converse particular. 

(1) (A) always admits of immediate conversion by limi- 
tation. 



(A) All S is P. 
.-. (Z) Some P is S, 



(2) (i?) always admits of immediate conversion by limi- 
tation. 





{E) ISTo 8 is P. 
.*. (0) Some P is 
not >S. 



(7) and (0) having already reduced quantity^ can not 
be converted by limitation. 

Conversion is mediate when the convertend is con- 
verted through a preliminary change of form; that is, 
the original proposition itself is not converted, but is 
changed to another which is converted. Mediate con- 
version, when applied to (J.), or (JS^) is called conversion 
by contraposition, and when applied to (0), conversion 
by negation. 

3d. Mediate conversion is simple when the converse 
has the same quantity and quality as the proposition 
into which the original is changed, and hence is denoted 
by the same vowel. 

(1) {A) can always be changed to {E) which may be 
converted simply. 

{A ) All S is P. 
=Ie) No S is non-P. 
.\ {E ) No non-P is S. 

(2) (J57), in case S and P are' contradictories, can be 





CA TEG OEICA L JUD G ME NTS. 



317 





changed into co-extensive (A) or (/) either of which may 
be converted simply. 

{E)m s i^ p= \ (^) ^^^ ^ ^^" ^^^-^- ^ 

(.(/) Some S is non-F. [ s 
.-. {A) All no/2-P is >?. (/) Some non-P is aS. 

(3) (/) does not admit of mediate simple conversion. 

(4) (0) can always be changed to (Z), which may be con- 
verted simply. 

(0) Some 
S is not P. 
= (/) Some 
S is non-P. 
.'. (7) Some 
non-P is S. 

Mediate conversion is by limitation^ when the quantity 
is reduced, the original proposition and the proposition 
into which the original is changed, being universal^ and 
the converse particular. 

(1) {A) cayi alicays be changed to (^), which may be con- 
verted by limitation. 

{A) All .9 is P. 
= (^) ISTo /S is non-P. 
.*. (0) Some non-P is not S. 

(2) {E) can always be changed into {A), which may be 
converted by limitation. 

(E) No S is P. 
= (A) All S is non-P. 
.-. (/) Some non-P is S. 

(3) (7) and (0), being particular, that is, already in re- 
duced quantity, can not be converted by limitation. 





CHAPTEE XII. 



CONDITIONAL JUDGMENTS. 




Conditional Judgments are, as we have seen, of three 
kinds — hypothetical, disjunctive, and dilemmatic. 

1. Hypothetical judgments may be divided into five 
groups, each containing four forms. Let the laws of 
truth of each be exhibited by Euler's notation of circles, 
thus: 



If A is B, A is C, 

True, if B is C. 



1st. The subject of the condition is the subject of the con- 
sequent. 

(1) If A is B, A is a True, if B is C. 

(2) If Ais B, A is not C. True, if B is not C. 

(3) If A is not 5, A is C. True, if B and G are con- 
tradictories. 

(4) If A is not B, A is not C. True, if C is B. 

2d. The subject of the condition is the predicate of the 
consequent. 

(1) If ^ is 5, is A, True, if C is B, and A is co- 
extensive with B. 

(2) If ^ is ^, is not A. True, if G is not B. 

(3) If A is not B, G is A. True, if G is not B, and A 
and B are contradictories. 

(4) If A is not J?, G is not ^. True, if G is ^. 

(318) 



CONDITIONAL JUDGMENTS. 319 

3d. The ^predicate of the condition is the subject of the 
consequent. 

(1) If ^ is B^ B m C. True, if A m (7, and is co-ex- 
tensive with B. 

(2) If A is Bj B is not C. True, if A is not C, and is 
co-extensive with B. 

(3) If A is not B, B is C. True, if A and C are con- 
tradictories. 

(4) If A is not B, B is not C. True, if C is A. 

4th. The predicate of the condition is the predicate of the 
consequent. 

(1) If Ais B, C is B. True, if C h A. 

(2) If A h B, C is not B. True, if C is not A, and ^ 
is co-extensive with B. 

(3) If A is not B, C is B. True, if (7 is not A, and J. 
and B are contradictories. 

(4) If A is not ^, (7 is not B. True, if C is A. 

5th. T/i6 subjects and predicates are different in the an- 
tecedent and. consequent. 

(1) If A is J5, C is D. True, if C is A and B is D. 

(2) If A IS B, C is not D. True, if C is J and B is 
not J). 

(3) If A is not J5, (7 is D. True, if A and 5 are con- 
tradictories, and either A or B is in _D, and C is not in 
the other. 

(4) If A is not B, C is not D. True, if C is either A 
or B, and D is the other. 

2. Disjunctive judgments are those which present al- 
ternatives. These alternatives are either unexclusive or 
exclusive. 

1st. Unexclusive alternatives are of two kinds: 
(1) When the alternatives are simply different words 
for the same thing. In this case, the judgment is dis- 
junctive only in expression. Thus, this electricity is 
vitreous, or positive. 



320 PSYCHOLOGY, 

(2) When the alternatives are different but congruent 
tilings. Tims, this man is a knave or a fool; he may be 
both. Augustine was a saint or a philosopher; he was 
both. 

2d. Exclusive alternatives have two forms, expressed, 

(1) In the copula. Thus, >S either is or is not P. This 
is equivalent to the proposition S is either P or non-P^ 
which, as pure contradictory opposition, is true by the 
law of contradictories. 

(2) In the terms, a. In the subject. Thus, either P or 
>SisP 

b. hi the predicate. S is either P or Q. 

If R and 8 or P and Q are contradictories, we have 
contradictory opposition, and the judgment is true by 
the law of contradictories. 

If P and S or P and Q are contraries, we have con- 
trary opposition, and hence can not affirm the judgment 
a priori^ but only a posteriori^ by showing that all other 
contrary judgments are false. Then, the same inferences 
follow as in contradictory opposition ; that is, one of the 
alternatives is true; if either is true, the other is false; 
if either is false, the other is true. 

Such a proposition as angles are right or oblique is 
divisive. It does not mean that all angles are right or 
all angles are oblique; but that angles are divided into 
right angles and oblique angles; that is, that some angles 
are right and some oblique, or that any angle is either 
right or oblique, which is disjunctive, not only in ex- 
pression, but in thought, and the alternatives are contra- 
dictories in the genus angles. 

Alternatives may be contradictories within a limited 
sphere, but only contraries if the sphere be extended. 
Thus, Vertebrates and invertebrates are contradictories in 
the sphere of animals; but only contraries in the sphere 
of organic beings. Any animal is either a vertebrate or 



CONDITIONAL JUDGMENTS. 321 

an invertebrate, but it will not do to say that every 
organic being, much less, that every thing, is either a 
vertebrate or an invertebrate animal. 

3. The dilemmatic judgments are divided into two 
groups, each containing four forms. Let the law of truth 
be given for each and illustrated with circles, according 
to Euler's notation. 

1st. When the condition is simple, 

(1) If A is B, S is either P or Q. 

(2) If A m B, S is neither P nor Q. 

(3) If A is not B, S is either P or Q. 

(4) If A is not B, S is neither P nor Q. 
2d. When the condition is compound. 

(1) If either A m B or C is D, >S is either P or Q. 

(2) If either A i^ B or C is D, S is neither P nor Q. 

(3) If neither A is B nor C is D, S is either P or Q. 

(4) If neither A is B nor C is P, S is neither P nor Q. 
The disjunctive consequent is in contrary opposition; 

for if in contradictory opposition, then, in either group, 
the consequents of (1) and (3) would be true and the 
consequents of (2) and (4) would be false by the law 
of contradictories, and the reason in the conditional 
clause woald be redundant. Thus, it would be super- 
fluous to say, if A is B, S is either P or non-P, for J3 
is either P or non-P, whether A is B or not. 



CHAPTEE XIII. 



DEDUCTIVE REASONING. 



Reasoning is the process by which the truth or falsity 
of a proposition is proved. 

An argument is the derivation of a judgment from 
another judgment or from other judgments. It infers, 
in the final proposition, what was virtually contained in 
the preceding. 

An immediate argument is an argument in which the 
relation of the terms of the derived proposition is inferred 
from another proposition, or from other propositions, with- 
out the intervention of a middle term. 

The varieties of immediate arguments are the follow- 
ing: 

1st. Inferences from the relation of the four propositions^ 
{A), (E), (Z), (0). See Chapter X. 

(1) What inferences can be drawn from the truth of 
the proposition, (A), All S is P? from the falsity of (A)f 

(2) What inferences can be drawn from the truth of 
the proposition (^), :N'o ^ is Pf from the falsity of (E)? ^ 

(3) What inferences can be drawn from the truth of 
the proposition (J), Some S is Pf from the falsity of 
(I)f 

(4) What inferences can be drawn from the truth of 
the proposition (0), Some S is not P? from the falsity 
of(0).^ 

2d. Inferences from the conversion of the propositions, (A), 
(E) (/), (0). See Chapter XI. 

(1) What inferences from conversion can be drawn 

(322) 



I MM EDI A TE ARG VMENTS, 323 

from the proj)osition {A)^ in case of co-extension? in 
case of subordination? What from the 2)roposition, Pen- 
tagons are polygons of five sides? What from the prop- 
osition, Pentagons are polygons? 

(2) What inferences from conversion can be drawn 
from the proposition (^).^ What from the proposition, 
No knowledge is useless? 

(3) What inferences from conversion can be drawn 
from the proposition (/).^ What from the proposition, 
Some men are liars? 

(4) What inferences from conversion can be drawn 
from the proposition (0),^ What from the proj)osition, 
Some men are not liars? 

(5) State the contrary, the subaltern, and the contra- 
dictory of the proposition. All criminals deserve punish- 
ment. 

(6) Classify the proposition. All just acts are expedi- 
ent. What inferences can be drawn from it, by means 
of relation? What b}^ means of conversion? Classify 
and convert these inferences. 

(7) State and classify the propositions incompatible 
with the proposition. All liars are detestable. Convert 
each. 

3d. Inferences from model restriction. The necessary, im- 
plies the actual; the actual, the probable; the probable, 
the possible. What inferences can be drawn from the 
proposition. Space is necessarily infinite? 

4th. Inferences from composition. Thus, A is in C ; B 
is in C ; therefore, A and B are in C. 
' 5th. Inferences from divisive judgments. Thus, S is P, 
Q, or R ; therefore, the P of S is neither the Q nor the 
P of S; the non-P of S is either the Q or the R of S; 
the neither P nor Q of aS is the R of S. 

Gth. Inferences by means of privatives. 

(1) All S is P; therefore, ISTo S is non-P, and all 



324 PSYCHOLOGY, 

non-P iis non-S. Also, from the proposition. All non-S is 
no7i-Pj we infer, T^o non-S is P, and all P is /S. 

(2) Infer, by means of privatives, the conclusion from 
the proposition, JSTo /S is P; from, No non-8 is non-P. 

(3) What inference, by means of privatives, can be 
drawn from the proposition, Some >S is Pf From, Some 
non-S is non-Pf 

(4) What inference, by means of privatives, can be 
drawn from the proposition, Some S is not Pf From, 
Some non-S is not non-Pf 

7th. Inferences by means of determinants. This class of 
inferences consists in joining the same modifier to both 
subject and j)redicate. Thus, An Indian is a fellow creat- 
ure; therefore, A happy Indian is a happy fellow creat- 
ure. Inferences of this kind are often fallacious. Thus, 
A president is a man ; therefore. An incompetent presi- 
dent is an incompetent man. A dwarf is a man ; there- 
fore, A big dwarf is a big man- The inference is valid 
in case of co-extension, or when the modifier does not 
afiect the characteristics of the subject. 

8th. Inferences by means of complex conceptions. This 
class is clearly allied to the last. Thus, Metals are ele- 
ments; therefore, A mixture of metals is a mixture of 
elements. Inferences of this kind are often fallacious. 
Thus, Americans are human beings; therefore, A major- 
ity of Americans is a majority of human beings. 



CHAPTER XIV. 



DEDUCTIVE REASONING. 




A mediate argument is an argument in which the re- 
lation of the terms of the derived proposition is inferred 
from other propositions through the intervention of a 
middle term. 

The derived proposition is called the conclusion. The 
propositions from which the conclusion is inferred are 
called the premises. 

A syllogism is an argument in regular form. 



f All M is P. 
Thus, \ All S is M. 

.'. All S is P. 



A syllogism contains three terms : two extremes — -the 
major term and the minor term — and the middle term. 

The major term, P, is the predicate of the conclusion ; 
the minor term, S, is the subject of the conclusion ; and 
the middle term, M, is the medium of comparison. 

A syllogism contains three propositions: two premises 
— the major premise and the minor premise — and the 
conclusion. 

The major premise is the premise which expresses the 
relation of the middle term, M, to the major term, P. 

The minor premise is the premise which expresses the 
relation of the minor term, S, to the middle term, M. 

The conclusion is the proposition which expresses the 

(325) 



326 PSYCHOLOGY. 

relation of the minor term to the major, as inferred from 
the premises. 

As an illustration of an argument, take the following : 

All responsible agents are free agents. 
Man is a responsible agent. 
.-. Man is a free a^ent. 

Man and a free agent, the subject and the predicate of 
the conclusion, are the extremes, — a free agent, the pred- 
icate, is the major term, and man, the subject, is the 
minor. The term, resj^onsible agents, with which the 
extremes are separately compared in the premises, is the 
middle term, and is in both premises, but not in the 
conclusion. 

All responsible agents are free agents, the premise 
which expresses the relation of the middle term to the 
major term, is the major premise Man is a resj^onsible 
agent, the premise which expres.Hes the relation of the 
minor term to the middle, is the minor jDremise. 

In extensive quantity^ the class res23onsible agents is 
subordinate to the class free agents; the class man is sub- 
ordinate to the class responsible agents; hence the class 
man is subordinate to the class free agents, according to 
the principle, a subordinate to a class is subordinate to 
any genus embracing that class, or, as it may be stated, 
a part of a part is a part of the whole. 

In comprehensive quantity^ the class responsible agents 
comprehends free agency as an element of resj)onsibility; 
the class man comprehends responsibility as one of its 
attributes; hence, the class man comprehends free agency 
as an attribute, on the principle that the whole compre- 
hends a part of a part. 

It is to be observed that the term ccreatest in exten- 
sion is least in comprehension; and that the term least 
in extension is greatest in comprehension. 



MEDIA TE AE G UMENTS. 327 

The names, major and minor terms, are significant 
only in extensive quantity; but even in this quantity, 
the major term, as a matter of fact, as we shall hereafter 
see, is frequently less in extension than the minor term. 
These names are, therefore, to be regarded as mere 
technical expressions, the major term denoting the 2:>red- 
icate of the conclusion, and the minor, the subject. 

The expressions, major and minor premises, are also 
to be regarded as technical expressions, the major 2:)rem- 
ise being the premise containing the major term, and 
the minor premise the premise containing the minor 
term. 

The order of the premises is not essential, though the 
major premise generally stands first. The conclusion 
may even stand before the premises. 

The function of an argument is to prove that a certain 
relation exists between two terms, when that relation is 
not self-evident. 

In mediate arguments, this is accomplished by select- 
ing, as the medium of comparison, a third term, called 
the middle term, with which the other terms are sepa- 
rately compared. The • relations of the extreme terms 
to the middle term prove the relation of the extremes 
to each other. 

The conclusion must not only be compatible with the 
premises, but must be necessitated by them, otherwise 
the argument is a fallacy. 

This is shown in the following argument and illustra- 
tions. The conclusion may be accidentally true, as 
shown in the first set of circles, but it is not necessi- 
tated by the premises, as shown by the second set. 

'^o M is P. 
No S is M, 
..-. No S is P. 




328 PSYCHOL OGY. 

The same relations may have different expressions: 

]^o 3f is P. /^7C\ /^~^ ^o P is M. 

All >S is .¥. ( ® i ( -^ ) All S is i¥. 

.-.JSTo /? is P. V_^ V_y .-.ISro S is P. 

These arguments are identical in thought, as is seen 
by the circles, with an accidental difference of expression. 

Does the syllogism beg the question? It has been as- 
serted, by John Stuart Mill and others, that the syllo- 
gism involves the fallacy called petitio principii, the beg- 
ging of the question. This charge is made, not in the 
sense that in all valid syllogisms the premises virtually 
assert the conclusion, — for this they must do, otherwise 
the argument is a fallacy, — but, in the sense that the 
conclusion, so far from being deduced from the premises, 
must be known to be true before the major premise can 
be established; but as the conclusion is not known to 
be true, the very thing to be proved is begged in the 
major premise, thus: 

All men are mortal. 
Gabriel is a man. 
.-. Gabriel is mortal. 

Mill says : '' That we can not be assured of the mortal- 
ity of all men, unless we were previously certain of the 
mortality of every individual man; that if it be still 
doubtful whether Socrates, or any other individual you 
choose to name, be mortal or not, the same degree of 
uncertainty must hang over the assertion, All men are 
mortal." 

The warrant for the major premise, All men are mor- 
tal, is not found in the fact that Gabriel is mortal; for 
we may be totally ignorant even of the existence of 
Gabriel. Much less is the major premise a case of so- 



MEDIATE AEGmiENTS, 329 

called perfect induction, established by an examination 
of every individual man, which is impossible in the nat- 
ure of the case; and, yet, after examining a multitude of 
cases, we are warranted in asserting that all men are 
mortal, as an induction of a very high degree of prob- 
ability. 

Neither is the warrant for the conclusion, Gabriel is 
moi'tal, found only in the inajor premise, All men are 
mortal; for Gabriel may be an angel. We must also 
know that Gabriel is a man. Then, without begging the 
question, the conclusion, Gabriel is mortal, follows logi- 
cally from the premises, but with no higher probability 
than the major 2:)remise. 

The syllogism is based on classification ; and classifica- 
tion, on the law of Eeasoii and Consequent. An examin- 
ation of a great number of individuals of the human 
race reveals sufficient reason for concluding that, in the 
present condition of man, mortality is the law, or gen- 
eral fact, of humanity. 

Again, suj)pose I find a plant of a class v^hich I have 
never before seen, and am desirous of knowing the char- 
acter of its fruit, if indeed it bear fruit, not at present 
having any. I examine the plant according to the meth- 
ods of botany, and find it to belong to a certain class. 
Heading a further description of the class, I find the 
character of the fruit which plants of this kind bear. I 
then reason thus: 

Plants of this class bear a certain kind of fruit. 
This plant belongs to this class. 
.-.This i^lant bears this kind of fruit. 

This process is legitimate, and the conclusion is an im- 
portant extension of my knowledge. 

But how do botanists know that plants of this kind 
bear such fruit? Surely not because they have seen 

Psy.— 28. 



330 PSYCHOLOGY, 

this plant bear such fruit; but because they have seen a 
great many specimens of this kind of plants bear such 
fruit, and have found no exceptions; that is, they have 
found no plants of this kind bearing a different species 
of fruit. 

Again, suppose we wish to know how many diago- 
nals can be drawn in a chiliagon, a polygon of a thousand 
sides. It would not be practicable to draw all the diag- 
onals and then count them; for they are too numerous; 
but the proper thing to do is to find a general formula 
for the number of diagonals that can be drawn in a 
polygon of n sides. This formula is not found by in- 
duction, that is, by finding the number of diagonals 
that can be drawn in polygons of four, fiYe, six, etc., 
sides; bat by reasoning thus: 

Since the polygon has n sides, it has n vertices. Now, 
from any vertex, a diagonal can be drawn to any ver- 
tex except itself and the two adjacent vertices; hence, 
from each vertex, n-3 diagonals can be drawn, and 
therefore from the n vertices, n times n-3, or n (n-3) 
diagonals can be drawn ; but in this w^ay, each diagonal 
is counted twice; hence the number of diagonals is 
I n (n-3.) • 

This formula has been established without any refer- 
ence to the chiliagon. Now, we reason thus : The num- 
ber of diagonals that can be drawn in a polygon of n 
sides is Jn(n-3), whatever be the value of n; but, in a 
chiliagon, n := 1000; hence, the number of diagonals that 
can be drawn in a chiliagon is 500x997 = 498500. 
Where is there even a shadow of petitio principu here? 

Again, suppose I stand on the lake shore and see a 
vessel sink w4th all on board. Now, need I know that 
John Jones was drowned to know that all on board 
were drowned? I may not even know that John Jones 
was aboard. The next da}^, however, I learn from wit- 



MEDIA TE AEG UMENTS, 331 

nesses who saw the vessel leave a neighboring port that 
John Jones was aboard. Then I reason thus: 

All on board a certain vessel at a certain time were 
drowned. 

John Jones was on board that vessel at that time. 
.-. John Jones was drowned. 

There is no begging of the question here, since I 
knew the truth of the major premise before knowing 
the truth of the conclusion. The minor premise is as 
essential to the truth of the conclusion as the major; 
but if the tw^o j^remises be admitted, the conclusion can 
not logically be denied. 

An enthymeme is an argument w^ith one proposition, 
either of the premises or the conclusion, suppressed, thus: 

All men are mortal. .*. You are mortal. 
You are a man. .-. You are mortal. 
All men are mortal. You are a man. 

Such reasonings are common. The last form is im- 
pressive, as it leaves the hearer to draw his own con- 
clusion. 



CHAPTER XV. 



DEDUCTIVE REASONING. 



Categorical syllogisms are those in which the propo- 
sitions — the two premises and the conclusion — are cate- 
gorical. They are simple or compound. 

1. Simple categorical syllogisms are those which con- 
tain only three terms and three propositions. The three 
terms are the two extremes — the major term, or the 
predicate of the conclusion ; and the minor term, or the 
subject of the conclusion; and the middle term, or the 
medium of comparison. The three propositions are the 
two premises — the major premise, or the premise con- 
taining the major term and the middle term; and the 
minor premise containing the minor term and the mid- 
dle term; and the conclusion containing the major term 
and the minor term. 

Laws warranting the conclusions, (J.), {E^^ (7), (0). 

1st. The universal affirmative conclusion (^) is warranted^ 
if all the middle term is contained in the major, and all the 
minor in the middle. 

This general principle holds whether the relations ex- 
pressed be those of subordination or co-extension, as 
thus shown: 

All M is P. 

All S is M. 
.-. All S is P. 

2d. The universal negative conclusion (E) is ivarranted, 

(332) 




CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISMS. 333 

if all of either extreme is contained in the middle and all 
of the other is excluded from the middle. 

This general principle holds whether the relation in 
the affirmative premise be one of subordination or co- 
extension, and whether the terms in the negative prem- 
ise are contraries or contradictoi^ies. Illustrate by circles. 

All P is M. No P is M. 

ISTo S is M. All S is M, 

.-.No S is P. .-.No S is P. 

3d. The jyarticular affirmative conclusion (7) is warranted, 
if all the middle is contained in both extremes, or if all the 
middle is contained in either extreme, and a part of the mid- 
dle in the other. 

In both cases, the same thing — either all or the same 
part of the middle — is contained in both extremes ; hence, 
the extremes must, in part at least, coincide with each 
other, or a particular affirmative conclusion, at least, is 
warranted. 

These princij)les hold, whether the relations in the 
universal premises be those of subordination or co-exten- 
sion, or the relation in the particular premise be that 
of co-extension, or intersection, or subordination, which- 
ever term be subordinate to the other. Illustrate: 

All M is P All M is P. Some M is P. 

All M is S. Some M is S. All M is S. 

.'. Some S is P. .*. Some S is P. .-. Some S is P. 

If both premises be particular, that is, if some of the 
middle is contained in the major term, and some in the 
minor, it will not be known that it is the same some ; 
the same thing, then, will not be known to be in both 
extremes, and there will be no w^arrant for the conclu- 
sion. The argument will then be a fallacy, thus: 




334 PSYCHOL OGY, 

So mo 21 is P. 
Some ilf is S. 
.'. Some S is P. 

If. however, a part of the middle is contained in one 
extreme, and more tlian the complementary part in the 
other, the same thing — a part of the middle — is con- 
tained in each extreme, and the argument is valid,, thus: 

Two thirds of M is P. 
More than one third of M is S. ' 
.'. Some S is P. 

If, at a certain election, a majority of the electors 
voted for A, and a majority voted for 5, then some 
who voted for A, voted for B. 

4th'. The particular negative conclusion (0) is warranted 
if all the major term is excluded from the middle, and some 
of the minor is contained in the middle; or, if all the major is 
contained in the middle, and some of the minor is excluded 
from the middle; or, if all the middle is contained in the 
minor, and some of the middle is excluded from the major. 

These principles hold for all possible relations of the 
terms in the premises, and in each case some of the 
minor, at least, will be excluded from the major. Illus- 
trate : 

No P is M. All P is M. Some M is not P. 

Some S is M. Some S is not M. All M is S. 

.'. Some S IS not P. .-. Some S is not P. .'. Some S is not P. 

2. A compound syllogism is a combination of simple 
syllogisms. There are several varieties. 

1st. The compound syllogism, composed of a prosyllo- 
gism and an episyllogism — the conclusion of the prosyl- 
logism being one of the premises of the episyllogism, 
thus : 



CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM. 335 

r All B is A. 
Prosyllogism } All C \^ B. 

(..-.AH (7 is ^. -) 

All D is (7. > Episyllogism. 
.-. All D is A. ) 

2d. An epichirema is a syllogism in which the reasons 
for the premises are stated in connection with them, 
thus: 

(1) All true patriots are friends to religion, because 
religion is the basis of national prosperity. Some great 
statesmen are not friends to religion, because their lives 
are not in accordance with its precej)ts. Therefore, some 
great statesmen are not true patriots. 

!A is B, for A h C and C is B. 
D is A, for D is LJ and E is A. 
..D'mB. 

3d. The sorites^ or chain syllogism, is a compound ar- 
gument which may be indefinitely extended. There are 
several varieties which may be illustrated by circles. 

(1) When the predicate of each premise is the subject 
of the next. 



r All A is B. ( All A \s B. 

All B is 0. ^^ ,. I All B is a 

'^^^^ 1 Ml n ' T^ Negative < at ^ • , 

j All (7 IS D. ^ j No (7 IS If. 

I -.All A is D. I -.No A is n. 



(2) When the subject of each premise is the predicate 
of the next. 



f 



All B is A. 

All C is B. 



No B is A. 
All C is ^. 



Atnrmative -< , ,, -r^ - ^ Negative^ . n t^ . /^ 

All D IS (7. ^ AH i) IS C. 

I .-.All D is A I .-.No i) is A 



336 



PSYCHOLOGY, 



(3) When the first and second varieties are combined. 



Negative < 



All A is B, 
All B is C, 
No G is D, 
All E is D. 
All F is JS'. 
All G^ is F. 
.-. No ^ is G. 



Negative < 



V 



All A is 5. 
All B is (; 
All (7 is D. 
No i; is D, 
All i^^ is ^. 
All G is i^. 
.*. No A is ff. 



The laws of the sorites are the following: 

(1) Only one premise can be particular — the first in 
the first variety, the last in the second j and the first or 
last in the third — and the subject of the particular prem- 
ise is the subject of the conclusion. 

(2) Only one premise can be negative — the last in 
the first variety, or the first in the second variety. 

(3) In the third variety, one premise must be negative 
— the last in the first series, or the first in the second 
series. 

The expansion of the sorites is thus effected, 
trate by circles. 



lllus- 



(1) ^ 



' All A is B, 
All B is G 



^ 



All C is B. 
.: All A is D. 






V 



All A is 5. 
All B is G. 
.-. All A is G. 

All G is D. 
All A is G. 
.-. All A is D. 



It will be observed that the minor premise stands 
first in the first simple syllogism, and the major in the 

second. 

This order might, in either or both cases, have been 
reversed; hence, the order of the premises is not essen- 
tial. 



CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISMS, 337 

(2) Expand each of the examples above given to il- 
lustrate the varieties. 

(3) Expand the following concrete example: 
The mind is a thinking substance. 

A thinking substance is a spirit. 

A spirit has no composition of parts. 

That which has no composition of parts is indissoluble. 

That w^hich is indissoluble is immortal. 

Therefore, the mind is immortal. 



Psy.-^29. 



CHAPTEE XVI. 



DEDUCTIVE REASONING. 



Conditional Syllogisms are divided into three classes 
— Hypothetical, Disjunctive, and Dilemmatic. 

1, The hypothetical syllogism is a syllogism having 
an hypothetical major premise and a categorical minor. 
Its form is, therefore, determined by the law of Reason 
and Consequent. 

The hypothetical syllogism is said to be constructive, 
or modus ponens, the mood which posits or affirms, when 
the minor premise affirms the condition, and the conclu- 
sion the consequent, — and destructive, or modus tollens, 
the mood which removes or denies, when the minor 
premise denies the consequent, and the conclusion the 
condition. . 

The rule to be observed is that the antecedent condi- 
tion is to be affirmed in the minor premise and the 
consequent in the conclusion, or the consequent is to be 
denied in the minor premise and the condition in the 
conclusion. The following are illustrations: 

r If ^ has the fever, he is sick. 
Constructive I But A has the fever. 

C Therefore, A is sick. 

!If A has the fever, he is sick. 
But A is not sick. 
Therefore, A has not the fever. 

If the rule be violated, by either denying the antece- 

(338) 



CONDITIONAL SYLLOGISMS, , 339 

dent in the minor premise or affirming the consequent, 
nothing follows, thus: 

If A has the fever, he is sick. 
But A has not the fever. 

It does not follow that A is not sick; for he may have 
some other disease, and hence be sick. It would, how- 
ever, follow that A is not sick, if fever were co-extensive 
with sickness. 

If A has the fever, he is sick. 
But A is sick. 

It does not follow that A has the fever; for his sick- 
ness may be the result of some other disease. It would, 
however, follow that A has the fever, if fever were co- 
extensive with sickness. 

The analysis of the hypothetical syllogism, therefore, 
gives the following results: 

1st. The major premise is an hypothetical proposition, 
enouncing the dependency between a conditioning ante- 
cedent and a conditioned consequent, but affirming noth- 
ing in regard to the actual existence of either. 

2d. The minor premise is a categorical proposition, 
either affirming the conditioning antecedent or denying 
the conditioned consequent. 

3d. The conclusion is a categorical proposition, affirm- 
ing the consequent, if the antecedent is affirmed in the 
minor premise, or denying the antecedent if the conse- 
quent is denied in the minor premise. 

4th. There is no conclusion, when either the anteced- 
ent is denied in the minor premise, or the consequent is 
affirmed, unless the predicate of the antecedent is co- 
extensive with the predicate of the consequent. 

The reduction of hypothetical syllogisms to categorical 



340 



PSYCHOL OOY, 



is effected by substituting for the major premise the 
condition of its truth, as determined in Chapter XII. 
Thus, the condition of the truth of the proposition, If A 
is B^ A is (7, is the proposition, B is C. Hence the 
reduction : 



r If A is B, A is a 
Constructive I But A is B, 

(..-. A is G. 



r B is a 
= \ A i& B, 

.'. A is C. 



Illustrate the above by circles, also the following: 



Destructive 



r If A is B, A is C. 
} But A is not C. 
L .'. A is not B, 



B is a 

A is not G, 

.-. A is not B. 



Clf A is B, G is JD. 
Constructive -j But A is B, 

(-.•. (7 is D. 



A is jB. 
G is ^. 
.-. C is B. 

B is B. 
^} G is B. 

.'. G is D. 



rlf^is^, (7isi). 
Destructive < But (7 is not D. 
L.-. J- is not J5. 



r 



= < 



B is D. 
G is not Z). 
.-. G is not jS. 

(7 is A. 

G is not J5. 

.-. Some A is not B. 



The last constructive syllogism may be thus reduced 

The case of A being B, is the case of G being D. 
The present case is the case of J^ being B. 
.*. The present case is the case of C being 7). 



CONDITIONAL SYLLOGISMS. 341 

Construct hypothetical syllogisms having for major 
premises the hypothetical propositions of Chapter XII. 
Eeduce them to categorical by employing the conditions 
of their truth as premises. 

2. The disjunctive syllogism is a syllogism having a 
disjunctive major premise, and a minor premise in which 
the number of alternatives is reduced. 

1st When there are only two alternatives. In this case, 
the form is determined by the law of contradictories. 

There are two moods: — -the affirmative, or modus po- 
nendo tollens, the mood which by affirming denies, when 
the minor premise affirms one of the alternatives, and 
the conclusion denies the other, — and the negative, or 
modus tollendo ponens, the mood which, by denying, af- 
firms, when the minor premise denies one of the al- 
ternatives, and the conclusion affirms the other: 

The following is the modus ponendo tollens: 

A is either B or C. 
But A is B. 
.-. A is not C. '^ 

The modus ponendo tollens proceeds on the supposition 
that there is opposition, contradictory or contrary, be- 
tween the alternatives. If the opposition is contradictory, 
the major premise is known, a priori, to be valid; but if 
the opposition is contrary, the truth of the major prem- 
ise is determined a posteriori. In either case, if one al- 
ternative is affirmed, the other must be denied. 

If there is no opposition between the alternatives, the 
affirmation of one does not involve the denial of the 
other. Thus, if we say : "A good book is valued either 
for the usefulness of its contents or the excellence of its 
style," it does not follow that if valued for the useful- 
ness of its contents, it is not valued for the excellence 



342 PSYCHOLOGY, 

of its style. These alternatives are not in opposition, 
and the book may be valued both for the usefulness of 
its contents and for the excellence of its style. 

The alternatives are always diverse, but may be either 
congruents or conflictives, which are the two species 
embraced by the genus diverse things. 

The following is the modus toUendo ponens: 

A is either B or (7, 
But A is not B, 

• r,A is a 

The book is valued either for the usefulness of its 
contents or the excellence of its style. But it is not 
valued for the usefulness of its contents; therefore, it 
is valued for the excellence of its style. This will be a 
true conclusion, if the major premise be true, whether 
there is opposition between the alternatives or not. 

The analysis of the disjunctive syllogism in the case 
considered, therefore, gives the following results: 

(1) The major premise is a disjunctive proposition ex- 
pressing two alternatives. 

(2) The minor premise is a categorical proposition af- 
firming or denying one alternative. 

(3) The conclusion is a categorical proposition deny- 
ing one alternative, if the minor premise affirms the 
other, and if the alternatives are conflictives, or affirm- 
ing one alternative, if the minor premise denies the other, 
whether the alternatives are congruents or conflictives. 

(4) If the alternatives are not conflictives, the modus 
ponendo tolleiis fails, but the modus tollendo ponens is still 
valid. 

2d. When there are more than two alternatives. In this 
case the minor premise may be either categorical or 
disjunctive, thus: 



CONDITIONAL SYLLOGISMS. 



343 



r 



Affirmative ^ 



( A is either J5, C\ D, or ^. 

] But A is 5. 

L.-.A is neither C, J), nor U. 

iui is either B, C, D, or ^\ 
But J is either B or C. 
.-.A is neither D nor LJ. 



Negative -^ 



A is either B, C, D, or K 
But J. is neither B, C, nor -D. 
.-. A is ^. 

A is either B, C, D, or U. 
But J. is neither B nor (7. 
.-.J. is either D or ^. 



The laws aj^plying to more than three conflictive al- 
ternatives are the following: 

(1) Affirming a j^art of the disjunctives, determinately 
or indeterminately, in the minor premise, denies all the 
others in the conclusion if the alternatives are conflict- 
ives, but not if the alternatives are congruents. 

(2) Denying a part of the alternatives in the minor 
premise, affirms the rest, in conclusion, determinately or 
indeterminately, according as one or more remain, whether 
the alternatives are conflictives or congruents. 

If the minor premise neither affirms nor denies an al- 
ternative, but affirms something to be contained in the 
subject, the conclusion is disjunctive, thus: 

• 

B is either C or D. 
Ah B. 
.'.A is either C or D. 

This syllogism is, in thought, categorical. 
3. The diiemmatic syllogism is a syllogism having 
an hypothetical major premise and a disjunctive minor. 



344 



PSYCHOLOGY, 



There are at least four forms, as follows: 
1st. The simple constructive dilemma. The major prem- 
ise has different antecedents and the same consequent; 
the minor j)remise disjunctively affirms the antecedents; 
and the conclusion affirms the consequent, thus: 



If A is B. X is Y. 



cA\^B, 



it A IS a, Ji \^ l.~\ CA IS i/, ^ 

If (7 is i), Jr is y. [ But either] or (7 is D, [ .-. X is T. 
If E is F, X is Y. J (or ^ is i^. 3 

If the minor premise had been, X is not F, the con- 
clusion would have been, A is not ^, G is not D, and E 
is not F, This is virtually a destructive hyj)othetical 
syllogism, but is not strictl^^ dilemmatic, since the minor 
premise is not a disjunctive proposition. 

2d. The simple destructive dMemma. The major prem- 
ise has the same antecedent and different consequents; 
the minor premise disjunctively denies the consequents; 
and the conclusion denies the antecedent, thus: 

If A is -S, (7is Z). ^ r G is not D, ^ 

If A is B, E is F. V But either \ or ^ is not F^ V .\ A is not B, 

If^isi?, G^isJyJ (.orG^isnotll.J 

If the minor premise had been A is B^ the conclusion 
would have been, (7 is D^ E is i^, and G is H^ which is 
virtually a constructive hypothetical syllogism but not 
dilemmatic. 

3d. The comj)lex constructive dilemma. The major prem- 
ise has different antecedents and different consequents; 
the minor premise disjunctively affirms the antecedents; 

and the conclusion disjunctively affirms the consequents, 
thus : 



If A is 5, G is H. \ 

If G is B,J is K. [But either 
If E is F. E \s M.) 



A is B, 
or G is D, 
or E is F, 



. Either G is //, J is K. or X is M. 



CONDITIONAL SYLL O GISMS. 345 

4th. The complex destructive dilemma. The major prem- 
ise has different antecedents and different consequents; 
the minor premise disjunctively denies the consequents; 
and the conclusion disjunctively denies the antecedents, 
thus: 

If A is B, am H.\ rG is not H, 

If is D, J is X. y But either ^ or J" is not K, 
If E is F, L is M. ) ( or X is not M. 

.-.Either A is not J5, is not D, or E is not F. 

To which class does the following dilemma belong? 

If a science furnishes useful facts, it is worthy of cul- 
tivation ; if the study of it exercises the reasoning pow- 
ers, it is worthy of cultivation; but a science either fur- 
nishes useful facts, or its study exercises the reasoning 
powers; therefore, it is worthy of cultivation. 

4. The reductio ad absurdum is an indirect argument 
which, by employing some form of the conditional syl- 
logism, proves a proposition to be true by showing that 
the supposition that it is false involves an absurdity. 
It is based on the harmony of truth. 

There are two cases of the reductio ad absurdum: 

1st. When only two relations are possible — one ex- 
pressed by the given proposition, and the other by its 
contradictory. 

In this case, either the given proposition or its con- 
tradictory is true. The given proposition is proved 
true by assuming that it is false, or, which is virtually 
the same, that its contradictory is true. We then rea- 
son on this assumed proposition till we reach a conclu- 
sion conflicting with a known truth, and hence absurd. 
Therefore, the assumed proposition, which led to this 
absurdity, is false, and if false, its contradictory, or the 
given proposition, is true, and is hence demonstrated. 



346 PSYCHOLOGY. 

Thus, of two unequal quantitieSj a and 6, we can prove 
that ay>h^ if we can show that the supposition, aKb, 
involves an absurdity. 

2d. When more than two relations are possible — one 
expressed by the given proposition, and the others by 
its contraries. In this case, the given proposition, or 
some one of its contraries, is true. The given proposi- 
tion is proved true, by assuming that it is false, or, which 
is virtually the same, that some one of the contraries is 
true. We then show that each of these contraries is 
false, because involving an absurdity; but the falsity of 
all the contraries implies the truth of the given propo- 
sition, which is, therefore, demonstrated. Thus, we can 
prove that a = ^, if we can show that each of the sup- 
positions, a > 6 and a < ^, involves an absurdity. 

In dealing with the second case, care must be taken 
that all possible contraries are considered. If a possible 
contrary is omitted, the conclusion is vitiated. 

As an example of this method, prove that the side 
opposite the greater of two unequal angles of a triangle is 
greater than the side opposite the less, — having first proved 
that the angles opposite the equal sides of an isosceles tri- 
angle are equal, and that the ayigle opposite the greater of 
two unequal sides of a triangle is greater than the angle 
opposite the less. 



CHAPTEE XVII. 



DEDUCTIVE REASONING, 



A formal fallacy is a fallacy which, in its form, vio- 
lates some law of thought. It is also called a paralogism^ 
or a fallacy in dictione or in voce. 

1. Classification and Illustrations. — There are several 
varieties. 

1st. A paradox^ or violation of a fundamental law of 
thought. It is self-contradictory, and, when explicitly 
stated, is at once detected. Thus, A is non-A. A part 
is greater than the whole, etc. 

2d. Fallacies in immediate inferences. The varieties are : 

(1) Fallacies in the relation of the propositions, (J.), (F), 
(J), (0). Thus, inferring from the falsity of either (J.) 
or (^),the truth of the other; from the truth of either 
(7) or (0), the falsity of the other; from the falsity of 
(J.), the falsity of (I) ; from the truth of (7), the truth 
of (A) ; from the falsity of (JS"), the falsity of (0); from 
the truth of (0), the truth of (^). 

(2) Fallacies in conversion. Thus, All S is P; .-.All 
P is S. All seeds come from plants; .*. All plants come 
from seeds. Some S is not P; Some P is not S. Some 
animals are not horses; .-.Some horses are not animals. 

(3) Fallacies in extending modal restriction. Thus, ;S' is 
possibly P; .-. S is probably P. S is probably P; .-. S 
is actually P. aS^ is actually P; .-. S is necessarily P. 

(4) Fallacies from composition. Thus, A and B are C ; 
.'.A is C. In numbers, this fallacy is apparent, as 3 
and 2 are 5; .-. 3 is 5. 

( 347 ) 



348 PSYCHOL OGY. 

(5) Fallacies from determinants. Thii8j a pony is a 
horse; .-.A big pony is a big horse. 

3d. Fallacies in mediate inferences. There are several 
varieties : 

(1) Undistributed middle. This fallacy consists in com- 
paring each of the extremes with a part of the middlCy 
and, as it is not certain that it is the same part, the 
extremes are not known to be compared with the same 
thing, and hence there is no warrant for inferring their 
relations to each other. It will suffice, however, if the 
middle term be distributed in one of the premises. 

Let it be remembered that a term is distributed, if it 
is either the subject of a universal proposition or the 
predicate of a negative; and that a term is to bo re- 
garded as undistributed, if it is either the subject of a 
particular proposition or the predicate of an affirmative. 

In a valid argument, the conclusion is not only com- 
patible with the premises, but is necessitated by them, 
otherwise the argument is a fallacy. 

Take an argument with an undistributed middle: 



All P is Jf. 

All S is M. 
.'. All S is P. 



The middle term is undistributed, since in each term 
it is the predicate of an affirmative. The conclusion 
does not necessarily follow from the premises, as seen 
from the first diagram; but it may be accidentally true, 
as seen from the second, yet the argument is no less a 
fallacy, since the conclusion is not necessitated. 

If the relation in the major premise is known to be 
that of co-extension, in which case the conclusion is 
true, the argument can be relieved from the appearance 





FORMAL FALLACIES. 349 

of fallacy by converting the major premise, as is ad- 
missible in case of co-extension, thus: 

All M is P. 
All S is M, 
.'. All S is P. 

What is the fallacy in the following argument? 

Every country under a tyranny is distressed. 
This country is distressed. 
.-. This country is under a tyranny. 

(2) Illicit process. This fallacy consists in distributing 
either the major or minor term in the conclusion, when 
it is not distributed in its premise. Take the following 
argument : 

All M \^ P P is distributed in the conclusion, since 
No S is M. it is the predicate of a negative, but is 
.-. No S is P. undistributed in the major premise, since 

it is the predicate of an affirmative; 
hence, we have an illicit process of the major term. 
Show the fallacy by circles. Take also the following: 

All M \^ P. S is distributed in the conclusion, since 
All M is S. it is the subject of a universal, but it is 
.*. All S is P. undistributed in the minor premise, since 

it is the predicate of an affirmative; 
hence, we have an illicit process of the minor term. 
Show the fallacy by circles. 

(3) Farticular premises. This name aids in detecting 
certain fallacies, since we know at once that there is a 
fallacy, when each of the premises begins with the word 
some; but this case is not another class of fallacies, since, 
it involves either the undistributed middle, or an illicit 



350 PSYCHOLOGY, 

process. Show this in the following, and illustrate by 
circles: 

Some P is M, Some M is P. 

Some /S is ilf. • Some 8 is not M. 

.'. Some S is P. .*. Some S is not P. 

(3) A universal conclusion and one particular premise. 
This involves either an undistributed middle or an illicit 
process. Show this in the following, and illustrate by 
circles: 

Some M is P. All M is P. 

All S is M. Some S is not M. 

.', All S is P. .-. Some aS is not P. 

Some Jf is not P. Some ilf is not P. 

All If is 8. . All >S is M. 

.-.No >S is P. .-.ISro aS is P. 

(5) Negative premises. In this case, no conclusion is 
warranted; for the denial of certain relations between 
the middle term and the extremes, warrants neither the 
affirmation nor denial of any relation between the ex- 
tremes. Thus, show the fallacy of the following b}^ cir- 
cles: 

No P is M. Some M is not P. 

No 8 is M. No 8 is M. 

.'. No 8 is P. .*. Some 8 is not P. 

(6) ^n affirmative conclusion and one negative premise. 
The affirmative premise expresses the agreement, in 
whole or in part, of one of the extremes with the mid- 
dle; and the negative premise, the disagreement of the 
other extreme with the middle; hence, if any relation of 
the extremes follows, it is that of disagreement, or the 



FORMAL FALLACIES, 351 

conclusion is negative. Show the fallacy of the follow- 
ing by circles: 

No M is P. No M is P. 

All 8 is M, . Some >9 is M. 

.-. All >S is P. .-. Some 8 is P. 

(7) A negative conclusion from affirmative premises. Both 
extremes agree in whole or in part with the middle, 
and hence if any relation is warranted, the extremes 
must agree with each other, or the conclusion is affirm- 
ative. 

Show the fallacy of the following by circles : 

All ilf" is P. All M is P. 

All 8 is M. Some 8 is M. 

.-.No 8 is P. .-. Some 8 is not P. 

(8) Fallacies in hypothetical syllogisms. This fallacy 
arises either when we deny the condition in the minor 
premise, and the consequent in the conclusion, or when 
we affirm the consequent in the minor premise, and the 
condition in the conclusion. 

The following is an example of the first kind: 

If this man has stolen, he is immoral. 
But he has not stolen. 
.-. He is not immoral. 

The following is an example of the second kind: 

If this man has stolen, he is immoral. 
But he is immoral. 
.-. He has stolen. 

(9) Fallacies in disjunctive syllogisms. This fallacy 
arises when, in case there is no conflict between the al- 



352 PSYCHOLOGY, 

ternatives, we affirm one in the minor premise and deny 
the other in the conclusion. 

The following example will illustrate : 

This science i& valued either for knowledge or for 
discipline. 

It is valued for knowledge. 

.*. It is not valued for discipline. 

It may be valued for both knowledge and discipline. 

(10) Fallacies in dilemmatic syllogisms. These are 
analogous to those in the hypothetical syllogism, and 
consist in denying the condition, and hence the conse- 
quent, or in affirming the consequent, and hence the 
condition. 

(11) Fallacy of four terms. The use of four terms in 
a syllogism involves a fallacy nicknamed the logical 
quadruped. In this case, there are either two middle 
terms, and the extremes are separately compared with 
diiferent things, thus affording no warrant for inferring 
their relations to each other, or thei:e is a term in the 
conclusion not found in either premise, in which case 
one extreme is not compared with the middle, and hence 
its relation to the other extreme can not be inferred. 

The fallacy in this form is too glaring to deceive; 
hence, it generally assumes the form called the fallacy 
of equivocation — the same word being used with two 
distinct meanings. There are apparently but three terms, 
though in reality four. 

Any one of the three terms, the major, the minor, or 
the middle, is liable to be equivocal, but it is more fre- 
quently the middle term which is thus used in a double 
sense. In this case, the fallacy is called the fallacy of 
the amMguous middle. The following are illustrations: 

Light is contrary to darkness. 



FORMAL FALLACIES. 353 

Feathers are light. 
.-. Feathers are contrary to darkness. 

All criminal actions ought to be punished by law. 
Prosecutions for theft are criminal actions. 
.-. Prosecutions for theft ought to be punished by law. 

(12) Fallacy of amphibology. This fallacy consists in 
the use of an ambiguous grammatical construction. 
Thus, the conclusion depending on the interpretation 
of the proposition, '^ The duke yet lives that Henr^^ 
shall depose," would be doubtful, since, from the con- 
struction, it is uncertain whether Henry is to depose 
the duke, or the duke, Henry. 

(13) The fallacy of composition. This fallacy occurs 
when the middle term is used distributively in the 
major premise and collectively in the minor, as in the 
following example: 

Three and four are two numbers. 
Seven is three and four. 
.-. Seven is two numbers. 

(14) The fallacy of division. This fallacy occurs when 
the middle term is used collectively in the major prem- 
ise and distributively in the minor, as the following: 

Seven is one number. 
Three and four are seven. 
.-. Three and four are one number. 

(15) The fallacy of accent or emphasis. This fallacy 
consists in misplacing the accent or emphasis. In the 
proposition, "The study of Logic is not supposed to 
communicate a knowledge of many useful facts," place 
the emphasis first on supposed^ then on 7nany, then on 
useful^ and state the sense expressed in each case. 

Psy.— 30. 



354 PSYCHOL OGY, 



(16) The fallacy of figure of speech. Thus, the follow- 
ing will illustrate: 

A hero is a lion. 
A lion is a quadruped. 
.-.A hero is a quadruped. 

Designing persons are untrustworthy. 
Every body forms designs. 
.-. Ever}^ body is untrustworthy. 

2. Bules guarding against fallacy. — These are. 

1st. Every syllogism must have three, and only three, 
terms — the major term, the minor term, and the middle 
term, and these terms must not be ambiguous. 

2d. Ever}^ syllogism must have three, and only three, 
propositions — the major premise, the minor premise, 
and the conclusion, and these propositions must not be 
ambiguous. 

3d. The middle term must be - distributed at least in 
one of the premises. 

4th. A term must not be distributed in the conclusion, 
unless it is distributed in one of the premises. 

5th. If both premises are affirmative, the conclusion 
is affirmative. 

6th. If one premise is affirmative and the other neg- 
ative the conclusion is negative. 

7th. If both premises are negative there is no con- 
clusion. 

8th. If the conclusion is universal, both premises are 
universal. 

9th. If one premise is universal and the other partic- 
ular, the conclusion is particular. 

10th. If both premises are particular, there is no con- 
clusion. 

3. General laws of the syllogism. — These laws, on the 



FORMAL FALLACIES, 355 

supposition that no formal fallacy is involved, are the 
following : 

1st. The truth of the premises involves the truth of 
the conclusion ; for the premises necessitate the conclu- 
sion. 

2d. The falsity of the conclusion involves the falsity 
of one of the premises; for if the premises were true, 
the conclusion would be true. 

3d. The falsity of a premise does not necessitate the 
falsity of the conclusion. 

4th. The truth of the conclusion does not involve the 
truth of the premises. 

The third and fourth laws are thus illustrated: 

Every month has thirty days 
April is a month. 
.-. April has thirty days. 

4. Miscellaneous examples of fallacies. — Character- 
ize the following fallacies, stating the irregular examples 
in due form : 

1. All good fathers provide food and clothing for their 
children. Mr. B provides food and clothing for his 
children. Therefore, Mr. ^ is a good father. 

2. All moral beings are accountable. IN^o brute is a 
moral being. Therefore, no brute is accountable. 

3. No Pagan is a Christian. Every villager is a Pa- 
gan. Therefore, no villager is a Christian. 

4. Nothing is better than wisdom. Dry bread is better 
than nothing. Therefore, dry bread is better than wis- 
dom. 

5. His imbecility of character might have been in- 
ferred from his proneness to favoritism; for all weak 
princes have this failing. 

6. The express trains do not stop at this station. The 



356 PSYCHOLOGY. 

train that has just passed did not stop at this station. 
Therefore, the train that just passed is an express train. 

7. A successful author must be very industrious or 
very talented. Gibbon was a successful author and 
was very industrious. Therefore, Gibbon was not very 
talented. 

8. Who is most hungry eats most. Who eats least is 
most hungry. Therefore, who eats least eats most. 

9. The end of a thing is its perfection. Death is the 
end of life. Therefore, death is the perfection of life. 

10. He who believes himself to be always in the right 
in his opinions lays claim to infallibility. You always 
believe yourself to be right in your opinion. Therefore, 
you lay claim to infallibility. 

11. Improbable events happen every day. But what 
happens every daj^ is probable. Therefore, improbable 
events are probable. 

12. The ancient Greeks produced the greatest master- 
]3ieces of eloquence and philosophy. The Lacedemonians 
were ancient Greeks. Therefore, the Lacedemonians 
produced the greatest masterpieces of eloquence and 
philosophy. 



CHAPTEE XVIII. 



DEDUCTIVE REASONING. 



A material fallacy is a fallacy in the matter of 
thought. It is said to be a fallacy in re, and is, there- 
fore, extra dictionem, and, in fact, extra logical, unless it 
is also faulty in form. 

Material fallacies can be detected only hj those ac- 
quainted with the subject-matter, or with the special 
science under consideration. Thus, to settle matters of 
fact pertaining to plants, we appeal to botany; facts 
pertaining to the stars, fall within the province of as- 
tronomy, and so on. 

Though material fallacies can not be detected purely 
by the methods of logic, yet it is important to point 
them out and classify them, thus rendering the mind 
alert, and diminishing the liabilities of falling into error. 

We shall consider eight varieties of material fallacies: 

1. Assumptions. — An assumption is that which is 
taken to be true without evidence. It may be true or 
false; but, resting on no basis of evidence, it is, in either 
case, invalid, not because known to be false, bat because 
not known to be true. To assume an assumption false 
on account of its lack of evidence, is a procedure as in- 
valid as to assume it true. There are several varieties 
of assumptions : 

1st. The want of attention results in non-observation or 

mal-ohservation. Failing to notice many things, we are 

likely to assume their non-existence. Other things, not 

wholly overlooked, are, from inattention, misapprehended, 

( 357 ) 



358 PSYCHOLOGY. 

and assuming them to be what they are not, we are in- 
volved in confusion. 

2d. Prejudice is a fruitful source of assumptions. JSTor 
is it easy to divest ourselves of its influence, though we 
are loath to admit that we are, in any degree, subject to 
its control. Prejudice which leads to assumptions vitia- 
ting our judgments and involving us in error, may arise 
from too high an opinion of ourselves, or from too low 
an opinion of others; from ruling desires; from national, 
party, church, or society relations; from preconceived 
opinions, association, ignorance, or defective education. 
A generous disposition, a love of truth, due caution, and 
patient investigation, are guards against the assumptions 
arising from prejudice. 

3d. Superstition has, especially in the past, been fruitful 
in assumptions; consider the mythologies, oracles, omens, 
witchcrafis, apparitions, ghosts, fairies, signs, and charms. 
Nor has superstition yet lost its influence, as is indi- 
cated by such current sayings as these: ''If it rain the 
first Sunday of the month, it will rain every Sunday." 

^' If you first see the new moon over your right shoulder, 
you will have good luck for that month." '' If you have 
floating tea-leaves in your cup, you will have visitors." 

4th. Hasty generalization leads to assumptions and in- 
volves us in error. We thus assume that what is true 
of ourselves is true of others; that what is true of a 
few individuals of a class is true of the class; that edu- 
cation is not desirable, because a few have risen to emi- 
nence without it; that fortune favors fools, because a 
man confessedly below par has accidentally become rich. 

5th. A ivaiit of thorough investigation may lead to the 
assunifjtion that a given appearance corresponds to the 
reality; that a temporary order of sequence is a law; 
that an accidental antecedent is a cause, or that an ac- 
cidental consequent is an eflect. 



MATEEIAL FALLACIES. 359 

2. The fallacy of accident. — This fallacy consists in 
extending a rule to a case to which it is rendered in- 
applicable by some specific or accidental circumstance. 
There are three varieties. 

1st. Arguing from the general to the special. Thus, 
every man has the right to inculcate his own opinions. 
A magistrate is a man. Therefore, a magistrate is justi- 
fied in employing his official powers in forwarding his 
political or sectarian views. A magistrate has the same 
general rights as other men, and he may properly em- 
ploy his powers as a man, but not as a magistrate, in 
propagating his opinions. 

2d. In arguing from the special to the general. Thus, 
thieves are dishonest ; but thieves are men ; therefore 
all men are dishonest. 

3d. In arguing from one special case to another. Thus, 
certain beggars do not deserve assistance; therefore, 
other beggars do not deserve assistance. 

3. Irrelevant conclusion. — This fallacy, technically 
called ignoratio elenchij consists in arguing to the wrong 
point, or proving one thing when another should be 
proved. This fallacy is the great resource of those who 
have a weak case, or the wrong side of the question. 
A certain English statesman, instead of j)roving the ex- 
pediency of taxing the colonies, which was the real ques- 
tion to be considered, undertook to prove the right. 

A form of this fallacy, called argumentum ad hominem, 
consists in arguing the case, not on its merits, but in 
relation to the opinion or character of your opponent, 
as when it is attempted to refute an opjDonent by prov- 
ing that his present position is inconsistent with his 
previously expressed views or with his character. 

Another form of this fallacv, called araumentiim ad 
populum^ consists in appealing to the prejudice or pas- 
sions of the people. It is the weapon of demagogues. 



360 PSYCHOLOGY. 

There is still another form of this fallacy called ar- 
gumentiim ad verecundiam. It is an apj)eal to reverence 
for resj)ected authority or venerable institutions. 

Closely connected with the irrelevant conclusion, which 
logically follows from the premises, though it is not the 
conclusion in question, is an unwarranted conclusion from 
premises which warrant another conclusion. Thus, it is 
often inferred that the conclusion is false because the 
premises are false or the reasoning is illogical. The true 
inference is, that the conclusion is not proved; but it 
may be trae, notwithstanding the premises are false. 
An able debater once said, "I have undertaken to prove 
the conclusion false, by showing the premises on which 
it is based to be unsound." 

4. The begging of the question, petitio principii, called 
also a circle in reasoning, circulus in probando^ consists in 
taking for one of the premises something which de- 
pends on the conclusion, and then having deduced the 
conclusion, employ it in proving the premise. Thus, it 
is reasoning in a circle, to assume that a party is right, 
and hence conclude that you ought to support it, and 
then attempt to justify the assumption that the party is 
right because you ought to support it. 

The fallacy of reasoning in a circle may be unjustly 
charged. Thus, if your opponent sees that your propo- 
sition will lead to your conclusion, he may attempt to 
evade the force of your argument, by charging you with 
begging the question, and then escape in the cloud of 
dust which he raises. 

5. The fallacy of the consequent. — This is the name 
of an argument so loose that no one can discover its 
cogency. It has no cogency. It is usually character- 
ized by the expression, non sequiter, that is to say, it 
does not follow. 

6. The fallacy of false cause, or non causa pro causa. 



MA TERIAL FALL A CLES. 361 

This fallacy consists in calling one thing the cause of 
another, because it is an antecedent, or one thing the 
effect of another, because it is a consequent. The fallacy 
of mistaking a consequent for an effect is described by 
the phrase, post hoc^ ercjo propter hoc, 

7. The fallacy of many questions. — This fallacy con- 
sists in combining two or three questions in one, so that 
whether answered in the affirmative or negative, the 
answer can be turned to your disadvantage. Thus, if 
the question, "Have you left off beating your mother?" 
is answered in the affirmative, then the retort is that 
you formerly beat her; if in the negative, that you still 
beat her. 

8. The fallacy of objections. — This fallacy consists in 
inferring a conclusion to be false, because objections can 
be raised against it. Very few things could be regarded 
proved, if only those are proved against which no pos- 
sible objection can be raised. It is, perhaps, true that 
objections can be raised against any thing whatever. But 
this does not prove that nothing is true; for objections 
can be raised against either of two contradictor}^ propo- 
sitions, one of which must be true. If, however, a 
proposition conflicts with a known truth, it can not be 
true, and we have a warrant for its rejection. 

Miscellaneous examples of fallacies. — Detect the fal- 
lacy in each of the following examples : 

1. If Christianity were from God, it would be univer- 
sal. It is not universal. Therefore, it is not from God. 

2. You are not what I am. I am a man. Therefore, 
you are not a man. 

3. He who calls 3^ou a man, speaks the truth. He 
who calls you a knave, calls 3^ou a man. Therefore, 
he who calls you a knave, speaks the truth. 

4. You do not know what I am going to ask you 
about. I am going to ask you about the nature of 

Psy.— 31. 



362 PSYCHOLOGY, 

yourself. Therefore, yoii do not know about the nature 
of yourself 

5, The following sophism^ called the Achilles^ was pro- 
posed by Zeno^ the Eleatic, and is very celebrated: If 
Achilles runs ten times as fast as a tortoise one mile 
ahead, he will never overtake it; for when Achilles has 
run this mile, the tortoise has run -^^ of a mile farther; 
when Achilles has run this y^^, the tortoise has advanced 
TOT ^^ ^ mile still farther, and so on, ad infinitum. 

6, According to Zeno, a finite body is impossible. For 
if there be such a body, and if it be divided into any 
number of parts, the sum of the parts ought to be equal 
to the body. Let the number of parts be infinite. Then 
these parts either have magnitude, or they have no 
magnitude; if the parts have magnitude, their sum has 
infinite magnitude, since there is an infinite number of 
parts; if the parts have no magnitude, their sum will 
have no magnitude, since the sum of any number of 
zeros is zero. In neither case is the sum equal to the 
body, as it ought to be, since the sum of all the parts 
is equal to the whole. Hence, the supposition that there 
is a finite body, which led to this absurdity, is false. 

7. The Diodorus Cronus^ so called from its inventor, at- 
tempts to prove the impossibility of motion, thus: If 
motion is possible, a body moves either in the place 
where it is, or in the place where it is not. But it can 
not move in the place where it is, since it fills that 
place, leaving no room. It can not move in the place 
where it is not, for it is not there. Hence, it can not 
move at all, or motion is impossible. 

8. The Litigiosus^ or Beciprociis, is the notorious di- 
lemma concerning a matter of business between Protag- 
oras, the prince of Sophists, and Euathlus, his student 
in the law. Euathlus had contracted to pay his tuition 
fee when he gained his first case. But not being in a 



\ 



m 



MATERIAL FALLACIES. 363 

hurry to commence the practice of law, Protagoras 
sued him for his fee, and thus addressed him in court: 
^' Learn, most foolish of young men, that whatever be 
the decision of the judges, pay me my demand you 
must. For, if the judgment be against you, I shall ob- 
tain the fee b}^ decree of the court; but if the judgment 
be in your favor, I shall obtain my fee by the terms 
of our contract, since you will then have gained your 
first case." 

To this Euathlus replied, ^' Learn, most sapient of 
masters, from your own argument, that, whatever may 
be the decision of the court, absolved I must be from 
the payment of the fee. For, if the decision be in my 
favor, I shall pay nothing according to the decree of the 
court; but if the decision be against me, I pay nothing 
by virtue of the contract, since I shall not have gained 
my first case." 

9. The mentiens, or sophism of the liar, was invented 
by Eubulides, and runs thus: ''If you say that you lie, 
and tell the truth, then you do lie ; but if you tell a lie, 
then you speak the truth. Hence, if you tell the truth 
you lie, and if you lie, you speak the truth." 

10. If an event is to be, it w^ill be, and effort is use- 
less. If it is not to be, it will not be, and effort is use- 
less. But it is evident that the event either is to be, or 
is not to be. Therefore, effort is useless. 

11. According to Empedocles, the subject which knows 
and the object which is known must be of like nature ; 
but the mind knows matter. Therefore, the mind and 
matter must be of like nature. Hence, the mind is re- 
solvable into matter, or matter into mind. 

12. According to M. Comte, the events of the world 
are not controlled by supernatural will; for if so, they 
would be both variable and beyond human control; but 
they are not variable, since they are the objects of hu- 



364 PSYCHOLOGY. 

man prevision in astronomy; neither are thej^ beyond 
human control, since they are subject to human modi- 
fication, as in physics. 

13. Whatever I know, must be as I know, otherwise 
I could not know. I know that you are here. Tliere- 
fbre, you must be here, and hence are not a free agent. 

14. Wiiatever God foreknows must be as He foreknows, 
otherwise he could not foreknow. God foreknows the 
actions of men. Therefore, these actions must be as 
God foreknows. Hence, these actions are necessitated, 
and men are not free agents. 

15. If God is both able and willing to prevent sin, it 
would not occur; but sin does occur. Therefore, God is 
able to prevent it, but not willing; or willing, but not 
able ; or neither willing nor able. If He is able, but not 
willing, He is not holy; if He is willing, but not able, 
He is not omnipotent; if He is neither willing nor able. 
He is neither holy nor omnipotent; but any of these 
consequences is subversive of the idea of God; hence, 
there is no God. 

It may be remarked that fallacy, in general, may be 
summarily divided into fallacy of apprehension, fallacy 
of reasoning, and fallacy of assumption. 

Fallacy of apprehension consists in misapprehension 
in regard either to the proposition itself or to its 
grounds. Its essence is confusion. 

Fallacy of reasoning consists in illogical inference, and 
is either formal or material. 

Fallacy of assumption consists in taking the premises 
for granted without evidence. Probable premises, how- 
ever, ma}" be employed, if the conclusion also be re- 
garded as only probable. 



CHAPTEK XIX. 



DEDUCTIVE REASONING. 



1. A knowledge of the doctrine of Mood and Figure^ 
as developed in this and the following chapter, though 
not essential in testing a sound argument or in detect- 
ing a fallacy, as the preceding discussions prove, is 
nevertheless interesting in itself and in its historical as- 
sociations. 

2. The mood of syllogism is the designation of the 
quantity and quality of its propositions, taken in the 
order of major premise, minor premise, and conclusion, 
each by one of the symbols, ^, ^, /, 0. 

Thus, the mood of the following syllogism i^ E A E. 

No ikf is P. 
All S is M. 

,-. No S is P. 

3. The number of possible moods is thus determined: 
Any one of the four propositions, J., E^ /, O, may be 
the major premise, each having either A^ E, 7, 0, for the 
minor premise, making sixteen combinations of premises, 
each combination having either A, E, I, 0, for the con- 
clusion, making sixty-four possible moods. These sixty- 
four moods are therefore divided into four groups having 
A^ E, 7, O, respectively, for the major j)remise;- each 
group is divided into four sub-groups, having A, E, 7, O, 
respectively, for the minor premise ; and each sub-group 
is divided into four moods, having A, E, 7, 0, respectively, 

for the conclusion, as thus exhibited: 

( 365 ) 



366 



PSYCHOLOGY, 







Group A. 


Group E. 


Group I. 


Group O. 








' A 


A A 


E A A 


I 


A A 


A A 




Sub-group 


A < 


A 
A 


A E 
A I 


E A E 
E A I 


I 
I 


A E 
A I 


A E 
OAT 








u 


A 


E A 


I 


A 


A 








' A 


E A 


E E A 


I 


E A 


E A 




Sub-group 


E < 


A 
A 


E I 


E E E 
E E I 


I 
I 


E E 
E I 


E E 
E I 








u 


E 


E E 


I 


E 


E 


•* 






' A 


I A 


E I A 


I 


I A 


I A 


- 


cy 7 


T 


A 


I E 


E I E 


I 


I E 


I E 




tSub-group 


I < 


A 


I I 


E I I 


I 


I I 


Oil 


1 






A 


I 


E I 


I 


I 


10 


1 






(A 


A 


E A 


I 


A 


A 


I 


Sub-group 


< 


A 
A 


E 

I 


E E 
EOT 


I 
I 


E 
I 


E 
1 








, A 





E 


I 











4. Valid moods are those in which valid arguments 
can be constructed. Invalid moods are those in which 
valid arguments can not be constructed. 

Most of the above moods are invalid, since they vio- 
late one or more of the following rules : 

(1) If both premises are affirmative, the conclusion is 
affirmative. 

(2) If one premise is affirmative and the other nega- 
tive, the conclusion is negative. 

(3) If both premises are negative, there is no conclu- 
sion. 

(4) If the conclusion is universal, both premises must 
be universal. 

(5) If one premise is universal and the other partic- 
ular, the conclusion is particular. 



MOOD OF SYLLOGISMS. 367 

(6) If both premises are particular, there is no con- 
chision. 

(7) The middle term must be distributed in, at least, 
one of the premises. 

(8) ]^o term must be distributed in the conclusion 
which is not distributed in one of the premises. 

5. The negative method o^ finding the valid moods is 
as follows: 

Point out the invalid moods, and tell which of the 
above rules are violated. The moods not violating any 
of the above rules are valid. Tell which moods are 
valid« Eemember that a mood is valid, if a valid argu- 
ment can be constructed in it, though other arguments 
in the same mood be invalid. 

The above method of determining the valid moods 
may be characterized as the negative method^ since the 
valid moods are not positively determined, but are those 
left, after striking out the moods that are invalid. 

The following moods are valid : A A A^ A A I^ A E E^ 
A E 0, A I T, A O 0, E A E, E A 0. E I 0, I A I, 
GAG. The mood LEG involves an illicit process of 
the major term. Prove this. 

6. The positive method of determining the valid moods 
is as follows: 

1st. If the conclusion is A, both premises must be A. 
For since the conclusion is universal, both premises must 
be universal, and hence both A, or both E^ or one A 
and the other E. Both premises can not be E, for then, 
by rule (3), there would be no conclusion. One premise 
can not be A and the other E, for then, by rule (2), 
the conclusion would be negative. Hence, if the conclu- 
sion is warranted at all, both premises must be A^ which 
is the only remaining case. 

That A A A is Si valid mood, is verified by the follow- 
ing valid syllogism : 



368 PSYCHOLOGY, 

All M is R 

All 8 i^M, 
.'. All S is P. 

2d. 7/" the conclusion is E^ one premise must he A, and 
the other E, Prove this and construct valid syllogisms 
having the moods, A E E^ E A E, respectively, 

3d. If the conclusion is 7, both premises are affirmative, 
and one. at least, universal. Prove this and construct 
valid syllogisms having the moods, A A I, A I I, I A I, 
respectively. 

4th. If the conclusion is 0, one premise must be affirma- 
tive, the other negative, and one, at least, universal. 
Prove this, and construct valid syllogisms whose moods 
are, A E 0, E A 0, A 0, A 0, E I 0, respectively. 



CHAPTBE XX. 



DEDUCTIVE REASONING. 



The figure of a syllogism is the position of its middle 
term with respect to the extremes in the premises. 

Let M denote the middle term, P the major, and S 
the minor, and let the order of the letters denote the 
order of the terms. Then we have the following figures: 





1st. Fig. 


-2d. Fig. 


3d. Fig. 


4th. Fig. 


Major premise, 


MP 


P M 


MP 


P M 


Minor premise, 


S M 


S M 


M S 


MS 


Conclusion, 


S P 


S P 


S P 


S P 



In the first figure, the middle term is the subject of 
the major premise and the predicate of the minor. 

In the second figure, the middle term is the predicate 
of both premises. 

In the third figure, the middle term is the subject of 
both premises. 

In the fourth figure, the middle term is the predicate 
of the major premise and the subject of the minor. 

Eemember that a universal proposition, A or E^ dis- 
tributes its subject; that a negative, E or 0, distributes 
its predicate ; that a particular, / or 0, does not distrib- 
ute its subject; that an afiirmative, A or 7, does not, in 
general, distribute its predicate; also, that the middle 
term must be distributed, at least, in one of the premises; 
and that a term must not be distributed in the conclu- 
sion, if it is not distributed in one of the premises, since 

that would be an illicit process. 

(369) 



370 PSYCHOLOGY, 

Figure T. 

cM P. 
1st. Order of terms. The order of the terms, is ^ >S Jf. 

Is P. 

2d. Definition. Figure first is that figure in which the 
middle term is the subject of the major premise and the 
predicate of the minor. 

3d. Valid moods. The valid moods of Fig. I. are thus 
determined : 

(1) To have an affirmative conclusion, both premises 
must be afiirmative. The major premise must be uni- 
versal, otherwise the middle term would not be distrib- 
uted, since it is not distributed as the predicate of the 
afiirmative minor premise. If the minor premise is uni- 
versal, the conclusion may be universal or particular; 
but if the minor premise is particular, the conclusion is 
particular. Hence, A A A^ A A I^ A 1 1^ are valid af- 
firmative moods in Fig. I. The mood A A I i^ usually 
discarded, since the premises warrant the conclusion A, 
which implies I. 

(2) To have a negative conclusion, the major premise 
must be negative, in order to distribute the predicate 
which is distributed in the conclusion. The minor 
premise must be afiirmative, otherwise both premises 
would be negative, and there would be no conclusion. 
The major premise must be universal, in order to dis- 
tribute the middle term, which is not distributed as the 
predicate of the affirmative minor premise. If the minor 
premise is universal, the conclusion may be universal 
or particular; but if the minor premise is particular, the 
conclusion must be particular. Hence, E A E^ E A 0, 
E I Oj are valid negative moods in Fig. I. The mood 
E A is usually discarded, since the premises warrant 
the conclusion E, which implies 0. 



FIGURE OF THE SYLLOGISM, 371 

4th. Doctrine, The doctrine of Fig. I. is the following: 

(1) The middle term is the subject of the major prem- 
ise, and the predicate of the minor. 

(2) The major premise is universal, and the minor af- 
firmative. 

(3) The conclusion agrees in quality with the major 
premise, and in quantity with the minor. 

(4) All forms of conclusion, J., E^ /, 0, are admissible 
in Fig. I. 

5th, Aristotle's dictum. Whatever is predicated, affirm- 
atively or negatively, of any term distributed, may be 
predicated, in like manner, of whatever is contained 
under that term. This dictum is sometimes separated 
into two dicta: — the dictum de omni, Whatever is af- 
firmed of any term distributed, may be affirmed of any 
thing contained under that term ; and the dictum de nidlo, 
Whatever is denied of any term distributed, may be de- 
nied of any thing contained under that term. 

6th. Names. The names of the arguments in Fig. I. 
are b Arb A r A^ c E I Ar En t, d Ar II, and f ErI 0. 
The vowels denote the propositions. Construct these ar- 
guments, using the letters, Jf, P, /S, and test their valid- 
ity by circles, also by Aristotle's dictum. Illustrate by 
concrete arguments. See Schuyler's Logic, pp. 65, 78. 

Figure II. 

rP M. 

1st. Order of terms. The order of terms is I S M. 

Ls P. 

2d. Definition. Figure second is that figure in which 
the middle term is the predicate of both premises. 

3d. Valid moods. The valid moods of Fig. 11. are thus 
determined : 

In order to distribute the middle term, since it is the 
predicate of both premises, one of the premises must be 



372 PSYCHOLOGY, 

negative; hence the other premise must be affirmative, 
otherwise there would be two negative premises, and 
therefore no conclusion. Since one premise is affirmative 
and the other negative, the conclusion is negative, aad 
therefore its predicate is distributed; hence, the major 
premise must be universal in order to distribute its 
subject, which is distributed as the predicate of the con- 
clusion. If the minor premise is universal, the conclu- 
sion may be universal or particular; but, if the minor 
premise is particular, the conclusion is particular. Hence, 
E AE, A E E, E A 0, AEG, E I 0; AGO, are valid 
moods in Fig. II. The moods, E A G, AEG, are usually 
discarded, since the premises warrant the conclusion Ej 
which implies 0. The striking fact in this figure is that 
the conclusion is always negative. 

4th. Doctrine. The doctrine of Fig. I. is the follow- 
ing : 

(1) The middle term is the predicate of both prem- 
ises. 

(2) One premise is affirmative and the other is neg- 
ative. 

(3) The major premise is universal. 

(4) The conclusion is negative, and agrees in quantity 
with the minor premise. 

5th. Names. The names of the arguments in Fig. II. 
are cEsArE, cAmEstrEs, fEstInG, f A k G r G. 

Construct the arguments and test them by circles, and 
illustrate by concrete examples. Aristotle's dictum does 
not directly apply to any of the four figures except the 
first. Syllogisms in Figures II., III., or lY. can always 
be reduced to those in Fig. I., and then tested by the 
dictum, and thus it is shown that all categorical syllo- 
gisms conform to one principle, a fact of great scientific 
interest. The consonants in the names of the syllogisms 
furnish the key to the reduction, as shown hereafter. 



FIGURE OF THE SYLLOGISM. 373 



Figure III. 

cM P. 
Ist. Order of terms. The order of the terms \h} M S. 

Is P. 

2d. Definition. Figure third is that figure in which 
the middle term is the subject of both premises. 

3d. Valid moods. The valid moods of Fig. III. are 
thus determined: 

In order to distribute the middle term, one of the 
premises must be universal. This is also true of any 
syllogism, in any figure. The conclusion can not be 
universal, either affirmative or negative. For: 

(1) The conclusion can not be a universal affirmative; 
for then both premises must be universal affirmative, 
and there would be an illicit process of the minor term, 
since it would be distributed in the conclusion, as sub- 
ject of a universal, but undistributed in the minor 
premise, as the predicate of an affirmative. 

(2) The conclusion can not be a universal negative; 
for then both premises must be universal, one affirma- 
tive, and the other negative; if the major premise is 
affirmative, there would be an illicit process of the major 
term, since it would be distributed in the conclusion as 
predicate of a negative, but not distributed in the major 
premise as predicate of an affirmative; if the minor prem- 
ise is affirmative, there would be an illicit process of the 
minor term, since it would be distributed in the conclu- 
sion, as the subject of a universal, but not in the minor 
premise, as predicate of an affirmative. 

Since the conclusion can be neither a universal affirm- 
ative nor a universal negative, it is particular, which is 
the striking fact in this figure. 

If the conclusion is affirmative, both premises must be 



374 PSYCHOLOGY, 

* 

affirmative. If the conclusion is negative, the major 
premise must be negative, in order to distribute its 
predicate, the major term, which is distributed as the 
predicate of the negative conclusion; and, therefore, the 
minor premise must be affirmative. Hence, A A I^ I A I, 
All, E AG, OAO, EI 0, are valid moods in Pig. III. 
4th. Doctrine. The doctrine of Fig. III. is the follow- 
ing : 

(1) The middle term is the subject of both premises. 

(2) One premise is universal, and the miinor is affirm- 
ative. 

(3) The conclusion is particular and agrees in quality 
with the major premise. 

5th. Names. The names of the arguments in Pig. III. 
are, dArApt I, dis A m Is, dAtlsI, f El AptOn, 
d Ok Am 0, fErlsO. Construct the arguments and 
test them by circles ; also illustrate by concrete examples. 

PiGURE IV. 

rPM. 
1st. Order of terms. The order of terms is^ M S. 

(s P, 

2d. Definition. Pigure fourth is that figure in which 
the middle term is the predicate of the major premise 
and the subject of the minor. 

3d. Valid moods. The valid moods in Pig. TV. are 
thus determined: 

(1) If the conclusion is affirmative, both premises must 
be affirmative, the minor premise universal, in order to 
distribute the middle term which is not distributed as 
the predicate of the affirmative major premise, the major 
premise may be universal or particular, and the conclu- 
sion must be particular, otherwise there would be an 
illicit process of the minor term, which is not distrib- 
uted as the predicate of the affirmative minor premise. 



FIGURE OF THE SYLLOGISM. 375 

Hence, the valid affirmative moods in Fig. lY. are A A I, 
lAL 

(2) If the conclusion is negative^ one premise must be 
affirmative and tlie other negative, and the major prem- 
ise must be universal in order to distribute its subject, 
which is distributed as the predicate of the negative 
conclusion; and if the major premise is affirmative, the 
minor must be negative, since the conclusion is negative, 
and universal, in order to distribute the middle term, 
which is not distributed as the predicate of the affirm- 
ative minor premise, and the conclusion may be univer- 
sal or particular; but if the major premise is negative, 
the minor must be affirmative, either universal or par- 
ticular, and the conclusion must be particular, otherwise 
there would be an illicit process of the minor term. 

Hence, AEE, AEG, EA 0, EIOj are valid negative 
moods in Fig. TV. The mood AE is usually discarded, 
since the premises warrant E, which implies 0. 

4th. Doctrine. The doctrine of Fig. TV. is the following: 

(1) The middle term is the predicate of the major 
premise and the subject of the minor. 

(2) Either the major premise must be negative or the 
minor universal. 

(3) If the conclusion is affirmative, both premises must 
be affirmative, the minor universal, the major universal 
or particular, and the conclusion particular. 

(4) If the conclusion is negative, the major premise 
must be universal, and if affirmative, the minor premise 
must be a universal negative, and the conclusion uni- 
versal; but if the major premise is negative, the minor 
must be affirmative, either universal or particular, and 
the, conclusion must be particular. 

(5) All forms of conclusion, except A, are admissible 
in Figure TV. 

5th. Names. The names of the arguments in Fig. TV. 



376 PSYCHOLOGY. 

are, hrAmAnt Ip^ c A mEnEs^ d Im A r Is, fEsAp 0, 
frEsIs On. Construct these arguments^ test them by 
circles, and ilhistrate by concrete examples. 

The fourth figure was not recognized by Aristotle, 
but is supposed to have been introduced by Galen. 

It is an awkward figure, and the propriety of giving 
it a place among the figures is questioned by many 
logicians. See Mahan, pp. 121-4; Hamilton, pp., 285, 
302, 626; Coppee, p. 117; Tappan, p. 347; Thompson, 
pp. 201-6; Wilson, p. 110; Whateley, p. 96; Davis, 156-8. 

5. Comparative view of the four figures. 

1st. In the first figure, the middle term is the subject 
of the major j)remise and predicate of the minor; the 
major premise is universal, and the minor affirmative; 
the conclusion agrees in quality with the major premise, 
and in quantity with the minor; every conclusion. A, 
E, /, 0, is admissible in this figure, and A in no other; 
the dictum is directly applicable only to this figure, 
which, from this fact, as well as from its clearness, has 
been regarded by Aristotle and by other logicians, as 
the most perfect of all the figures. 

2d. In the second figure, the middle term is the predi- 
cate of both premises; one premise is affirmative, and 
the other is negative; the major premise is universal; 
the conclusion is negative and agrees in quantity with 
the minor premise; this figure is naturally used in dis- 
proving a statement. 

3d. In the third figure, the middle term is the subject 
of both premises; one premise is universal, and the 
minor is affirmative; the conclusion is particular, and 
agrees in quality with the major premise; this figure is 
naturally used when the middle term is singular, and 
in establishing objections, by proving exceptions to gen- 
eral statements. 

4th. In the fourth figure, the middle term is the predi- 



FIGURE OF THE SYLLOGISM. 377 

cate of the major premise and subject of the minor; 
either the major premise must be negative or the minor 
universal; if the conclusion is affirmative, both premises 
must be affirmative, the minor universal the major uni- 
versal or particular, and the conclusion particular; if 
the conclusion is negative, the major premise must be 
universal, and if affirmative, the minor premise must be 
a universal negative, and the conclusion universal; but 
if the major premise is negative, the minor must be 
affirmative, either universal or jDarticular, and the con- 
clusion must be particular; all the conclusions except A 
are proved in this figure. 

According to Lambert, "The first figure is suited to 
the discovery or proof of the properties of a thing; the 
second, to the discovery or proof of the distinctions 
between things; the third, to the discovery or proof of 
instances and exceptions; the fourth, to the discovery or 
exclusion of the different species of a genus." 

6. The unfigured syllogism. — This demands notice. 

1st. Definition, The unfigured syllogism is an argument 
in which the terms of the propositions do not sustain to 
each other the relation of subject and predicate. 



2d. Examples^ 



A and B always co-exist. 

(V) Positive \ ^ ^^^ ^ always co-exist. 

.-. A and (7 always co-exist. 

A and B alw^ays co-exist. 

(2) Negative ] ^ ^i^^ ^ never co- exist. 

.'.A and C never co-exist. 



3d. Laws. The laws of the unfigured syllogism are 
the following: 

(1) As far as two terms agree with a third term, so 
far they agree with each other. 

Psy.— 32. 



378 PSYCHOLOGY. 

(2) As far as one term agrees and another disagrees 
with a third, so far they disagree with each other. 

4th. Remark. Some logicians have questioned the ex- 
istence of the unfigured syllogism, claiming that such 
syllogisms can always be reduced to those in one or the 
other of the figures. But the question is not, Can the 
unfigured syllogism be made to assume a figure ? but, 
Does it, as it stands, have a figure? 

The following exercises will be useful: 

1st. Eeduce the foregoing examples of the unfigured 
syllogism to syllogisms in the first figure. 

2d. Deduce the conclusion from the following premises, 
and state the figure, mood, and name of the argument: 



(1) 



(2) 



(3) 



(4) 



I All mammalia are vertebrates. 

1 Some amphibious animals are mammalia. 

1 1^0 planets are self-luminous. 
1 All planets are heavenly bodies. 

I ISTo fish suckles its young. 
(The whale suckles its young. 

f Ruminants are not predacious. 
I The lion is predacious. 



3d. Construct an argument having false premises and 
a true conclusion. 

4th. Supply premises which prove the following con- 
clusions, and state the figure, mood, and name of the 
syllogism : 

(1) ]^o vicious conduct is heroic. 

(2) ISTo wicked man is happy. 

(3) Some worthy of admiration are not philosophers. 

(4) Some who are admired are dreaded. 



CHAPTEE XXL 



DEDUCTIVE REASONING. 



Reduction is the transformation of an argument in 
the second, third, or fourth figures into one of the first. 
There are two kinds of reduction — the direct and the 
indirect. 

1. Direct reduction. — The direct reduction of the 
so called imperfect figures to the perfect, that is, the 
second, third, and fourth to the first, is readily accom- 
plished by the subjoined method, than which, as Ham- 
ilton has remarked, " There are few human inventions 
^hich display a higher ingenuity." 

First, thoroughly learn the following lines, which may 
be scanned as Latin Hexameters: 

B ArbAr A, cElArEnt^ dArll, fEr I Oque prions; 
CEsArE, cA7nEstrEs. /Est InO^ fAKOr 0, secundce; 
Tertia, dArApt I, d Is Am Is, dAtlsI, f El Apt On, 
DOkAmO, fEr I s On, habet ; quartet insuper addit 
BrAmAyit Ip, c Am EnEs, d ImAr Is, f E s A p 0, 
frEs Is On. 

The initial consonants denote reduction to syllogisms 
in the first figure, beginning with the same letters. 
Thus, initial b denotes reduction to b Arb Ar A; c, to 
cElArEnt; d, to dAr II ; f, to f Er 1 0. These conso- 
nants do not aid in making the reductions, but are a 
check on the result. 

The other consonants, so far as expressive, have the 

following significations; m denotes that the premises are 

(S79) 



380 PSYCHOLOGY. 

to be transposed; s that the proposition represented by 
the preceding vowel is to be converted simply; j9, that 
the proposition represented by the preceding vowel is to 
be converted by limitation, that is, its quantity is 
changed from universal to particular, except in hrAra- 
Antlp, in which the quantity is changed from particu- 
lar to universal; ^, that the preceding A is to be 
changed to j5J, or to J, and the result converted simply. 
The following are given as specimen reductions : 

r IS^o P is Jf. ^ r 'No Mis P. 

cEsArE ) All >S is J£ V^cElArEnUAWSisM. 
l.-.l^o >S is Pj * (.-.IN'o >Sis P. 

r All P is M. \ r'Eo non-Mis F. 

fAkOrOj Some S is not M. I =fErIO ] Some>S^is non-M. 
(,.'.Some>SisnotP 3 C.'.SomeASisnotP 

The A of the major premise. All P is M, is changed 
to E^ No P is non-M^ as denoted by k^ which converted 
simply, gives No non-M is P. If the minor premise 
remain negative, no conclusion could be drawn, since we 
should have two negative premises ; moreover, the middle 
term would not be the same in form in the two prem- 
ises, giving the ambiguous middle; but if we change (9, 
Some S is not M, to /, Some S is non-M^ these difficul- 
ties will both be obviated, as seen above. 

Reduce all the syllogisms of the second, third, and 
fourth figures to those in the first. 

2. Indirect reduction. — This is accomplished, not by 
the use of the consonants, but by the following nde : 

Substitute the contradictory of the conclusion for the 
major premise^ except in the second figure and in cAmEnEs 
of the fourth, in which substitute for the minor. 

One example will serve to illustrate the method : 



BED UCTION TO THE FIRST FIG UEE, 381 

r No P is ilf. ^ r No P is ilf. \ 

cEsAvE} All S is M. [gives-] Some 8 is P VfErlO 

(.-.NoASisP ; (..-.Some /Sis not ilf J 

But Some S is not ilif is the contradictory of All S is 
M^ which is true by hypothesis; therefore, Some 8 is 
not M is false ; hence, either No P is M or Some 8 is 
P is false; but No P is ilf is true by hypothesis; there- 
fore, Some aS is P is false ; but Some /S is P is the con- 
tradictory of No 8 is P, which is, therefore, true. Ob- 
serve that, in the new syllogism, P is the middle term. 

The truth of the original conclusion is thus estab- 
lished by reasoning in connection with a new argument 
in the first figure. In some cases, the new conclusion is 
the contrary instead of the contradictory of the rejected 
premise; but it is false in either case. The falsity of the 
new conclusion involves the falsity of one of the prem- 
ises ; but one of these premises is a premise in the orig- 
inal syllogism, and is, therefore, true by hypothesis; 
hence, the other premise, which is always the contra- 
dictory of the original conclusion, is false, and since 
false, its contradictor}^, or the original conclusion, is 
true. 

By indirect reduction^ reduce all the syllogisms of the 
second, third, and fourth figures to those of the first, 
and vindicate the original conclusions. 

Construct concrete arguments, as the following, in the 
second, third, or fourth figures, and reduce them by both 
methods. 

No science is capable of perfection. 
All science is worthy of cultivation. 
.-. Something worthy of cultivation is not caj)able of 
perfection. 



CHAPTEE XXII. 



INDUCTIVE REASONING. 



Induction is the process of inferring general proposi- 
tions from particular instances. It includes, therefore, 
both the discovery of the particular instances, and the 
inference of the general proposition. 

Induction may be classified as follows : , 

{Mathematical — demon strative. 
r Perfect — demonstrative. 
Logical I Imperfect —probable. 

Mathematical induction is the process of proving a 
general proposition by means of an empirical fact to- 
gether with a conditional principle. The empirical fact 
is that the proposition holds true for several of the first 
of the consecutive cases; and the conditional principle is 
that if the proposition holds for any case, it holds for 
the next. The nature of mathematical induction will be 
made clear by the following illustrations: 

1. In the series of odd numbers, 1, 3, 5, 7, . . ., find 
any term^ and the sum of the terms. 

To find any term, observe that, for the first term, 
1=1X2 — 1; for the second term, 3=::=2X2 — ^^1; for 
the third term, 5 = 3 X 2 — 1 ; for the fourth term, 7 ^= 4 
X2 — 1; that is, so far as examined, any term is twice 
the number of the term, minus 1, which is the empir- 
ical fact required. 

To prove by mathematical induction that the law is 

(382) 



MATHEMATICAL INDUCTION. 383 

general, it is necessary to prove the conditional princi- 
ple that if the law hold true for any number of terms, 
it holds for the next term. Assuming the law true for 
n terms, we have 1, 3, 5, 7, ... 2 n — 1. 

Since two added to any odd number gives the next 
greater odd number, we have, by adding 2, the next 
term, 



n—lJ^2==2n-^l=2 (n-f 1) — 1 . 



But 2(n + l) — 1 i^ twice the number of the term, 
minus 1; hence, if the law hold for any number of 
terms, it holds for the next term ; but the law does 
hold, as shown above, up to the 4th term; hence, by the 
above principle, it holds for the 5th term; and since for 
the 5th, then for the 6th, and so on up to the nth, that 
is, for any number of terms. 

To find the suvi of the tervis, observe that for one 
term, 1=12; for two terms, 1 -]- 3 ^^ 4: :===: 2^ ] for three 
terms, 1 -\- 3 -\- b = 9 =i^^ ] for four terms, 1 + 3 -f- 5 -|- 7 
= 16=42; and so on, that is, so far as examined, the 
sum of the terms is equal to the square of the number 
of the terms, which is the empirical fact required. 

To prove the law general, it is necessary to prove the 
conditional princif)le, that if it hold for any number of 
terms, it holds for one term more. Assuming it true 
for n terms, we have 

1 _f 3 + 5 + 7 -f , . . + 2 /I — 1 = 7^2. 

Adding the next term to both members, we have 

1 + 3 + 5+7 + -. ..+2 n — l-f2n4-l = n2-f 2/1+1 
==(n + l)2. 

Hence, if the law hold for n terms, it holds for n -j-1 
terms; that is, since n may be any number, if it hold 



384 PSYCHOLOGY. 

for any number of terms, it holds for one term more, 
which is the conditional principle required; but the law 
holds, as shown above, up to the 4th term; hence, by 
the above principle, it holds for five terms; and since 
for five, then for six, and so on for any number of 
terms. Hence, the law is general. 

2. The difference of the same powers of two quanti- 
ties is divisible by the difference of the quantities. 

By actual division, we shall find that 

(a — fc) --- (« — &):=: 1; (a2 — 62-)_^ ^a-~h)z=:a -^b; 

This gives the required empirical fact. 

If we should go on, in this way, to the 100th power, 
and find no exceptions, it would not prove the law gen- 
eral, though it would render it highly probable. This 
is the method of probable induction; and giving only 
probable conclusions, it is tolerated only when no better 
methods are attainable. 

To prove the law general, it is necessary to prove that 
if it hold for any power, it holds for the next higher 
power. 

GBo show this, let us divide a^' + i — 6" + ^ by a — b. 



(2^ + ^ — a'^b 



a 



a *' = quotient 



Eemainder :=a''b — 6^ + i=6(a^ — 6**). 

Now, it is evident that if a'' — b'\ which is a factor 
of the remainder, is divisible by a — 6, the whole re- 
mainder, and consequently the dividend, a^' + i — 6'' + ^, is 
divisible by a — b ; that is, if the difference of any pow- 
ers, of the same degree, of two quantities is divisible by 
the difference of the quantities, then the difference of 



MATHEMATICAL INDUCTION. 385 

the powers one degree greater is divisible by the differ- 
ence of the quantities, which is the conditional principle. 

But it has already been found, by trial, that the. dif- 
ference of the powers of the same degree, up to the 3d 
power, is divisible by the difference of the quantities; 
hence, by the above principle, the difference of the 4th 
powers is divisible by the difference of the quantities; 
and since the difference of the 4th powers, then the 
difference of the 5th powers, and so on to any de- 
gree. Hence, the law is general. 

3. To find the law of bodies falling in a vacuum, on 
the supposition that gravity near the earth is a con- 
stant force. 

Let g be the velocity generated by gravity in one sec- 
ond. Since the body, by its inertia, retains all the 
velocity it has acquired, and gravity is a constant force, 
it receives each second an increment g of velocity; hence, 
the velocity generated varies with the time, and at the 
expiration of the successive seconds, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, . . ., is 

g, 2^, 3^, ^g, 5^, ... 

The body starts from, rest, and is uniformly accelera- 
ted, since gravity is constant; hence, the velocity at the 
expiration of the first second, which is g^ is twice the 
average velocity for the second; therefore, the space 
described the first second is ^g. The space described in 
any second is equal to the space which it w^ould have 
described without gravity, which is equal to the velocity 
at the expiration of the preceding second, plus \g^ the 
space due to gravity for one second. Hence, the spaces 
described in the successive seconds are, 

29^ 2"^' 29i 2"^? "2^? • ' • 

The whole space described in any number of seconds 

Psy.— 33. 



386 PSYCHOLOGY. 

is evidently obtained by taking the sum of the corre- 
sponding number of terms of the last series, and hence is 

By examining these series, we observe that the veloc- 
ity at the expiration of any second is equal to g multi- 
plied by the number of the second; that the space de- 
scribed in each of the successive seconds is equal to \g 
multiplied by one less than twice the number of the 
second; that the whole space is equal to the space de- 
scribed in the first second multiplied by the square of 
the number of seconds. These are the empirical facts. 

To generalize the laws, it will be necessary to show 
that if they hold for t seconds, they hold for t-\-l sec- 
onds. Assuming them true for t seconds, we have, 

(1) g, 2^, 3^, 4.g, ... tg, 

2t—l 

(2) hg, ig, ig, ig, ••. — tt^ g- 



11 

\P) '^g-) 2"?? 2"9'j ~2~?7 • • • ~^^* 

The velocity for the (t-\-V)^^ second is evidently 
(t-\-V)g; the space described in the (t^l)'^ second is 

2f + l 2(^H-1) — 1 
^g + ^g^ which IS equal to —^ g = g; 

the whole space, which is found as before, is 

f^ 2t + l __ t'^+2t+ l _ (?^ + 1) 2 ^ 

~2^ 2^" 2 ^~~ 2^' 



Hence, if the laws hold for t seconds, they hold for 
^ + 1 seconds; that is, since t may be any number of 



MATHEMATICAL INDUCTION, 387 

seconds, if they hold for any number of seconds, they 
hold for one second more, which is the conditional prin- 
ciple; but the laws hold, as shown above, up to five 
seconds; and since for tive, then for six, and so on, for 
any number of seconds up to t. Hence, the laws are 
general. 

Denoting the velocity by v, the space described in the 
V^ second by s\ and the Avhole space by 5, we have 

v=gxt; s' = lgxi2t — l)] s = lgXt''. 

From the foregoing illustrations of Mathematical in- 
duction, it is evident that the empirical fact that the 
law holds for several of the first consecutive cases, which 
is found by trial, gives, by itself, only a probable con- 
clusion, as in probable induction; that the conditional 
principle, gives, by itself, only the conclusion that if the 
law hold for any case, it holds for the next case; and 
that the empirical fact and the conditional principle, 
taken together, give an induction of the utmost gener- 
ality, whose truth is demonstrably certain. 



CHAPTEE XXIII. 



INDUCTIVE REASONING. 



The subsidiaries of induction are experience, observa- 
tion, experiment, hypothesis, analogy, classification, and 
denomination. 

1. Experience is the accumulated knowledge of the 
past, and is either personal, that is, our own experience; 
or foreign, that is, the experience of others, obtained 
from testimony. 

2. Observation is the direction of the attention to the 
facts of matter or mind. It takes the form of percep- 
tion, when the facts are external, or physical, and the 
form of consciousness, when the facts are internal, or 
psychical. 

3. Experiment is the act of placing the facts in cir- 
cumstances favorable for observation, by means of instru- 
ments or apparatus by which we vary the conditions of 
the phenomena. 

In pure observation, we find our instances; but in 
experiment, we make them. By experiment we vary 
the circumstances or degree of the phenomenon under 
consideration, or isolate it, or combine it with other 
phenomena, and thus greatly extend our field of obser- 
vation. Trial is a simple experiment. It may be made 
with little apparatus, or with none at all. 

In some cases, experiment is impracticable, as in as- 
tronomy, where the facts are acquired by observation, 
though the observation may be aided by such instru- 
ments as the telescope. In other cases, experiment is 
( 388 ) 



LOGICAL INDUCTION —SUBSIDIARIES. 389 

indispensable, as in chemistry, Avliere experiment is the 
chief resource. In most sciences, both observation and 
experiment are requisite. 

To make an observation or to perform an experiment 
properly, the mind should be in a vigorous condition, 
and free from prepossession, partiality, or prejudice; 
and the attention should be withdrawn from all irrele- 
vant objects, and concentrated upon the object to be ex- 
amined, which should be divided, if necessary, till the 
perceptions become clear and distinct. 

4. An hypothesis is a supposition made to account for 
the co-existence or succession of phenomena. 

The tendency of the human mind to frame hypotheses 
is very strong. The explanation of this tendency is 
found in the intuition of causality — that every event 
must have a cause. It should be remembered, however, 
that this intuition does not inform us what the cause is, 
but only that there must be a cause. Room is thus left 
for hypothesis; and since the hypothesis may be true or 
false, it should, therefore, be regarded as merely provis- 
ional, till verified or refuted by further investigation. 

The utility of hypotheses is evident from the follow- 
ing considerations: 

1st. An hypothesis, though un verifiable, may be use- 
ful in affording a probable explanation of phenomena 
otherwise inexplicable. The hypothesis of an attenuated 
medium called ether pervading space, accounting for the 
transmission of light from the stars, is an example of 
an hypothesis of this kind. 

2d. An hypothesis may be useful in affording an ex- 
planation, which, though conjectural, may afterwards be 
verified. Kepler discovered the laws of planetary revo- 
lution by making various hyj)otheses, some of which he 
afterwards verified. 

3d. An hypothesis, though it prove false, may be use- 



390 PSYCHOLOGY, 

ful in leading to another which may be verified. Kep- 
ler made no less than nineteen different hypotheses of 
planetary motion before he discovered the truth. 

4th. An hypothesis may be useful in colligating and 
distinguishing the phenomena to be explained, thus di- 
recting the course of investigation, and preventing a 
waste of time and labor. 

The formation of hypotheses is due largely to the im- 
agination ; but as the inventions of this fertile faculty 
are not all worthy of the highest confidence, it is im- 
portant to guard against a hasty acceptance of a plaus- 
ible h3q3othesis. 

The characteristics of hypotheses worthy of considera- 
tion are the following: 

1st. An hypothesis should be probably or at least 
possibly true. 

2d. An hypothesis should, if possible, be of such a 
nature as to admit of verification or refutation, or at 
least of being rendered, by subsequent investigation, 
more or less probable. 

3d. An hyjDOthesis should be capable of accounting for 
all the phenomena, without exception. 

The hypothesis which possesses these characteristics 
may be accepted, provisionally, as true, subject, of course, 
to subsequent verification or refutation. The hypothesis 
which affords, at the same time, an explanation of differ- 
ent classes of facts, has a very high probability of truth. 

The only possible hypothesis which can account for 
the phenomena must be accepted as the true explana- 
tion. Such an hypothesis has the force of an intuition. 

The following example will serve as an illustration 
of an hypothesis considered verified : To account for the 
deflection of the path of a planet from a straight line, 
Newton assumed a force directed towards the center of 
the sun. He then showed that the action of such a force 



LOGICAL INDUCTION—SUBSIDIARIES, 391 

oa a planet, in connection with its projectile force, is 
the only force which could cause the radius vector of the 
planet to describe equal areas in equal times — a fact 
already known as one of Kepler's laws; hence, the hy- 
pothesis of a force directed towards the sun is regarded 
as established. It does not follow^, however, that the 
sun exerts this force, that is, attracts or draws the 
planet towards himself The force may possibly be due 
to currents of ether running in towards the sun. 

Newton also assumed that the deflecting force varies 
inversely as the square of its distance from the sun, and 
proved that this is the only supposition wdiich would 
account for Kepler's second and third laws— facts al- 
ready known; hence this hypothesis is also to be re- 
garded as verified. It is remarkable that this would be 
the law, if the deflecting force is due to currents of 
ether setting in towards the sun, 

5. Analogy is the likeness of relations, or the resem- 
blance of two things, from which we infer that an addi- 
tional fact known of one is probably true of the other. 

The conditions to be complied w^ith in reasoning from 
analogy are the following: 

Ist. The objects compared must agree in certain re- 
spects. 

2d. The attributes observed should be positive and 
essential, and not negative and accidental. 

The conclusion is only probable; but this probability 
is increased in proportion to the number of congruent 
attributes; to the importance of the congruent attributes; 
to the number and accuracy of the observations. 

The following is an example of analogical reasoning: 

A has the attributes p, ^, r, and s. 

L has the attributes p^ q, r, 

.'. L probably has the attribute s. 



392 PSYCHOLOGY. 

This argument can be refuted, if it can be shown : 

Ist. That s is the effect of some cause found in A but 
not in L. 

2d. That there are present with ^ and absent from X, 
certain circumstances which are indispensable to s. 

3d. That L has attributes incompatible with s. 

4th. That the circumstances attending L prevent the 
existence of s. 

As a concrete illustration of an argument from anal- 
ogy, and a counter argument, take the following: 

The earth is an opaque solid, nearly spherical^ derives 
its light and heat from the sun, and is inhabited. 

The moon is an opaque solid, nearly spherical, derives 
its light and heat from the sun. Therefore, the moon 
is probably inhabited. 

If the points of agreement are equally likely to be 
the conditions of life, the probability that the moon is 
inhabited would vary directly as the number of such 
points of agreement. 

The points of difference, that the moon is only a sec- 
ondary, that it is smaller and more rugged, that it re- 
volves on its axis but once in twenty-eight daj^s, that it 
has no atmosphere and no water, present a counter 
probability that it is not inhabited; and this counter 
probability is strengthened, when we reflect that some 
of the circumstances wanting on the moon, such as air 
and water, are indispensable conditions of life on the 
earth; we must, therefore, conclude either that the 
moon is not inhabited at all or that the conditions on 
which life depends on the moon are totally different from 
the conditions on which life depends on the earth. The 
conditions of life on the moon being, therefore, different 
from those on the earth, if they exist at all, the more 
points of resemblance established between the moon and 
the earth, the indispensable conditions of life which exist 



LOGICAL INDUCTION—SUBSIDIARIES. 393 

on the earth being wanting in the moonj the less the 
probability of the supposed different conditions, and con- 
sequently, the less the probability that the moon is in- 
habited. 

Analogical arguments, if not refuted, may be usefully 
employed in showing the reasonableness of the conclusion ; 
in removing prejudice; in silencing objections; in pre- 
paring the mind for direct argument. 

6. Classification and denomination are also subsidiary 
to induction; but these have been sufficiently treated in 
chapters II-Y. of this division. 

The distinction between knowledge and belief may be 
profitably considered in this connection. 

Knowledge implies that a truth be correctly expressed 
by a proposition; that this proposition be clearly ap- 
prehended; that the truth of the proposition, if primitive, 
be known by intuition, either empirical or rational; that 
the truth of the proposition, if derivative, be based on 
grounds whose truth is known by intuition or is logically 
derived from other grounds ultimately known by intui- 
tion. 

Belief implies a proposition based on probability ; and 
this probability may vary between the limits, known 
actuality and known impossibility, without ever reaching 
either limit; for if it reach either limit, the belief is 
transformed into knowledge, either of the truth or of 
the falsity of the proposition. 



CHAPTEE XXIV. 



INDUCTIVE REASONING. 



Logical induction is the process of discovering that 
a certain thing is true of parts of a class, and thence 
inferring that the same thing is true of the whole class. 

Mathematical induction generalizes its common fact, 
or proves it to be a law by showing that if it hold for 
any instance, it holds for the next; but logical induction 
passes from the parts to the w^hole, without the inter 
vention of a conditional principle. 

Logical induction is divided into two varieties — per- 
fect, or demonstrative, when all the instances are ex- 
amined; and imperfect, or probable, when only a part 
of the instances are examined. 

1. Perfect induction is the process of establishing a 
general proposition by an examination of all the par- 
ticular instances. By discovering that a certain thing is 
true of all the parts, we prove that the same thing is 
true of the whole. The following are examples: 

By examination, we find that A has the property P, 
that B lias P, that C has P, and that D has P; but A, 
B^ C, and D constitute the class E ; therefore, all of the 
class BJ have the property P. 

In geometry, sc proposition involving several cases is 
proved to be true for each case, and hence to be uni- 
versally true. The reasoning in each case may be de- 
ductive ; but the method of establishing the general prop- 
osition by establishing its truth in each case, is essen- 
tially inductive. 
(394) 



LOGICAL INDUCTION. 395 

Some logicians assert that what is called perfect in- 
duction is not induction at all, since, after finding that 
a certain thing is true of every case, nothing remains 
but to sum up and state, in one general proposition, 
what is already known. But the process in question 
conforms to the definition of induction, since, from the 
discovery of what is true of the parts, it establishes w4mt 
is true of the whole. Whether we examine all the in- 
stances or only a part of them, is not essential to in- 
duction itself, though it affords the discriminating char- 
acteristic by which we divide induction into perfect and 
imperfect. Perfect induction is the limiting case of im- 
perfect induction. The same general formula which 
expresses the degree of probability of the conclusion in 
imperiect induction, expresses, as will be shown here- 
after, the certainty of the conclusion in perfect induc- 
tion, thus showing, beyond question, that the two are 
sj^ecies of the same genus 

In perfect induction, the finding that a certain fact 
is true in the particular instances, does not warrant the 
certainty of the general conclusion, that it is true in 
all the instances, unless it is also known that the in- 
stances in which the fact is found true are all the in- 
stances. 

The minor premise does not assert that the fact is true 
of all the instances; for then it w^ould be identical with 
the conclusion; but that the instances examined are all 
the instances. The argument is not stated thus: 

A has the property P, so has B, and (7, and D. 
All of the individuals of the class E have P. 
.-. All of the individuals of the class E have P. 



This would be trifling; but the statement is thus 



396 PSYCHOLOGY, 

A lias the property P, so has B and C and D. 
But Aj B^ Cj D are the whole of the class E. 
.'. All of the class JS have P. 

Perfect induction is applicable to those cases in which 
the instances are few in number and accessible. 

2. Imperfect induction is the process of inferring tlie 
probability of a general proposition from an examina- 
tion of some of the particular instances. The following 
is an example: 

By examination^ we find that A has the property P, 
so has By and (7^ and D. . . . . But A, B, C, D, are some 
individuals of the class P; therefore, all of the class JE 
probably have the property P. 

This conclusion is logical so long as it is stated to be 
only probable; but it would be illogical if it were stated 
as certain. 

The following examples will serve to illustrate the 
difference between perfect and imperfect induction , the 
first being perfect, the second imperfect: 

Mercury, Venus, the Earth, Mars, etc., all move round 
the sun from west to east; but Mercury, Venus, the 
Earth, Mars, etc., are all the known planets; therefore, 
all the known planets move round the sun from west to 
east. 

Mercury, Venus, the Earth, Mars, etc., all move round 
the sun from west to east; but Mercury, Venus, the 
Earth, Mars, etc., are all the known planets; therefore, 
all the planets probably move round the sun from west 
to east. 

Whether the induction be perfect or imperfect, there 
must be no exceptions in the cases examined. 

No doubt that in perfect induction, before all the cases 
are examined, the mind jumps to the conclusion, or 
infers the general proposition by an imperfect induction, 



LOGICAL INDUCTION, 397 

and then by a perfect induction verifies its conclusion. 
In an imperfect induction, the conclusion remains un- 
verified. 

A comparison of Probable induction and Analogy leads 
to the following results: 

Ist. By probable induction we infer that if many ob- 
jects of a class have a common quality, all the objects 
of that class probably have that quality; that is, an at- 
tribute known to be present in a part of the extent of 
a class is inferred as probably present in the whole ex- 
tent of that class. 

2d. By analogy we infer that two objects agreeing in 
certain respects, probably agree in other respects; that 
is, an attribute known to be a part of the content of 
one of two objects whose contents agree in many com- 
mon qualities, is inferred as probably a part of the con- 
tent of the other object. 

3d. Probable induction and analogy agree in the fact 
that they give only probable conclusions, and that the 
degree of the probability may vary between the limits, 
impossibility and certainty, without ever reaching either 
limit. 

4th. There is, however, a most intimate relation be- 
tween induction and analogy, which we now proceed to 
point out. Eeasoning by induction is essentially the 
same as reasoning from analogy, but with this modifica- 
tion — that in simple analogy, we reason from one of 
the objects of a class to another object of that class, 
whereas in induction, we reason from several objects of 
a class to the remaining objects of the class, thus in- 
creasing the probability of the inference, by increasing 
the extent of the evidence, and diminishing the proba- 
bility of the inference, by increasing the extent of the 
conclusion. 

Let A and L be two objects of a class, each known 



398 PSYCHOLOGY, 

to have the qualities, p^ q; r, and let A also be known 
to have the quality 5, then we infer that L probably 
has the quality s. This is reasoning from analogy. The 
argument is not, that because we have found s combined 
with p, q^ r, in many objects of the class, we shall, there- 
fore, find s combined with p, q, r, in L; but that because 
we have found that A and L agree in possessing so 
many qualities, ^, q^ r, in common, we may likewise 
find any quality, s, which is in A^ also in L. The ar- 
gument is based on the number of qualities common to 
the two objects, A and i, and not on the number of 
objects having the common qualities. 

ISTow, if another object 5, of the same class, has the 
same qualities, p^ q^ r, how would the probability that L 
has s be affected, if it is also found that B has sf The 
probability of the inference that L has s would evidently 
be strengthened by finding that B has s. Here we be- 
gin to pass from analogy to induction, not on the side 
of the conclusion, but on that of the evidence, by in- 
creasing its extent. 

The probability that L has s is likewise strengthened 
every time we find in the class an object, (7, D, j^, . . . 
having not only the qualities, p, q^ r, but also s. 

So far we have strengthened analogy, increasing the 
probability of the inference by increasing the extent of 
the evidence, and the process becomes inductive with 
respect to the evidence, but not with respect to the con- 
clusion. 

Let there be, in the same class, another object i¥, 
having the qualities, p, q^ r, and differing from L in no 
essential circumstance. The probability that M has s is 
evidently equal to the probability that L has s; hence, 
we can infer with the same probability that any other 
object, iV, Oj P, . . . not differing essentially from i, and 
having the qualities, p, g, r, and belonging to that class, 



LOGICAL INDUCTION. 399 

has the quality 5. We still have, so long as we restrict 
the conclusion to one of the objects, Jv, Jf, O, P, . . . only 
a strengthened analogy, inductive as to the evidence, but 
not with respect to the conclusion. 

Now, if we infer that all the remaining objects, X, Jf, 
Nj 0, P, . . . known to have p, q, r, and belonging to that 
class, have the quality s, we reason by induction, both 
with respect to the evidence and the conclusion. But 
is the ^probability of the inference the same as before, 
or is it strengthened or weakened? In other w^ords, 
how does the probability that all the remaining objects, 
L, M, N, . , , of the class have the quality s, compare 
wdth the probability that any one of them, as X, has 
this quality? The probability that all have s is evi- 
dently less than that any one of them has s; for, since 
there is a chance of failure in each instance, there is 
greater probability that there will be failure when all 
the instances are considered than when only one is con- 
sidered. 

To estimate this probability, it is necessary to discuss 
briefly the doctrine of chances, including simple and com- 
pound probability. 

Thus, if there be a vase, containing m white "and n 
black balls, what will be the probability of drawing a 
white ball? 

There are m -f ^ chances of which m are favorable ; 

. m 
hence, the probabilitv of drawing; a white ball is 

^ -^ . m + n 

Hence the measure of a simple probability is equal to 

the number of favorable chances divided by the whole 

m 
number of chances. Since m<^ ni -[- n.— << 1 ; hence, 

m -|- ^^ 

a simple probability is less than 1. 

If in another vase, there are t red and u blue balls. 



400 PSYCHOLOGY. 

. t 
the probability of drawing a red ball is . If 2^ = 0, 

Jj — — u 

the probabilitj^ of drawing a red ball becomes — =^1, 

the symbol of certainty 

Now, if a ball be drawn from each vase, what is the 
probability that we shall have a white and a red ball? 

Combining the balls in the two vases, in sets of two, 

any one of the m -\- n balls can be combined with any 

one of t -\-u balls, giving (jn -\- n) (t ^ u) ^^mt -\~ m u -^ 

nt-\-nu possible chances, of which mt are favorable; 

hence, by the law of simple probability, the probability of 

mt 
drawing a white and a red ball is = 

mt-\-mu-\-nt-\-nu 

m t 
X = the product of the simple probabilities. 

m -f 71 t^u 

Hence, the compound probability of the joint occurrence 
of two chances is the product of their simple probabili- 
ties. In like manner, it can be shown that the proba- 
bility of the joint occurrence of any number of chances is 
the product of their simple probabilities. 

To return from this digression, let the probability that 

X X 

L has s be denoted by — ) then — will also express the 

probability, that any one of the objects, M.^ JV, 0, , . . has s. 
Let n denote the number of the objects, L^M^N^... Then 
since the compound probability that all of these objects, 
Jj, M, N, . . . have s is the product of the simple proba- 
bilities that they severally have s, we have for the com- 
pound probability that all have s, 



rp rp >y^ I /)•» I'H nr* rv* 

\Aj %A~f tX' * tA/ y cA-/ xAj 

— X — X ~~ • • • =1 — I 5 which is less than ^, since — < 1. 

y y y \ y J y y 



Since A^ B^ C, D . . . up to X are known to have s, the 



LOGICAL INDUCTION, 401 

probability that all the objects of the class have s is 

(X y 
— I • This probability increases as the number of 
y I 

objects of the class known to have 5, increases, that is, 
as 71 diminishes; it becomes certainty when n=:0; but 
then the induction becomes perfect, since the objects 
known to have s are all the objects of the class. 

The increase of probability as n diminishes, is due to 
two causes — the extent of evidence is increased, and 

(X Y 
— I 
y I 

exhibits the law, since as more and more of the objects 

X 

of the class are found to have s, — increases and ap- 

y 

proaches 1, and n diminishes and approaches 0, and both 
these changes conspire to increase I — j . When all the 

X 

objects are found to have 5,-=^ = !, the symbol of cer- 

tainty, and ?z = 0, and we shall have 1^=^1, or the in- 
duction is perfect. 

/ X Y 

Since the expression, I ~~ I , which denotes the proba- 
bility of the conclusion in imperfect induction, gives the 
certainty of the conclusion in perfect induction, the two 
cases are connected by the same law ; hence, perfect in- 
duction, so far from not being induction at all, as some 
logicians assert, is the limiting case of imperfect induc- 
tion; in other words, perfect induction and imperfect 
induction are the two species of the genus logical in- 
duction. 



Pry.— 34. 



CHAPTEE XXY. 



INDUCTIVE REASONING. 



From the fundamental agreement of induction and 
analogy, it follows that the ground of induction will be 
found, if we find the ground of analogy. 

According to the law of association, p^ q^ r, in L would 
suggest 5, since s is found in connection with p^ q^ r, in 
A; but this is merely the occasion of the suggestion, 
and not the ground of the inference. 

The ground of the induction is not found by throw- 
ing the induction into a syllogism, as Whately does, 
as thus exhibited : 

Whatever belongs to the individuals examined belongs 
to the whole class under which they come. 
s belongs to the individuals examined. 
.-. s belongs to the whole class. 

Observe that in the major premise the predication is 
made of every quality found in the individuals exam- 
ined, and not simply of the one quality 5. The major 
premise having, therefore, a wider subject than the con- 
clusion, a subject including that of the conclusion, is less 
probable, since it is more probable that any one quality 
.s found in connection with jp, ^, r, in A^ will also be 
found in connection with ^, ^, r, in i, than that every 
quality found in connection with p, ^, r, in A will also 
be found in connection with j9, q. r, in L. The wider 
induction of the major premise being less probable than 

the narrower induction of the conclusion, is more diffi- 

( 402 ) 



[ THE GBOUND OF INDUCTION. 403 

cult to establish, and can not, therefore, be taken for 
the proof of the conclusion, which is more evident than 
the major premise itself. If, however, the major prem- 
ise can be rendered probable in an}^ degree hj evidence, 
independent of the conclusion, it will follow that the 
conclusion will be probable in a still higher degree. 

But how is this major premise obtained, resolvable as 
it seems to be into the uniformity of the laws of nature? 
Whately replies, "Whether the belief in the constancy 
of Nature's laws, — a belief of which no one can divest 
himself — be intuitive, and a part of the constitution of 
the human mind, as some eminent metaphysicians hold, 
or acquired, and in what way acquired, is a question 
foreign to our purpose.' It is evident that Whately 
throws no light on the ground of induction. 

Mill says, "'Whatever be the most proper mode of ex- 
pressing it, the proposition, that the course of nature is 
uniform, is the fundamental principle or general axiom 
of induction. It would yet be a great error to offer this 
large generalization as any explanation of the inductive 
process. On the contrary, I hold it to be itself an in- 
stance of induction, and induction by no means of the 
most obvious kind. Far from being the first induction 
we make, it is one of the last, or at all events, one of 
those which are latest in attaining philosophical accuracy. 
.... Yet this principle, though so far from being our 
earliest induction, must be considered as our warrant 
for all the others in this sense, that unless it were true 
all other inductions would be fallaciou-s." 

If the induction, that the course of nature is uniform, 
is the latest induction, and is the warrant of all the 
others, then these others are made without warrant, and 
this so-called fundamental induction is itself without war- 
rant. We have here the fallacv of the vicious circle. 
Through the first inductions, made without warrant, we 



404 PSYCHOLOGY, 

work up to the final induction, that the course of nature 
is uniform, and then take this generalization from un- 
warranted inductions, as the warrant of those unwar- 
ranted inductions of which it is the generalization. 

Experience, including observation and experiment, in 
furnishing the facts of analogy, has much to do with in- 
duction. We have thus often found that, in couples of 
objects having common qualities, an additional quality 
found in one, is afterwards found in the other. An ex- 
pectancy is thus awal^ened in other cases. The finding 
of the objects A and i, having the common qualities, 
j9, q^ r, is due to experience ; also the knowledge of the 
fact that A has s; then by analogy we infer that L 
probably has s. The strengthened analogy arising from 
finding in the class containing A and i, other objects 
B, C, Dj ... each having, not only p, q^ r, but also 5, is 
likewise due to experience. 

Other reasons than experience, however, seem to en- 
ter into the ground of the induction, since, for the same 
extent of experience, the induction is much more highly 
probable in some cases than in others. In certain cases, 
a single instance warrants an induction, with so high a 
degree of probability as to approach certaintj^ ; while in 
other cases, many instances are scarcely sufficient to 
warrant any induction at all, even of a low degree of 
probability. 

If s is an accident in A^ produced by circumstances 
not attending Jj, and not by causes inherent in A, or 
if the causes which produce s are inherent in A, but not 
in iy, or if L has some attribute inconsistent with s^ or 
if the circumstances attending L tend to prevent s, the 
probability that Ij has s is greatly diminished^ if not 
reduced to zero. 

The common ground of analogy and induction is found 
in the two following principles: 



THE GR O UND OF IND UCTION. 405 

(1) Every constant coincidence of phenomena has its 
cause and its conditions. 

(2) Like conditions and causes are followed by like 
consequences. 

The reason of the coincidence of the first principle is 
that one phenomenon is the cause of the other, or that 
they have a common cause or some causal relation. 

The reason of the second principle is found in the fact 
that the two cases are essentially alike, and whatever 
determines the effect in the one case, is present to de- 
termine it in the other. 

These two principles, which are rational intuitions, fur- 
nish the warrant for the induction that nature is uni- 
form in her operations, the essential antecedents being, 
by supposition, the same in the cases compared. 

From the above principles, it follows that in the case 
considered, the probability that L has s varies with the 
probability that the conditions and causes connected 
with L are essentially the same as those connected with 
A. If this can be known with certainty, the conclusion 
that L has s will also be certain; and if it is also cer- 
tain that the same essential conditions and causes hold 
for each of the remaining instances, M^ iV, ... of the 
class, it will be equally certain that any one of these 
instances, M^ N^ ... has s; that is, the expression for the 
strength of the conclusion for each instance, which is 

X 

denoted by — becomes 1, the symbol for certainty; 

y 

hence, it is certain that all of the instances, L^M^N^ ... 
have 5, since the probability in this case is 1 X 1 X 1 X 
1 , . . = 1** = 1 = certainty. 

To illustrate the above, take the case of the mathe- 
matician who in proving the proposition, The square of 
the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equivalent to the sum 
of the squares of the other sides, draws a particular right 



406 PSYCHOLOGY. 

triangle and constructs a square on each of the three 
sides; and assuming the constructions perfect, proves by 
deductive reasoning that the square of the hypotenuse is 
equivalent to the sum of the squares of the other sides. 
He then concludes that the same is true for every right 
triangle of which there is an infinite number, varying 
in the relative proportion of their sides, and also in their 
magnitude, from those too small to be seen with the 
naked eye, to those whose sides are millions of miles in 
extent. Here we seem to infer the widest possible in- 
duction from a single instance; but the reason which 
determines the consequent is the same in everj^ instance. 
The proof does not turn on the relative length of the 
sides, nor on their magnitude, but solely on the fact 
that the triangle is right angled, and hence holds true 
for any triangle which conforms to this hypothesis, and, 
therefore, for all such triangles. Hence, the strength of 
the general conclusion is 1"° = 1 = certainty. The truth 
of the proposition, for the figure drawn, is not deter- 
mined experimentally, as that would be impossible ex- 
actl}^ to do; but it is determined deductively; and since 
like reasons hold for every like case, the proposition 
is true for every particular case, and hence for all cases, 
and is, therefore, universally true. 

We are now able to see how mathematical reasoning is 
characterized by demonstrative certainty — its facts are 
definite, and its processes strictly logical; it keeps the 
essential facts clearly in view, and disregards those that 
are not essential. Since the essential antecedent condi- 
tions are the same in each of the infinity of possible 
instances, and the conclusion is demonstrated for one, 
it is certain for any other, and hence is true for all. • 

Pascal has remarked, that '' Geometry is almost the 
only subject as to which we find truths wherein all men 
agree; and one cause of this is, that geometers alone 



THE GROUND OF INDUCTION. 407 

regard the true laws of demonstration." These are the 
following : 

" 1st. To define nothing which can not be expressed 
in clearer terms than those in which it is already ex- 
pressed. 

"2d. To leave no obscure or equivocal terms undefined. 

"3d. To employ in the definition, no terms not already 
known. 

"4th. To omit nothing in the principles from which we 
argue, unless we are sure it is granted. 

"5th. To lay down no axiom which is not perfectly 
self-evident. 

"6th. To demonstrate nothing which is already as clear 
as it can be made. 

"7th. To prove every thing in the least doubtful by 
means of self-evident axioms, or of propositions already 
demonstrated. 

"8th. To substitute mentally the definition instead of 
the thing defined." 

These principles are of especial application in deduc- 
tion; but they have their bearing upon induction, since 
deduction is often employed in establishing the particu- 
lar instances which are used in inferring the general 
proposition of induction. 

In cases not mathematical, the probability of the gen- 
eral proposition approaches certainty in proportion as 
the antecedents in the cases compared approach essential 
identity. This exj)lains why, in certain cases, as in 
chemistry, a very few experiments warrant an induction 
of very high probability, if not certainty, whereas, in 
other cases, as in natural history, many observations 
give to the induction but a moderate degree of proba- 
bility. Thus, it was thought to be a well established 
induction, that all swans are white; but black swans 
were afterwards found in Australia. 



408 PSYCHOLOGY. 

Since, in the inductions of nature, we can never be 
absolutely certain from observation that the conditions 
and causes are essential!}' alike, the induction can never 
be absolutely certain, but at best can possess only a high 
degree of probability. 

The methods of conducting experimental inquiry have 
been elaborately discussed hj Mr. Mill under the desig- 
nation of the Method of Agreement, the Method of Dif- 
ference, the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference, 
the Method of Residues, and the Method of Concomitant 
Variations. 

The reader is referred to MilVs Logic ^ Chapter VIII., 
and to Fowler's Inductive Logic, Chapter III. See also 
Jevon's LogiCj Lessons XXVII. to XXXI. 



CHAPTEE XXVI. 



MODERN LOGIC. 



1. Hamilton, by the quantification of the predicate, 
made eight propositions, four of which are ambiguous: 



( U) All S is all P. 



© 



{A) All S is some P. 




( r) Some S is all P. 




(7) Some S is some P. 



© 



V 






8{ P 



(IE) Any /? is not any P. [ .s ] ( T \ 

Psy.-35 (409) 




410 



PSYCHOLOGY. 



(7j) Any S is not some P. 




(0) Some S is not any P. > 




( a>) Some >S is not some P. 




In Hamilton's scheme, botli (A) and (Y) express the 
relation of subordination. In {A)^ the subordinate con- 
cept is the subject, but in (F), the subordinate concept 
is the predicate; but since we can, if we choose, always 
take the subordinate concept for the subject, we shall, 
in the following scheme, treat (A) and (Y) as one. 

2. Definite deduetion.— In definite deduction the prop- 
ositions are all definite, each expressing but one relation 
between the subject and the predicate. 

There are only four possible relations between two 
terms in extensive quantity- — co-extension, exclusion, 
subordination, and intersection. Definite propositions 
are obtained by expressing these relations. 

Let the initial letters, ((7), (-E^), (aS), (/), respectively, 



MODERN LOGIC, 



411 



express the relations of co-extension, exclusion, subordi- 
nation, and intersection. Then we have the following 
definite propositions: 



((7) aS is co-extensive with P. 




(E) S is excluded from P. 




S 




(/S) /S is subordinate to P. 




(/) S intersects P. 




The laws warranting the conclusions, ((7), (i^), (aS), 
(/), may be stated and exemplified thus: 

1st. The relation of co-extension is warranted in the con- 
clusion^ if each extreme is co-extensive with the middle 
term. 

!P is co-extensive with M. 
S is co-extensive with M. 
.\ S is co-extensive with P. 

Let the argument be stated in the other figures. 

2d. The relation of exclusion is icarranted in the conclu- 
sion^ if either extreme is either subordinate to, or co-extensive 
with, the middle, and the other extreme is excluded from the 
middle. 




P is subordinate to Jf. 
(1) -l S is excluded from M. 
S is excluded from P. 



\: 




412 



PSYCHOLOGY. 









P is excluded from M. 

(2) -] aS is subordinate to M. 
..'. S is excluded from P. 

P is co-extensive with M. 

(3) ^ /§ is excluded from M, 
,-. S is excluded from P. 

P is excluded from M. 

(4) } S is co-extensive with M, 
.'. S is excluded from P. 



3d. T/ie relation of subordination is warranted in the 
conclusion^ if the middle term is subordinate to the major, 
and the minor to the middle; or if the middle is co-exten- 
sive with the major, and the minor is subordinate to the 
middle; or if the middle is subordinate to the major, and 
the minor is co-extensive with the middle. 




M is subordinate to P. 

(1) ■< aS is subordinate to M. 
.'. S is subordinate to P. 





M is co-extensive with P. 

(2) ^ >S is subordinate to M. 
.-. S is subordinate to P. 

M is subordinate to P. 

(3) -< aS is co-extensive with M. 
.'. S is subordinate to P. 



4th. The relation of intersection is warranted in the con- 
clusion, if the middle term is co-extensive with one extreme 
and intersects the other. 




I 



<*.i 



1' 



MODERN LOGIC. 



413 




M is co-extensivo with P. 

(1) \ S intersects M. 
.-. S intersects P. 

M intersects P. 

(2) ^ /S is co-extensive with M. 
■. 8 intersects P. 



Let us now restate the above syllogisms in the brief- 
est possible manner, by using (C) for is co-extensive with, 
(_JE) for is excluded from, (S) for is subordinate to, and 
(7) for intersects. Then we have 




P (C) M. 

8 (C) M. 
.: 8 (C) P. 

P (8) M. 

8 {E) M. 

.: 8 (E) P. 

M (8) P. 

8 (8) M. 
.: 8 (8) P. 

M (C) P. 

8 (I) M. 

.: 8 (I) P. 



Illustrate this and the following by circles. 



P (E) M. 
8 {8) M. 
8 (E) P. 

M (C) P. 
8 (8) M. 
8 (8) P. 

M (7) P. 
8 (C) M. 
8 (7) P. 



P (C) M. 
8 (E) M. 
8 (E) P. 

M (8) P. 
8 (C) M. 
8 (8) P. 



P (E)'M. 

8 (C) M. 

.: 8 (E) P. 



This method is remarkable for clearness, precision, and 
simplicity. The propositions are perfectly definite, each 
denoting but one relation. 

{A), (7), (0) in Aristotle's sj^stem, and (7), (jj), 
(0), (<i)) in Hamilton's, are ambiguous, each being con- 
sistent with two or more relations. 

The systems of 7>e Morgan, Boole, and Jevons are 
worthy of attention. For a knowledge of these systems, 
we refer to the works of these authors. 



i 



PART II. 
FEELING AND THE SENSIBILITY, 



(415) 



CHAPTER I. 



PHYSICAL FEELINGS. 



Feelings are agitations of the soul. They embrace 
all those phenomena of the soul not included in cogni- 
tions and volitions. In feeling, the soul is chiefly j^as- 
sive in the reception of an incitement, but is involunta- 
rily active in its response. 

The feelings may be roughly classified as physical, 
vital, and psychical. 

The physical feelings are those especially related to 
the organism, as sensations, instincts, and appetites. 

The vital feelings are those which are especially re- 
lated to the vitality or health of the organism, as a 
sense of rest or fatigue, of vigor or languor, and of 
health or sickness. 

The psychical feelings are those especially related to 
the soul, as emotions, affections, and desires. 

The word feeling^ as a generic term, includes all these 
phenomena, and is, therefore, the term needed; whereas, 
the word emotion^ used by Dr. McCosh, is too specific, 
since it includes only a part. 

The feelings imply the sensibility or susceptibility of 
feeling. Without the sensibility, as a faculty or suscep- 
tibility, feeling, as a phenomenon, would be impossible. 
The susceptibility of experiencing any specific feeling is 
called an appetence. 

The feelings also imply causes^ external or internal, 
physical or psychical, real or ideal, which excite them 

and call them forth as phenomena of consciousness. 

(417) 



418 



PSYCHOLOGY, 



Cognitions tend to excite feeling, and the wider the 
sweep of the cognitions, the wider the range of the ob- 
jects concerning which feeling may arise; but there is 
no necessary ratio between the strength of the intellect 
and the intensity of feeling. 

The feelings are also more or less intimately related 
to certain organic affections, either as causes or as effects. 

We then have feelings as phenomena of consciousness, 
the appetencies implied by these feelings, the exciting 
causes, and the organic affections. 

The physical feelings have been defined as those es- 
pecially related to the organism, and classified as sensa- 
tions, instincts, and appetites. 

1. Sensations are those feelings which are occasioned 
by the excitement of some portion of the organism, 
caused, in normal cases, by the action of a stimulus. 

Since sensation has already been discussed as the con- 
dition of perception^ it will suffice, in this connection, 
to give a brief summary^ and assign it to its place 
among the feelings. 

The conditions of sensation are the sensorium consist- 
ing of the nervous system and sense organs, excitants or 
objects capable of exciting the sensorium, the action of 
excitants on the sensorium, and the sensibility or general 
susceptibility of feeling. 

Sensations are, in general, localized, definitely or vaguely, 
that is, are referred to the part of the sensorium affected. 
In certain instances, the location of the sensation is 
quite definite, but in other instances it is only vaguely 
apprehended. 

The object of consciousness in sensation is neither the 
sensorium excited, nor the external excitant, but the 
sensation itself as a state of the sensibility. 

The quality of sensation involves existence as opposed 
to non-existence, and identity, or the fact that the sen- 



PHYSICAL FEELINGS. 419 

sation is itself and nothing else, involving peculiarity, 
or the positive characteristics of the sensation, and par- 
ticularity, or the negation of the positive characteristics 
of any other thing. 

The quantity of a sensation involves its degree of in- 
tensity ^ varying between the limits zero and a degree so 
great as to be insupportable, its temporal relations of 
date and duration, and its spatial relations of locality, 
and, in some instances at least, but more vaguely, of 
extent and form. 

Complex sensations only are capable of analysis, which 
may be effected, in some cases, by reflection alone, but 
in other cases, only by the aid of experiment. 

Sensations are identified or discriminated as similar or 
dissimilar in kind, according as they are acquired through 
the same sense or through different senses. 

Sensations are identified or discriminated as similar or 
dissimilar in variety, according as they involve similar 
or dissimilar qualities. 

Sensations similar in kind may be similar or dissimi- 
lar in variety, but sensations dissimilar in kind are also 
dissimilar in variety. 

Sensations similar in kind and variety may agree or 
differ in degree of intensity or in temporal or s^Datial 
relations, and, as such, may accordingly be" identified or 
discriminated. 

Sensations are classified as to kind, w^hen referred to 
the organs or senses through w^hich they are acquired. 
They are subdivided both as to quality and quantity. 

Agreeable or pleasurable sensations are those w^hich 
arise from normal excitement of the sensorium ; and dis- 
agreeable or painful sensations are those which arise 
from abnormal exciteme»nt of the sensorium. 

The general sensations comprise all those connected 
with the various portions of the organism, except the 



420 PSYCHOLOGY. 

five senses. They raay be divided into the muscular, 
the nervous, the nutritive, the circulatory, and the re- 
spiratory. 

The special sensations are those connected with the 
organs of the five senses, — smell, taste, touch, hearing, 
and sight. 

2. Instincts are blind tendencies to actions, having for 
their ends the physical well-being of the individual or 
of the species. 

The actions prompted by instinct are automatic in 
their impulses, though, in form, apparently intelligent 
and voluntary. They occupy the border territory be- 
tween the purely automatic movements below, as the 
beating of the heart, and the rational activities above, as 
in reasoning. 

The instincts have their basis and spring in the spon- 
taneous movements of the living organism. By the ev- 
olutionist, they are regarded as habits — not as acquired 
habits, induced by the actions of the individual, but as 
hereditary habits, organized and embodied in the phys- 
ical constitution, and manifested as reflex actions of a 
more or less complicated character. The truth probably 
is that they have their origin in the constitution of the 
species as formed by the Creator, modified by inherited 
habits formed through successive generations and organ- 
ized in the physical constitution. 

Though instincts are directed towards ends, there is 
no reason for supposing that these ends are clearly con- 
ceived or deliberately aimed at by the individual. The 
brute is, no doubt, blind to the end, though his actions 
are directed towards the end with as much precision as 
if it were clearly apprehended and deliberately pur- 
sued. 

The end of instinctive actions is the j^hysical well- 
being of the individual or of the race, designed and se- 



PHYSICAL FEELINGS. 421 

cured by the Author of Nature, through the automatic 
action of the organism. 

The instincts may be classed as follows : 

1st. Those relating to subsistence, as in procuring, 
storing, and eating food. 

2d. Those relating to the propagation of the species, 
as pairing, building nests, and the care of the young. 

3d. Those of a more general nature, as hybernation 
and migration, excited by causes internal and external. 

Instincts have the following characteristics: 

1st. Through organic states, they blindly prompt to 
actions w^hose end is the physical well-being of the in- 
dividual or of the species. That the actions prompted 
by instinct are blindly directed and not the result of 
reflective intelligence is illustrated by the fact that a 
hen will sit as readily on stones as on eggs; that she 
shows the same solicitude for the ducklings which she 
has hatched as for the chickens from her own eggs; and 
that when her ducklings take to the water, she manifests 
great alarm, yet her eyes are not opened to the fact 
that she is rearing the children of strangers. That in- 
stinctive actions are prompted by organic conditions is 
illustrated by the fact that a hen determined to sit may 
be cured of this propensity by dipping her breast sev- 
eral times in cold water. 

2d. The instinctive actions are always performed by 
individuals of the same species in essentially the same 
way without the guide of experience or education. 
Thus, young mammalia are impelled to suck their 
mother's breasts; the young chick to pick up a grain of 
wheat at first sight; the young robin to open its mouth 
to receive the food which its mother brings. 

3d. The instincts, in certain cases, at least, act j)eri- 
odically, corresponding to the wants of the individuals 
or their offspring. Thus, the old birds care for their 



422 PSYCHOLOGY. 

young till they ure fully fledged, and then leave them 
to care for themselves. 

4th. The instincts are not rigidly fixed but are, within 
certain limits, plastic, varying with the physical struct- 
ure of the individuals, and accommodating themselves, 
to a certain extent, to the modifications of external cir- 
cumstances, thus enabling the individual to adapt itself 
to its environment. Thus, a hen will sit more than 
three weeks to hatch the eggs of turkeys or geese, or 
less than three weeks to hatch those of quails. Under 
domestication, instincts are modified — in some cases in- 
tensified, in other cases weakened, so that it might ap- 
pear that certain instincts are acquired, and others lost. 
Thus, animals can be taught many things they do not 
know by nature, and which they will continue to do as 
if from instinct. 

The conditions for the manifestation of instinct are 
stimuli, external or internal, which incite the impulsive 
action of the organism. Thus, a young dog of sufficient 
age will bark at a stranger, though he has never barked 
before or heard any other dog bark. Birds of passage, 
incited by the increasing cold of autumn, take flight for 
warmer climes. 

Examples of instinctive actions may be found in the 
construction of the spider's web, birds nests, and honey 
comb, and in hibernation and migration. 

As we rise in the scale of being, instinct diminishes 
and intelligence increases till we reach man, who, though 
exhibiting traces of instinct, is especially characterized, 
not by instinct, but by reason. 

The difierence between man and the lower animals is 
strikingly apparent: 

Ist. Animals, in caring for their oflfepring, are con- 
cerned alone with their physical wants, and with these, 
only till they are able to care for themselves; whereas. 



PHYSICAL FEELINGS. 423 

the solicitude of human parents for their children ex- 
tends also to their intellectual, social, moral, and spirit- 
ual welfare, and continues unabated till the end of life. 

2d. The thinking of animals, if thinking it may be 
called, is from particulars to particulars; whereas, man 
generalizes his ideas into concepts, and proves general 
propositions. 

3d. Animals have no language but the instinctive one 
prompted by nature; while man has developed an arti- 
ficial language, both spoken and written, admirably adap- 
ted to meet his present requirements, and to provide 
for unlimited advancement. 

4th. As to knowledge, animals are stationary, except 
within narrow limits in the training they receive in 
domestication, while man is progressive without appar- 
ent limit. 

5th. Animals are destitute of moral and religious 
faculties, which are the crow^ning glory cf man. 

6th. The training of animals has been accomplished 
by man, but this training is only within a very narrow 
range; and w^hen withdrawn, the animal relapses into 
its original condition. This renders the view that man 
is the development of an order of animals, very im- 
probable. There was no higher race to train him. He 
is indeed a high order of animal — a rational animal, a 
moral animal, a noble animal, but he was created so, as 
we must conclude, if we regard the facts of the case, to 
say nothing of the teachings of revelation. 

3. Appetites are the cravings prompted by the recur- 
ring wants of organic life. 

Appetites are distinguished from sensations by their 
periodicity and by the fact that they are cravings di- 
rected to the end of satisfying wants, natural or artifi- 
cial, while sensations may occur at any time and are 
not characterized as craving's. 



424 PSYCHOLOGY. 

Appetites are distinguished from instincts by the fact 
that they are feelings consciously impelling to their 
gratification as an immediate end, though undoubtedly 
they have an ulterior end in the good of the individual 
or of the species, while instincts unconsciously prompt to 
actions which secure results that are only means to ul- 
terior ends. Thus, the spider is incited by instinct to 
weave his web, but by appetite to eat his prey. 

The appetites are illustrated by the following crav- 
ings — for sleep, for exercise, for rest, for food or drink. 

The periodicity of the appetite for sleep is notorious. 
After a certain period of wakefulness, there is a craving 
for sleep, which becomes more resistless the longer it 
is frustrated, unless determined effort or a new excite- 
ment causes a reaction, which may, for a time, dispel 
drowsiness. 

The craving for the alternations of exercise and rest 
have the character of appetite, though in a less marked 
degree. After toil, physical or mental, there is a craving 
for rest ; and, after sufficient rest, there is a prompting to 
activity. It should, however, be kept in mind that the 
function of rest is to recruit exhausted energy, and to 
prepare it for further action. Though there is satisfac- 
tion in rest, when it is needed, yet the pleasure it affords 
is by no means so exhilarating as that which springs 
from the normal activity of vigorous powers. 

Hunger and thirst afford the best examples of appe- 
tites. These are familiar on account of their frequent 
occurrence and decided character. Mr. Bain well says, 
" In the case of hunger, there is a double spur to the 
taking of food; first, the stimulus of uneasiness, and 
next, the impulse arising out of the pleasure of eating. 
It is well understood that these two things are quite 
different, and on their difference hangs the whole art 
of refined cookery. Yery plain food would satisfy the 



PHYSICAL FEELINGS. 425 

craving for nutrition, but there is a superadded pleas- 
ure that we have to cater for." Senses and Intellect, 
page 243. 

The appetites have the following characteristics: 

1st. They are physical as to their origin, conditions, 
and immediate ends. 

2d. They are not continuous but periodical in their 
manifestations. 

3d. As craving, or sense of want, they involve uneas- 
iness or discomfort, and their gratification is attended 
with satisfaction or pleasure. 

4th. The end of appetite is both immediate satisfac- 
tion and ulterior good, either to the individual or to 
the species. 

Appetites may also be considered as natural or ac- 
quired. The natural appetites are the gifts of God, and 
may be innocently gratified, in due moderation, if in 
their gratification no moral law is violated. 

The excessive gratification of appetite leads to slug- 
gishness, gluttony, debauchery, and degradation. 

Acquired appetites are modifications of natural ap- 
petites, directed towards specific objects. In certain 
cases, they are harmless, as when the appetite is culti- 
vated for a certain kind of food, as tomatoes, not at 
first relished. More frequently the acquired appetites 
are harmful, as those disgusting and degrading appetites 
for tobacco, opium, and intoxicating drinks. These ap- 
petites become morbid and well nigh uncontrollable. 
Even the natural appetites for food and drink may be 
indulged to excess, leading to gluttony, a vice more re- 
spectable than drunkenness, more common, and hence, 
perhaps, more generally disastrous. 

Acquired appetite may be transmitted, and thus be- 
come hereditary — a fact which, in the case of vicious 
appetites, ought to lead to reflection and reformation. 

Psy.— 36. 



426 PSYCHOL OGY, 

Simple habits are powerful in their influence; but how 
much more irresistible do they become when urged on 
by the cravings of an insatiable appetite! 

The cravings of appetite are guides to proper action 
only in case the appetite is natural or unperverted. 
Diseased or perverted appetites should never be gratified, 
or rather they never should be acquired; but whether 
acquired by the individual, or inherited from his pro- 
genitors, they should be corrected as soon as possible; 
for the end thereof is death. It is discreditable to hu- 
manity that perverted appetites are common among men, 
but are rare, if not entirely unknown, among brutes. 

As appetite may intensify and strengthen habit, so 
may habit, acquired by forethought and persistent effort, 
restrain, modify, or even overcome perverted appetite, 
inherited or acquired. This fact affords a ground of 
hope to those who are enslaved by degrading appetite. 
It is possible to be free. 



CHAPTBE 11. 



VITAL FEELINGS. 



The vital feelings are those feelings which are espe- 
cially related to the vigor of the organism. They are 
the feelings induced by the states of rest or fatigue, 
vigor or languor, health or sickness, and by those 
more permanent states called temperaments. 

1. Rest and fatigue. — The feeling of rest comes as a 
consequence of ceasing, for a time, from labor, and in- 
dulging in repose. It is both agreeable and stimulating. 
After due rest, there is felt an incentive to renewed 
activity. This activity, if not excessive, is itself a source 
of enjoyment, till the vitality accumulated in rest is so 
far exhausted that demands are made on the reserve 
forces of the system. Activity prolonged beyond this 
point brings on a feeling of fatigue, which may be pro- 
tracted till exhausted nature refuses longer to work, 
when rest again becomes imperative. In practice, labor 
is seldom carried to the point of exhaustion, but it is 
frequently carried beyond the point where rest would 
be beneficial. 

2. Vigor and languor. — These states are analogous to 
the preceding, but are, in general, of longer duration. 
A man's general condition, for a protracted period, may 
justly be described as vigorous; and yet, in this period, 
he may experience many alternations of rest and fatigue. 
Vigor is that general condition in which vitality pre- 
dominates over decay. The feeling of vigor is exhilara- 
ting, and impels to activity and achievement. Languor 

(427) . 



428 PSYCHOL OGY. 

» 

is a consequence of low vitality. The tone of the sys- 
tem is relaxed, and there is a tendency to decay. The 
feeling of languor is depressing, causing an aversion to 
activity, and a desire for repose. It is the consequence 
of more general conditions than those of a feeling of 
fatigue, which may be induced by a few hours of labor, 
and dispelled by a few hours of rest. It can be over- 
come only by restoring tone to the system. 

3. Health and sickness. — These are opposites. Health 
is the state characterized by the felicitous performance 
of the vital functions. It is the normal condition of a 
human being. Sickness may be regarded as an ab- 
normal condition of the living organism attending dis- 
ease or injury. The feelings attending health are agree- 
able and exhilarating, and, when invigorated by rest, 
prompt to active exertion. The feelings attending sick- 
ness are depressing, disagreeable, and often painful, even 
to the limit of endurance. They are more marked than 
those of health, since it is a law of human nature, that 
the unusual and the abnormal are more noticeable than 
the usual and the normal. 

The feelings of sickness have also a far greater vari- 
ety than those of health. Each of the innumerable mul- 
titude of diseases has its special sj^mptoms, and is 
attended by its peculiar feelings, which, to be realized, 
must be experienced. 

For a classification of diseases, and a description of 
their symptoms and accompanying feelings, the reader 
is referred to works on pathology. 

4. Temperaments. — Temperament denotes an original 
quality of the constitution supposed to be due to the 
predominance of one or more of the vital systems — the 
respiratory, the circulatory, the nutritive, the nervous, 
and the muscular, modified also by the conditions and 
relative proportion of the solids and fluids of the system. 



VITAL FEELINGS,' 429 

It is more fundamental and permanent in its influ- 
ence than the preceding conditions, and its effects are 
more difficult to trace. 

1st. There are four simple temperaments — the sanguine, 
the bilious, the lymphatic, and the nervous. Of these, 
two have been regarded as primary, — the sanguine and 
the bilious; and two as secondary, — the lymphatic and 
the nervous, called also the encephalic. Even the bili- 
ous has been by some regarded as a modification of the 
sanguine, produced by external influences. 

(1) The sanguine temperament is characterized by the 
predominance of the respiratory and the circulatory 
systems, whose centers are the lungs and heart. It is 
indicated by a strong and rapid pulse, plump figure, 
fair skin, light eyes, soft and light hair, approaching 
red, a cheerful disposition, and a love for pleasure. 
This is the prevailing temperament of the English peo- 
ple. Combined with a well-developed muscular system, 
it constitutes, in the absence of mental culture, the ath- 
lete, a well developed animal with little mind. 

(2) The bilious temperament, due to the predominance 
of the nutritive system, is characterized by strong pulse ; 
skin, hair, and eyes dark; flesh muscular rather than 
fat, strong passions, inflexible wdll, and boldness of 
character. This is the temperament of those born to 
command. 

(3) The lymphatic temperament results from the great 
relative proportion of the fluids to the solids, in conse- 
quence of the activity of the secreting system and the 
inactivity of the absorbents. It is characterized by well- 
rounded figure, shapeless person, adij)ose tissue, full 
cheeks, flabby muscles, and soft skin. It is aggravated 
by wealth, and begets a desire for an easy life, but is 
not incompatible with many good qualities. It is the 
temperament of a mandarin. 



430 -PSYCHOLOGY, 

(4) The nervous temperament is characterized by a 
prominence of the nervous system. It is indicated by a 
slender person, narrow chest, light hair, and mental 
vigor. This is the usual temperament of the artist and 
the scholar. 

2d. The compound temperaments result from a union 
of the simple temperaments, giving rise to binary, ter- 
tiary, and quaternary combinations. They exhibit the 
characteristics of their components mutually modified. 

Of the compound temperaments, it will suffice to no- 
tice the following: 

(1) In the sanguine bilious temperament, the hair, the 
eyes, and the complexion are light or dark, according to 
the preponderance of one or the other of the compo- 
nents. The head is compact, and the muscles are firm. 
It is a good combination, and is found in many great 
men, giviag them a natural superiority. 

(2) In the sanguine lymphatic temperament, the per- 
son is plump, the head round, the chest full, and the 
complexion fair. Though it is frequently attended with 
beauty of person, it is an unfavorable combination, tend- 
ing rather to criminal pleasure than to noble achieve- 
ment. It is favorably modified by an earnest life. 

(3) In the sanguine nervous temperament, the person 
is slight, head narrow, forehead high, the skin light, the 
muscles feeble, the disposition amiable, and the charac- 
ter too gentle for successful contests with the stern re- 
alities of life. Persons of this temperament are better 
fitted for the counting room than for the open field. ' 

(4) In the bilious lymphatic temperament, the person 
is full, head rounded, hair and eyes dark, and the mus- 
cles, though well developed^ rounded over with adipose 
matter. Persons of this temperament are usually sound 
in judgment, conservative in opinion, and prudent in 
conduct. 



VITAL FEELINGS. 431 

(5) In the bilious nervous temperament, the person is 
slender, the head high, the hair and eyes dark, and the 
muscles firm though slender. Persons of this tempera- 
ment are inclined to moral enterprises and to achieve- 
ments which tend to advance the welfare of mankind. 

(6) In the sanguine bilious lymphatic temperament, the 
forehead is low and retreating, the lips thick, and the 
form and disposition that of the prize-fighter. 

(7) In the sanguine bilious nervous temperament, the 
person is well formed, the head large, the forehead high 
and expanded, indicating great physical and mental 
power and fertility in resources. 

(8) In the sanguine nervous lymphatic temperament, the 
head is large, forehead high and broad, indicating great 
capacity for literary pursuits, but less adaptation to the 
external contests of life. 

Marriage alliances contracted between persons of simi- 
lar temperaments are supposed to be unfavorable to the 
well-being of the offspring. 

The disposition of a person is largely determined by 
health and temperament. It may be cheerful or morose, 
generous or miserly, sedate or volatile, good-natured or 
quarrelsome, pleasant or peevish, etc. It may, however, 
be modified or controlled by the will, or even perma- 
nently changed by persevering effort which has become 
habitual. 



CHAPTER TIL 



PSYCHICAL FEELINGS. 



An emotion is the agitation of the sensibility, purely 
psychical, seeking neither, as in desire, to bring some- 
thing to the subject, nor, as in affection, to go out to 
an object. Though a purely psychical feeling, it is pre- 
ceded by physical conditions, and accompanied or fol- 
lowed by physical effects, as the blu^h accompanying 
shame, or the blanched cheek attending fear. 

Pleasure and pain. — In addition to the peculiar char- 
acteristics of the several emotions, they are, for the most 
part, attended with pleasure or pain, which are contra- 
ries, not contradictories, since certain emotions, so far 
as pleasure or pain is concerned, may, perhaps, correctly 
be regarded as indifferent. Let us, in a brief digression, 
consider the theory of pleasure and pain. 

Pleasure is the reflex feeling which accompanies nor- 
mal activity or passivity. It results whenever an object 
induces, in due degree and duration, the energy of one 
or more of the active powers, or the excitement of one 
or more of the passive susceptibilities. The pleasure is 
the most complex and agreeable when the object is of 
such a character that it involves the greatest number of 
powers or susceptibilities, and induces such energy or 
excitement as is neither excessive nor defective, either in 
degree or duration. By excess, we are to understand a 
greater degree of intensity or a longer period of dura- 
tion than the constitution of the power or susceptibil- 
ity can endure without injury. By defect, we are to 
(432) 



EMOTIONS. 433 

understand a less degree of intensity, or a shorter 2)eriod 
of duration, than the full gratification of the power or 
susceptibility requires. 

It is to be remarked that, in general, the degree of 
intensity varies inversely as the duration of the energy 
or excitement, and the number of powers or suscepti- 
bilities involved. The most intense pleasures are short 
lived. They can not be long endured. The soul returns 
with satisfaction to the less intense, but more prolonged, 
enjoyments. 

Pain is the reflex feeling w^hich accompanies abnormal 
activity or passivity. It results whenever an object in- 
duces, in undue degree or duration, the energy of one 
or more of the active powers, or the excitemeiit of one 
or more of the passive susceptibilities. Not only does 
excess or defect, in either the degree or duration of the 
activity or -passivity, diminish or frustrate the pleasure 
attending normal activity, but it induces irregular or 
abnormal action, thus causing pain. Injury or lesion of 
any portion of the physical system is also a cause of 
pain, often intense and prolonged. The soul sympathizes 
and suffers with the body. 

Pleasure and pain are both positive elements in feel- 
ing, and each appears augmented when in antithesis 
with the other. 

As our -views enlarge and embrace the future, our 
conceptions of pleasure and pain naturally lead to those 
of haj^piness and misery, which are not mere momentary 
pleasures or pains, but are more abiding satisfactions or 
discomforts. 

There is a tendency to exercise our strongest faculties, 
since these afford us our highest pleasure, and to leave 
dormant those which most need cultivation, since their 
exercise is attended with difficult}^ labor, or even pain. 

The emotions may be divided into several classes: 

Psy.— 37. 



434 PSYCHOLOGY. 

1. Emotions arising from general conditions. 

1st. Cheerfulness is a state characterized by joj^ous 
emotions of moderate intensity and indefinite duratioxi. 
It may arise from good health, sanguine temperament^, 
amiable disposition/ good fortune; satisfactory social re- 
lationSj or good prospects for the future. 

Dejection is the opposite of cheerfulness^ and is caxised 
by contrary conditions. 

Content or discontent, gladness or depression, joy or 
sorrow, raj^ture or melancholy, may be regarded as hav- 
ing the same general characteristics as cheerfulness and 
dejection, each, in general, more intense than the pre- 
ceding, though usually less prolonged. 

In youth, these states are transient and are affected 
by slight causes, though, at this period, cheerfulness and 
joy prevail. In mature years, these states are usually 
more permanent, and less easily affected, but not infre- 
quently sadness and melancholy prevail. 

2d. Self-satisfaction is the emotion which a person 
feels in view of his excellences, real or imaginary. It 
may arise in consideration of physical perfection — 
strength, agility, or beauty, — or from intellectual en- 
dowments or attainments — -genius, talent, knowledge, 
skill, or accomplishments. 

Self- dissatisfaction is the emotion which a person feels 
in view of his defects. It is the opposite of self-satis- 
faction, and arises from contrary causes. 

Self -complacency arises when, on the whole, we are 
satisfied with our past life; and self-displacency when we 
are dissatisfied.' 

Self-congratulation or self-reproach arises in view of a 
deed nobly or ignobly done. Exultation or chagrin arises 
in view of success or failure, irrespective of moral quality. 

Self-sufficiency or self- depreciation arises from a confi- 
dence or distrust in our abilities. 



EMOTIONS. 435 

2. -31sthetical emotions. — These have reference to the 
sentiment of taste, and to the different forms of the 
beautifuL 

1st. Novelty awakens and gratifies curiosity. A novel 
object is sure to attract attention and to excite wonder; 
but if it has no other merit, its notoriety and the curi- 
osity which it excites will be short-lived. It is, how- 
ever, preferable to dull monotony, which results in 
weariness and emiui; but even ennui is useful as a stim- 
ulus to action. 

The effect of novelty is due to previous ignorance, 
and is dispelled by knowledge. Familiarity soon de- 
prives novelty of its charms. This is seen in the fickle- 
ness of fashion. 

JSTovelt}^ affords little pleas are to the philosophic mind, 
since such a mind seeks rather for agreement, general 
principles, universal law, than for disagreements and 
novelties. 

The curiosity excited by novelty is frequently a vul- 
gar desire for gossip, characteristic of a mind weary of 
dull monotony, and ignorant of the rich sources of truth 
and beauty found in nature, science, literature, and art. 

]^ovelty often marks the decay of art. The lack of 
originality and beauty is supplied by the new and the 
startling, which, for the lack of merit, soon lose their 
hold on the attention, and are dis^Dlaced by something- 
still more fantastic. 

Association has much to do with the pleasure of taste. 
It throws around certain objects the dignity of rank, 
wealth, genius, or worth, and around others the deg- 
radation of poverty, ignorance, or vice. 

Fashion is governed chiefly by novelty and associa- 
tion. The leaders seek in novelty that which will distin- 
guish them from the vulgar; but the common herd fol- 
lows, through the influence of association, till general 



436 PSYCHOLOGY. 

coiiformity forces the leaders to seek distinction in other 
novelties, perhaps less beautiful, or still more devoid of 
good taste. 

Habit and custom have a powerful influence on the 
pleasures of taste. Habit is tendencj^ acquired by repe- 
tition, and is applicable to the individual. Custom is 
the habit of society. 

Fashion and custom are antagonistic. Fashion seeks 
the new. Custom clings to the old. The one has greater 
influence in youth ; the other in mature years. Fashion 
has the greater influence in dress; custom, in architect- 
ure, in manners, and in etiquette. 

2d. Wit^ humor^ ridicule^ the comic^ the ridiculous^ are 
sources of the pleasures of taste, though not of a high 
order. They elicit attention, provoke laughter, and, as 
aflbrding pleasure, have their place, so long as they do 
not degenerate, as they are liable to do, into the trifling, 
the low, the malicious, or the immoral. 

3d. Variety in unity is a source of aesthetic pleasure. 
By unity we are to understand, not the absolute sim- 
plicity of the object, but the union of the parts in the 
whole — many members in one body, E plurihus unum. 

Yariety in unity is always pleasing in the scoj^e which 
it gives to the intellect in tracing relations and adap- 
tations. The unity in variety may be seen, with in- 
creasing admiration, as the scale is enlarged from the 
individual to the family and dwelling, the citizens and 
the state, the human race and the world, rational beings 
and the universe. 

Harmony is the concord of diversity, and may relate 
to tone, color, form, character, or relation. Multiplicity 
w^ithout relation and adjustment of individuals, as a dis- 
ordered mass, is unattractive and displeasing. 

Grace, the harmony of attitude or movement, both 
soothes and delicchts the emotions. It is seen in the free 



EMOTIONS. 437 

movements of nature — the winding rivulet, the swaying 
branches, the curling smoke, the fleecy cloudy tiie gam- 
bols of the lamb, the circling flight of the bird, or in 
the plays of children. It is seen as art in the attitudes 
and gestures of the orator. 

Contrast^ in things beautiful, is a source of pleasure 
by giving play to thought, and by heightening the effect 
of the contrasted objects. 

4th. Begularity^ proportion^ or symmetry has each its 
peculiar effect. Eegularity affords pleasure in revealing 
law", and order, and utility. Proportion, the harmony 
of the Avhole and parts, and symmetry, the harmony of 
part with corresponding part, attract and j^lease, while 
deformity repels and offends. 

5th. Beauty is that form of expression of idea, thought, 
or design, which affords a universal, disinterested, and 
necessary feeling of satisfaction. It is a general quality, 
including all the sources of aesthetic pleasure. 

Beauty is found in various forms, and in countless 
varieties of objects from the crystal to the human face 
divine. Thus, we have the beauty of color, light, and 
shade, addressed to the eye; the rythm of poetry, and 
the harmony of music, addressed to the ear; the smooth, 
velvet surface, addressed to the touch; the agreeable 
flavor or odor, addressed to taste or smell. Indeed, the 
word cjesthetics — the name of the science of the beautiful — 
indicates that the senses are the avenues through which 
beauty approaches the mind. The agreeable assthetic 
feeling has its origin in the alternate excitation and rest 
of the nerves of the several senses. The repose after 
stimulation restores the susceptibility and reactive power 
of the nerves, and prepares them for fresh excitement. 
The mind, in sympathy w^ith the sensorium, anticipates 
the renewal of the stimulation, enjoys the sensation con- 
sequent upon the excitement, and is disaj)pointed at its 



438 PSYCHOLOGY. 

non-recurrence. Hence arises the pleasure from the 
rythmof poetry, of music, and of the dance, and the 
displeasure from discord. 

The beautiful is not realized by itself. It is always 
some object which has an end or purpose, which exhib- 
its an idea or thought, design or skill, that awakens in 
the beholder the emotions of beauty. 

Beauty is subject to limitation or restraint. Infinite 
profusion would overwhelm the finite faculties of man. 
Both nature and art observe the law of economy — nat- 
ure, in seeming accommodation to human limitations; 
art, from necessity. . 

Beauty seeks the alliance of that which has intrinsic 
dignity — natural, intellectual, or moral worth; and on 
such objects, both nature and art display their power. 
It shuns the ignoble and the degraded. 

6th. The grand and the sublime exalt the thoughts and 
ennoble the emotions. Objects of surpassing greatness 
are sublime — the plunging cataract, the lofty mountain 
chain, the broad expanse of ocean, the movement of 
armies and shock of battle, the flash of lightning, the 
roar of thunder, the concussion of the earthquake, in- 
finite space, endless duration, and omnipotent power. 
Beauty charms and soothes; sublimity elevates and awes. 
The one is gentle and abiding; the other, powerful and 
short-lived. 

Unpleasant sesthetical emotions are excited by monot- 
ony, by deformity, b}^ ugliness, by discord, by degrada- 
tion, and by decay. 

The elements of poetic imagery are originally derived 
through sense perception. Note the contrast of the 
poetic and unpoetic words — pink, scarlet, crimson, pur- 
ple, violet, blue, green, azure, orange, or golden, — dun, 
brown, drab, bay, or black; lustrous, luminous, spark- 
ling, twinkling, pearlj^, or silvery, — dull, dingy, or tur- 



EMOTIONS. 439 

bid; curving, winding, curling, flowing, — straight, stiff, 
or angular; clear, soft, musical, mellow, melodious, — 
shrill, harsh, hoarse, grating; smooth, soft, velvety, — 
rough, harsh, coarse; luscious, sweet, delicious, — sour, 
bitter, acrid; fragrant, perfumed, sweet-scented — pun- 
gent, stifling, suffocating. 

The conditions for the gratification of the pleasures 
of taste are found both in nature and in art; — in nat- 
ure, through countless diversities of landscape, adorned 
with hill and dale, and winding stream, and silvery 
lake, and distant mountain range, with azure sky and 
floating clouds, with trees and bowers, with fields of 
grass and waving grain; with living forms, and hum of 
bees,, and song of birds, and merry sports of childhood; 
in art, in grounds and dwelling, park and palace, in 
matchless form of sculptured marble, in speaking canvass, 
in the melody of the human voice or harmony of or- 
chestral band, in persuasive words of eloquence, or in 
the divine creations of poetic power. 

Novelty excites surprise and gratifies curiosity ; beauty 
and sublimity awaken admiration. 

3. Ethical emotions.- — The intellect discovers the fact 
that man is under law, divine and human; that the di- 
vine law, whether revealed in nature, in the constitu- 
tion of man, or in the written word, has for its end the 
welfare of the human race; that human law, though 
more or less imperfect, has the same end, and in the 
main is conducive to human happiness; that it is, there- 
fore, right to obey just law, and wrong to disobe^^, and 
that we should endeavor to promote the general good. 

Ethical acts are accompanied by three distinct classes 
of ethical emotions, or phenomena of conscience. 

1st. Preceding the act, there is a sense of obligation 
to do the right and to avoid the wrong. 

2d. Preceding, accomjDanying, or following the act, 



440 PSYCHOLOGY. 

there is a sense of responsibility, either to divine or 
human authority, for moral actions, whether right or 
wrong. 

3d. Following the act, there is a sense of recompense 
— for a right act, the approval of conscience, of our fel- 
low-men, and of God, — for a wrong act, the disapproval 
of conscience, in a sense of guilt, of shame, of regret, or 
of remorse, also the disapprobation of our fellow-men, 
and of God. 



I 



CHAPTEE lY. 



PSYCHICAL FEELINGS. 



Affection is, in general, either love or hatred of an 
object. Emotion is, as we have seen, an agitation of 
the sensibility. It may be comjDared to ripples upon 
the surface of water. 

An affection is an emotion with a current directed 
outward, and terminating on an external object. 

A desire is an emotion with a current directed inward 
and terminating on self. 

Passion is violent and controlling aifection or desire. 

Inclination is the tendency of the aifections or de- 
sires to affect others or to gratify ourselves. 

Disposition is the prevailing spirit or character. 

Propensity is the constitutional bent or proneness 
which gives direction to the inclinations. 

The aifections are divided into two general classes — 
the benevolent affections, characterized by love, and the 
malevolent, characterized by hate. 

1st. The benevolent affections. A benevolent affection 
is an interest in an object, an inclination towards it, an 
attachment to it, with a disposition to care for it, or do 
it good. 

The inclination, attachment, and benevolent intention, 
naturally, though not necessarily, follow from the inter- 
est which the object excites. Though the benevolent 
affections may, in general, be characterized as love, yet 
they are more definitely designated by specific names: 

(1) Sympathy is feeling with others as they feel. It 

(441) 



442 PSYCHOLOGY. 

originates in the social nature of man, and is fostered 
by the satisfaction which arises when our feelings har- 
monize with the agreeable feelings of others. It is not, 
however, limited to feelings of pleasure, but is extended 
to those of distress. Through sympathy, we not only 
rejoice with those who rejoice, but weep with those 
who weep. 

Personal experience, or at least some knowledge or 
conception of a feeling, is a condition of sympathy in 
respect to that feeling. We sympathize more readily 
with others in those feelings which have deeply affected 
ourselves or those with whom we are acquainted. 

Certain signs are associated with certain feelings, and 
are their indications. Perceiving these signs, we infer 
the feelings, and enter into sympathy with them. A 
knowledge of these signs is essential to sympathy. 

Persons susceptible to external influences, especially 
if they are also characterized by a refined sensibility, 
are usually more sympathetic than others, though their 
sympathy may be superficial and evanescent, like the 
sympathy felt for strangers; but the sj^mpathy between 
friends of kindred spirit is deeper and more abiding. 

Community of interests, of circumstances or opinions, 
of hopes or fears, tends to augment sympathy. 

The tendency to sympathy is checked by press of 
business, a selfish disj)Osition, irascible temper, avarice, 
ambition, or disparity in age, education, temperament, 
or social position. 

Not only does inordinate self-regard diminish sympa- 
thy, but also self-abnegation. The hermit or anchorite is 
not in sympathy with mankind. 

(2) Fity is the sympathy with others excited by their 
sufferings. It regards its object, not only as suffering, 
but as weak or helpless, and hence as inferior, at least, 
in regard to that which awakens pity. Though a be- 



AFFECTIONS. 443 

nevolent sentiment, it is, in regarding its object as in- 
ferior, allied to contempt. The condescension implied 
in pity is humiliating to a high-minded sufferer. He 
does not like to be pitied, though he may desire to be 
relieved. The sense of humiliation in being pitied is 
usually obviated, to some extent at least, either by the 
intensity of the suffering, or by habitual admission of 
inferiority on the part of the object of pity. 

(3) Compassion is sympathy excited by misfortune, 
and extends to persons in all conditions — inferiors, 
equals, or superiors. It is a feeling akin to pity: but 
pity may be a mere sentiment, a sym]3athetic emotion, 
resulting in no effort for relief; but compassion prompts 
to an effort to relieve the distress. The priest and the 
Levite, no doiibt, felt pity for the man who fell among 
thieves, yet they passed by on the other side; but the 
good Samaritan had compassion on him, and went to 
him, and dressed his wounds, and poured in oil and 
wine, and put him on his own beast, and took him to 
an inn, and paid for his care. 

A benevolent heart, in performing acts of compassion, 
will guard against wounding, by a display of condescen- 
sion, the self-respect of those whom he relieves. If, how- 
ever, pride in the sufferer is overborne by his sufferings, 
and anxiety for relief, the display of condescension may 
be disregarded or overcome by a sense of relief and 
gratitude to the benefactor. 

(4) Mercy is compassion extended to fallen enemies or 
to those exposed to suffering for demerit, by one who 
has the means of vengeance or the power to remit or 
mitigate the penalty. Pity may be bestowed when jus- 
tice forbids mercy ; it is felt, even for one w^ho suffers 
for crime, though it is augmented by extenuating cir- 
cumstances; but mercy seeks for those extenuating cir- 
cumstances as a justification for mitigating the penalty. 



444 PSYCHOL OGY. 

Though justice forbid mercy, compassion offers consola- 
tion and softens the rigors of the penalty. 

Pity, compassion, and mercy, though differing in their 
manifestations or in their objects, have the common ele- 
ment of sympathy with others in their distress. Pity 
may be felt for men or even brutes, though affording 
no relief. Compassion for any object in distress, seeks 
to relieve the distress. Mercy is extended to those in 
our power, whether enemies or criminals, in forgiveness 
of injury, or in remitting or mitigating the penalty of 
violated law. 

God pities the miseries of mankind, shows his com- 
passion by relieving our distress and by his bountiful 
provision for our wants, and exhibits his mercy in the 
forgiveness of sins. 

(5) Gratitude is the feeling experienced towards a 
benefactor for benefits conferred. It involves satisfac- 
tion in the benefit received, admiration for the generous 
deed, esteem for the benefactor, and a desire to make 
suitable returns. 

(6) Thankfulness is a sense of kindness received, and 
a readiness to acknowledge it in words or other appro- 
priate signs. 

Genuine thankfuhiess may be regarded in its mani- 
festations as the expression of gratitude; but the form 
of thankfulness may be employed, when gratitude is not 
felt. A profusion of thanks may be offered by one 
whose conduct proves him to be ungrateful. 

Regarding mere thankfulness as an imperfect return 
for benefits received, gratitude seeks to make more ade- 
quate returns in appropriate deeds. 

The common sentiment of mankind approves of thank- 
fulness, but demands gratitude. Unthankfulness is re- 
garded as a breach of etiquette; ingratitude is branded 
as a moral baseness. 



AFFECTIONS. 445 

(7) Esteem is the regard which we feel for others in 
consideration of their excellences of character. Though 
entering as an element in gratitude and friendship, it 
is not identical with either, since it may be felt in the 
absence of benefits received or of personal attachments. 
It can be called out only by good qualities, real or sup- 
posed, in the object of esteem. 

(8) Friendship is the mutual attachment of two per- 
sons who have esteem, regard, or predilections for each 
other, exclusive of natural relationship or the tender 
passion of love. It presupposes an intimate acquaint- 
ance, and finds expression in the reciprocation of kind 
offices. It implies community of feeling, congruity of 
character, and mutual sympathy; though, in many re- 
spects, true friends may be diverse, or even the com- 
plements of one another, each supplying the deficiencies 
of the other, and admiring in the other what is lacking 
in himself. 

True friendship is the mark of a generous and noble 
character, and can be felt by no other. A person des- 
titute of true friends is certainly wanting in generous 
qualities, and is an object of pity. 

Appreciation of high and noble qualities in another, 
though an essential condition of friendship, is not iden- 
tical with it, since it may exist when friendship is want- 
ing. True friends will stand by one another in ad- 
versity, that test which distinguishes false friends from 
true. Nothing but an unexpected discovery of unworthi- 
ness in the character of one of the parties, showing that 
the other was mistaken in him, or that he is not what 
he once was, will sever the tie of friendship, and even 
then he will always be regarded w^ith a melancholy in- 
terest which would manifest itself in deeds of kindness. 
The friend of former years can never be regarded as 
an alien or a stranger. 



446 PSYCHOLOGY. 

Friendship seeks the good of the object of its regard, 
and is disinterested and self-sacrificing. It is not blind 
to faults, but sees them and endeavors to correct them, 
and thus to render the object of regard more worthy. 

Friendship is progressive. Time strengthens and con- 
firms it, and renders it proof against the rude blasts of 
adversity. It sympathizes both in joy and in sorrow, 
rejoicing in the one, affording consolation in the other. 

The question has been raised whether friendshij^ can 
be cherished between more than two persons. The num- 
ber of i^ersons towards whom a warm friendship can be 
cherished is not indeed very great; but there is no rea- 
son why the number should be limited to a single in- 
dividual. The acquisition of a new friend does not im- 
ply the loss of an old one, neither is it a just cause of 
jealousy. In this respect, friendshij) differs greatly from 
love between persons of opposite sexes, which, in the 
very nature of the case, is exclusive. 

(9) Self-love is that form of love in which the subject 
and the object are identical. It is the regard of the in- 
dividual for himself, and leads him to guard against 
danger and to seek to promote his own happiness. 
Self-love is said to be the first law of nature. It is 
either due or undue. 

Due self-love, or self-respect, which guards our own 
welfare and restrains us from whatever is debasing, is 
proper and commendable. The injunction, Love thy 
neighbor as th^'self, implies that, within reasonable lim- 
its, it is right to love ourselves. We are at liberty to 
promote our own interests, when, in doing so, we do 
not disregard the interests of others. True greatness is 
modest, generous, and self-sacrificing. 

Undue self-love is selfishness. It seeks our own grati- 
fication, regardless of the rights of others. 

It is egotism when it seeks to make one's self conspic- 



AFFECTIONS, 447 

nous, and obtrudes the great I whenever it finds an 
opportunity. 

It is haughtiness^ when it looks down with contempt 
upon others regarded as inferior. 

It is j^riV/e when it exalts self, and glories in its own 
importance or achievements, exclaiming, ''Is not this 
great Babylon that I have built for the house of the 
kingdom, by the might of my power, and for the honor 
of my majestj'?" 

It is selfish cwibition, wdien, for self-glory, it seeks for 
ecclesiastical, political, or military power, regardless of 
the misery which it causes. 

(10) Conjugal love is the reciprocal attachment of two 
persons of opposite sexes, who are united by the mar- 
riage engagement or tie. It is, perhaps, the strongest 
affection of the human heart. 

There is a natural affinity or attachment between the 
sexes; and if a marriageable man and woman of suita- 
ble ages and social position, entertain mutual friendship, 
no other attachment intervening, that friendship is almost 
certain to develop into love. 

This affection, awakened by mutual attraction, and in- 
tensified by restriction to a single object, becomes, by 
action and reaction, an all-controlling passion. The 
lovers are blind to each other's faults, and each sees in 
the other the perfection of every excellence. 

Conjugal love ought to be enduring as life, and will 
be thus enduring if the parties are well mated, con- 
siderate, forbearing, and true. But how often is the 
ardent love before marriage transformed into indiffer- 
ence or hate ! Its very ardor and intensity is unfavor- 
able to its constancy. More selfish than friendship, love 
is exclusive, easily excited to jealousy, and brooks no rival. 

Friendship demands genuine virtues, and is confirmed 
and tested by time; but love, capricious and inconsider- 



448 PSYCHOLOGY, 

ate, blind to faults, deaf to advice, too often sows to the 
wind and reaps the whirlwind. 

(11) Parental and filial love is that love which exists 
between parents and children — parental, the love of 
parents for their children ; and filial, the love of children 
for their parents. 

It is an instinctive feeling, exhibited by the lower an- 
imals as well as by man; but in the lower animals, it 
ceases when the young are able to care for themselves, 
while, in man, it is not only an instinctive feeling, but a 
rational sentiment, as enduring as life itself. 

This affection seems to have been implanted by the 
Creator for the wise purpose of caring for the young 
and preserving the species. 

Parental love is stronger than filial, and maternal than 
paternal. With what unceasing care the mother watches 
over her children through the years of helpless infancy 
and dependent childhood! 

The feeling of parental and filial love is strengthened 
by the relation of the parties as protector and protected, 
by association and habit, by worth in the parents and 
dutiful conduct in the children; but that these circum- 
stances do not constitute the affection, or wholly explain 
it, is evident from the difierence between the feeling 
towards one's own child or parent and that with which 
a step-child or a step-parent is regarded. 

(12) Fraternal love is the love existing between broth- 
ers and sisters. Though less intense than conjugal, pa- 
rental, or filial love, it is a beautiful sentiment, and is 
abiding as life. 

The family affections — conjugal, parental and filial, 
and fraternal love, constitute a group by themselves. 
They exhibit divine w^isdom in their origin; and, surviv- 
ing the loss of Eden, continue to work for the good of 
the race. 



AFFECTIONS, 449 

The affections, the source of the dearest joys of life, are 
also the occasions of the sharpest pangs. Sorrow for the 
loss of friends refuses to be comforted, save in the hope 
of a reunion in a future life. The fact that love out- 
lives the natural life of the person loved, is in harmony 
with the doctrine of immortality, but is out of harmony 
with the gloomy view that death is an eternal sleep. 

(13) Philanthropy is the love of mankind. It is a 
broad and generous sentiment, neither bounded by state 
lines, nor restricted by language or race. It is the 
power Avhich moves a Howard or a Wilberforce to deeds 
of love, and gives him a place in the hearts of mankind. 
Our j)bilanthropic impulses are often overborne by nar- 
rower or more selfish feelings. 

(14) Patriotism^ or love of country, is a noble senti- 
ment. Though inferior to philanthropy in breadth, it 
is superior to it in depth. It has for its object the good 
of country, and is gratified with national prosperit}^, and 
stirred to self-sacrificing activity in times of national peril. 

In times of peace, men are engaged with their own 
pursuits, and the sentiment of patriotism slumbers; but 
if the country be threatened with invasion, or if its life 
be imperiled by rebellion, the slumbering fires of patri- 
otism will burst forth into flame, and, through sympa- 
thy, patriotism becomes contagious. 

(15) The love of home is kindred with that of patri- 
otism, but warmer, and, in ordinary cases, more intense. 

Nostalgia^ or home sickness, indicates the strength of 
the affection for home. It more severely affects the un- 
cultivated than it does the cultivated — those who through 
knowledge and discipline have resources of hapj)iness 
within themselves. 

(16) Piety is love for God. It is a complex affection 
involving reverence^ or profound respect, for the divine 
character; adoration^ or worship of Him as Supreme; 

Psy.— 38. 



450 PSYCHOL OGY, 

gratitude for mercies and blessings received; and trust in 
God, or confidence of safety and welfare under his pro- 
tection and providence. 

True love to God prompts to obedience to the divine 
laws, and stimulates every noble sentiment. 

2d. The malevolent affections. A malevolent affection 
is a feeling of resentment awakened by an object which 
disagreeably affects us. 

The most favorable view that can be taken of them 
is that they serve the purpose of inciting to prompt ac- 
tion in case of sudden personal danger, and that they 
lead to the detection and punishment of crime, and thus 
to the protection of society. In this light they may be 
regarded as a natural response to a sense of injury. 
More frequently, however, they are suffered to control 
action, when they should themselves be restrained, or 
directed by reason. Though originally constituted by 
the Creator for wise purposes, they have been perverted 
by sin, and have become the occasions of evil. 

(1) Dislike is the repugnance felt towards an object 
which displeases. It is more than the negative indiffer- 
ence with which those objects are regarded wd:iich neither 
awaken desire nor call forth the benevolent or malev- 
olent affections. 

Something in an object awakens unpleasant feelings 
which find expression in some token of disfavor. The 
feeling is not positive hatred, but there is aversion or 
a disposition to repel the object. 

(2) Antipathy is a strong dislike, indicating not only 
a want of sympathy, but positive disagreement or dis- 
cord. In certain cases it may be regarded as constitu- 
tional, since no other reason can be assigned for it. 
Certain persons feel antipathy to others at first-sight, so 
do certain animals. 

(3) Contempt is the feeling of dislike and disapproba- 



AFFECTIONS, 451 

tion manifested towards those who are considered base. 
These are regarded as justly deserving to be branded for 
their meanness. It is not external circumstances, such 
as poverty or mental inferiority, that render a person 
an object of contempt, but baseness of character, or in- 
tentional meanness of conduct. 

Contempt is not incompatible with the hope that the 
obloquy cast upon the person may cause a reaction of 
his moral nature leading to reformation. When a person 
is despised as beneath contempt, he is regarded as hope- 
lessly lost to all that is good. 

(4) Scorn is the feeling w^hich leads to the rejection 
of something proffered as unworthy of our acceptance. 
Contempt implies that something is not good in itself; 
scorn, that it is not good enough for us. Scorn is alto- 
gether a perversion when the wicked scorn the right- 
eous or that which is good. 

(5) Disdain is the feeling entertained by a haughty 
person towards others whom he despises as unworthy 
of his consideration. Haughtiness is the effect of pride, 
and leads to the feeling of disdain for those regarded as 
inferior, and to an indifference alike to their j)raise or 
censure. Arrogance is a compound of pride and vanity, 
and manifests itself in pretensions to superiority and in 
demands for deference. 

A haughty man treats with disdain those whom he 
regards as destitute of marks of distinction. An arro- 
gant man makes lofty pretensions, and claims superior- 
ity for himself, and exacts deference from those whom 
he regards as his inferiors. The pride of an arrogant 
man would lead to disdain, if his vanity did not covet 
praise. His vanity modifies his pride and excludes dis- 
dain ; his pride makes his vanity arrogant. 

(6) Envy is the resentment felt at the success or su- 
j)eriority of others. The envious person, seeing in the 



452 PSYCHOLOGY. 

success of another his own failure, or in the superiority 
of another his own inferiority, resents it by attempting 
to lower him by depreciation, insinuation, or slander. 

Envy is always base and degrading. It is without 
justification or palliation. 

The true remedy for envy is to bring ourself up, and 
not to bring a superior down. If any one would de- 
velop, to their full extent, all the possibilities of good in 
himself, he would find little occasion for envy. 

(7) Jealousy is a burning desire to possess or to keep 
something regarded as valuable, coupled with a fear that 
another will appropriate it to himself 

Envy regards, with an evil eye, the possessions, the 
success, the reputation, or the superiority of others. 
Jealousy fears that another may deprive us of what we 
desire or possess. We may be envious at the success or 
the superiority of others, when it simply reveals, but does 
not cause our own failures or inferiority; but we are 
jealous of the success or the superiority of others when it 
is believed to sustain to our failures or inferiority the 
relation of cause to effect. We are envious of superiors 
in position, influence, or fortune. We are jealous of 
equals who supplant us or gain at our expense. Thus, 
one child is jealous if another is praised in his presence, 
imagining that the other withdraws praise from himself 
Those of the same profession, whose success depends, to 
a great extent, upon their popularity, are most liable to 
be jealous of one another, as musicians, actors, physi- 
cians, or preachers. 

The typical case of jealousy is that exhibited by a 
lover who believes that he is supplanted by a rival in 
the affections of the one he loves. In this case, the 
more ardent the love, the more violent the jealousy. 
Eeginning with suspicion, which implies doubt, jealousy 
becomes furious when evidence dispels doubt, and turns 



AFFECTIONS, 453 

uncertainty into dreaded certainty, and ardent love into 
murderous hate. 

"Thy numbers, Jealousy, to naught were fixed, 
Sad proof of thy distressful state ! 
Of differing themes the veering song was mixed ; 
And now it courted love, now raving called on hate." 

(8) Malice is ill-will cherished towards others, termin- 
ating in evil intent or premeditated injury. Though it 
may be called out by prejudice, or dislike, or injury, 
•real or imaginary, it springs from a bad disposition, or 
a wicked heart, and is without justification or excuse. 
It is exactly the opposite of benevolence, which is the 
cardinal virtue. 

(9) Resentment is the reaction of feeling in response 
to a sense of personal affront or injury. It seeks ex- 
pression in some form of retaliation. Arising from a 
sense of wrong received, it tends to continue till the 
wrong is redressed. Wrongs to our friends are resented, 
since they are regarded, as in a certain sense, personal. 
We consider them as wrongs to ourselves. 

Resentment implying malice is to be distinguished 
from indignation^ or the feeling awakened by the unjust 
or atrocious conduct of others. Indignation springs from 
a high sense of honor, and, being exempt from selfish 
personality, is devoid of malice, and not irreconcilable 
with a benevolent disposition. , 

(10) Hatred is cherished resentment. It broods over 
wrong, takes time for consideration, and deliberately 
plans retaliation. Less violent than anger, it is more 
lasting. Hatred between individuals leads to feuds be- 
tween families, and clans, or tribes. 

(11) Anger is sudden and strong resentment. It often 
produces intense excitement, and manifests itself in deeds 
of violence. Anger is usually of short duratiou ; its 



454 PSYCHOLOGY. 

very intensity forbids its continuance; lience, it has 
been defined as a short-lived madness. Anger may, by 
sudden provocation, be aroused in hearts devoid of mal- 
ice, but it is unsafe to be subject to its control, since it 
may lead to deeds which may be the lasting regret of 
our lives, and which no repentance can remedy. 

(12) Wrath is heightened anger felt by a superior to- 
wards an inferior. It may be displeasure or righteous 
indignation, devoid of malice, felt towards the guilty, as 
the wrath of God; but, when provoked by personal in- 
juries, if involving malice, it becomes haughty vindic- 
tiveness, dangerous or destructive to its object. 

(13) Rage is a violent ebullition of anger^ breaking 
out into extravagant expressions and vehement demon- 
strations of resentment. 

(14) Fury is excessive rage, lashing the soul to such 
a pitch of excitement, that it is no longer under the 
control of reason. 

(15) Revenge is deep-seated hatred, manifesting itself 
in retalliation for injuries received. It is a destructive 
passion, seeking satisfaction in returning injury for in- 
jury, and usually with interest compounded. Not 
satisfied with the retribution which civil or Divine jus- 
tice will visit upon the offender, it takes upon itself the 
work of retribution, forgetting that God has said, 
"Avenge not j^ourselves, but rather give place unto 
wrath; for vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the 
Lord." 



CHAPTEE V. 



PSYCHICAL FEELINGS. 



Desire is a cleaving for a supposed good not in pos- 
session. The object of desire must either be known or 
believed to be a good, that is, something whose pos- 
session would afford satisfaction, or gratify the feelings. 
Desire may be regarded as an emotion with a current 
directed towards self 

Aversion is the opposite of desire. It may be re- 
garded as negative desire — a desire to be rid of a suj)- 
posed evil. The object of aversion must be either known 
or believed to be an evil, that is, somethiog which 
would disagreeably affect the sensibility. 

In desire, the order is, a supposed good not in pos- 
session, an interest in that good or an affection for it, a 
desire or craving to possess it. In aversion, the order 
is, a supposed evil, a dislike excited against that evil, 
and an aversion to it. 

Desire attracts; aversion repels. The object of desire 
pleases; the object of aversion dipleases. 

1st. General desires and aversions. There are three 
general classes of legitimate desires and aversions — de- 
sire for happiness, for perfection, for usefulness; and 
aversion to misery, to imperfection, and to uselessness. 

(1) A desire for happiness^ or an aversion to misery, 
is universal. Man desires not only pleasure, the gratifi- 
cation of a passing hour, but happiness, rational enjoy- 
ment; and desires it to be abiding, eternal, which in- 
volves a desire for continued existence. 

(455 ) 



456 PSYCHOLOGY. 

Happiness is attainable only by a compliance with its 
conditions; but a knowledge of these conditions is in- 
dispensable to compliance. What, then, is happiness, 
and what are the conditions of its attainment? Happi- 
ness is the agreeable emotions which spring from the 
enjoyment of good. It is not quiescence — it does not 
consist in rest. It springs both from the exertion of our 
active powers, and from the excitement of our passive 
susceptibilities. 

But neither is every action nor every excitement a source 
of happiness. Certain actions or certain excitements re- 
sult in positive misery. Happiness springs only from 
proper actions or from proper excitements, that is, from 
such exertion of the active powers or excitement of the 
2)assive susceptibilities as are in accordance with the 
laws of our being. Obedience to law is a condition of 
happiness, and a knowledge of law is a condition of 
obedience, and therefore a condition of happiness. 

A desire for happiness naturally leads to the desire 
for those things which confer happiness. An aversion 
to misery leads to an aversion to whatever is a cause 
of misery. 

(2) A desire for perfection and an aversion to imper- 
fection, is natural to man, and is, therefore, legitimate, 
when not selfishly pursued at the expense of others. 

Perfection is either physical, intellectual, or moral, 
each contributing to the others, all being essential to 
the perfection of man. 

Physical perfection^ embracing health, strength, agility, 
and beauty, is rather an ideal towards which some prog- 
ress can be made, than an end which can be definitely 
attained. 

A desire for physical perfection tends to guard life 
and to preserve health and beauty. It prompts to the 
observance of the physical laws in exercise and rest, in 



DESIRE AND A VERSION, 457 

food and drink, in pure ,air and proper clothing, and 
in cleanliness of person. 

Physical well-being is favorable to intellectual and 
moral perfection, and contributes to human happiness. 

Intellectual perfection^ consisting in the symmetrical 
development and complete control of our mental powers, 
is a loft}^ ideal which can be approximated, though 
never reached. The desire for the attainment of this 
ideal is an incentive for assiduous culture. 

A knowledge of the conditions and laws of happiness 
is the indispensable condition of obedience to these con- 
ditions and laws, and obedience results in happiness. 
By knowledge, man avoids many evils, otherwise inev- 
itable, enlarges his dominion over the forces of nature, 
and thus multiplies the sources of enjoyment. 

Moral perfection^ or virtue — integrity of purpose, pu- 
rity of heart, love to God and to man, uprightness of 
life, is not only a noble and inspiring ideal, but is, by 
the help of God, an attainable end. 

Moral perfection is a never-failing fountain of pure 
and unalloyed happiness, and will ensure peace of mind 
and rest of soul, in spite of poverty, persecution, sick- 
ness, loss of friends, or even death itself 

(3) A desire for usefulness grows out of man's social 
relations, and is legitimate and praiseworthy. It nat- 
urally leads to thoughtful plans and noble deeds. It 
stimulates the benevolent affections, which seek the good 
of others. Its language is, May others be blest, and 
may I bestow the blessing. 

2d. Special desires and aversions. The special desires 
and aversions can be reduced to three classes — desire for 
knowledge, for wealth, and for power, and aversion to 
ignorance, to poverty, and to inferiority and obscurity. 

(1) The desire for knowledge is more than a vulgar 
curiosity, a desire for novelty. It embraces the wide 

Psy.— 39. 



458 PSYCHOLOGY. 

field of science, literatnre, and art^ also the professional, 
commercial, mechanical, and agricultural purBuits, 

The desire for knowledge is closely related to the do- 
sire for intellectual perfection. It arises from the utility 
of knowledge, from the constitution of the intellectual 
powers, from the scope for activity which the pursuit 
of knowledge affords, and from the pleasure which tlie 
acquisition confers. 

Knowledge is a power and a great utility — a means 
of distinction and influence. The activity of the intellect 
is itself a means of happiness. The field of knowledge, 
vast and greatly diversified, is a never-failing source of 
pure enjoyment. The desire for knowdedge arises, there- 
fore, naturally from the constitution of man in relation 
to the world in which he lives. It usually assumes 
specific forms — a desire for a knowledge of a certain 
science, art, language, or profession. 

In early life, the desire for knowledge partakes more 
of the character of curiosity; but in mature years, it 
seeks rather for the practical, and, in some cases, for 
the speculative and the universal. 

Aversion to ignorance is the necessarj^ counterpart of 
the desire for knowledge. It is also augmented by a 
consideration of the disabilities attending ignorance. 

(2) The desire for wealth is natural, and within cer- 
tain limitations, useful and commendable. It checks 
vice, promotes industry, and fosters the useful arts. 

The pursuit of wealth affords pleasure in the activity 
which it calls forth. The possession gratifies the desire 
for its acquisition, affords the means for the gratification 
of other desires, confers the dignity of independence and 
social distinction, and supplies the means for promoting 
the welfare of others. 

Avarice^ or the undue desire for wealth, induces anx- 
0U8 care and slavish toil, begets covetousness, or desire 



DESIRE AND A VERSION. 459 

for the property of others, and culminates in a mammon- 
worship or miserly wretchedness. 

Aversion to poverty^ the necessary consequence of the 
desire for wealth, is strengthened by a knowledge of the 
evils of j^overty. 

(3) Ambition^ the desire for j^ower or farae^ is a native 
and powerful impulse to action. The ambition to be 
useful is a laudable virtue; but selfish ambition is a vul- 
gar vice, detestable in itself, and dangerous to society. 
The selfish possessor of power is a tyrant, and the am- 
bitious conqueror has been the scourge of mankind. 

The desire for the approval of the wise and the good, 
coupled with an effort to merit that approval, leads to 
worthy achievement; but vanity^ the undue desire for 
the approbation of others, is a weak and silly vice, usu- 
ally exhibited by those destitute of merit. Coupled with 
untruthfulness, it leads to deceit or hypocrisy. 

Pride desires power; vanity fame. Pride elevates us 
in our own estimation; vanity seeks elevation in the 
estimation of others. Mortification is wounded vanity. 

Aversion to inferiority or obscurity is the counterpart 
of ambition, or desire for power or fame. 

3d. Compound desires. These are hope and fear. 

(1) Hope is the desire and expectation of good. It 
points to the future. We do not hope for that which 
we now possess, nor for that which we either do not 
desire, or do not expect. 

Desire and expectation, the two elements of hope, are 
not always in equilibrium. Expectation is an intellect- 
ual element, and varies with the degree of probability. 
When the probability is small, the exjDcctation is weak, 
and we are said to hope against hope, that is, against 
expectation ; but when the probability is great, the ex- 
pectation is strong, giving the assurance of hope. If 
the desire is weak, and the expectation also, but little in- 



460 PSYCHOLOGY. 

terest is taken ; if the desire is weak, and the expecta- 
tion strong, hope approaches pure expectation; if both 
desire and expectation be strong, the hope becomes a 
joyful anticipation. 

Faith is confidence in a person or thing from which 
we hope to realize some object of desire. The object of 
hope is a good; but the object of faith is a person or 
thing regarded as the source of good. Trust implies the 
committal of an interest to the keeping of an object of 
faith . 

Hope is a powerful spring to action. The loss of 
hope usually paralyzes effort; but, when coupled with 
resentment, it may lead to the rashness of despair. 

(2) Fear is the aversion felt towards expected evil. 
Expectation is common to hope and fear, but the objects 
of expectation, in the two cases, are opposites. In hope, 
the object of expectation is some form of good ; in fear, 
the object is some form of evil. The desire of hope, 
and the aversion of fear are also opposites. 

Anxiety is a form of fear in which the evil is rather 
possible and uncertain, than probable and expected. It 
is usually more continued than fear. 

Apprehension indicates a stronger probability than 
anxiety. It anticipates danger. 

Alarm is the fear excited by the presence of sudden 
danger. 

Dread is the fear of some impending calamity. 

Terror is paralyzing fear. 

Horror is the sympathetic terror induced by the sud- 
den calamity of others. 

Despair is the absence of all hope of deliverance from 
present evil. It may result in complete inactivity or it 
may, as sometimes in war, exhibit prodigious effort 
known as the courage of despair. 



PART III, 
VOLITION AND THE WILL. 



(461) 



CHAPTER I. 

GENERAL VIEW OF VOLITION. 

1. Phenomena and faculties of the soul. — We have 
already found that the phenomena of the soul are reduci- 
ble to three classes, — cognitions, feelings, and volitions. 
These phenomena imply three classes of faculties, — the 
Intellect, the Sensibility, and the Will. 

Since the soul has cognitions, that is, since it knows, 
it has the power to know, or the faculty of knowing, 
and this faculty is called the intellect. Since the soul 
feels, it has the susceptibility of feeling, and this sus- 
ceptibility is called the sensibility. Since the soul puts 
forth volitions, that is, since it wills, or chooses between 
alternatives, it has the power of decision or of choice, 
and this power is called the will. 

The faculties of the soul are not divisions of the soul; 
they are capabilities, or susceptibilities, or powers of 
the soul. W^hen it is said that the soul has intellect, 
sensibility, and will, the meaning is, the soul can think, 
and feel, and choose; but these processes go on together, 
though one may be more prominent than the others. 

In cognition, the soul thinks. The intellect, or faculty 
of cognition, is the faculty, which the soul sj^ecially ex- 
erts; but the other faculties, the sensibility and the will, 
are relatively, not absolutely, quiescent. In feeling, the 
susceptibilities are agitated, and though thought and vo- 
lition may be present, the phenomena of the sensibility 
are especially prominent. In volition, the soul exerts 

its powers of choosing between alternatives, but the in- 

(463) 



464 PSYCHOL OGY. 

tellect and the sensibility are not only not absent, but 
not even quiescent. 

The cognitions make known the properties of things, 
and thus awaken our appetites, or induce affections and 
desires or aversions, which become springs to action. 

In saying that the will decides which alternative it 
will choose, the meaning is, the soul exerts its power of 
choice, called the will, and decides which alternative it 
will elect. 

2. Definition of terms. — In order to avoid ambiguity, 
it is necessary to define the principal terms employed. 

Decision sometimes signifies an intellectual act, as when 
a judge decides a question of law, or, in general, when 
the intellect decides whether a given proposition is true 
or false; but when used in connection with the will, de- 
cision means that we have made up our minds to act 
or not to act in a given manner; and growing out of 
this, is a secondary meaning of firmness or adherence 
to the alternative chosen. A decision to act is always 
an act of the will; and, conversely, an act of the will 
always involves decision. 

A purpose is a predetermination to enter upon a given 
course of action. 

Intention is the deliberate purpose to accomplish a 
certain result. • 

Yolition is the intentional decision to act in a given 
manner. It is the typical act ^ of the will. 

Choice is the election of one of two or more alterna- 
tives in view of motives rationally apprehended. 

The relation of choice to volition is that of a species 
to its genus. Choice is rational volition, electing its 
alternative in view of reasons. It implies preference. 

Alternatives are necessary to choice; that is, where 
there is no alternative, there can be no choice. Ea- 
tional motive is also a condition of choice. The term 



GENERAL VIEW OF VOLITION. 465 

rational motive is here generalized, and signiiies motive 
in view of reasons good or bad. 

Volitions may be put forth in view of motives rationally 
apprehended, or from impulses of the sensibility without 
reflection, or without motive or impulse. In the first 
case, the volition is elective; in the second, impulsive; in 
the third, arbitrary. All volition is conative ; choice is 
not only conative, but elective. 

Refusal is the expressed decision not to accept a given 
proffer, or not to comply with a given request. But to 
refuse to accept a proffer, is to choose its alternative, 
not to accept; and to refuse to comply with a request is 
to choose its alternative, not to comply. Eefusing is 
negative choosing, or choosing the negative. Thus, an 
apple is offered me, I may either choose or refuse to 
accept it; that is, I may choose to accept it, or I may 
choose not to accept it. I may be requested to lend 
$100, 1 may either choose or refuse to comply with 
the request; that is, I may choose to comply with the 
request, or choose not to comply. To decline to accept 
an invitation is a polite refusal to accept, expressing the 
choice not to accept. 

More than two alternatives may be presented. Thus, 
I may choose to take one of two or more apples, or 
I may choose to take more than one, or I may choose 
iio4^ to take any. 

The alternatives here considered are not congruents, 
but conflictives, and are either contradictories or contra- 
ries — contradictories, if but two in number; contraries, 
if more than two. 

Volition is not to be confounded with the external 
executive act. Thus, the decision to take an apple pre- 
cedes the act of putting forth the hand and taking it, 
and is, therefore, distinguishable from the act. 

Volition is to be distinguished from desire; for desire 



466 PSYCHOL OG Y. 

is a craving for an object in view of appropriating it to 
the use of self; but the decision to act in reference to 
it is a volition. The object of desire is something con- 
sidered as a good. The object of volition is the execu- 
tive act consequent upon the volition. Desires are pas- 
sively determined by something foreign to self, consid- 
ered as a good. Volitions are intentionally determined . 
by the will itself, usually in view of motives. Desires 
are phenomena of the sensibility, and do not necessarily 
eventuate in action. Volitions are sovereign acts of the 
will, determining executive actions. In like manner, 
volition is to be distinguished from aversion. 

A purpose is, as we have seen, a general choice or 
predetermination to enter upon a given course of action. 
It may be regarded as a general volition, determining 
many subsequent volitions. Thus, the purpose to lead 
a virtuous life, that is, the general choice of virtue, de- 
termines many subordinate choices or volitions. 

The will is the faculty of volition. 

A motive is an inducement soliciting the will to choose 
between alternatives, or to decide to act in a given 
manner. 

The expression to act is to be understood in a general 
sense, and may signify not only to act, but to refrain 
from acting in a given manner. 

To will is to decide or to exert the power of volition. 
To will and to choose are nearly synonymous, differing 
slightly in their applications. It is correct to say, I 
choose virtue, not I will virtue, though it is right to 
say, I will to be virtuous; and this is the meaning of 
the expression, I choose virtue. 

A preference is the favor accorded to one alternative 
in deeming it rather to be chosen than another. It 
naturally precedes choice. 

Indifference is the absence of preference. It signifies 



GENERAL VIEW OF VOLITION. 467 

that one alternative is neither more nor less to be 
chosen than another. The opposing motives are equal, 
whatever be their influence. In this case, as there is 
really no preference, the alternative may be left to be 
determined by another jDcrson. or by chance, or in gen- 
eral by circumstances foreign to choice, or the person 
may decide for himself; if so, he decides without pref- 
erence. It is then virtually volition without motive. 

Inclination^ propensity^ and disposition have already 
been defined; but it is imj)ortant to remember that in- 
clination is the reaching forth of the affections or desires 
for an object; that a propensity is a constitutional ten- 
dency to a given course of action ; and that disposition 
is the general attitude of the soul with regard to other 
things, out of which arises the favor or disfavor with 
which a given thing is regarded. 

3. Order of the phenoraena.— 1st. Pre-volitional. The 
intellect discovers the properties of many objects which 
affect the sensibility as agreeable or disagreeable, thus 
exciting the appetites, and inducing affections and de- 
sires or aversions. The appetites crave gratification. 
The affections and the desires seek those objects which 
are agreeable to the sensibility. The aversions repel 
those which are disagreeable. 

The appetites, the affections, the desires, and the aver- 
sions furnish motives or springs of action which solicit 
the will to act in choosing between alternatives. 

2d. Volitional. The soul, as rational, reflects upon 
these alternatives, and by the power of the will decides 
which alternative it will choose. The motives do not all 
solicit the will to choose the same alternative. The will 
is frequently, perhaps commonly, solicited b}^ conflicting 
motives. In view of all the motives, the soul prefers 
one alternative, and exerts its power of Avill in choosing 
that alternative, and rejects the other alternatives. 



468 PSYCHOLOGY, 

3d. Post -volitional. The decision of the will being 
made in the choice of the alternative, there remains the 
post- volitional act by which the volition is executed. 
Thus, having decided to consult a certain book lying at 
hand, I put forth my hand and take the book, and open 
it, and read a certain passage. 

The threefold phenomenon can be thus simply illus- 
trated. An apple is offered me. My appetite is excited, 
and a desire for the apple induced, which acts as a mo- 
tive soliciting the will to decide to accept the offer, '^o 
counter motives appearing, or none of sufficient weight, 
the will decides to accept the apple. It now" remains 
to put forth the hand and take it. This is the external 
execution of the volition, and is a voluntary action. 



CHAPTEE II. 

FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 

1. Nature and limitations of freedom. — Freedom is 
exemption both from restraint and from constraint, that 
is, from prevention and from compulsion, whether in- 
ternal or external. 

Liberty is external freedom to act as we choose, that 
is, to execute our volitions. It is freedom from external 
restraint or prevention, and from external constraint or 
compulsion. It is not necessarily freedom from all re- 
straint, or from all constraint; for freedom from restraint 
in doing any particular thing is liberty to do that thing, 
and freedom from constraint to do any thing is liberty 
not to do that thing. 

A man is not free to appropriate the property of his 
neighbor without his consent, or to injure his reputa- 
tion or his person. From such actions he is restrained 
by civil law. This restraint is not, however, absolute, 
since he may violate the law; but for this violation, he 
is subject to penalty. He is not free from contributing 
his just proportion in bearing public burdens, in defray- 
ing the expenses of government. He is compelled to 
pay his taxes. 

Man is not free from obligation to obey the laws of 
God, but he is free from compulsion. If he violate these 
laws, as he has power to do, he is not free from the 
consequences of the violation. Though a man may pos- 
sibly escape the penalty of violated human law, he can 

not escape the just judgments of God. 

(469) 



470 PSYCHOLOGY, 

Within certain limits, however, man is free to act as he 
pleases; that is, he has liberty, so long as he violates no 
law, to execute his volitions. He can choose his place 
of residence, and engage, without hinderance, in any 
business or profession. He can act with the party he 
prefers, unite with the church of his choice, or refuse to 
co-operate with any party or church. In such cases 
man is free, that is, he has liberty of action. 

Liberty, or external freedom, applies, therefore, not to 
all external actions, but to those which violate no law. 
In regard to these, man has liberty to execute his voli- 
tions. Hence, in respect to external action in general, 
man has but a partial, or limited freedom; but this is 
not the freedom of the will, but freedom to execute those 
volitions of the will which violate no law, either human 
or divine. 

Liberty of action in the cases in which it is found, is 
not only freedom from external restraint, as a stone 
thrown into the air is free to fall, but it is also free^ 
dom from external constraint. A man is not free in 
doing what he is compelled to do. Freedom includes 
exemption from external compulsion. It is, therefore, 
freedom from co-action^ that is, both from external re- 
straint and from external constraint. 

Though liberty of action implies freedom from both 
external restraint and constraint, yet such action is not 
free from the control of the man himself. The person, 
by the power of his will, puts forth the volition, and 
the volition, in the absence of external hinderance, neces- 
sitates the action. By liberty of action, we are, there- 
fore, to understand the liberty of the person to act. 
The action, as such, abstractly considered, is not free 
from constraint, for it is caused by the volition; but it 
is free from restraint. It has the same kind of freedom 
that a stone has when thrown into the air. The stone 



FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 471 

is free to fall, that is, it is not hindered from falling; 
but it is not free from falling; for it is constrained to 
fall by the force of gravity. In like manner, though an 
action may be free from restraint, it is not free from in- 
ternal constraint, since it is determined by the volition; 
yet free action, so far as man is concerned, is freedom 
both from external restraint and from external constraint. 
2. Volitions are free from restraint, but not from 
constraint. — To suppose them not free from restraint is 
to suppose that volitions actually^ put forth have been 
prevented from being put forth, which is absurd, since 
whatever is, has not been prevented from being. But 
volitions are not free from constraint. As events, they 
come under the law of causality, which may be stated. 
All events have causes. That volitions have causes, that 
is, that they are caused or necessitated, can be jDroved 
sj^llogistically, thus: 

• All events have causes. 

Human volitions are events. 
.-. Human volitions have causes. 

Every volition is, therefore, caused or necessitated; 
but, as we shall presently see, the volition is caused, not 
by the motive, but by the will itself. 

When it is said that volition is not free from con- 
straint, it is not to be understood that the volition pre- 
viously existed, and that it is forced, in opposition 
to its resistance, to be what it otherwise would not 
be, for the volition has no previous existence to be 
acted upon ; but it is to be understood, in saying that 
the will constrains the volition, that the will brings the 
volition into being, that is, causes it to be, and to be as 
it is. 

In like manner, when it is claimed, though incor- 



472 PSYCHOLOGY, 

rectly, that motives constrain or compel volition ^ it is 
not to be understood that the motives constrain or com- 
pel a volition already existing to change, or to be what 
it otherwise would not be, but that motives, acting upon 
the will, not as a volition, but as a faculty, compel it 
to assume a certain state, condition, or attitude, called 
volition, thus bringing the volition into being, and 
causing it to be what it is. If this be so, the will is 
not an active power, but a passive susceptibility, and 
choice is a j)assive determination of the will, and not its 
free action. 

3. Is the will free? — The will is the cause of volitions; 
but, because volitions are caused, it does not follow that 
the will, which is the cause of volitions, is caused to 
cause them. The question is not. Are volitions free? 
but. Is the will free? In what sense is the will not 
frcQ? In what sense is the will free? 

The will is not free in the sense that it is, in general, 
exempt from the influence of motives. But what is the 
nature of this influence? Are motives causes compelling 
the will to choose as it does, or are they reasons for 
the choice? The question is not, Is the will free from 
the solicitation of motives, but, Is it free from compulsion 
and from prevention? But prevention from a certain 
decision is compulsion not to make the decision, that 
is, compulsion to the contradictory decision or to some 
contrary decision. 

Motives are indeed causes; but causes of w^hat? What 
are their eflects? They are causes in the sense that they 
awaken thought, afl'ect the sensibility, and influence the 
will. But what is the nature of this influence? Do 
motives compel, or do they solicit the will? Do the 
motives cause the volitions, or does the will cause the 
volitions in view of motives? If the motives cause the 
volitions, then the will is passive in volition, and the 



FBEEDOM OF THE WILL, 473 

volitions are phenomena caused in a passive susce2:)tibil- 
ity, called the will, by the action of forces called motives, 
thus bringing the phenomena of the will within the 
province of Mechanics. Eat is the will a j)assive sus- 
ceptibility, and not an active power? Can the phenom- 
ena of volition be brought within the province of Me- 
chanics? 

That the phenomena of volition are not included within 
the province of Mechanics is demonstrably certain ; for, 
if so, the volition would, in a given case, be the result- 
ant of the action, at the time, of all the forces called 
motives. Thus, a person standing at one corner of a 
square, and solicited by two friends, one at each of the 
adjacent corners, the motives for going to the two being 
equal, would go in the diagonal of the square, passing 
the other diagonal by his momentum, till drawn back 
by the motives, and after a few vibrations, Avould finally 
come to a stand at the middle point of that diagonal. 
But this would not be the case. If it be said that the 
motives are never equal, the reply is, that so long as 
either is not zero, the volition, if caused by the motives, 
woctid be the resultant of the action of the motives. 
But the fact is, that in choosing one alternative, the 
motive soliciting the choice of the other, though not 
without influence in inducing deliberation, is without 
volitional effect. Hence, motives are not causes of which 
volitions are effects. The will, therefore, though not 
in general, free from the solicitation of motives, is free 
from necessitated determination by motives. 

The will is not passive in volition; for, if so, it 
would not itself make the decision, but being quiescent, 
save as it is passively affected, the volitions would be 
the necessitated movements of the will, analogous to 
those of a foot-ball as it is kicked about by contending 
parties. The same results would follow, so long as the 

Psy.-40. 



474 PSYCHOLOGY, 

will is regarded as passive, whether the motives are 
impulses, attractive forces, allurements, or enticements, 
acting through the appetites, affections, desires, or aver- 
sions. The motives would be causes determining the 
volitions as effects. This would make a volition the re- 
sultant of motives, which as we have shown above, is 
not the case. 

The will is free to suspend choice, that there miay be 
opportunity for further reflection. 

The will is active in volition ; it makes the decision. 
We are conscious of the exertion of the power of the 
will in making the choice. The motive does not choose; 
but the will chooses. The will is not a passive instru- 
ment swayed by motives, as the weights sway the bal- 
ance; but it is the power which a reasonable soul has 
to decide in view of motives as reasons. The will as 
free may refrain from putting forth volitions which it 
has full power to put forth; hence, the absence of a vo- 
lition does not imply the absence of the power to bring 
it into being. 

As motives do not constrain or necessitate the decis- 
ion of the will, so neither do they restrain or prevent 
the decision; for then they would necessitate the con- 
tradictory or some contrary decision. The will is equally 
free from constraint and from restraint. The freedom 
from restraint is freedom to choose a given alternative. 
The freedom from constraint is freedom to choose any 
other possible alternative. But why does the will choose 
one alternative rather than another? The choice of any 
alternative is accounted for by the fact that the will has 
alternative power. An effect is explained by a cause 
capable of producing it. 

In the order of time, the choice follows the consider- 
ation of the motives, and the execution follows the 
choice. 



FBEEDOM OF THE WILL, 475 

4. Does the will ever act without motive P — In case 
of contradictory alternatives, the decision must, in some 
way, be made in favor of one or the other, since, in this 
case but two alternatives are possible. Let the motives 
to choose these alternatives be equal, and let the will itself 
make the decision. Then the will decides, virtually, in 
the absence of motives; for, since, by hypothesis, the al- 
ternatives are contradictories, to choose either is not to 
choose the other, and the motive to choose either is an 
equal motive not to choose the other, and since the pos- 
itive motives for choosing the alternatives are equal, 
and these are equal motives for not choosing the other, 
the motives for choosing either reduce to zero, or there 
is no choice; but, since a decision is made, it is made 
virtually without motives. 

To make this still clearer, let the contradictory al- 
ternatives, the fact of deciding in favor of one or the 
other, and the equal motives remain, and let the motives 
diminish equally till each becomes zero, then there is 
decision absolutely without motive, proving that, in this 
case, the will is free. 

Let the motives still diminish equally. They will 
become negative, but will continue equal. Each motive 
becomes a motive for choosing the other alternative, -and 
cancels the motive for not choosing that alternative, and 
again, we would have decision virtually without motive. 

In these cases, there is volition, if not choice, without 
motive. 

5. Condensed statement of phenomena. — The com- 
plex phenomena connected vfith the will are, therefore, 
the following: Alternatives, any one of which is a pos- 
sible object of^ choice or volition ; in general, motives 
soliciting the will to choose one or more of the alterna- 
tives; deliberation or consideration of the motives in 
favor of the different alternatives; freedom of the will 



476 PSYCHOL OOY. 

from compulsion and from prevention ; the decision, that 
is, the volition or choice of one alternative; the execu- 
tion of the volition, that is, the external action which 
secures or accomplishes the alternative chosen. 

6. The decisions of the will not necessarily unrea- 
sonable. — Though the will is free, the soul is rational; 
hence, the decisions of the will are not necessarily arbi- 
trary or irrational. These decisions ought to be, and 
may be, in the highest degree, both intellectually reasona- 
ble and morally right. When truth and right are in- 
volved, the will is under moral obligation to decide in 
accordance with the light of reason and of conscience. 
Though the decisions of the will are not necessarily ir- 
rational, yet they may be so, and often are so, as a 
matter of fact. The will has the fearful power to decide 
to act contrary to the dictates of truth and righteous- 
ness, and this power it often exerts; but, for the exer- 
tion of this power, it is responsible. 

7. Meaning of the words obligation and responsibil- 
ity. — The words, obligation and responsibility or responsi- 
ble^ are of frequent occurrence in discussions pertaining 
to the moral aspects of the will, and hence their mean- 
ing should be clearly understood and discriminated. 

When it is said a person is under obligation to do or 
not to do a certain thing, the meaning is, he ought or 
ought not to do that thing. 

When it is said a person is responsible for his actions, 
the meaning is, that he is justly accountable, or deserves 
reward or punishment, according as the actions are good 
or bad, and that he must meet the consequences. 



CHAPTEE III. 



MORAL RESPONSIBILITY. 



1. Freedom is an essential condition of responsibil- 
ity. — If the will is necessitated by motives to choose 
a given alternative, that is, if the choice is unavoida- 
ble, the person choosing is not morally responsible. He 
neither merits praise for a right choice, nor deserves 
blame for a wrong choice. Indeed, the choice can, on 
this supposition, be properly called right or wrongs only 
by a comj)arison of the choice with an external stand- 
ard, and not in the sense that the man is commendable 
or censurable for his choice, since he chooses as he does, 
because he can not do otherwise. How could it be mor- 
ally wrong for an individual to choose what he can not 
help choosing? How could he be guilty for such a 
choice? Since the choice determines the action, how 
could he be responsible for the action? If a man suf- 
fers his will to be enslaved by passion, he is responsi- 
ble for this enslavement and its consequences; but this 
enslavement is, in general, not absolute. 

If the will is not free, it would always be unjust to 
the individual to punish him for crime. It could be 
justified only on the ground that such punishment is a 
motive deterring others from similar crimes. But even 
this motive does not always deter from crime. Notwith- 
standing the punishment, crime is still committed. The 
offender, must, therefore, be impelled by a stronger mo- 
tive, and can not avoid the crime; hence, to him, pun- 
ishment would be an act of injustice. 

(477) 



478 PSYCHOLOGY. 

2. There is no exception to the principle that freedom 
is an essential condition of responsibility. — If a debtor 
should willfully squander his resources^ and thus deprive 
himself of the power to discharge his obligations, he is 
not, therefore, released from moral responsibility. He 
had the power to meet his obligations, and for the 
proper use of this power he is responsible. In will- 
fully squandering his resources, he has incurred guilt; 
and for this guilt, he may justly be branded as dishon- 
est by honorable men. 

If it be asked, Is he now under obligation to pay his 
debts, and can he justly be branded for not doing it? 
the answer is: Though the legal obligation is still in 
force, unless he has availed himself of the provisions of 
a bankrupt law, he is not under moral obligation to do 
what he can not do, and he (^ught not to be held re- 
sponsible for not doing an impossibility; but. when he 
had power to pay his debts, he was under moral obli- 
gation to pay them. He is now held responsible for 
failing to do what he had the power to do, and what 
he was under obligation to do. If the ability to pay 
the debt should return, the moral obligation to pay it 
would revive. Present obligation implies present power. 

A man may indeed now be guilty for a past crime 
which he can not now avoid, since it is done and can 
not be recalled, though he may repent of it; but the 
guilt was incurred when the crime was commited, when 
he had power to avoid it. 

He is not now guilty for not undoing what he can 
not now undo; but he is guilty for having done what, 
at the time, he had power to avoid. 

3. Freedom of the will is freedom to choose any- 
one of the possible alternatives. — The question is some- 
times asked, Can the will choose differently from what 
it does choose? It is possible to become mystified by 



MORAL RESPONSIBILITY. 479 

such a question. It is, of course, im^^ossible for the will 
to choose a given alternative, and, at the same time, not 
to choose it, but to choose a different alternative. The 
true question is, Can the will choose a different alterna- 
tive from any designated one of the possible alternatives? 
The answer is. It can. Let A name any one of sev- 
eral possible alternatives, then B can always choose 
another. 

It is sometimes said that we are conscious of the 
power to choose differently from the choice actually made, 
but this is not correct, since we are not conscious of 
powers, but of phenomena. We know powers by the 
rational intuition of their conditional necessity as the log- 
ical antecedents, or necessary conditions, of phenomena; 
but in case of the power of contrary choice there is no 
phenomenon implying such a 2)C)wer, since there is no 
choice contrary to actual choice. 

If there is in the human mind a consciousness of the 
power to choose contrary to the actual choice, this fact of 
consciousness would settle the question, and controversy 
would be at an end. The fact that the existence of such 
power of choice is called in question by a large class of 
thinkers, is proof that there is no consciousness of such 
a power, for a datum of consciousness always compels 
recognition. 

There is, however, in every unsoj)histicated mind a 
belief or conviction that there is power of contrary 
choice, and of this belief or conviction such a mind is 
conscious. Before choice, there is a conviction that 
there is power to choose any one of the possible alterna- 
tives; and, after choice, that any other one of the possi- 
ble alternatives might have been chosen instead of the 
one actually chosen; but a conviction that there is a 
certain power is not a consciousness of that power. 

That the will can choose any one of the possible al- 



480 PSYCHOLOGY. 

ternatives, follows from the fact that the volition is not 
a resultant of motives, but is an act of the will. 

Since the volition is an act of the will and not a re- 
sultant, it is free both from the constraint and the re- 
straint of motives. Freedom from constraint is freedom 
from the necessity of choosing any given alternative; 
and freedom from restraint is freedom to choose any 
possible alternative. Freedom, both from constraint and 
from restraint, that is, the freedom of the will both 
from compulsion and from prevention, is the indispen- 
sable condition of responsibility. 

4. The voice of conscience is decisive as evidence in 
favor of liberty.^ — But what does the conscience of the 
criminal say? It declares him guilty and deserving of 
punishment. The criminal arraigned before the bar of 
his own conscience, confesses his crime, admits his guilt, 
and acknowledges the justness of his punishment. 

If he believed that his choice was necessitated, his 
conscience would acquit him of guilt, not that he did 
not do the deed, or that he did not will to do it. but 
that he could not help doing it, since he could not help 
willing to do it. But his conscience does not acquit him 
of blame. In his inmost soul, he believes that he is 
guilty. He could not be guilty, iii the sense of being 
to blame, unless his will was free in the act of volition. 
He could not believe himself to be guilty, unless he be- 
lieved himself to be free; but he does believe himself to 
be guilty; therefore he believes himself to be free. The 
voice of conscience is not the voice of a sophist, but it 
is the voice of nature, yea, the voice of God declaring 
in tones not to be misunderstood, that the transgressor 
is not passive, but active in his crimes. 

Conscience, in approving the right and condemning 
the wrong, postulates the freedom of the will. If, there- 
fore, the will is not W^a^ the action of conscience, tht) 



MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, 481 

noblest of our moral powers, is based on a false postu- 
late, and the very constitution of our nature is self- 
contradictory. 

It would, of course, be reasoning in a circle, to assume 
responsibility, and deduce freedom from this assumption, 
and then from freedom deduce responsibility, or the re- 
verse. The fact is, either responsibility or freedom can 
be established on evidence independent of the other; and, 
when established, the other may be inferred as a logi- 
cal antecedent or a logical consequent. 

The phenomenon of conscience is a proof of responsi- 
bility; but responsibility implies freedom as its neces- 
sary condition, or logical antecedent. 

The fact that a volition is not a resultant of motives 
is a proof of the freedom of the will ; but this freedom 
involves responsibility as its logical consequent. 

6. Ground of responsibility. — The ground of respon- 
sibility is moral obligation to do right and to avoid 
wrong. Freedom of the will is the condition of moral 
obligation, and hence of responsibility. Man is respon- 
sible for the use he makes of his freedom of will and 
liberty of action. 

Though the freedom of the will is the condition of 
obligation, it is evidently not the ground. The fact that 
a man is free to do a certain thing, is no reason why 
he should do it. Not only is there liberty to perform 
one action and to avoid another, but there is reason 
why the one should be performed and the other avoided. 
But why should a person do one thing and avoid another? 
What is the ground of obligation? 

Every man knows that happiness is an object of de- 
sire, and that misery is an object of aversion; that in 
all lawful ways, he has the right to seek to gain the 
one and to avoid the other; and that, so long as he 
does not forfeit his liberty by crime, or encroach on 

Psy.-41. 



482 PSYCHOL O G Y, 

the rights of others, he has the right to enjoy, with- 
out hinderance, the fruit of his labor. The rights which 
one claims for himself, he is under obligation to concede 
to others, since they have the same right to claim for 
themselves what he demands for himself 

JS^ot transient pleasure, frivolous or unsatisfying, but 
happiness, substantial and abiding, is the birthright of 
man, and this he may enjoy by obedience to the laws 
of his being, which are the laws of God, unless, like 
Esau, he sells his birthright for a mess of pottage. 

To attain to happiness, man must have the opportu- 
nities of education in the development of his powers, 
physical, intellectual, and moral. He must have the 
right of pro^Derty, or the enjoyment of the fruit of his 
own labor. He must be protected in person and prop- 
erty. To secure these blessings, they must be mutual 
and universal, limited only by the requirements pertain- 
ing to the general good. 

Since others have no right to encroach upon our 
rights, we have no right to encroach upon theirs. Since 
our happiness is promoted, not only by our own efforts, 
but by the good- will, and, in certain cases, by the aid 
of others, and since this good-will and aid we gladly 
accept, they, in like manner, are entitled to our good- 
will and aid, so far as that aid can be reasonably af- 
forded. Mutual benevolence is, therefore, the fundamen- 
tal moral obligation between man and man, and is of 
universal application. Therefore, ^^All things whatsoever 
ye icould that men should do to you, do ye even so to them.'' 
This is the law of righteousness. 

Man has no right to squander the powers which God 
has given him, but he is under obligation to develop 
these, in order to promote his own happiness and that 
of others. To promote his own happiness, it is neces- 
sary that he guard his life, liberty, and reputation, pre- 



MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, 483 

serve his health, protect his property, and promote his 
physical, intellectual, and moral perfection. The prepa- 
ration which enables him to advance his own interests, 
best qualifies him to promote the welfare of others. 

The family relations of husband and wife, parents and 
children, brothers and sisters, involve peculiar and sacred 
obligations. 

Special duties are implied in the relations of teacher 
and pupil, pastor and people, employer and employee. 

Man is also under certain obligations to society, to 
his government, and to the world at large. 

Our obligations to God are based upon the relations 
which we sustain to Him as our Creator and Benefac- 
tor. In this case, the inequality of the parties modifies 
the statement of the law of benevolence. It would not 
do to say. Whatsoever we would that God should do for 
us, we should do for him; for we desire His help and 
protection, and many other favors which we are una- 
ble to render Him. But certain things are due to God 
from man. We should show repentance towards God 
for past sins by confessing and forsaking them. We 
should have faith in His mercy and constant goodness. 
We should exhibit reverence for God in view of His 
power, wisdom, and holiness. Above all, we should ren- 
der obedience to His righteous laws. 

The science of Ethics may, however, be well under- 
stood by those who refuse to reduce its principles to prac- 
tice. Virtue is not identical with knowledge, as Socrates 
taught, since man does not always do what seems to him 
to be morally right. The will does not always choose the 
greatest apparent good. A man may know that virtue 
is the highest good, and that it will bring the greatest 
reward; and yet, with this knowledge before his mind, 
and w4th his eyes open to the consequences of evil, 
he may follow the lead of his appetites and passions, 



484 PSYCHOLOGY. 

and pursue the path of sin and death. Justly may lie 
apply to himself the language of the poet, 

*^ Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor." 

His will, in yielding to the solicitations of appetite 
and desire, refuses to obey the voice of reason and con- 
science. His moral nature is disordered, and he is 
brought into captivity to the law of sin and death ; yet 
he is free to seek what he so much needs — the regener- 
ating energy of the Spirit of the living God. 



4^^'7 



^3 



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: Oct. 2004 

PreservationTechnologies 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 

1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 16066 
(724)779-2111 



